Andy Newcomer Political Science 472 Professor Raymond Tanter The Cuban Embargo in the Post Cold War Era Introduction Since 1959, the United States has faced a Cuban state led by Fidel Castro. With the creation of a socialist regime soon after his rise to power, Castro joined the side of the Soviet-led Communists. This ensured that his country would face opposition from the United States for the duration of the Cold War. Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US legitimately considered the Cubans to be a threat and an enemy, and sanctioned them accordingly. However, the Cold War has now ended. The Soviet Union no longer exists and Cuba receives little economic and no military support from former Soviet countries. Furthermore, former Soviet countries themselves are no longer considered to be enemies of the United States. With the current world situation being what it is, one might expect that the United States would no longer consider Cuba an enemy, and would have ended any and all sanctions. This is far from the case however. The United States has continued not only to sanction Cuba, but has even strengthened the sanctions. This prompts the following question. Why does the United States continue to sanction Cuba in the post Cold War era? Theoretical Orientation To fully explore the reasons and situations behind the continued American sanctions against Cuba, a number of theoretical concepts will be used. The first concept to be defined is that of threat perception. A country will generally perceive another country as a threat when the opposing country Òdisplays a willingness to ignore accepted procedure, a disregard of what are usually considered the legitimate rights of others, and an exceptionally high propensity to accept risks in order to improve its position.Ó(1) Thus, it is not merely the fact that another country possesses military capability, but the manner in which another country behaves that can classify it as a threat. Furthermore, threat perception is affected by both motivated and unmotivated biases. Motivated biases are biases that cause an actor to perceive another actor in a certain way because it is in the best interest of the first actor to do so. Unmotivated biases arise in situation where one actor perceives that another will act in the same manner that they have in the past. Both types of biases can affect threat perception.(2) In order to determine reasons for which the United States still sanctions Cuba, it must be determined if CubaÕs actions constitute a threat to the United States. Rationality is another very important concept in the realm of international relations. Rationality refers to the ways in which leaders decide the courses of action for their countries. In general, those who make policy decisions can be considered rational if they choose the option that promises either the largest benefit or smallest loss. In doing so they must identify various options while estimating the costs or benefits of such options along with the likelihood of success.(3) However, leaders must also be aware of ambiguity or contradiction in available information, consider multiple interpretations, consider the validity of observations, be skeptical in their decision making, and be aware of any biases they may possess.(4) When all this has been accomplished before a decision is made, then it can be said that a decision maker is rational. It must also be noted that often times, a decision maker will Òblack boxÓ an opponent. In black boxing someone, one assumes that the opponent will act rationally and will Òseek rewards and avoid punishment.Ó(5) This is another indication of irrational decision making, as the position of the opponent is not fully considered. Prospect Theory is related to rationality. Whereas rational choice involves the Òmaximization of expected gain or loss,Ó(6) Prospect Theory, which incorporates the concept of loss aversion, says that people will give more weight to losses over profits.(7) In other words, it is more painful to lose something than it is rewarding to gain an equivalent thing. In light of this, decision makers will become risk acceptant, and Òthey will risk more to avoid a loss than they would to achieve a gain.Ó(8) Weighing losses more heavily than similar acquisitions is not rational, as rationality involves weighing both equally. When a leader does act according to Prospect Theory, he or she is said be acting out of a basement of fear. Rationality and Prospect Theory have heavy implications in the current situation between the United States and Cuba. The level of American rationality will be explored, as will that of the of Castro in his reaction to the demands of the United States leadership. Deterrence, coercion, and persuasion are important concepts that describe the ways in which states attempt to influence other states. Deterrence involves an attempt by one state to reinforce the behavior of another state. Through deterrence, a state hopes to prevent and discourage any unwanted actions from its opponent. Coercion, on the other hand, is a process where a state seeks to change the behavior of an opponent. This means that an action is encouraged to be undertaken, or a previous action undone.