Andrew Lovasz Political Science 472 Fall Term 1996 Professor Raymond Tanter The Motivations for the Continuing United States Policy of Isolating North Korea Preface In the years since the end of the Korean War, the United States has conducted a policy of isolationism against North Korea. Through its considerable economic might, the U.S. has succeeded in its strategy of attrition and has caused a near collapse of the Stalinist regime. But, the Democratic PeopleUs Republic of Korea still hangs on...waiting. Waiting to play its trump card. In 1985, the United States snuck a look at North KoreaUs hand and found that the trump card was a nuclear facility, soon capable of producing weapons grade material. It took Washington three presidents and nine years to come up with a solution to the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The 1994 October Agreed Framework was signed by the now deceased Kim Il Sung and President Bill Clinton. The framework provided for North Korea freezing its nuclear program in exchange for the United States state of the art reactors (that produce minimal weapons grade material) to replace the ones to be shut down in compliance with the framework. Recently the framework has come under fire for being a softline policy which allows for North Korea to continue its nuclear program in secret. Additional current events such as the threatened NPT withdrawal by North Korea and the medium range missile test have also tested the resolve of America to intervene to stop North Korean aggression. Competing theoretical frameworks suggest that the U.S. is acting from a Prospect Theory framework valuing losses over gains. The competing view holds that America is not irrationally fearful, but is rationally considering a dangerous geopolitical situation that may cause serious damage to vital U.S. interest. To explore these concepts we will explain the competing theoretical frameworks: Prospect Theory and rational choice theory. Next, the theories will be incorporated into the logical structure of each states decision making process. The key issues to be explored here are whether the states are unitary actors and exactly how rational is each in terms of the Rrheostat of rationalityS. The work concludes with an analysis of the motivations and effectiveness of each countryUs policy and a suggestion for future U.S.-North Korean policy. Theoretical Orientation The United States may be operating from a Prospect Theory approach to North Korea. Prospect Theory is concerned with loss aversion as an unmotivated bias to rationality. When Prospect Theory is mentioned as an unmotivated bias, it simply refers to the fact that the decision maker is unaware of the bias, as it occurs on an unconscious level. The decision maker is unaware that he or she is being influenced by perceptions of a situation. The crux of the loss aversion mindset is that a person places more emphasis on avoiding losses than achieving gains. The theory is deeply concerned with how a person frames a situation. In the present case it is a hypothesis of this work that the United States places the losses associated with a imploding or exploding North Korea on a higher priority than gains it may be able to achieve (such as a nuclear free Korean Peninsula). The reference points available to Washington would be the following: North Korea is on the verge of collapse and may lash out at any time to a) gain economic aid or RcarrotsS from the United States or b) insure that it will not be attacked by a united South Korea and America. In other words, Washington may see North Korea as gain oriented or fear motivated, respectively. These two possible reference points set the groundwork for prospect theory and the rational choice theory approaches to explaining U.S. policy in the Korean peninsula. For the analysis of prospect theory, we will examine what the United States stands to lose and how it has attempted to avoid these losses. America stands to lose a great deal if North Korea implodes or explodes. First, what is meant by Rimploding or explodingS. The historical context of the situation in North Korea will be explained below, but what is key to understanding the critical losses is the current state of the North. North KoreaUs economy is undergoing severe problems due to years of America fostered economic isolation. The country is also undergoing a famine due to poor crops for the last few years and a recent flood. The situation is definitely a powderkeg, with the potential to cause North Korea to lash out against South Korea or Japan. This scenario may develop by an internal power struggle or the decaying regime may try to take pressure off internal problems by attacking the South. Both scenarios spell trouble for U.S. strategic and intrinsic interests in the region. Strategically, the United States must protect its longtime ally the Republic of Korea. In terms of intrinsic interests, the United States must protect the 37,000 American troops stationed in South Korea. Thus, it is the postulate of Prospect Theory that the U.S. values avoiding these losses over possible gains. The possible gains are tied in with the United States goals in the region which will be discussed later. But the most relevant goal of the United States that has been put on the RbackburnerS is a verifiable, non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. The backbone of Prospect Theory states that the decision maker must have been risk acceptant in the face of possible losses and risk averse when gains are possible. The best example of the former is the United States accepting the risk of possible proliferation of nuclear weapons under the weak enforcement of the 1994 Agreed Framework. A possible reason for this soft approach would be a fear of implosion or explosion of North Korea. In addition the Clinton administration has not used any measure other than persuasion against North Korea for a series of aggressive actions. These actions include non-compliance with IAEA inspections, the submarine commando expedition, and the attempted medium range missile test. It