Aida Montes de Oca December 9, 1996 International Peace & Security Affairs Poli Sci 472 Prof. Raymond Tanter PREFACE Since the end of the Cold War and the break up of the former Soviet Union, the United States government (USG) needed to find (and found) legitimate reasons for maintaining a defense budget relative to what it was during the Cold War. In order to insure the survival of a large military establishment the USG came up with the term rogue states or nuclear outlaws," to define/personify an already existing threat. The fear of seeing the military budget reduced to a mere 50% of its Cold War status was subsided by these rogue states. Rogues are defined as hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third World states with large military forces and nascent WMD [weapons of mass destruction] capabilities...bent on sabotaging the prevailing world order. They harbor aggressive intentions vis-`-vis their less powerful neighbors and are guilty of circumventing international norms against nuclear and chemical proliferation (Klare, p. 26, 1995). In August 1990, President Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion of its smaller, weaker, yet wealthier neighbor Kuwait. This paper will attempt to evaluate both nations' actions and the circumstances leading up to the invasion and the ensuing conflict. In order to understand the decisions made by Hussein and the USG, one must look at the history leading up to the conflict and relevant theories and strategies, to evaluate each actors choices. One important factor that should be understood is that the information needed to analyze Iraqs position and Husseins decisions are far limited. Thus it is necessary to evaluate Iraqs state of affairs just before the invasion. This may provide some limited insight from which certain inferences can be made about the decision-making processes. On the other hand there is a plethora of information for evaluating the USGs choices and perspective. The critical points this paper will attempt to answer are: From the information available, why did Saddam Hussein invade Kuwait? When and why did the US intervene in the conflict? What were the USGs efforts in coercing Iraq out of Kuwait? Finally, why did Saddam not withdraw before the use of coercive air power by the US on January 16, 1991. Other questions critical to answering the ones above will also be addressed: Did the US attempt to deter Iraq from invading Kuwait? Did Saddam have other alternatives? What were the motivations involved on both sides? In order to address these questions it will be important to discuss the theoretical framework involved. There are several key concepts that will be recurring throughout this paper which shall be discussed shortly. This framework and the concepts will be drawn from PS 472 class discussions, several class and outside readings, and research taken from the World Wide Web. Following the discussion of the theoretical framework, an attempt to analyze the perspectives of both sides will be made. Then we will take a look at the respective goals, responses and the decisions made in the conflict. Finally, we will examine to what extent the actors policies were consistent with theory and analyze what specific policies needed to be reconsidered. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION We shall now turn to the theories and concepts relevant to this paper. An in depth understanding of the rationality of the actors involved, the expected utility of the actors decisions (i.e. the cost and benefits of making certain decisions), and the strategic and intrinsic interests involved are important factors, among others, that will be analyzed. Rationality is a key concept we need to begin with in order to understand an actors foreign policy decision-making process. When judging the rationality of an actor, the decisions or policies the actor makes is what needs to be evaluated and not the goals being sought. The rationality of an individual is independent of the values they hold and pursue (472NOT1.DOC). Take for example Hitler, one would assume that he must not have been a rational man. Yet all his decisions were made rationally despite the goals he was pursuing. His decision to invade France before Russia was capable of invading Germany from the other frontier was essential in avoiding a two front war for Germany. So even though many of us realize that his ideals were absurd, he went about pursuing them in a rational manner. Key components in determining the rationality of a decision maker are whether the actor is a unitary actor, whether the actor identifies all the options available, pays attention to new evidence, and whether or not the actor maximizes the expected utility of the relevant choices (i.e. the highest benefit or the lowest loss). This process is know as analytical decision-making. The idea of a rheostat of rationality must also be considered. If you are on the low end of the rheostat, you are leaning towards irrationality. If you are on the higher end, then you are more rational. Cognitive decision-making is also key in determining where you fall on the rheostat. Although the analytical is