Martin Ptasinski Political Science 472 12-9-96. The Syrian Vision Preamble The United States Government (USG) has keenly followed the stability of the Middle East in an incremental fashion ever since the US's rise to hegemonic stature. In the past couple of decades, though, a few nations in the region have increasingly taken measures which undermine the USG's interests and threaten the stability of the Middle East. These nations have been dubbed "rogue regimes." As a hegemonic actor, the USG favors nations that yield to, or at least do not obstruct, American interests. The Syrian Government (SG) has been involved in acts of state-sponsored terrorism, chemical and biological weapons programs, a system of narcotic trafficking through Lebanon. These mischievous actions and a reluctance to settle a peace agreement with Israel undermine the US's interests; hence, because of its actions, Syria has earned a spot on the US department of State's notorious list of state sponsored terrorism since the list's inception in 1979. The main focus of this paper is to view the actions of Syria and offer explanations as to why the SG continues to sponsor terrorism, support drug trafficking, engage in a chemical and biological weapons program, and is disinclined to reach a peace agreement with Israel despite pressures from the USG. First, there will be a brief overview of the theoretical implications used to explain the actors' behavior. And then successive sections will apply these theories to actions taken by the USG, the SG, and to a minimal extent, the Israeli government; but principally, this paper will be discussed through a Syrian facet. Finally, the paper will conclude with my policy recommendations that I think USG should espouse and a look at the horizon. Theoretical Overview This paper will use three theories to study the USG and SG's actions in relation to each other: the classical deterrence theory ,cognitive theory, bureaucratic politics. The basic notion behind the deterrence theory is that states act out of a "window of opportunity." Essentially, an actor will choose options that value maximize their position in relation to the status quo. Imbedded in this theory is the concept that actors treat gains and losses equally and that actors calculate their prospective outcomes. Additionally, actors "black box" their adversary by treating them as a mirror image of oneself. Thus, actors use methods such as coercion, deterrence, and the power of latent force backed by their resolve. On the other hand, the cognitive theory claims that actors are impeded by their "basement of fears and needs" and thus are incognizant of external pressures. A premise of this theory is that states have motivated biases (a bias that causes the actor to see what he wants to see) and unmotivated biases (a bias that causes the actor to see what he expects to see). Therefore, acts such as coercion or deterrence are less likely to affect an actor sheltered in his basement of fears. Two important concepts in evaluating any international relationship through deterrence theory are rationality and unitary actor. The concept of rationality is the degree to which a decision maker chooses the most value maximizing outcome. The decision maker is placed on a litmus-like "rheostat of rationality" when evaluating the degree to which they act in value maximization. Whether an actor is placed high or low on the rheostat depends on if the actor behaves in a value maximizing way or a non-value maximizing manner, respectively. But it is important to realize that no actor is fully rational because they are bounded by information constraints of their adversary, and at many times, domestic political constraints. The latter being known as bureaucratic politics. The unitary actor is also an indispensable concept when evaluating a states course of action. Each state vests different amount of power into a particular body of government. As a country's power and decision making are narrowed to, and controlled by, a single person, then the nation is controlled by a unitary actor. On the other hand, when a state's power and control of decision making become diffuse, than that nation is no longer a unitary actor. If nations are highly unitary it is easier to send signals and calculate their stance than if control is diffuse. Deterrence theory holds that each actor acts in a rational manner and is unitary. States have intrinsic interest -- interests which are tangible (ex., territory, economic interests, natural resources) and strategic interests -- interests that are intangible (ex., prestige, nationalism, resolve). Further, a state's utility function is a relative figure of how much a decision maker holds some value(s) over others. The final theory that will be used to examine the Syrian-Israeli peace process is the prospect theory. This theory holds that actors tend to be risk-averse for gains and coincidentally risk-acceptant for losses. Additionally, actors weigh losses more heavily than gains and their computations of choice are framed on a relation to a reference point -- a position where an actor deviates his calculation from, rather than deviating a calculation from the net asset level.