Paul Quinones PS 472 Professor Tanter Fall 1996 NORTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES Recently, due to dramatic events involving North Korea, policy makers and analysts alike have been debating how the United States should act towards the roguish North Korea. The stakes for both North Korea and the United States are high. Strategic interests such regional security and international prestige are on the line. The possibilities of all-out war, economic collapse, and other frightening scenarios are all possible outcomes to this situation. In light of the precarious situation, how should the United States interact with North Korea? The critical question that this paper will address is has recent American policy towards North Korea been a failure because the United States has had trouble gaining North Korean compliance with the 1994 Agreed Framework and because recent North Korean actions have heightened threats towards American interests and those actions have not been met with considerable American resolve. In order to adequately address those issues, a theoretical orientation which will discuss certain key terms relevant to the critical questions will be included. Also included will be a historical background that will provide an insight into how the how the current situation between the two nations has evolved. It will address what have been the goals of each country, what actions have they taken, and why they have taken them. Finally, a conclusion is included stating what recent events have meant for the two countries and what American diplomatic measures should be taken to try to resolve the situation. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION To lay a foundation for analysis, some of the important terms that will be used should be explained. These include rationality, search, persuasion, strategy, deterrence, coercion, unitary actor, strategic and intrinsic interests, and brinkmanship. Rationality is based on if an actor chooses to make the most efficient choice or not.1 Rationality and rational-choice theory assumes that a rational actor will choose the course of action that will bring the highest expected value. The highest expected value is characterized as the value with the highest benefits or the lowest costs. In contrast, an irrational actor, is unpredictable. The irrational actor disregards the efficiency of the decision-making consequences. Actor rationality can theoretically be measured on what is deemed the "rheostat of rationality." The rheostat is a scale of rationality with the opposite ends being, of course, rationality and irrationality. An actor's decision as well as an aggregate of the actor's decisions can be assessed and put somewhere on the rheostat. In the context of the American-North Korean discussion, rationality will be important when trying to determine if recent North Korean actions infer that the North Korean leadership is irrational. Another aspect of rationality that should be noted is the concept of bounder rationality. Bounded rationality is the theory that actors are constrained due to information costs, as to the amount of intelligence that they have to analyze a situation. Bounded rationality becomes very apparent as to the difficult challenge that American diplomacy has had in determining the motives and intentions of recent North Korean actions. This is because of the closed-nature of the North Korean government creates a significant degree of uncertainty. Determining the rationality of an actor is important because deterring a rational opponent is easier than deterring an irrational one.2 This is because what a rational actor values can be determined and a deterrence policy can use that information to implement a policy that will affect those values, thus forcing the opponent to react. The values of an irrational actor hare incredibly difficult to determine and thus it is hard to figure out what course of action would make it probable to gain deterrence. Search is the process of discovering what options an opponent finds unacceptable.3 An analogy that describes search is that of a used car salesman. A used car salesman asks and throws out options. He eventually finds out information about the buyer, including what options the buyer does not prefer. As a result, the salesman can try to use the information to his advantage by disregarding the less preferred options and instead concentrating on the values that the buyer prefers. Search is relevant here because it was and is used in negotiations between North Korea and the United States to find out what issues and policies each side finds satisfactory and unsatisfactory. Persuasion is the next key term. It is the process of convincing someone to take an action without forcing them to do it.4 This is facilitated by making that person aware of a cost or benefit that person what previously unaware of and by convincing that person that you have no control over the outcome. Strategy involves offering rewards or punishments and having complete control over rewards or punishments.5 It can be divided into deterrence and coercion. Deterrence is an action taken to force a party to maintain a certain behavior of to prevent them from changing their behavior.6 Deterrence is divided into assurance and deterrence. Assurance is the use of rewards or "carrots." Assurance is a form of positive reinforcement. Deterrence is the use of punishments or "sticks." The sticks are threats of punishment made to prevent unacceptable behavior. Coercion