(9) Both deterrence and coercion are strategic, meaning that in each case the state that is undertaking the action of coercion or deterrence controls the rewards or consequences of compliance or non-compliance with its wishes. Persuasion involves pointing out to an actor, the possible benefits or consequences of that actorÕs actions. In doing so, one state hopes to influence another state into a particular course of action. However, any effects such as rewards or consequences are beyond the control of the state that is trying to persuade.(10) In the current situation between Cuba and the United States, coercion is most common. Through sanctions, the United States is trying to coerce the Cuban government into bringing about democratic elections and the stop to human rights violations. Evidence Across Time and Space The Legality of U.S. Sanctions Fidel Castro first came to power in Cuba in 1959, soon after the flight of former Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. At the beginning of the Castro government, freedom of the press was allowed, and the Cuban government did not ally with the Soviet Union, or even consider themselves communists.(11) Initially, it was hoped and believed that free election would be held in Cuba. However, it soon became apparent that this was not the case. Castro claimed initially that he wanted a democratic government that provided both Ò. . . bread and freedom.Ó(12) However, during the early period of the Castro government, the United States and Cuba were unable to form a meaningful alliance due to U.S. concerns over some of CastroÕs intended reforms. The U.S. viewed CastroÕs agrarian reform law in particular as detrimental to the interests of U.S. citizens.(13) With uncertainty over the future of U.S. and Cuban relations, and in need of a strong economic partner, Cuba turned to the Soviet Union. Diplomatic relations were established between Cuba and the Soviet Union on May 7, 1960.(14) ÒBy the summer of 1960, the Soviet Union was beginning to supply most of CubaÕs petroleum needs.Ó(15) Relations between Cuba and the United States continued to worsen. In June 1960, the oil companies Esso, Texaco, and Shell refused to refine crude oil imported by the Soviet Union. In response to this, Castro nationalized the refineries of all three companies on June 28, 1960.(16) This action prompted the United States to refuse to purchase Cuban sugar for a previously agreed upon quota. To counter this act, Cuba nationalized Ò. . . all U.S.-owned industrial and agrarian enterprises on August 6, and all U.S. owned banks on September 17.(17) These actions by Cuba led to the beginning of the U.S. embargo on October 19, which prohibited exports to Cuba with the exception of food and medicine.(18) The seizure of American property would prove to be a major point of contention between the two countries up until the present day, and is still mentioned in the bodies of the legal acts which provide for current sanctions of Cuba. Castro did not officially declare the new Cuban government to be socialist until April 16, 1961.(19) Following soon after this announcement came the attempt by the United States to invade the island. The invasion, which was known as the Bay of Pigs, was a complete failure. The failure of the invasion and CastroÕs acceptance of a socialist government proved to be the end of friendly relations between Cuba and the U.S. until this day. The trade embargo came into the form it would hold for the duration of the Cold War on February 3, 1962.(20) The legal foundation for the embargo was given in the Cuban Assets Control Regulation Act which was finalized in 1963, and drew its basis from the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917.(21) Furthermore, in 1964, all members of the Organization of American States, with the exception of Mexico, agreed to end all trade with Cuba.(22) In 1975, the OAS amended its policies and decided to allow for its member states to follow their own policy in regards to Cuba. At this time, the U.S. even allowed some subsidiaries to export products to Cuba which contained twenty percent or less content of materials made in the United States.(23) In 1980, however, the embargo would be restrengthened. With Reagan in office, new emphasis was placed on the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. As a Soviet ally, Cuba was more strongly sanctioned. In 1982, U.S. subsidiaries in other countries Ò. . . were strongly warned not to exceed the limits allowed by U.S. law.(24) U.S. businesses were forbidden from operating with certain firms thought to be against the embargo, and a partial travel ban on travel by Americans to Cuba was reimposed.(25) The Cold War ended in the late 1980Õs, and the Soviet Union disbanded in 1991. One of the justifications for the original embargo was that Ò. . . Castro was establishing a totalitarian regime in alliance with the Soviet Union.