Steven Pack 5 December 1996 Political Science 472 Professor Raymond Tanter The Persian Gulf War of 1991 was a turning point in international relations. While the conflict was a victory in the realms of multinational cooperation and American military superiority, it was ultimately a policy failure on the part of the United States Government. We must assume by US reaction to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait that the Administration would have preferred maintaining the status quo to forcibly reinstating it. By analyzing the events leading up to the invasion we should be able to better understand why the United States failed to deter Iraq from attacking and annexing Kuwait. There are basically three levels at which a state can attempt to press its will on other actors. These are maintaining current behavior through deterrence, changing behavior through coercion, and physically forcing another actor to behave in a certain way through military domination. The crisis in the Persian Gulf went through all three of these stages. The period leading up to Iraqi aggression was the time to reinforce the status quo, but for various reasons it was not done effectively. The ensuing troop build up was an attempt to coerce Saddam Hussein into withdrawing his troops from Kuwait without engaging him militarily. Finally, because coercion failed, the coalition resorted to the actual use of force in Operation Desert Storm. The period we are primarily concerned with here, however, is the one prior to Iraqi aggression. There are two options available for maintaining the status quo and the appropriate option depends on the motivations of the potential aggressor. If a potential aggressor is acting out of a 'basement of fear' and feels threatened, the most appropriate policy is to reassure them. In these instances an actor often is prepared to strike preemptively because of a perceived threat or is willing to take action as a way of dealing with other pressures. It thus becomes necessary to address these fears and put them to rest. The second possibility is that an actor may see a 'window of opportunity' and is simply behaving opportunistically. If this is the case it is necessary to deter them from action. This is often accomplished by making it clear that the costs of such an action will outweigh any perceived benefits. Finally, there can be a combination of both of these strategies if an actor is responding to both fears and opportunities. In this case it is necessary to address these fears and concerns while making it clear that certain behaviors are unacceptable (Stein, 135). Furthermore, if an actor is motivated by fear of loss, he/she will be more accepting of risks. However, if an actor is motivated by gain they are more likely to avoid risk. This is because we tend to value losses more than gains. A loss of 1000 dollars would be weighed more heavily than a similar gain of 1000 dollars. For this reason an actor will risk more to maintain the status quo than they would to alter it. There are two forms of deterrence: deterrence by threat, and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by threat simply involves raising the perceived costs of an action, thereby making it uninviting. Deterrence by denial involves limiting the ability of a potential aggressor to take a particular action. This can range from blocking transfers of military equipment to militarily destroying a state's ability to threaten its neighbors. In this context the destruction of Iraq's military could be seen as a form of deterrence by denial. Finally, there is the question of whether the Gulf War was a case of deterrence or reassurance policy failure, or a case of failure to have a deterrence or reassurance policy at all. Were there attempts in either direction or did the Gulf war arise from neglect? As stated above, before determining what would have been an appropriate strategy in the pre-War Gulf, it is necessary to investigate Saddam Hussein's perspective and motivations. To what degree was he a rational actor, appropriately weighing different options and the costs and benefits of each? How much were his calculations skewed by current wants and past experience? History is inevitably an incomplete and selective process. However it necessary to look at the events leading up to the 1991 Gulf War in order to fully appreciate the complexity of the situation. This includes not only the events immediately prior to the conflict but the events of past decades and even centuries. Of course, it is not only the actual events but the way that these events were interpreted by the actors. At the end of the 19th century both Iraq and Kuwait were parts of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. By the end of World War I, however, both were being administered by Great Britain. Both eventually gained independence, Iraq in 1932 and Kuwait in 1961 (Chadwick, 6). Iraq and Kuwait both have predominantly Arab, Sunni Muslim populations. In contrast to this is Iraq's neighbor Iran whose population is (primarily) ethnically Persian and Shia Muslim. The Crusades, Turkish and British domination, and now the Arab Conflicts with Israel have all contributed to what L. Carl Brown calls "the Arab Myth." According to Brown the myth focuses on the idea of foreign domination bent on keeping the Arab people separated in order to keep them from uniting and becoming a world power (Brown, 10). Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party strongly supports the idea of pan-Arabism. In spite of this pan-Arab hope, relations with Kuwait became tense on several occasions, particularly in 1973 when Iraq crossed the border and held the town of As Samitah. The issue was eventually handled "by Arabs" and Hussein withdrew his troops ("Iraq"). During the 1970's the United States was supporting the Shah of Iran and the government of Israel as regional balancing powers. In line with Cold War pressures and tendencies, Iraq turned to the Soviet Union for support. There were tensions and border conflicts with Iran during this period, but because of US support and Iranian military superiority, Iraq often got the short end of the stick. Iraq, however, was steadily building up its own military. Although much of this buildup was accomplished through foreign imports, Iraq was also building its own industrial base in order to limit its reliance on foreign powers. The US was caught largely off guard by the fall of the Shah in 1979, and this totally upset the power balance in the region. After initial attempts at normal relations it became obvious that the revolutionary government was not interested. The United States needed a force to balance the new threat. Saddam, seeing the disorder of Iran as an opportunity to gain control of the Shatt al Arab waterway, oil fields, and possibly all of Iran, attacked in September of 1980. US concern about Iran and implied support for the invasion seem to have influenced the decision to invade (Timmerman, 82). It was also feared by many of the Arab Gulf states, with significant Shiite populations, that the new Shiite government of Iran would threaten the stability of their regimes. Moral support as well as financial support were provided by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and Hussein seemed to see himself as the first line of defence for the Arab world. Saddam's decision to attack had apparently relied on the hopes of an Arab revolt in southern Iran and a coup in Tehran (Timmerman, 82). Neither occurred. Iraq found itself in an 8 year war that robbed it of many of its resources and left it in an only marginally better position. In 1986 it was discovered that while the United States had been attempting to improve relations with Iraq it had in fact sold weapons to Iran during the war. In 1988 Iraq found itself 40 billion dollars in debt to the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, and at least as in debt to the West. In 1990 the Iraqi economy was in shambles. The inflation rate in Iraq had reduced the dinar to one twelfth of its official value and the price of oil had dropped from $20.50 a barrel to $13.00, costing Iraq a billion dollars a year in revenue for every dollar drop in price (Stein,128-129). With the enormous war debt it was difficult for Iraq to make ends meet. Kuwait began calling in its loans, and soon Iraq was accusing Kuwait of economic sabotage. According to the Iraqi's, Kuwait was pumping more than its share from the Rumaila oil fields, which they share, and was selling more than its share of oil on the open market, driving the price down. To make matters worse, in April the US suspended $500 million dollars in agricultural loan credits. Hussein began voicing his concerns about the price of oil in May 1990, and his rhetoric became increasingly aggressive towards other Arab Gulf states and towards Israel. On July 10 Iraq, Kuwait and several other oil producing states met and agreed to limit production. Kuwait stated the following day, however, that it would reconsider the agreement in the fall. As Iraq began massing troops on the Kuwaiti border, Secretary of Defense Cheney reaffirmed the American commitment to defend Kuwait. On July 25 US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, was asked to a meeting with President Hussein, and stated "I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations with Iraq" (Fingrut). On August 1 negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait broke down.The following day on August 2, Iraqi tanks crossed the border into Kuwait and took control within hours. That same day the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 660 condemning the invasion under articles 39 and 40 of the UN Charter. Because of the high level of centralization and the limited information we have access to, Iraq seemed to be quite unified in its actions. Although its demands increased from the original economic issues, these remained and Iraq became increasingly hostile when its concerns were not met. Legally Iraq was on shaky ground concerning the international community, no matter how justified it felt. Not only did it violate the United Nations Charter, but it violated the Charter of the Arab League, seriously undermining any support it hoped