Marek, Erika.Iraq THEORETICAL ORIENTATION When Saddam Hussein ordered and successfully completed the invasion of Irbil, why did the United States launch an immediate strategic military attack against Iraq rather than use the techniques of search or persuasion? The country of Iraq has had a long history of being a sponsor of terrorism. The US and its allies are no longer responding to Saddam Hussein as a national leader in use of rational faculties, but as a terrorist who needs to be stopped from inflicting damage on his own people and his neighbors. In order to be rational, a decision-maker must choose the most efficient choice--that alternative that promises the highest expected value. He must identify options, estimate likely consequences of options, consider cost, benefit, and likelihood of success, and trade off expected cost and benefit to establish expected value. He must then select the option that promises the highest gain or lowest loss. A rational procedure should yield expected value maximizing outcomes over the long run. Gross deviations from accepted norms are indicative of a lack of rationality (1). Saddam Hussein has displayed none of the characteristics which identify rationality, and only those which would identify irrationality, eliminating him from any discussion regarding Prospect Theory. He has not chosen the most efficient alternative which would promise the highest gain or lowest loss. He has continually defied the entire international community, which can only lead to the eventual destruction of Iraq and its people. Despite the destruction of his country in the Persian Gulf War, Saddam has struck again, in the face of suffering a great deal of loss. and ultimately gaining nothing. In light of these facts, the US has come to view Saddam as a bully who needs containment in order to protect those around him. As Minister Portillo of the United Kingdom stated in a September 4, 1996 DoD News Briefing on the situation in Iraq, We, in particular, share an understanding of Saddams track record. We know about his murderous history, we know about the anti-humanitarian acts that he has committed within his own country in the past. We know about the threat to stability that he poses to the region and his proven propensity to invade the territory of his neighbors. We therefore, though with you, that this major escalation, this intimidatory act in Northern Iraq to go without any response from the international community would pose a danger. It would encourage him to move to another dangerous stage in his remilitarization (2). Search and persuasion have become moot objectives. Deterrent and coercive diplomacy have become the only options. The degree to which deterrence and coercive diplomacy have been a part of the overall containment approach has been high. (Deterrence as in forcing an actor to change their behavior, or preventing a behavior, and coercion as in forcing an actor to change unacceptable behavior, or undo an unacceptable action). Coercion by compellence (punishment short of brute force) has continually failed in the case of Iraq, and so coercion by inducement (brute force) is currently being used in order to have Saddams forces withdraw from Irbil. Deterrence is a by-product of the process in that if we are successful, Saddam will hopefully be discouraged from attempting any more acts of aggression in the future. In the DoD News Briefing noted above Secretary Perry stated that, Our [the US] objective remains the same as it has been from the beginning, to deter Saddam Hussein from taking actions which commit atrocities to his own people, which attack his neighbors, and which upset the security and stability of the region. All of our various responses to him through the years have been intended either to deter him from taking those actions or to punish him or stop him from taking those actions. LOGICAL STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE ACROSS TIME AND SPACE Department of State Publication 10136, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993, states that no one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance... however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 265f(d). That statute contains the following definitions: -- The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. -- The term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens of the territory of more than one country. -- The term terrorist group means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism (3). The Iraqi government has continually engaged in terrorism, international terrorism, and sponsored terrorist groups. According to the 1995 report of Patterns of Global Terrorism, During 1995 several acts of political violence in northern Iraq matched Baghdads pattern of using terrorism against the local population and regime defectors. Although Iraqs terrorist infrastructure has not recovered from the blows it suffered during the Gulf war, Baghdad has taken measures to restore its terrorist options, exemplifying domestic terrorism. Exemplifying sponsorship of terrorist groups, Iraq continues to provide haven and training facilities for several terrorist clients. Abu Abbas Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) maintains its headquarters in Baghdad. The Abu Nidal organization (ANO) continues to have an office in Baghdad. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF), headquartered in Baghdad, continues to receive funding from Saddams regime. Iraq also continues to host the former head of the now-defunct 15 May organization, Abu Ibrahim, who masterminded several bombings of US aircraft. A terrorist group opposed to the current Iranian regime, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), still is based in Iraq and has carried out several violent attacks in Iran from bases in Iraq. Individual accounts of Iraqi-sponsored terrorism include: Early in the year, a number of Iraqi oppositionists in northern Iraq were poisoned by thallium. At least one survived and was treated in a British hospital. The British Government confirmed that he was a victim of a regime assassination attempt. In October, the British Government expelled an officer of the Iraqi interest Section in London for engaging in activities incompatible with his diplomatic status. The London-based Iraqi opposition reported that the official concerned wan an employee of the Iraqi intelligence services who was responsible for targeting Iraqi exiles for attack. On 20 January a US District Court in California awarded $1.5 million to Dr. Sargon Dadesho, an Iraqi oppositionist living in the United States who had brought suit against the Iraqi regime. The court concluded that the Iraqi Government was involved in a 1990 plot to assassinate Dadesho. Iraq remains far from compliance with UN resolutions that require it to cease internal repression and support for terrorism. These examples, aside from the invasion of Kuwait leading to the Persian Gulf War, and the recent invasion of Irbil, which are examples of international terrorism, are only a few of the reasons why Iraq has remained on the list of terrorist states (4). In response to the invasion of Irbil, President Clinton released a Statement on September 3, 1996. In his statement he speaks to not to Saddams reasoning or rational use of faculties, but to his terrorist action: Our missiles sent the following message to Saddam Hussein: When you abuse your own people or threaten your neighbors you must pay a price. Our objectives are limited, but clear: to make Saddam pay a price for the latest act of brutality, reducing his ability to threaten his neighbors and Americas interests. Saddam Husseins objectives may change, but his methods are always the same -- violence and aggression, against the Kurds, against other ethnic minorities, against Iraqs neighbors. Our answer to that recklessness must be strong and immediate, as President Bush demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm, as we showed two years ago when Iraq massed its forces on Kuwaits border, and as we showed again today. We must make it clear that reckless acts have consequences or those acts will increase. We must reduce Iraqs ability to strike out at its neighbors, and we must increase Americas ability to contain Iraq over the long run. The steps we are taking today will further all those objectives. Time and again, Saddam Hussein has made clear his disdain for civilized behavior. He brutalized his own people, attacked his neighbors, supported terrorism, and sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction. But I think its important to move now. We have not seen any withdrawal of Saddams forces from the area, and we know that he has a history of seeing how far he can go -- taking a little and then doing a little more, taking a little and doing a little more (5). President Clinton made it clear that he was responding not in the interest of appeasing or subduing Iraq, but in the interest of putting an immediate stop to Saddam Husseins behavior so as to protect the people of Iraq and the interests of America and states neighboring Iraq from Saddams reckless, violent, and aggressive acts of terrorism. There was no room for search or persuasion. The US departments and agencies failed to employ search or persuasion as these options had already been exhausted during the Persian Gulf War. The US in conjunction with France and Algeria encouraged and arranged peace conferences, but there was no softening in Saddams resolve to keep Kuwait. The UN made a final appeal for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait with a face-saving formula. Iraq refused. Every effort to find an alternative to conflict was futile. Persuading Iraq to back down without damaging its ego was futile. Search and persuasion were futile (6). Having learned from this experience, the President Clinton ordered a strategic attack that went straight for Iraqs capabilities in order to try and weaken Saddam Husseins resolve, and strengthen the US threat credibility. Military strategy was the only way to deal with Saddam Hussein as a terrorist. The legal authority by which the US attempts to deter, coerce, or launch military action is written in the Charter of the United Nations. CHAPTER VII ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION: Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 40: In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Member of the United Nations (7). The U.S. in conjunction with the U.K. and Northern Ireland, all UN Security Council members had full rights when Iraq violated the peace aspects of the Charter with its aggressive action toward Irbil. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY The US policy on terrorism is consistent with the theory that the US reacted to the invasion of Irbil with an immediate implementation of a strategic military attack, rather than the use of search or persuasion, based on Saddam Husseins terrorist track record. As President Clinton said when he signed the new Counterterrorism Act last weak, combating terrorism, both domestic and international, is a critical priority for this Administration. Although terrorism kills or injures relatively few people compared to other forms of violence, it inflicts an extraordinary psychological, political, and economic toll. Its random quality, the fact that it strikes without warning, the fact that it preys upon innocent victims, gives it a particularly evil quality. It increases our collective sense of fear and vulnerability. Thats why we pay so much attention to it. We dont surrender to terrorist blackmail. We dont make