Ó(26) With this justification no longer valid, the United States adopted new acts to govern the embargo in the post Cold War era. The first act to continue the embargo, which was drafted after the end of the Cold War, was the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. This act was signed by President Clinton soon after he entered office. Section 1702 of the Act, which is entitled ÒFindingsÓ says that the government of Cuba has shown disregard for human rights and has not allowed room for a democratic transition in the country. Furthermore, the Act claims that CastroÕs refusal to accept democracy increases the chances of economic collapse and suffering among his people.(27) In section 1703 of the Cuban Democracy Act, the United States Government states that it seeks a Ò. . . peaceful transition to democracy. . .Ó(28) and the end of human rights violations Ò. . . through the careful application of sanctions directed at the Castro government.Ó(29) The sanctions provided by the Act include penalties for trading with Cuba, whereby a ship that enters a Cuban port can not load or unload any supplies in a United States port for a period of 180 days afterward. The Act also allows for the sanctioning of foreign countries, in that any country that gives assistance to Cuba is not eligible for assistance under both the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and the Arms Export Control Act, and is not eligible for any reduction of debt that is owed to the U.S. government.(30) In short, the Act closes Ò. . . existing ÔloopholesÕ allowing U.S. subsidiaries abroad to do business with Cuba. . .,Ó (31) and discourages any trade or relations between foreign countries and Cuba. However, section 1705 of the Act does allow for the exports of food or medicine to the citizens of Cuba, as long as it is deemed that such items would not be used for negative purposes or to strengthen the regime.(32) The Cuban Democracy Act not only continued the embargo against the Cuban government, it actually increased the level of sanctions. However, this piece of legislation was followed by an even tougher one that provides the current basis for U.S. sanctions against Cuba. The current legislation behind the embargo is the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 which is popularly known as the Helms- Burton Act. This Act became law on March 12, 1996. Section 102 of the Helms-Burton Act reaffirms the portion of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 that Ò. . . states that the President should encourage foreign countries to restrict trade and credit relations with Cuba.Ó(33) In addition, the President is encouraged to take actions against foreign countries in a manner described in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. However, in other sections of the Helms-Burton Act, changes are made to the Cuban Democracy Act. One change is the inclusion of an expanded definition of what constitutes assistance to Cuba. In addition, new definitions are given for what qualifies as a transitional government, the creation of which is a major factor for determining the end of sanctions. Within the definition of a transitional government, it is stated in section 205, part a7 of the Act that a transitional government Òdoes not include Fidel or [his brother] Raul Castro.Ó(34) One of the most controversial section of the Helms-Burton Act is Title IV, which provides for the exclusion of certain people from U.S. territory. Specifically, visas are to be denied to any aliens Ò. . . involved in the confiscation of property or the trafficking in confiscated property, owned by a U.S. national.Ó(35) What this means in essence is that if a foreign businessman bought any property such as a factory that was owned by a U.S. citizen before CastroÕs nationalization of U.S. businesses in the early 1960Õs, or if he made any repairs or improvements to an already owned factory, then he and his family would be unable to enter the United States.(36) Just as controversial if not more so, is Title III of the Act. This part of the Helms-Burton Act gives U.S. nationals the right to sue any foreign investor in U.S. courts if they deal with the confiscated property of the national in the manner described above.(37) This provision is creating the largest uproar on the international scene. Another very important result of the Helms-Burton Act is that it puts Ò. . . into law all existing economic sanctions against Cuba, including the comprehensive trade embargo that has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy since. . . 1962.Ó(38) This means that any sanctions will now require the approval of Congress before they can be lifted. With U.S. sanctions tougher than ever and codified into law, and new restrictions being placed on foreign businessmen who want to invest in Cuba, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 has caused a lot of reaction around the world. Canada and Mexico have complained about the Helms-Burton act by claiming that it is a violation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Chapter 16 of NAFTA pertains to temporary entry for businessmen of the United States, Canada, and Mexico into any of the three states. Under NAFTA, some restrictions are placed on the entry of Mexican citizens into the United States due to immigration problems. However, other than these restrictions, travel between the three countries is simplified by the agreement.