would seem that the core of ClintonUs softline policy in the face of such aggression must reflect some fear of giving North Korea an excuse to attack South Korea. The reluctance to take strong action against Northern aggression is an example of risk aversion in the face of gain. Washington could use these acts of aggression as justification for unilateral or multilateral sanctions, military intervention or forced peace talks. All could be used to coerce North Korea into IAEA nuclear inspections, four-way peace talks or other regional goals. But, instead of jumping through the windows of opportunity, the Clinton administration chooses the less rational approach of staying in a basement of fears. For the Clinton administration, the basement of fears is the inability to analyze all available options because of a fear of a North/South conflict that dominates decision making. The basement of fears compliments the Prospect Theory analysis because it serves to explain the inaction symptomatic of the loss averse state. But Prospect Theory goes a step further by saying that the state will not only stay in the basement to avoid loss, but will take more risks to avoid losing their vital interests than they would to advance gains. What this means is that the Clinton administration may be suffering from a bias that allows for a lower rating on the Rrheostat of rationalityS. Rationality is a way of understanding policy makers frame of mind when making a decision. To measure such a subjective quantity, we rate heads of state on the RrheostatS. The RrheostatS allows the user to classify a leaders actions in terms of an ideally rational state utilizing the most information available in an analytical fashion. The more cognitive structures (Prospect Theory, motivated/unmotivated biases, misperceptions) an individual uses in his or her decision making process, the lower on the RrheostatS the person falls. At this point is seem appropriate to introduce the rational choice theory. The rational choice or Schellingesque model is known for an assumption of rationality in decision making. An actor is rational if Rif they choose the most efficient choice--that alternative that promises the highest expected value, either highest benefit or lowest loss.S1 What is most often associated with rational choice theory is the concepts of search, persuasion, and strategy. Search is a process of gathering information in order to make more rational decisions. Persuasion involves convincing a party to comply by making them think it is in their best interest to comply. Strategy involves deterrence and coercion to either maintain or change the status quo. Deterrence involves threats of punishment while coercion involves punishment up to and including brute force. The concept of unitary actor is also important to determining rationality. A unitary actor is more or less a single minded decision maker. It is important to determine to what extent the United States and North Korea are unitary actors in analyzing their motivations, biases and actions. Finally, one must consider the concepts of strategic and intrinsic interests. Intrinsic interests are interests that are concrete, such as human lives or property. Strategic interests are more abstract and therefore more difficult to define. Prestige, respect, and loyalty are all examples of strategic interests. Historical Perspective North Korea has been isolated for the past four decades. Intentional American economic and political isolation as well as secrecy by the Stalinist regime have finally caused problems for the Democratic PeopleUs Republic of Korea. According to Sim Jae Hoon, a staff writer for the Far Eastern Economic Review, Rthe countryUs increasing isolation has shattered its economy. Since the Soviet-led communist trading bloc ceased to function, subsidies from Moscow have stopped and North KoreaUs GDP has declined for six straight years.S2 WhatUs more, its not only outsiders that are speculating on the troubled nature of the North Korea economy. Marcus Noland notes Reven North Korean officials admit the economy has shrunk by 30 percent since 1991.S3 There are troubles not only for the economy, but for the North Korean people. A combination of economic woes and natural catastrophe have caused famine in the Democratic PeopleUs Republic of Korea. Frank Gibney, Jr. reports that Rtorrential rains last August drowned North Korea's annual harvest and turned its most fertile fields into a wasteland. One year later, the persistent food shortage is limiting many children to 35% of their U.N.-recommended calorie intake, and it has driven villagers into forests to forage for any scraps nature might still provide.S4 The situation is grave for the citizenUs of North Korea. Some policy analysts have hypothesized that the North Korea will attack South Korea soon as a result of current internal strife.5 So, what is the North Korean threat? Secretary of Defense William J. Perry explains the dual threat North Korea poses. RThere are two aspects to the Korean threat. One of them is their conventional military forces. They have more than a million men in their army. The second part of the Korean threat, though, is that a few years ago we became greatly concerned at their program to develop nuclear weapons.S6 The development of nuclear facilities was detected in 1985, but it was not until 1990 that the United States realized the speed at which North KoreaUs nuclear program was developing. U.S. intelligence found that Rin early 1992 that North Korea might be only months away from building its first atomic bomb and that the installations at Yongbyon.S7 To attempt to preserve American interests in the region, Presidents Bush and Clinton began efforts to neutralize the nuclear potential of North Korea. Those efforts culminated with the signing of the October 1994 Agreed Framework. In signing the framework, RNorth Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for two new pressurized light-water reactors (which are considered less capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium) and 500,000 metric