(1) The Evaluation The US Perspective Title 22, Sec. 2656(f) of the U.S.C. defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." The USG has condemned Syrian sponsorship of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and chemical/biological weapons programs by placing various sanctions on the SG. In doing so, the USG acted as a rational actor because sanctions are a form of deterrence, which is a cheaper means of getting a message across to another party. The USG justifies most of these sanctions on that fact that Syria remains on the list of nation's that support state-sponsored terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. 2405. Therefore on March 25, 1996, because of Syria's roguish manner, the USG imposed numerous restrictions on a "License Exception," an authorization that allows a country to export or reexport items subjected to the Export Administration Regulation. Syria is mentioned various times under Section 740-744 (Section 742.9 specifically deals with Syria and labels the nation as a supporter of acts of international terrorism and requires a license for export or reexport by Syria for this reason) [Appendix A]. Under these sanctions various technological and software items, aircraft and vessels, nuclear, chemical, and biological commodities may not be exported or reexported to Syria. Additionally, various financial transactions are prohibited to the terrorist nations listed in section 6(j) under 31 CFR Part 596 [Appendix B]. Further, because the Syrian Scientific Research Center and the Syrian Ministry of Defense "have engaged in missile technology proliferation activities," the USG imposed sanctions through the Arms Export Control Act which prohibits USG contracts with, and imports from, Syria.(2) Finally, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight reported that as of March, the Clinton Administration has denied Syria certification because it "distributes heroin or allows it to transit through its borders."(3) These sanctions are a continuum of previous sanctions imposed on the SG in retribution for Syrian narcotic trafficking, weapons programs, and state-sponsored terrorism. The USG's implementation of sanctions have been retributive and not rehabilitative because the USG has not ceased sanctions despite a continuation of Syria's roguish policies. Earlier proof of this fact can be seen when President Ronald Reagan tried to take on a rehabilitative stance in regards to US sanctions against Syria by proposing to end deterrent policy because it was not working. But pressure from the US Congress forced the Reagan Administration to continue with sanctions against the SG and therefore solidified a retributive stance.(4) This same positions has prevailed to the present time as demonstrated by President Bill Clinton's speech given on October 22, 1996, "we [US] have to remain determined and strong. If we do, we know we can prevail" in regards to the USG's policy of containing nations that run state-sponsored terrorist programs.(5) Clinton and the USG have backed a policy of continuing sanctions despite their failed success. Plenty of nations, including China, North Korea, Iran, and various European nations continue to trade heavily with Syria; consequently, making the sanctions ineffective.(6) An example of how the sanctions against Syria are not working can be seen by Syria's large possession of US military vehicles. When US Rep. Lantos questioned US military spokesman Djerejian about Syria's possession of the vehicles during a sanctions hearing, Djerejian circumvented the question by stating that he can't proceed further in open session on this line of questioning. Possibly the US allies such as Saudi Arabia may have tacitly agreed with Syria in some sort of exchange for the vehicles.(7) The Clinton administration has viewed Syria through a motivated bias for it has acted in a hypocritical manner and overlooked Syria's roguish activities in order to bring Syria to the peace table. In a speech, Clinton stated that "we [US] simply cannot be doing business by day with people who are supporting terrorism who kill us by night."(8) The USG's wooing of Syria to the peace table obviously contradicts this statement for the USG was willing to ease the sanctions on Syria if Assad was willing to negotiate with Israel. This point is stated legally in the 104th Congress H. R. 3890 when the House passed a resolution that stated that Syria would be restored to a most favored nation status in the event that the "President determines that Syria is participating in the Middle East peace process in good faith."