(39) Under the agreement, the total number of Mexican professionals that can enter the United States is limited to 5500.(40) Furthermore, entrance to the country can be refused if it is thought that the person trying to enter may somehow adversely affect a labor dispute or take the place of a striking worker. NAFTA specifically says that entry does not require pre-clearance or labor market procedures, and visa requirements are only to be imposed if a country feels that it is absolutely necessary.(41) With the Helms-Burton Act in effect, business people could be restricted from entering the United States for doing business with Cuba. NAFTA does not include such restrictions, meaning that in the eyes of Mexico and Canada, the U.S. is violating the rules of the agreement. The opposition to the Helms-Burton Act, and continued sanctioning of Cuba is not restricted to Canada and Mexico, nor is it based only upon violations of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Title III which allows for legal action to be brought by U.S. nationals against foreigners involved in transactions with confiscated property is creating negative reactions throughout the world. The Canadian House of Commons amended their Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act on September 16, 1996, in response to Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. Included in the new Act are added powers to the Attorney General of Canada which allow him to Òdeclare certain foreign judgements not to be recognized or enforceable in Canada.Ó(42) The Act also provides the possibility of fines and imprisonment for individuals and corporations who are convicted for violating International Law. Provisions are also provided which allow Canadian citizens and corporations Ò. . . to sue and recover any amount obtained under foreign judgements not recognized or enforceable in Canada.Ó(43) With this legislation, Canada is clearly stating its opposition to any attempt to sue Canadian citizens for business deals that they conduct with Cuba. The Mexican government is also opposed to the extraterritorial measures of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. In a statement by the Mexican Government on August 28, 1996, it was expressed that Mexico feels the Ò. . . Act violates the principles of International Law, specifically those that guarantee equal sovereignty of states and non-intervention.Ó(44) Furthermore, Mexico stated that they object to extra-territorial measures that challenge the right of Mexican citizens to conduct business anywhere in the world.(45) The European Union has expressed similar dislike for the extra-territorial applications of the Helms-Burton Act. The European Union met on July 15, 1996 and proposed a Council Regulation that would Ò. . . protect the legal order of the European Community and its external economic interest. . .Ó(46) from the effects of the Helms- Burton Act. Included in the resolution created by the Union are articles which contain guidelines for Ònon-compliance with contested U.S. legislation,Ó recovering damages obtained by U.S. nationals under Title III, and allowing individual states to determine appropriate penalties for any actions which contest the Regulation.(47) The Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States released a statement on August 23, 1996 which, like Canada, Mexico, and the European Union, condemned the Helms-Burton Act. In the statement, the OAS said that U.S. courts are not where claims between states should be settled. They stated that U.S. can not take claims for those Ò. . . who were not nationals at the time of injury,Ó(48) meaning that Cuban refugees who later became American citizens should not be covered by Title III. The Committee further decided that the U.S. like all other states is bound by international law. A number of other conclusions were reached by the Committee, all of which pointed out that the extra-territorial applications of the Helms-Burton Act are in violation of international law.(49) The latest action against the U.S. embargo was taken on November 12, 1996 by the United Nations. At this meeting, the U.N. General Assembly for the fifth year in a row adopted a resolution to end the United States trade embargo against Cuba. The vote at this meeting was the most uneven ever, with 137 nations voting to end the embargo, three nations including the United States voting to maintain the embargo, and twenty-five nations abstaining.