more rational in terms of being more objective. First, a unitary actor is the idea in which all final decisions fall upon a single person, rational or irrational (i.e. Bush or Hussein). This unitary actor chooses his best choice (transitive preferences). These preferences need to be stable over a period of time. If they are not transitive and stable it is difficult to make a choice. The idea is that if option A is preferred to option B, and B to C, then option A has to be preferred to C. The actor should select the option with the greatest expected gain or the least expected losses. The expected utility among choices is determined by the value associated with a certain policy option, taking into account the costs of pursuing that policy and the probability of achieving those gains or the probability of suffering costs. The expected utility equals the net value x the probability of that value. A rational perspective says they will take into account new information and update their expected utility (guest lecture, Prof. Huth). Further, it is also important to note another approach to foreign policy decision-making. It is the concept of bounded rationality in which individuals need only to search across some goals, specify fewer options, make fewer calculations and make less than optimal choices (472NOT1.DOC). Using this approach requires us to consider an actors domestic circumstances and constraints that may bias the perception of threat (472NOT13.DOC). The controllability and calculability of risks are also important considerations. This is a cost-benefit analysis of the situation which helps calculate the risks of an option and control the unacceptable risks from taking an option. Motivated biases play a critical role in the actors decision-making processes. It entails ignoring the risks involved in a situation because you see what you want to see in order to benefit. It is a defense mechanism which in response to needs or external pressure. This can lead to a faulty assessment of your adversaries roles, overconfidence on the actors part and insensitivity to warnings (472NOT12.DOC). HISTORICAL SETTING Now that the theoretical foundations have been laid out we will now turn to the historical context of the paper. To analyze Iraqi decision-making it is critical to understand the related historical events. Iraq has always had territorial disputes with neighboring Kuwait. Since Iraq became an independent state in 1932, the territorial claims have varied from all of Kuwait to various islands (Warba and Baryon) to the territorial land borders. For Iraq, control of the territorial borders would mean ownership of many contested oil fields and control of the islands was critical for access to the Persian Gulf because the only current access is a waterway that is shared with Iran. Iraq offered to give up its claims to the land borders if Kuwait would lease the islands over to Iraq. Up until the Gulf War, a stalemate persisted over access and control of the islands. Iraq had also accumulated a large debt from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. Once the war was over, it was time for Iraq to begin paying off their debt which now totaled to a total of $80 billion, $10 billion of which it owed to Kuwait. This was compounded by the current oil prices which were too low from the Iraqi perspective. These oil exports are critical for their economy. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) production of too much oil was deflating the prices. At an OPEC conference in July of 1990 Saddam requested that his Arab neighbors curtail their production in order for the oil prices to go up. He did not receive any firm cooperation from Kuwait or the UAE which put him in a dire economic situation considering oil exports make up a large percentage of the Iraqi economy. Kuwait was not willing to heed to Iraqi demands of lowering its oil production or forgive any of Iraqs wartime loans. If Kuwait put itself in a position of acquiescing to Iraqi needs it would probably have been bombarded with constant demands. Another important internal factor to note is that at the end of 1988 until the spring of 1990 the Iraqi government was unstable with various attempts at coups and high discontentment with factions of the military who were now jobless after the 8 year war with Iran. The poor economy of Iraq led to severe internal malaise, not only for the people but for their leader as well. IRAQI PERSPECTIVE Taking the circumstances at hand, an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait seemed beneficial. The probability of Iraq prevailing over Kuwait was very high considering Kuwait could not defend itself against a concerted Iraqi effort. The potential benefits were too great to pass up. The expected utility of using force in a purely bilateral confrontation was very beneficial to Iraq: The unresolved territory would no longer be an issue, the disputed oil fields and their revenue would accelerate Iraqs economy (giving it a decisive say in the world oil market), oil production could be curtailed while also intimidating Saudi Arabias production, the Iraqi debts owed to Kuwait would be