(9) Evidently, the USG's policy was motivated by Syria negotiating a settlement with Israel. Therefore, a value high on the USG utility function was Middle East peace and other strategic interests like the proliferation of chemical/biological weapons and narcotics trafficking were interests of less weight. The administration was willing to overlook these issues in order to settle an agreement. Bureaucratic politics also plays a major role in constraining the signal of peace that the USG sent to both Syria and Israel. The Clinton Administration's policy of trying to bring Syria and Israel to a land for peace compromise is evident in Secretary of State Warren Christopher's over fifty visits to both Syria and Israel during the negotiations. But doubts of peace were sent to the SG when numerous representatives attached their name to a letter sent to Christopher by Rep. Michael Forbes (R-NY) on May 7, 1996 proclaiming that US tax dollars should not be used to "buy" a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. The letter went on condemning Syria's tendencies of providing a safe haven for terrorist groups and ended by denouncing Syria as "one of this centuries most cunning and brutal regimes."(10) Additionally, then presidential candidate Bob Dole criticized the Clinton Administration for refusing to speak out strongly enough on Syrian support for terrorism when he addressed the Veterans of Foreign Wars.(11) The USG had to deal with domestic sentiment in favor of containing Syria and thus the domestic message of containment undermined official government policy. The Syrian Perspective In order to be able to understand the USG's relation with Syria and why Syria continues to act in a defiant manner, Syria must be studied as an actor. Syria's president, Hafez Al-Assad, has been in control of the Syrian government since 1970. Assad espouses the Ba'th party principles of socialism and Arabic unity; furthermore, he has gripped Syria with his power by heading three institutions: the Ba'th party, the military, and the government bureaucracy. Additionally, the government justifies its power role of the security services in the government because of the state of war with Israel and alleged threats from terrorist groups.(12) Thus, Assad's power is the pinnacle of the SG, and therefore he can be treated as the country's unitary actor. Ironically, though, Assad and most of the controlled Ba'th party belong to the Alawati faction of Islam while 75% of the population is of the Sunni denomination; consequently, the majority of Syrians view their president as foreign. Historically, this disparity has brought on great tensions within Syria, leading the nation to the brink of civil war from the mid-1970's to early 1980's (ex., In 1982 the Moslem Brotherhood uprose in Hamah but were ruthlessly put down by the Assad regime).(13) With Alawati precariousness, the cadre creates a dilemma for foreign investment into the country. If Assad were to open Syrian doors and allow increased trade than he most likely would lose control of his state run economy; and thus, economic freedom would very likely lead to a toppling of the Alawati regime.(14) Therefore, Assad is constrained to act freely as a unitary actor by his own minority status within Syria, and perhaps because of this, he cannot choose to act in a wholly rational way by allying with the US economically. Therefore, Assad is constrained, to a moderate degree, by bureaucratic politics because he must always remember that the majority of Syrians do not want him at the helm because of his minority religious status. Assad holds the strategic interest of a "Greater Syria"/Pan-Arabic movement at the top of his utility function.(15) Examples of this notion can be seen in Syria's invasion and present control of Lebanon (Syrian hegemony over Lebanese security and foreign politics for the exchange of a smaller military force in Syria was secured by the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination of 1991.) and hopes of a future alliance with Jordan. Assad views Jordan and Syria as "one country, one people, one thing."(16) Additionally, Assad has expressed dissent over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait because he views it in a Pan-Arabic context; his own words state his position, "when Arab countries invade each other Israel will celebrate."(17) Hence, Syria has also expressed stringent animosity towards Israel ever since Israel was formally reinstated into the family of nations. In response to the Syrian perceived threat to the establishment of a "Greater Syria," Syria has pursued in creating a large military force. The SG has acquired well over 4,000 tanks and has over 600 combat aircraft, roughly the same amount as Israel. Additionally, Syria has purchased recent Scud missiles that can carry biological or chemical warheads that stand pointed at Israel alongside its well equipped Russian/Soviet armed MiG's and Su's. The SG has even reached an agreement with North Korea and Iran to develop Scud-C missiles at two facilities at near Aleppo and Hamma.