(50) This resolution is more evidence that the United States has very little support for the Helms-Burton Act, or the embargo that it has strengthened. Possible Reasons for U.S. Sanctions The legality of the United States embargo has been established. What has also been established is that the embargo itself, and the Helms-Burton Act are very unpopular. Canada and the European Union have created legislation against the Act. Mexico and the Organization for American States have released statements that are highly critical of the Act. The United Nations has even condemned the embargo by the largest majority ever for such a resolution. All of this shows that the United States not only lacks support for the embargo, but also faces stiff opposition from some of its closest allies. In light of this, one might wonder even more about the reasons for the continued embargo against Cuba. The United States Government may feel that the military of Cuba poses a threat to the national security of the United States. If such is the case, then an embargo is justified to protect the citizens and interests of the United States from possible military aggression. During the Cold War, Cuba was an ally of the Soviet Union, which at the time was the most powerful enemy of the U.S., and posed a very real military threat to the security of America. In 1962, Cuba played host to the Cuban Missile Crisis which saw an attempt by the USSR to place long range missiles on Cuba. Although the Soviet Union backed down in its attempt, it was apparent that Cuba could be a threat to the United States by providing a Communist military stronghold very close to American shores.(51) Castro and the Cuban Government also proved that they could threaten United States interests throughout the world. In 1974, 40,000 Cuban troops were sent to Angola to assist in a civil war in that country.(52) In 1978, 15,000 more troops were sent to Ethiopia and other African nations.(53) In sending troops overseas, Castro showed a willingness to spread communism through militaristic means. Furthermore, it has been reported by the U.S. Department of State that Òin earlier years, the Castro regime provided significant levels of military training, weapons, funding, and guidance to leftist extremists worldwide.Ó(54) Such actions could be seen as detrimental and threatening to the interests of the United States. Thus, if Cuba continues to have strong military today, and possesses the will to use it, then the United States might be justified in sanctioning Cuba to protect itself from military aggression. Current U.S. foreign policy no longer focuses on containing the spread of communism, as this is no longer seen as a major problem after the end of the Cold War. In recent years, American foreign policy has focused on preventing the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the monitoring and containment of rogue states. Rogue states are generally characterized as Ò. . . hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third World states with large military forces and nascent [weapons of mass destruction] capabilities. . . [that are] bent on sabotaging the prevailing world order.Ó(55) If Cuba fits this view, then a current U.S. embargo would have some justification. According to United States estimates, the Cuban military had as of early 1996 about 150,000 active troops.(56) By comparison, the United States military had, as of September 30, 1995, about 1,518,224 active military personnel.(57) The Cuban military budget has fallen to $600,000,000 annually, which is less than the U.S. Government spends in one day on the military, and Cuba has received no military or economic support from the Soviet Union since 1992.(58) Much of CubaÕs weaponry has been placed in storage, many soldiers are engaged in producing food supplies and constructing buildings, and the military Ò. . . engages in very few significant military exercises.Ó(59) Furthermore, Cuba currently houses no foreign troops, and has no forces abroad either.(60) The Cuban military focuses all military efforts solely on the defense of Cuba.(61) In addition to having a conventional military that is vastly inferior to that of the United States, Cuba possesses no chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, and is not trying to develop any.(62) In fact, Cuba does not even possess any nuclear fuel with which to power an unfinished nuclear power plant that has become another focus point of the American embargo.(63) Castro Ò. . . has formally ended all efforts to promote socialism in Latin America,Ó(64) and the U.S. Department of State has admitted that ÒCuba is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist incidents in 1995.Ó(65) The above evidence seems to indicate that Cuba does not meet the definition of a Rogue State. Thus, the strength of the Cuban military does not appear to be a sufficient explanation for the U.S. embargo. When looking for other possible reasons for the embargo, the rhetoric that accompanies U.S. actions must be examined. In Title I of the Helms-Burton Act, it is said that Ò. . . systematic human rights violations are a threat to international peace.Ó(66) If Cuba does indeed have human rights violations, then this would seem to be a reasonable explanation for the continued sanctions. The Special Rapporteur on human rights for the United Nations was denied a visit to Cuba by the Castro government. However, the Special Rapporteur did report that action has been waged against dissident groups in 1996, and that is has largely included harassment by State security forces. Threats and intimidation are employed by the Cuban Government. However, it has been reported that the number of trials and sentences has decreased in recent years.