deals. We treat terrorists as criminals, and we pursue them aggressively wherever they are, using extradition treaties and international treaties to the maximum. We work to condemn and isolate state sponsors of terrorism. We work to strengthen our cooperation with other governments through diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence cooperation, training, cooperation in research and development, in document security, and in many other areas. We also go after fund-raising for overseas terrorists in the United States. Defeating terrorists depends not only on good law enforcement, good intelligence collection, and professional counterterrorism efforts. It depends, to a great extent, also on a strong overall U.S. foreign policy and ample resources to support that policy. Not always but often, terrorism arises from political, social and economic conflicts. These are often the breeding grounds for some of the most venomous and dangerous terrorist movements, and we in this country have led the way since World War II in helping resolve such conflicts and by mobilizing other nations to help us in that effort (8). This statement is consistent with the theory that the US implemented counterterrorist activities in response to Iraq. There have been no deals attempted with Saddam Hussein, he has been treated as an outsider in the international arena, and maximum pressure has brought upon Iraq with sanctions, political pressure, and military responses to aggression. The key to a successful, long-term counterterrorism policy is international cooperation on these three basic elements. The United States enforced this policy in many ways during the past year: When it became clear that the Government of Iraq was responsible for the foiled plot to kill former President Bush, the Untied States used military force to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that such behavior would not be tolerated (9). The United States believes that implementing a strict counterterrorist policy is the best way to reduce the global terrorist threat. US policy follows three general rules: -- First, make no deals with terrorist or submit to blackmail. We have found over the years that this policy works. -- Second, treat terrorists as criminals, pursue them aggressively, and apply the rule of law. -- Third, bring maximum pressure on states that sponsor and support terrorists by imposing economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions and by urging other states to do likewise. The United States and its allies continue to focus on raising the costs for governments that support, tolerate, and engage in international terrorism. It is widely recognized that state support for terrorist groups enhances their capabilities and makes law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism more difficult. To pressure states to stop such support, US law imposes trade and other restrictions on countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism by supporting, training, supplying, or providing safehaven to known terrorists. The United States currently lists Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state supporters of terrorism. The list is sent annually to Congress, although countries can be added or removed at any time circumstances warrant (10). In my opinion, both the Bush and Clinton Administrations have acted properly in dealing with the terrorism and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein. He is a figure not want to peace or humanitarian efforts. He seems to act out of pure selfishness without regard to any other living being on the planet. It is pointless to fight fire with fire. The US must act as the extinguisher to keep his blaze under control lest it destroy the lives around him. Downing his military capabilities with a violent strike has been the only way to accomplish this. ENDNOTES (1) Tanter, 472not1.doc (2) DoD News Briefing, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Wednesday, September 4, 1996, 12:20 p.m. (EDT), of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Web site: http://www/dtic.mil/defenselink/news/Sep96/t090496_t0904hon.html (3) Department of State Publication 10136, Office of the Secretary, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 1994, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993, Web site: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/+F-1%3A6969%3A1993%20Report (4) 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Release Date: April 1996. Web site: http://www.usis.usemb.se/terror/TERINT.HTM (5) The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, For Immediate Release, September 3, 1996, Statement by the President, The Oval Office, 8:07 a.m. EDT, Web site: http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/iraq.html (6) Chronology of the Persian Gulf War, Web site: http://munshi.sonoma.edu/jamal/gulfwar.html (7) Charter of the United Nations, University of Minnesota Human Rights Library Web site: http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/auncharter.html (8) Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996 Briefing, Press briefing by Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism, on the release of the 1995 report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, Washington, DC, April 30, 1996. Web site: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/960430.html (9) Department of State Publication 10136, Office of the Secretary, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Released April 1994, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993, Web site: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/+F-1%3A6969%3A1993%20Report (10) 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Release Date: April 1996. Web site: http://www.usis.usemb.se/terror/TERINT.HTM