(18) Evidently, Syria's objective is to reach parity with Israel in terms of armament; thus, giving Assad more voice in the Pan-Arabic movement and a greater power of latent force in diplomacy. In addition to its massive accruement of conventional weapons, the SG has invested heavily in other intrinsic interests such as Chemical and Biological weapons. Syria has developed a biological weapons capability, and is thought to have one of the most intricate chemical weapons programs in the world. (19) This threat of chemical/biological war has been increased by continuing Syrian acquisition of Mig-29 combat aircraft because these Mig's could be used in a war versus Israel. Additionally, the long rage Scud-C missiles can be launched from northern Syria where they are less vulnerable to an Israeli bombing raid.(20) Assad has increased his arsenal of weapons to include all different sizes, shapes, colors, and forms and has them pointing straight at Israel. Through terrorism, various militant groups manipulate the fact that governments in democracies hold their populations in high regard. Conversely, reprisals have only a weak effect on subsequent terrorism;(21) so, for example, if Israel was to counterstrike after a terrorist action, then that action would not deter the terrorist from successive strikes. Knowing these facts, Syria and Lebanon have been a save haven for various terrorist organizations that target the populations of several countries throughout the world. In 1986 the UK severed diplomatic relations with Syria because a terrorist sponsored by Syria was found guilty of plotting to bomb an El-Al flight from London to Israel; the US and several other nations followed suite.(22) As a result, Syria no longer overtly sponsor terrorism but uses tacit means such as basing the groups in the Biqaa Valley of Lebanon. Such clever means allow Assad the opportunity to deny culpability and offer an avenue of formal disassociation with terrorism. Presently, the SG sponsors these several terrorist groups either by financial means or by refuge: the DFLP, JRA, PIJ, PFLP, PSF, PKK, ANO, and Hizballah [Appendix C].(23) Most of these terrorist groups target Israel and thus are one of Assad's weapons of Pan-Arabism and they continue to thrive even though the Israeli government has taken various countermeasures. Additionally, with the SG's sponsorship, many of these organizations have been involved in Syrian narcotic trafficking.(24) As a result, Syria is responsible for one-third the heroin found in the US today. Trafficking narcotics has pumped over an estimated billion dollars annually into the Syrian economy making it a wise choice for Assad's predicament.(25) By not being directly involved in the drug trade, the terrorist organizations offer the SG a scapegoat. It is primarily because of these terrorist organizations and weapons trade that a nexus has been created between Syria and other rogue regimes. On April 30, 1996, the USG's Dep. of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, stated that Syria continues to permit the Hizballah to import weapons through Damascus with Iran being the principle sponsor.(26) Also, during the peace negotiations between Syria and Israel, Tehran's fears of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria were eased by the Syrian ambassador in Tehran. The Syrian ambassador stated that "'Syria has never relinquished its friendship with...Iran and will not provide those who wany to harm these relations any opportunity to do so. Syria has always supported and will continue to support' its joint strategy with Iran." Additionally, in December of 1995, Syria and Iraq had reached an alignment through the mediation of Tehran. Iraq handed over to Syria the rich Safiyah-39 oil field to Syria and the nations agreed to open up their boarders to each other. The newfound Syrian-Iraqi-Irani alliance has, at least for the time being,(27) ended the enmity between these nations, and has resulted in a valuable Syrian strategic interest Despite the sanctions and demands of compliance imposed on Assad's Syria, why does the SG continue to support terrorism, trafficking of narcotics, enhance the country's chemical and biological programs, and be non-compliant with Israel? The answer simply is that Assad is acting as rationally as possible under his bureaucratic politics impediment. The only time when Syria was able to create a de facto alliance with the US was during the Gulf War. It was because of the war environment and circumstances (i.e., most major Arabic nation joined the alliance and Hussein invaded a fellow Arabic nation, respectively) that Assad was able to join the alliance and still "save face." He acted out of a window of opportunity because he knew that his commitment to a collective security alliance was very important to the USG for it showed Hussein that even his fellow rogue states were opposing him; hence, Assad was able to extort funding from several European nations and Japan by posing as ambiguous to the alliance and by holding out of it for quite some time.