(67) Amnesty International reports for 1995 estimate that there are about 600 hundred prisoners held for peaceful attempts at expression and assembly. It is further feared that a similar number are held for more serious dissident activities against the state.(68) Amnesty International also says that prisoners often do not receive fair trials and are subject to beatings and torture. In Cuba, the death penalty does exist, but it is reported it has not been used much in recent years, and that only two people received the death penalty in 1995 after being convicted of murder.(69) Evidence such as this, and that given by the United Nations indicates that there are human rights abuses in Cuba. However, to say that this is a main reason for U.S. sanctions is overlooking the way in which other countries with violations are treated by the United States. China has been sited by Amnesty International for Ògrave human rights violations. . . in 1995.Ó(70) It is reported that thousands of prisoners are held in detention for crimes such as peaceful dissent. Abuse and torture are common throughout the prison and detention system. Political prisoners almost never receive fair trials, and the death penalty is widely used to promote fear in the population. Amnesty International reports that thousands of people receive the death penalty each year in China.(71) Overall, the human rights violations that occur in China are much more serious and widespread than those that occur in Cuba. Logic would seem to indicate that if human rights truly are a legitimate reason for an embargo, then China must face U.S. sanctions as well. In actuality, China has received most-favored-nation trading status from the United States. In 1995, the United States imported a total of $45,543,198,817 worth of Chinese goods from the Chinese mainland, and exported $11,753,600,963 worth of goods back to China.(72) If human rights abuses by themselves were truly worthy of a strict embargo, then China and the U.S. would not be doing this much trade. If the United States Government can overlook serious abuses in one country, then they should not sanction other countries for less serious abuses. Thus, human rights abuses alone do not seem to be a sufficient reason for the continued sanctioning of Cuba. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, and the Helms-Burton Act both make references to the lack of free elections and a democratic government in Cuba. Since it is true that Cuba does maintain a socialist government, then maybe this is a legitimate reason for sanctions in the eyes of the United States Government. Once again however, the U.S. does not treat all socialist countries equally, just as not all human rights violators are treated equally. As mentioned above, a great deal of trade occurs between the United States and China, and China is a Most Favored Nation of the U.S. China is also a communist country. Vietnam is a country that is ruled by a Ò. . . one-party [communist] government that permits little dissent.Ó(73) Despite this, and despite the fact that the United States fought a ten year war with Vietnam, relations with this country were normalized in 1995. In 1995, the United States imported $198,922,783 worth of merchandise from Vietnam, and exported $252,532,831(74) worth of merchandise. With China and Vietnam, the United States proved that it will freely trade with communist nations. If communism is such a serious issue in relations with Cuba, then why does the United States normalize relations with other communist nations, including those it has fought wars against in the past? Another explanation for continued sanctions that must be explored, is the recent downing of two American civilian planes by Cuban Jet fighters. In March of 1996, just days before President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act into law, a Cuban-American group known as Brother to the Rescue, which tries to promote reform in Cuba and the overthrow of Castro by dropping flyers over the island, invaded Cuban airspace. Castro has claimed that this was done numerous times, and two planes were shot down, killing a total of four people.(75) In response to the killings, Clinton labeled the Castro regime as Òrepressive, violent, [and] scornful of international law.Ó(76) After this incident, Clinton also agreed to sign the Helms-Burton Act, which he had previously not supported. This incident certainly was important in the signing of the Helms-Burton Act. However, the Act had been written up in Congress before the planes were shot down, and the Cuban Democracy Act had been in effect for a number of years by this time. Thus, this incident does not provide an answer for the question of U.S. motivations in the Cuba sanctions. The best explanation for sanctions against Cuba in the post Cold War era may lie with the strength of the Cuban-American political lobby. The Cuban American National Foundation, or CANF, which is led by Jorge Mas Canosa pushes heavily for sanctions against Castro and the communist regime in Cuba. CANF states its fundamental missions as first and foremost, gathering Ò. . . support, among U.S. and international public opinion, for maintaining a position of steadfast resistance to the Castro regime, and assisting in the restoration of a democratic system in Cuba.