is utilized when one wants an actor to take an action to change behavior or to undo the consequences of an action already taken.7 Like deterrence, coercion can also be divided into two types. Compellence is punishment just short of brute force. The other form of coercion is induction. Induction is the use of brute force to change an opponent's behavior.8 A unitary actor describes the extent to which a decision maker is independent. The more independent the actor is, the more unitary he or she is. Strategic and intrinsic interests are also important concepts.9 Intrinsic interests are intangible interests. Examples of intrinsic interests include natural resources and American citizens. Strategic interests are tangible interests. Strategic interests can include resolve, credibility, and regional security. Strategic and intrinsic interests explain why the United States takes North Korean actions so serious. Intrinsically, American soldiers and other citizens are stationed across from North Korean forces across fro the DMZ. Strategically, North Korean nuclearization and it s ballistic missile program pose threats to the Asian security and American resolve over breaches of South Korean security and compliance to non-proliferation accords. Finally, brinkmanship is defined by Lebow as "a confrontation in which one state knowingly challenges an important commitment of another with the expectation that its adversary will back down when challenged."10 It is a test of resolve initiated by one actor to see how far it can push the other actor or how much it can extract from that actor, before the actor retaliates or steps up to the challenge. Brinkmanship may explain several instances of North Korean actions that may have been intended to otherwise taunt the United States and to challenge the American resolve. These include North Korean excursions near and across the DMZ, the incident of the North Korean spy submarine coming ashore in South Korea, and other cases. LOGICAL STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE ACROSS TIME AND SPACE The North Korean Perspective and American Implications To begin, North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in December 1985 under the notion that there would be negotiations with the IAEA to discuss enforcement norms such as inspections.11 From 1989-1991, there were reports that North Korea had reprocessed plutonium from its reactor at Yongbyon.12 Consequently, in April 1991, the South Korean Defense Minister threatened a commando attack on Yongbyon to prevent the continued construction of another reactor there.13 Incidentally, it should be pointed out that the South Korean Defense Minister's statement is an example of the limits of the United States as a unitary actor in this conflict. While it is necessary for the United States to vocalize its interests and goals, it must do so discretely. The United States must allow a certain level of space between itself and the South Korean government. Despite aid given to South Korea and the 30,000 US troops stationed in the Republic of Korea, the US must take into consideration South Korean interests. The United States must allow South Korea to appear as an independent nation so as to not threaten the legitimacy of the South Korean government. The need for US. moderatism in light of South Korean autonomy was confirmed by Mazarr: ...the Korean case also points to a danger on alliance relationships: if the United States insists on its own approach, it can create resentment and provide ammunition to nationalists in allied countries looking for examples of US. hegemonism...A politically helpful decrease of the US. military profile in South Korea symbolized and given substance by WashingtonÕs shift from a ÒleadingÓ to a ÓsupportingÓ role on the peninsula has been interrupted to some extent by US. assertiveness ` on the nuclear issue. South Korean nationalists in the legislature, in think-tanks and universities have attacked what they perceive as US. domineering.14 The United States also had to take into consideration the impact of its North Korean policy on other nations such as China. Chinese officials urged a softer approach will North Korea. Some American officials said that the Korean situation should be a test of US- Chinese relations to see how strong they really were. Washington decided not to test the relationship and softened its stance to appease the Chinese. Had Washington not eased up on North Korea, Mazaar concludes: ÒThe United States might have sacrificed its relationship with the worldÕs most important merging power because of a dispute over tactics.Ó15 Another issue that came up was that the North Koreans delayed signing the IAEA safeguards agreement until the US agreed to pull out all of its nuclear weapons from South Korea. The United States complied with this request in latter 1991.16 On December 31, 1991 both Koreas signed the "Joint Declaration on the Denucleariztion of the Korean Peninsula." The Koreas pledged: not to (1) test, produce, receive, possess, deploy or use nuclear weapons or (2) possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. The parties also agreed to allow mutual inspections subject to procedures to be negotiated with them.17 The next month, North Korea signed the safeguard agreements allowing for inspections. Over the next two years, however, North Korea and the IAEA had various disputes. North Korea refused inspections to certain sites and IAEA concluded that North Korea had not been reporting its nuclear