canceled, and finally a use of force could possibly stabilize internal dissent and therefore, Saddams position internally and in the Arab world. The expected utility of not using force for Iraq would have meant a continuing persistence of all the economic and political problems facing Saddams regime. So the expected utility of not using force is very low compared to a very high expected utility of using force. It appears Saddam may have had no other option. Even taking third party intervention into account, the expected utility of using force remained high. Saddam did not expect any response or commitment from the USG or any Arab states. Mid-July of 1990 Iraq began building its forces up along the Kuwaiti border threatening Kuwait if it did not adhere to Iraqi demands previously discussed. Kuwait interpreted Saddams position as a bargaining one and therefore would only negotiate if Iraq abandoned any claim over Kuwaiti territory. Steadily, Iraqi units, artillery, logistics support and aircraft on the border increased. Saddam continuously counted on the fact that the US would not get involved. Not only did Saddams meeting with April Glaspie assure him that the US was not interested in getting involved in the situation because the current goal was to maintain friendly relations, but even as the escalation of Iraqi troops occurred the US could not have provided the necessary means to prevent the invasion from happening. There were no immediate balance of forces capable of providing a deterrent threat for Kuwait. Saddam also relied on the fact that none of the Arab countries would turn to the US for outside intervention. There was no credible threat that Saddam needed to consider in his options. Credibility is a function of the forces you have, their capabilities, and your resolve to use them. The US did not pose a credible threat. US PERSPECTIVE With the initial build-up of the Iraqi forces along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, the USG did not attempt, explicitly or directly to issue a threat of military intervention if Iraq did not leave Kuwait alone. The US only made a weak, indirect effort at deterrence by stating that it would defend its interests and friends in the region. Another indirect threat was the holding for several days in mid to late July of military exercises with the UAE. The Arab regimes were concerned that any US involvement would conflict the situation further and provoke Iraqi action. On the other hand, there was the meeting between Saddam and US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, where Saddam assured Glaspie of a clear preference for a peaceful resolution of the crisis with military options as a lost resort. This led to a more conciliatory approach from the US, and the Arab countries waited patiently figuring that Saddam was using a strategy of tough negotiation. The Iraqi forces on the border were there to compel Kuwait to comply during diplomatic relations between the two countries. So a vigorous policy of deterrence was seen as unnecessary. Other factors to be taken into consideration are the recent US relations with Iraq before the Gulf War. The US had other important foreign policy objectives in the region at the time. Iran was posing a security problem for the US. Iraq became a useful ally to pursue cooperative policies where it made sense. If the US had taken a strong position with Kuwait against Iraq, it would have alienated Iraq. Iran posed a constraint in the situation for the US. For the US, Iraqs keeping Iran in check was a cause for commendation. Also the US was engaged, through the initiation of several Senators, led by Dole to sell agricultural and food products to Iraq. By 1987, Iraq became the US main customer for this market. Politically and economically the US had motivated biases in which they did not want to see Iraq turned into the demon that it was eventually made out to be. Not wanting to enter into conflict, many US officials saw what they wanted to see, which were the economic and political advantages of the situation. The US was willing to bring Iraq into its family of nations and forget its rogueness. Another constraint for the US operating at the time was that the Arab countries wanted to handle the situation diplomatically within the region. The US therefore could not take any military action and remain friendly and supported by other Arab states, such as Egypt. The US also needed the use of military bases in these countries to move US forces and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, initially, did not want any forces on their territory. With no credible deterrent threat standing in Iraqs way, it was easy to overrun Kuwait. The initial response to the Iraqi invasion was non-military. Through Executive Order 12722, President Bush froze all Iraqi assets within the United States. This was the beginning of clear policies adopted by the USG which confirmed the US opposition to the Kuwaiti occupation. That same day President Bush addressed the nation to express his concerns and motivations. He stated that: ...