(28) Furthermore, Assad waited until the final moments and pleaded for an Iraqi withdrawal; this action took some of the weight off Assad's opposition to Hussein because Hussein could view Assad's stance of ambiguity as reluctance. But presently, and at times of the past, Syria has made the best of its situation while adhering to its utility function of a Pan-Arabic movement, the domestic constraints of foreign influence, and a strategic alliance with Iran and other rogue regimes. Thus Assad acts as high on the rheostat as possible, and as a consequence seeks value maximization through roguish means like narcotic trafficking, terrorism, and sophisticated weapons programs. Additionally, the USG was sending mixed signals and low resolve with its deterrent sanctions because of its motivated bias to overlook Syria's roguish activities in order for Syria to come to the peace table with Israel; thereby, weakening the message of retribution. Another explanation, one that I choose not to believe, is that the SG is acting out a "basement of fears and needs" and Assad sees the world through a cognitive prism. Thus, an unmotivated bias of Assad would be to view each situation with the belief that the USG is solely trying to aid the government of Israel because of all the previous past commitments that the USG had made to the nation. Assad may have viewed the Arab-Israeli peace process with a bias of the Sunni Accords between the USG and Israeli government. Or he may have pictured in his mind all the times that the USG has verbally expressed its commitment. I do not find credence in this theory because Assad probably would not have come to the peace table if this was the case, nor would he have tried to exploit financial aid from the USG by demanding that the SG be taken off the USG's list of terrorist states.(29) Arab-Israeli Peace Process One of the USG's most important strategic interests is stability in the Middle East and its commitment to Israel. Beginning in 1975 with the initiation of talks between Israel and Egypt, the USG has been trying to bring the leaders of the Arabic nations and Israel together for the past two decades. Israel has signed peace agreements with all its adjoining neighbors except for Syria and Lebanon, so the USG views that an agreement is crucial for stability in the Middle East. With the demise of the US-Soviet zero sum game, Syria can no longer exploit Russia. Therefore Assad has been seeking alliances with various Middle Eastern nations; furthermore, the Gulf War facilitated the process of bringing Syria out of isolation and created a state of rapprochement between Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.(30) Being a rational actor, Assad gave in to the USG's demands and came to the peace table with Israel. But his objective was to "test the waters" and see what he could get out of an agreement. My analysis will now turn to using the prospect theory in order to explain why the peace process has failed, thus far, between Syria and Israel. In prospect theory, an "actor will choose the risky alternative when the choice is framed in terms of avoiding losses;" conversely, if the decision maker frames the situation in terms of gains, then he will choose the less risky option.(31) At the beginning of the most recent phase of peace negotiations Yitzhak Rabin was the prime minister of Israel. Although Rabin stated that he would not give up the Golan Heights, he also flirted with the idea that he was willing to negotiate a land for peace settlement. Rabin was willing to uproot Jewish settlements and withdrawal from the Golan if the SG was willing for full peace and "normalization" between the two nations.(32) Thus, at the beginning of the negotiations the Israeli government's (IG) reference point was to trade land for peace, or at least that is what Assad perceived the IG's stance to be. But if this is the case, then Rabin had chosen a very risky option because Israeli public sentiment viewed that the Golan as very important security barrier.(33) Rabin had framed the issue in the context of avoiding more Israeli civilian casualties due to terrorism and strife between the two nations. On the other hand, Assad also viewed the situation as avoiding losses. Assad wanted to avoid the loss of passing up the opportunity to regaining the Golan. But his reference point was nothing less than the complete withdrawal of Israel from the Golan and Adherence to UN resolution 242 and 338 as expressed by Damascus Radio [Appendix D].(34) Therefore he had chosen a tremendous risk because he was putting his alliance with Iran on the line. Additionally, he also would have to deal with domestic pressures from terrorist groups that he was sponsoring. Thus, both Assad and Rabin both were constrained in reaching a quick conclusion by bureaucratic politics. Indeed, Rabin was forced to take the stance of withdrawal in gradual steps and Assad wanted the Golan returned within six months; but these differences could have been overcome by a compromise.