capabilities correctly . The situation became grave on March 12, 1993, when North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the NPT.18 Negotiation continued between the IAEA, the United Nations, the United States, and North Korea. In May 1993, The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 825 (1993) which urged North Korea not to withdraw from the NPT and to honor its agreement to meet IAEA inspection requirements.19 Over the next year, continued complaints from the IAEA that North Korea was obstructing the inspection process brought about stern threats from the United States and even deployment of soldiers and equipment. Even after the May 3, announcement from President Clinton, deemed the offer of a Òhand of friendship,Ó which gave the North Korean government an option of stopping its nuclear weapons program in exchange for economic aid and normalization of diplomatic relations, and after the June 1994 threat of global sanctions, the North continued to stall. Eventually, the North did negotiated in August 194 and signed the ÒAgreed StatementÓ which declared: (1) a freeze on North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for light-water reactors and interim energy supplies and (2) movement toward the full normalization of political and economic relations. 20 What are the motives for North Korean nuclear weapons development? North Korea has pursued nuclear weapon development so that it can coerce other countries through compellence to give it what it wants. As Moon Young Park notes: It [nuclear capability] elevates the North to the status of a sort of superpower -- enabling it to play games with the big powers , reap the attention and respect it wants, and negotiate for what it needs...North Korea will continue to take advantage of the psychological pressure that nuclear weapons generate...21 Brian Bridges noted the success that North Korea has had by playing the Ònuclear card.Ó Because of the threat of nuclear weapons, North Korea has: repeatedly balked at implementing the agreement --demanding additional aid, refusing at first to accept light-water reactors built by South Korea, obstructing regular international inspections and threatening to resume its nuclear program -- all in hopes of extracting new US concessions or disrupting the US-Japanese- South Korean alliance.22 The nuclear threat has become the most pressing issue for the American diplomacy and North Korea. In a recent press briefing, the State Department noted that keeping North KoreaÕs nuclear program frozen is the Òvital national security interest in North Korea.Ó23 Additionally, North KoreaÕs ballistic missile proliferation and deployment threat has also caused anxiety for American strategists. State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns elaborated in October of this year that the United States has had a concern with the North Korean missile threat for sometime now. He noted that the missile threat creates tension on the Korean peninsula as well as contributes to Òinstability in other parts of the world....Ó24 What are the ramifications of the North Korean threat? The United States takes the North Korean threat seriously for two reasons: because the threat endangers United States strategic and intrinsic interests. Through search and strategy, the North Koreans know what the United States values and can thus exploit them. The United States must take the North Korean threat seriously. North Korea threatens United States strategic interests. Major Maxwell of the United States Special Forces commented that Òthe overriding strategic interest for the US is economic growth through access to the region.Ó25 The Asian region is key to the United States economy and problems with North Korea pose a serious threat to stability in the Pacific. Secretary of Defense Perry noted the extreme importance of Asia to the United States: ...more than 50% of US trade is with Asia, and that trade has helped generate 3 million jobs...For all intents and purposes, our economy has become interdependent with East Asia. Thus our vital interests will dictate that we will be increasing rather than decreasing our connection with East Asia.26 Furthermore, the US National Security Strategy specifically noted that the Korean situation was the single-most important threat to Asian stability, and thus to the American economy and American security.27 The intrinsic interest of American troops stationed in South Korea and neighboring Asian countries is also of concern. In March 1996, Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord declared that the ÒKorean Peninsula is rightly considered the most serious risk of full- scale armed conflict involving US troops.Ó28 What factors have formed North Korean perspective? In assessing the North Korean threat, it is useful to try to determine why North Korea has been acting the way it has. Unfortunately, North Korea is a unique case in that it is not transparent, itÕs rationality is questionable, and is in the middle of a tenuous and risky period in its history. One of the biggest problems for American analysts and policy makers in determining US policy towards North Korea is that intelligence-gathering on North Korea is difficult. Spokesperson Burns of the Department of State noted that communication and information-gathering efforts on North Korea have difficulties because those efforts are Òdealing with a country that is not an open and transparent country.