Ó(77) These goals are very similar to those stated by the United States Government, and this is no coincidence. The Cuban American National Foundation has been instrumental in maintaining the embargo against Cuba. This has largely been accomplished through political action such as the donations of campaign funds. CANF donates to both political parties, and from the beginning has recognized Ò. . . the need to work with and appeal to both national political parties as well as personalities of most ideological persuasions.Ó(78) In a little more than ten years, the Free Cuba Political Action Committee, which is related to CANF has given more than $1,000,000 to both Republican and Democratic candidates. In 1992, a fund- raiser organized by Mas Canosa raised almost $300,000 for the Clinton Campaign.(79) Florida is also home to large community of Cuban exiles, with about 750,000 of them donating funds to the Cuban American National Foundation.(80) With the considerable donations of CANF to various politicians of both parties, and the fact that the state of Florida represents eleven to twelve percent of the total electoral votes required to win a presidential campaign,(81) it is not surprising that politicians are eager to support the desires of CANF. Few politicians want to risk losing the votes or campaign money that comes with maintaining a firm stance towards the embargo of Cuba. With both republicans and democrats receiving contributions from CANF, support for current embargoes has been strong and bipartisan. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 was strongly bipartisan,(82) as was the passage of the Helms-Burton Act.(83) Implications for Theory and Policy With the evidence of US and Cuban actions presented above, implications for theory and policy can now be examined. A good place to start from is to explore whether or not Cuba truly is a threat to the United States. The definition of threat that can be found in the Theoretical Orientation section, says that it is usually the actions of a country which might classify it as a threat. By examining CubaÕs actions, one can see that they have reduced the size of their military, stopped promoting communist movements in Latin America, and ceased their support of international terrorism. They have also withdrawn all troops from overseas, and currently keep no foreign troops on their soil. All of these actions seem to indicate a dampening of aggression, which should lead to a lower perception of threat in the United States Government. However, the U.S. Government still continues to view Cuba as a threat. As noted in the beginning of this paper, threat perception can be clouded by biases. The evidence seems to indicate that Cuba is not a threat to the United States, but the United States Government has a bias which makes them see Cuba as a threat. One might think that the United States would have an unmotivated bias against Cuba. This means that sanctions against Cuba are continued by people who believe that since Cuba was once a legitimate threat, it is still a legitimate threat. This explanation seems unlikely though, as plenty of information is available to see that Cuban actions and military capability are clearly not offensive in nature. It is much more likely that American policy makers suffer from motivated biases. It is in the best interest of many members of the government to see Cuba as a threat. As long as they do, they can justify sanctions and continue to receive money and political support from the Cuban American National Foundation for their efforts. By examining the evidence behind the U.S. policy of containment, it appears that the United States policy toward Cuba is quite irrational. United States politicians seem to be acting according to Prospect Theory. They are presented with campaign contributions and political support from the Cuban American National Foundation, and they are reluctant to risk losing these things. The possible gain that could be obtained through cooperation with Cuba and the lack of sanctions has not been fully explored because of what would be lost with the lifting of sanctions and the loss of CANF support. The U.S. faces opposition from much of the world toward its embargo, and in particular the extra-territorial aspects of the Helms-Burton Act. Despite the amount and strength of negative reaction, the United States has continued the embargo. This could be the result of an unmotivated bias. In the past the U.S. has often had support from allies in many of its policies. For this reason, the United States may fail to comprehend the nature of the opposition that it faces. For example, since the United States has always gotten along well with Canada, U.S. leaders may not be fully anticipating that the Canadian government might take strong legal actions against them, and