to gain from the Arab world. The Arab League states that no Arab state should attack another, and although it cannot be enforced it was a symbolic breach of trust. The United States seemed to be much more divided in its intent and actions. Attempts to establish a commitment were generally downplayed in an attempt to maintain good relations with Iraq and because until the level of conflict was established it would be difficult to determine the threat and the level of public support. As Janice Gross Stein points out, up until August 1 "the general expectation in Washington was that Saddam was engaging in coercive diplomacy and that, at most, he would occupy the disputed oil fields and the strategic islands" (130). Even attempts at reassuring Hussein were negated by seemingly hostile actions from the US. For example, in April the US cuts off loan credits, yet in July President Bush is wiring President Hussein that he wants to improve relations. These contradictions represent not only bureaucratic politics but a fundamental conflict in the way the US viewed Iraq. The US only came to see Iraq as an ally after the fall of the Shah. The US was playing a delicate game of trying to maintain good relations for regional stability with a potential trouble maker. Legally the US was on shaky ground in the international community also. It was unclear how the Arab states would have reacted to increased US involvement, and it was unclear about the amount of US support that could be mustered for a distant border dispute. Furthermore, the Soviet acquiescence that materialized during the Gulf war was unprecedented in the United Nations and the United States had no formal defence treaties with Kuwait. To begin the analysis of the situation that developed in the Gulf we should first look at the forces influencing Iraq's President, Saddam Hussein. How accurately did he assess capabilities? Was he acting out a basement of fear or did he take advantage of an opportunity? After determining this we can state what would have been the best deterrence strategy to employ, and then compare that with US signals and actions. There is little doubt about Hussein's expansionist tendencies. Saddam's statements in the past have involved claims to Kuwait and his 1980 push into Iran is further evidence of this. However, determining his motivations at the time he invaded Kuwait is a bit more difficult. It is true that Iraq's economy was doing very poorly and this was a great concern to its leaders. The first indications of hostility were over the effects of Kuwait's behavior on Iraq's economy. These eventually led to further demands about Bubiyan and Warbah islands, and about Kuwaiti territory. However, Saddam had maintained these views for many years and had never attacked and annexed Kuwait. Additionally, simply because someone wants to do something does not mean that they are going to. A "window of opportunity" implies that something had changed, a "window" had been created. There is little evidence that there was a major change in the situation in Kuwait, the region, or the position of Kuwait that would make it more inviting. On the contrary, prior to the invasion Hussein himself commented on the increasing influence of the US in light of declining military power (Stein, 132). It is possible that Hussein was exhibiting a motivated bias in this case. Rather than seeing this as a reason for increased caution, Hussein seems to have seen this as a reason for Arabs asserting more power against foreign domination. This could reflect both his aspirations to be an Arab leader and his need to justify taking action. In this case it is likely that these motivated biases fit well with his unmotivated biases that portrayed foreign powers as oppressors that need to be resisted. The evidence in support of Hussein being motivated by gain is less compelling than that in support of him being motivated by loss. We have seen that the economy was bad off and probably getting worse. It was becoming difficult to acquire foodstuffs and this would have eventually affected Iraq's military capabilities. This hardship could have caused political upheaval within Iraq and threatened Hussein's position. It is also possible that Hussein was worried about a military coup being staged by his returned and restless military. In addition to these economic troubles the seizure of Iraqi nuclear triggers in London and the killing of Gerald Bull, who was working with Iraq to develop long range artillery, both resulted in Hussein feeling more threatened. The suspension of grain shipments from the US further exacerbated this feeling. If we take these facts and look at Hussein's actions leading up to the invasion, it looks as though he was applying increasing pressure on the Kuwaitis in an attempt to coerce them into returning to the status quo on oil production. Saddam began voicing his concerns in May of 1990 when he privately denounced over production by other Arab states. The Oil ministers from several countries met on July 10 to agree on a production limit. Kuwait initially agreed to reduce production, but backpedalled, stating