(35) Tragically, Rabin was assassinated by a countryman who obsessively viewed the Golan as an indispensable part of Israel. Rabin's successor, Perez, held the same reference point as Rabin but could not work out a deal before he lost the election to Netanyahu. Thus, the Netanyahu Administration shifted the Israeli reference point overnight to an adamant detainment of the Golan Heights. Henceforth, because both the SG and IG viewed the Golan Heights as their reference point, a compromise was impossible to reach and the peace process was destroyed the day Netanyahu had become prime minister. Because of the certainty effect -- decision-makers "overweigh outcomes which are certain relative to outcomes which are merely probable,"(36) Assad and Netanyahu both chose the status quo. Assad is certain that he will keep on making profits off of roguish actions and will look upon Israel as the "devil," and Netanyahu will not risk giving up sure land for a chance at peace. Conclusion The USG's choice of containing Syria is only leading to a unwanted alliance between Syria and other nations acting in a roguish ways. But if the USG were to tacitly aid the SG then the assistance would probably be used against America, or its interests, in way or another at some point in time; therefore, its seems as if the USG is in a no win situation in whichever option it chooses. Hopes of embracing Syria into the family of nations have dwindled with the new IG. And it seems as if the only option that should remain clear for the USG is to somehow destroy the new alliance between these rogue nations. If balancing is the eventual means chosen, then aide should be distributed very conservatively. Additionally, if the Alawati regime crumbles after the death of Assad, then the USG might have to deal with an even more ideologically polarized SG. As for the present, on December 1, 1996, the Arab League met in Cairo and scolded the IG for is recent expansion of settlement on occupied land. Syria favored the harsher option of severing ties with Israel altogether and continues its mischievous ways.(37) Currently, it seems as if the calm eye of the storm is passing. 1 Tanter, Raymond, Varous lecture notes off of the PS472 Homepage. 2 All of the sanctions were found at these homepages: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/960325a.htm http://www.fas.org/asmp/asm16.html http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_rpt/h104486.htm http://www.fas.org/asmp/asm16.html 3 http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_rpt/h104486.htm 4 http://www.freeman/spp/com.html 5 http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/GEI/wwwh5012.html 6 Perthes, Volker, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad T.B. Tauris: 1995. 7 http://www.fas.org/asmp/asm16.html 8 http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/GEI/wwwh5012.html 9 gopher://tad.micro.umn.edu:70/00/bills/104/1/10438901/billtext 10 http://www.covesoft.com/afsi/forbes/forbes.htm 11 http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/elect96/bd960820.htm 12 Perthes, Volkes, Syria Under Assad 13 Drysdale, Alasdair and Raymond A. Hinnesbusch. Syria and the Middle East Peace Process Council on Foreign Relations Books: 1991. 14 Pipes, Daniel The New York Republic: http://www.enews.com/magazines/tnr/archive/01/011596.2.html 15 Drysdale, Alasdair and Raymond A. Hinnesbusch. Syria ad the Middle East Peace Process, p. 54. 16 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) March 26, 1981, p.H15. 17 FBIS, August 15, 1990. p. 44. 18 http://www.biu.ac.il/~steing/carnegie.html 19 http://www.enew.com/magazines/economist/archive/09/960921-006.html http://www.biu.ac.il/~steing/chem.html 20 http://www.biu.ac.il/~steing/carnegie.html 21 Tanter, Raymond and Lisa Kaufman, "Terror and Reprisal: Process and Choice" in Everson, International Violance, p. 203-30. 22 Alexander, Yonah ed., Middle East Terrorism Dartmouth: 1994. 23 http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive/april/sd3_5-1.htm 24 ibid. 25 http://www.afsa.org/fsj/oct/octfocus.html 26 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996 Briefing. 27 http://www.freeman.org/feb96/bodansky.htm 28 U.S. Department of State Background Notes. Bureau of Public Affairs. 29 http://www.afsa.org/fsj/oct/octfocus/ssm.htm 30 Pipes, Daniel "Why Assad's Terror Works and Qadhdhafi's Does Not" From Middle East Terrorism, p. 356 31 Jervis, Robert. "Political Implications of Loss Aversion" from Political Psychology Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992. Levy, Jack. "An Introduction to Prospect Theory" from Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992. 32 Ha'aretz 25 and 29 March., 1, 5, 15, 17, 18, and 22 April 1994. NewYork Times 22 April 1994. Ma'oz, Moshe, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking. Oxford University Press: 1995. 33 Ibid. p.251. 34 http://www.golan.org.il/media75.html 35 Ma'oz, Moshe, Syria and Israel p.251 36 Jervis, Robert "Political Implications of Loss Aversion" 37 Headline News a CNN network. December 2, 1996.