[T]he department of defense has been in touch with governments around the world urging that they, too, condemn the Iraqi aggression and consult to determine what measures should be taken to bring an end to this totally unjustified act. It is important that the international community act together to ensure that Iraqi forces depart Kuwait immediately. Besides the US response, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on that same day drafted Resolution 660 which states: The Security Council, Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait of 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq, Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Acting under [Chapter VII] Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, 1) Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 2) Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990... After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US has a clear policy of deterrence with Saudi Arabia against Iraq. At this point the US also began pursuing a policy of compellence in order to get Iraq out of Kuwait. Compellence involves taking an action to force a party to change unacceptable behavior or undo an action already taken. It is acting so that the other acts to avoid conflict. With compellence, you have someone who believes it is in their best interest to use force (possibility of net gains). Iraq had already gone in and taken over Kuwait, the US (after some period of time) came out with a policy that if they did not leave, the US would resort to military force. Compellence is successful when you get the country (i.e. Iraq) to do what you want them to do by a threat or small-scale conflict, otherwise there will be war (and compellence will have failed). From September through December the US military position increased on Saudi territory. A very large conventional military presence, naval power, air power, a substantial number of ground forces and clear policy measures being taken, begins to pose a very credible threat. Before continuing with this analysis we must address why the US did not pursue a much stronger and clearer deterrence policy after the initial build-up of Iraqi forces. Deterrence is an action taken to force a party to maintain a certain behavior or preventing them from changing their behavior. The US did not pursue any such strategy. As we have already seen, the US had economic and political biases which were motivating the US to loom in the background without taking action. The other issue already raised is that even if the US had intentions or wanted to deter Iraq, the Arab countries desire to solve the conflict diplomatically would not have allowed the US any leverage. Use of the regions military bases was the only means the US could provide any type of a credible deterrent threat, but they were not accessible for US use. In light of the failure of deterrence attempts by the Arab States, mainly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the US began to pursue a much stronger and clearer policy after the Iraqi invasion. There are several explanations important to understanding this new firm stance. A key aspect is that the US was now given access to Saudi soil and use of military bases. But more importantly, in terms of national security rationales the US had several concerns (their strategic and interests) and motivations. Strategic interests are intangible. They are created by prior commitments and if those commitments intersect with ideals and politics than there is a definite established interest (472NOT.DOC). Some examples of these interests are the resolve of a country and ally commitments. In this case, these strategic interests played a vital role in the US defense of Saudi Arabia. Another strategic interest for the USG was weakening Iraqs military threat in the long term, especially concerning their WMD capabilities. The US also had intrinsic interests at stake. Intrinsic interests are those of inherent value. Because of their inherent value you will do more in order to protect these interests. In terms of the US intrinsic interests involved was the issue of oil and oil prices in the long term. If Iraq controlled Kuwaiti oil, Iraq would be in a strong position to influence Saudi Arabias OPEC policy and the production and prices of oil. Another factor influencing the Bush administration was the unmotivated bias of avoiding the mistakes of an earlier era. An unmotivated bias is a short-cut to rationality where the threat is automatically overestimated. Insufficient attention is paid to the overall frequency of events and too much attention is given to the vividness of some case from the recent past that occurred in the formative years of the decision-maker (472NOT12.DOC). The Munich Analogy was constantly referred to for gathering domestic and international support in opposition to Saddam. Like Hitler before WWII, Saddam needed to be stopped. If the international community did not respond to Hussein it would encourage other leaders in similar disputes to intervene. The international community needed to establish and convince Saddam (and other future potential threats) that, if necessary, forceful action would be taken against states. In turn this would also promote