that the limit would be reconsidered in the fall (Stein, 123). In July he began moving his troops to the border with Kuwait, and on August 2, allegedly after negotiations failed, he annexed Kuwait. These events seem to indicate an increasing level of hostility on the part of Iraq in an attempt to exert coercive diplomacy. It is possible that this was all a ploy to legitimize prior plans to invade, and that the demands were high to ensure conflict. However, other witnesses also recalled that the Kuwaitis were stubborn and no one denies that Kuwait was producing oil above the agreed upon level. It seems from this evidence that Hussein was motivated primarily by a fear that his country was on a downhill slide that he was unable to control. The basement and window analogies are not entirely incompatible, however. It is possible, even likely, that Kuwait presented Iraq with the window to escape from its basement of economic difficulty. However, the factors that made the Kuwaiti 'window' the most attractive could have been altered, making it a less attractive choice. If Saddam was acting on these perceived fears, the appropriate strategy would have been to address his economic concerns while making it clear that the Kuwaiti option was not a viable one. The US decided against a deterrence by denial strategy when it decided to use Iraq as a buffer against the new regime in Iran and relied instead on the other regional powers to limit Iraq's rogue potential. The difficulty of implementing a deterrence by threat strategy arises from Saddam's perception of the US as an aggressor. Attempting to reinforce the US commitment to Kuwait may have only reinforced these perceptions. However, if economic support for food had been combined with encouraging the Kuwaitis to make concessions, this idea of a joint US/Kuwait conspiracy may have subsided. It seems that the primary motivation for Iraq to attack Kuwait in 1990 was the economic trouble the country was experiencing. The freezing of loan credits by the US most likely intensified this situation and caused Hussein to further question US intentions. However, there seems to have been a conflict between balance of power policies, nuclear non-proliferation, and Hussein's aspirations that may have been inevitable. While the US had no problem building Iraq to the point of regional stability, it had no intention of letting Iraq upset the balance through conventional or nuclear means. Thus, while the US may not have been actively trying to overthrow the Ba'ath regime, it was definitely trying to limit its power, in the process fueling Saddam's fears. This situation, however, is likely to be a by product of any balance of power strategy and is likely to continue as the US attempts to maintain its nuclear advantage while limiting others. It is also likely that the US would prefer that Middle Eastern oil remained separated rather than monopolized. In this respect, then, perhaps Hussein was correct also. It seems that in the end while the US was not in a position determine or demonstrate its commitment to Kuwait, it failed to use its influence to reassure Iraq of its own economic security. It is likely that US officials did not realize the extent of frustration felt by Iraqi leaders. In addition to this lack of understanding there were the inherent conflicts between balance of power policies and Iraq's regional aspirations. If in fact we accept that Hussein was operating out of fear, then perhaps in the future we should concentrate less on military capabilities and more on the internal economic factors that affect nations, their leaders, and their populations. Works Cited Brown, L. Carl."Middle Eastern Mind-Sets and the Gulf War." In The Political Psychology of the Gulf War, ed.Stanley A. Renshon, 3-21. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993. Chadwick, Frank. Gulf War Fact Book.Bloomington:GDW, 1991. Charter of the United Nations [online] Available:URL:http://www. undcp.org/charter.html Fingrut, David. "Operation Desert Storm: Outright Disinformation Scheme." (1993) [online] Available:URL:http://www.worldlink. ca/~ahmed/private/desert_st/gulf-war.html#april "Iraq."Army Area Handbooks. (May 1988)[online] Available: URL: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cs:@field Stein, Janice Gross. "Threat Based Strategies of Conflict Management:Why Did They Fail in the Gulf?" In The Political Psychology of the Gulf War, ed.Stanley A. Renshon, 121-153. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993. Timmerman, Kenneth R. The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991. United Nations Resolution 660 (2 Aug 1990) [online] Available: URL:gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/ s90/14 Works Consulted Bush, George. "Inaugural Address." (20 Jan 1989) [online] Available:URL:http://kuhttp.cc.ukans.edu/carrie/docs/usdocs. txt/51bush1.htm United Nations Resolution 661 (6 Aug 1990) [online] Available: URL:gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/ s90/15 United Nations Resolution 662 (9 Aug 1990) [online] Available: URL:gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/ s90/16