Ó29 Deciphering what North Korea is doing and why becomes all the more difficult because of North KoreaÕs closedness. North Korea closed-naturedness stems from a longtime tradition of chuchÕe. Former President Kim defined chuchÕe as: Òthe independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and using oneÕs own powers, believing in oneÕs own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.Ó30 This ideology meant a self-sufficient economy (centrally planned), and independent foreign policy and an independent defense. Years of the chuchÕe philosophy has taken its toll on the North Korean populous. The chuchÕe philosophy coupled with an economy disproportionately geared towards military spending and not agricultural development, loss of aid-sources from China and the Soviet Union, and severe flooding and famines have created instability in North Korea.31 General Luck testified this year that: It is possible that the citizens of the North may no longer be satisfied by the so-called ÒjucheÓ philosophy developed by Kim Il Sung. The result of this famine may lead to food riots, causing further crackdowns by internal security forces and the military, and thus begin the vicious cycle leading to further destabilization. 32 The deteriorating conditions have caused several high-level defections and increasing political factionalism which compound the sensitive nature of the North KoreaÕs internal situation.33 The food crisis has become so bad that the North Korean government defied its chuchÕe tradition and in the fall of 1995, Òrequested international assistance for the first time in its history.Ó34 In the midst of the North Korean turmoil has come questions about the rationality of the North Korean leadership. Senator Craig Thomas commented that the North Korean situation as Òbecoming increasingly isolated, paranoid, and violent, If any country has come to epitomize a rogue regime, it is North Korea.Ó35 Recent troop movements, the running aground on South Korean soil of a North Korean spy submarine, missile testing in the Pacific, and threatening the South while asking the US for help has puzzled many experts. Maxwell questions the NorthÕs rationality: ...continuing to make conventional and military threats against the South while at the same time trying to court US favor do not seem to be stemming from a coherent foreign policy and...again begs the question as to who is in charge and is the North a rational actor?36 Jim Coles III, the civilian spokesperson for US forces in South Korea added: ÒThe one thing that we canÕt do is get inside their heads and know what theyÕre going to do ahead of time. They work pretty hard at being unpredictable.Ó37 One theory for explaining North KoreaÕs recent unusual behavior was proposed by Dr. Park Young-kyu at South KoreaÕs Research Institute for National Unification. ParkÕs theory is that the Northern leadership is trying to divert attentions from its domestic problems by engaging in highly-visible military maneuvering.38 Another explanation for the NorthÕs strange behavior may be that the leadership is trying to establish resolve in the wake of its many problems by engaging in brinkmanship. The motivation for doing so would be to make sure that the United States and other countries continue to take the North seriously instead of watching it weaken and collapse. In class pretending to be irrational was one of the ways to establish resolve: Techniques for establishing credibility and commitment to a no-retreat position include relinquishing options, burning bridges, feigning anger, severing communication links, pretending irrationality, faking drunkenness, loss of control over militant factions of an organization, throwing steering out of car windows, backing into a corner.39 CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY To the extent that the North has been successful in acquiring all of the goals it has wanted, United States policy to a certain extent has failed. North Korea has gained time to develop is nuclear program (which it may still be continuing underground despite signing the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It has gained free light water nuclear reactors and free fuel in exchange for signing the 1994 Agreed Framework.40 Despite embarrassing Washington because Washington didnÕt follow through on its threats, thus hurting American credibility41, Washington agreed to send more than $2 million in food aid to North Korea thus reducing to a certain degree domestic suffering. In terms of rationality, two topics have been proven. The first is that either being irrational or pretending to be irrational does establish oneÕs credibility in the eyes of an opponent. An actor must take seriously the threats of an irrational or irrational-appearing actor who threatens what the initial actor values, in this case, strategic and intrinsic interests. Another aspect of rationality that has been confirmed is that it is hard coerce an irrational actor. Because it is difficult to determine what an irrational actor values, coupled with the information cost constraints of bounded rationality which limits the accuracy of your assessment even more, compelling or inducing an irrational actor is almost impossible. A major policy recommendation should be to either follow up on threats or not make them at all. Mazarr concludes that ClintonÕs harsh words and subsequent capitulations to try to get the North to comply, severely hurt the United StatesÕ threat credibility with the North.42 The North Koreans have proven the United StatesÕ policy to be a failure.