long term regional stability. Given that economic sanctions placed on Iraq were not having any considerable effect, the UN Security Council drafted Resolution 678 giving Saddam an ultimatum for withdrawal from Kuwait. The deadline set was for January 15, 1991. Otherwise military means would be used to force him out. Once an international consensus was established that military forces would be used if Saddam did not withdraw, the US position and credibility was solidified. Still Saddam had his misgivings to the credibility of the threat. He was still hoping that the fear of US casualties incurred from involvement in a war would be too much for the USG and domestic opinion to handle. Saddam believed that the Vietnam syndrome would overwhelm the US and as a result would not involve itself in a war. He went as for to as assuring high casualties and a long, protracted war if the US intervened. Saddam was trying to deter the US from any involvement. The US needed to find a clear, quick and decisive strategy that would remove Saddam from Kuwait and avoid high casualties. Plus there was no clear support from Congress in backing Bush decision to go to war. Congressional debates ran clear up to the eve of the air war. Yet, with or without Congress, Bush was prepared to use military force. The UN deadline rolled around and Saddam had not budged. On January 16, 1991, the US began its air attacks against Iraq. US air strategy was devised into two parts. First, there was the Instant Thunder campaign. The ideas was to target and isolate the highest level of political and military leadership. This strategy is one of decapitation. However, this strategy was unsuccessful in isolating Hussein and it did not cause any internal revolt or conflict as hoped for. The Denial campaign followed. This strategy targeted all the troops and equipment in Kuwait and on the Iraqi border. This was successful in shattering the moral of Iraqi troops. It also cut off their mobility, leaving the Iraqi army nearly paralyzed and unable to counterattack any threat. Saddam seems to have still had a reputation to maintain. Domestically his retreat would have been seen as a failure. Regionally he would have been perceived as weak. Above all, a retreat in Saddams eyes was not possible under the terms demanded by the USG. It was no longer just a matter of withdrawal, but Iraq was to leave its weapons and be defeated. By agreeing to US terms, Iraq would give up its fighting capabilities it had in and around Kuwait. Under these terms, fighting was better than giving up everything. Saddam was unwillingly to accept this defeat and the humiliation that would come along with it. On the eve of the ground campaign, it may have been preferable for the US to fight in order to defeat the Iraqi army at relatively low costs and also reduce the long-term military threat that Iraq could pose in the future. Retaining Iraqi military equipment would provide this. A short ground war proved victory for the USG. Although the removal of Hussein from Kuwait was achieved, there are still many policies and goals that have been ineffective or left unresolved. Saddam is still in power, economic sanctions have proven unsuccessful and Iraq continues to be a rogue threat. CONCLUSION As has been set forth in this paper, the interests and goals of both the US and Iraq were attempted through the employment of rational decision-making. Both countries were unitary actors, although at times you may question Bushs position because of Congressional opposition. Still Bush was bent on pushing forward with or without Congress. He was also bounded by biases to the Munich Analogy in his decision-making. This problem, among others, caused a misperception for Saddam. The portrayed irrational actor Saddam, seems to have acted rationally in most of his decisions - in terms of weighing his highest expected gains and lowest expected losses. Motivated by all the internal turmoil Saddam faced, he proceeded to occupy Kuwait. As discussed above, an adequate dealing with Iraq was lacking in the beginning stages of the Gulf Conflict. The lack of an initial deterrent threat allowed Iraq to roll over Kuwait and proceed to deal with the consequences that came about. Obviously, Iraq made no gain economically from the war but Saddam still poses a threat today. A suggested alternative policy proposal for the USG is difficult to conceive considering the circumstances of the conflict. The US could not initially deter Iraq and once the US was involved and proceeded with a strategy of compellence, it was no longer sufficient. Saddam had reached a point where he would only lose more - military, face, and possibly his leadership - from backing down. WORKS CONSULTED Freedman, L., and Karsh, Efraim. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. Pape, R.A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Lectures and notes from PS 460 with Professor Paul K. Huth. Fall 1996. Lectures and Homepage Notes from PS 472 with Professor Raymond Tanter. Fall 1996. United Nations Resolution 660 at http://www.nd.edu/~aleyden/res660.html United Nations Resolution 678 at http://www.nd.edu/~aleyden/res678.html