openly disobey their sanctions. The reason such a thing might be overlooked is that Canada has not had to undertake such measures in the past, so it is hard for U.S. leaders to conceive of them undertaking such actions in the present or future. It could also be said that to some extent the Cuban government has acted irrationally. The incident where Cuban leaders ordered the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue airplanes was a moment of irrationality for Castro and his regime. By shooting down the planes, Cuba gave President Clinton a very good reason to sign the Helms- Burton Act and create even stronger sanctions against Cuba. Had these planes not been shot down, Cuba might have eventually been able to reduce the sanctions against it. However, Castro and his government were acting out of a basement of fear in this case. By allowing planes to invade Cuban airspace, the Cuban government was displaying a lack of resolve to defend its territory, and was allowing for the possible uprising of dissident movements sparked by the efforts of the Brothers to the Rescue. Either of these factors could have lead to a downfall of Castro. When faced with the prospect of losing oneÕs power and possibly life in a rebellion, a leader will become very risk acceptant and will go to great lengths to avoid such an occurrence. In this case, Castro ordered that the intruding planes be shot down in order to protect himself from such an occurrence, and in doing so he accepted the risk of a hostile United States reaction. The current United States policy towards Cuba is one that should be rethought. The United States claims that it is seeking democracy and improved human rights for Cuba. In order to achieve this democracy however, sanctions are thought to be needed against the Cuban government. However, one major clause of the recent Helms-Burton Act is that for a new government to be considered democratic, it cannot include Fidel Castro or his brother Raul. In order for sanctions to be lifted, Fidel Castro will have to be removed from power. He will not do this voluntarily, because of the loss involved. He has everything to lose and nothing to gain by stepping down from power. This virtually ensures that sanctions will not work, as Castro will hold out until the end. The United States would be best served to follow the examples of its allies such as Canada and invest in Cuba. If economic prosperity and a better way of life could be brought to Cuba, then Cuban citizens and the government would not want to give up their new wealth. the United States should use coercion with rewards and not punishments. Therefore, when the government of Cuba does not reform to the liking of the United States, economic rewards could be removed. Due to Prospect Theory and loss aversion, the government of Cuba would not want to lose the new rewards that they had gained, as losing these rewards might seem more salient than making any gains that would displease the United States. As it stands now, the government of Cuba can only lose by incorporating democratic reforms. By opening free elections, Castro ensures that he will be removed from power. Furthermore Castro will have to repress dissidents that are angered by the continuous sanctions and want to overthrow him. This will only cause more human rights violations as the communist regime fights to stay in power. and is forced to repress others to save themselves. As long as sanctions are in place, and Castro is the Cuban leader, no progress will be made towards democracy or increased human rights. Additionally, sanctions have so far failed to remove Castro, so there is no particular reason to think that he will be removed in the near future. The best option for the United States is not continued sanctions, but rather coercion involving rewards. The United States should also search for what would motivated the Cuban government in a non-sanctioned situation, and use that information to save time and money with persuasion. Conclusion With the end of the Cold War, the economic embargo against Cuba remains. The United States has even strengthened the embargo recently, despite international outcry. The main reason that the embargo remains after the Cold War is the irrational decision making of the United States Government, which is encouraged by the Cuban American National Foundation. CANF gives numerous contributions to politicians who support sanctions. Politicians, due to loss aversion, do not want to lose the benefits of these payoffs. Thus, they create a motivated bias to see a Cuban threat where none exists. Such irrational decision making towards Cuba is unlikely to bring about positive change in the near future. The current sanctions provide no reward for Castro to make any kind of economic or human rights concessions, for doing so could cost him his position as leader. The United States must look to work with other countries to provide incentives for the Cuban government to move towards democracy. Providing punishments for such a move will not help the people of Cuba. EndNotes 1. 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