tons a year of heavy fuel oil to meet its energy needs until the new reactors become operational.S8 The framework also provided for IAEA(International Atomic Energy Association) inspections to verify that North Korea was keeping her end of the bargain. The problem with verification of the North KoreanUs pledge to cease and eventually dismantle their nuclear program is her recent history. The most notorious case of questionable verification occurred when the Democratic PeopleUs Republic of Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT. According to Ted Galen Carpenter, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Cato Institute, Swhen the IAEA demanded to inspect two suspected clandestine sites in early 1993, however, North Korea's cooperative policy abruptly ceased. Pyongyang immediately abrogated the inspection agreement and announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT.S The IAEA later found that North Korea may have been hiding a quantity of weapons grade nuclear material.9 In addition, as early as October 22, the North Koreans intended to test fire a medium range missile capable of reaching Japan.10 After an apparent example of persuasive diplomatic efforts from Washington, North Korea appears to have canceled the test-fire.11 Add the recent infiltration of North Korean commandos by submarine into South Korea and one comes up with a rather puzzling picture of North Korea intentions. The RcommandosS were allegedly carrying Rslogans, small arms and chewing gumS.12 With the confusing nature of the above events, it seems to be an appropriate time to examine the American and North Korea perspectives using our theoretical framework and historical background. U.S. Perspective The United States goals for policy in the Korean peninsula can best be see by looking at the joint press release issued by the United States and South Korea on November 24, 1996. It reads: Point one: The Presidents of the Republic of Korea and the United States reaffirmed that the agreed framework will be implemented and also reconfirmed their shared position that they will continue to pursue the four-party meeting. Point two: Both sides reaffirmed their strong support for the four-party meeting and decided to continue to urge the North to accept this proposal based on the assessment that the meeting is all the more necessary in light of the current situation on the Peninsula. Point three: The two leaders called upon the North to take acceptable steps to resolve the submarine incident, reduce tension,and avoid such provocations in the future.13 The policy calls for continued protection of identified strategic and intrinsic interests in the region, namely support for a nuclear free, stable Korean Peninsula. The relevant interests to this paper are largely intrinsic interests. War prevention seems to be a paramount issue to the Clinton administration. War prevention is such an issue that it may cause Washington to act from a Prospect Theory mindset. The domestic political and economic situation in North Korea lends itself to instability. So, is the United States acting irrationally out of fear or simply considering all available data in making its decisions? There may be no clear, black and white answer to this question, but we will attempt to glean a conclusion from the available evidence as to the American theoretical framework. One way to examine motivations is to determine if the United States is a unitary actor. Again, this is a difficult question to answer because of the nature of the American political system of checks and balances. In this case congress provides a check to the unilateral powers of the presidency by controlling the purse strings. To successfully implement the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States must raise about $55 million per year to pay for oil sent to North Korea until the new reactors are built. Congress recently voted to cut funding to the Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization (KEDO) to $13 million.14 The situation is summed up by Nigel Holloway, a correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review. RWithout CongressUs backing, President Bill ClintonUs entire approach to stabilizing the Korean peninsula could unravel.S15 So, even with the freedom to make unilateral decisions regarding foreign policy the president is not a single-minded actor. The checks and balances of the American political system prevent a president from completing some foreign policy actions. In the above example the financial constraint of congress brings other minds to the equation, thus eliminating the possibility of a unitary actor. In more broad based foreign policy context, the president must have all treaties made approved by congress. The checks and balances of a non-unitary system may consume more time than a strictly unilateral approach, but it also eliminates a great deal of the biases that a unitary actor may encounter when making decisions alone. So, the decision making process in Washington may not be in a Rbasement of fearsS and is acting from less biased bureaucratic model, we should look at rational choice theory as an alternate explanation to U.S. behavior. The U.S. seems to be engaging in a mix of persuasion and strategy to change North KoreaUs behavior. Secretary of Defense Perry explains the U.S. policy. Sometimes preventing proliferation means employing "coercive diplomacy" -- a combination of diplomacy and defense measures. In North Korea, for example, we used such a combination to stop that nation's nuclear weapons program. The diplomacy came from the threat by the United States and other nations in the region to impose economic sanctions if North Korea did not stop their program and the promise of assistance in the production of commercial power if they did. The defense came from our simultaneous beefing up of our military forces in the region.16 Secretary PerryUs reasoning for the success of the Rcoercive diplomacyS rests in SchellingUs theories of Rthe diplomacy of violenceS. Compellance seems to best describe PerryUs remarks on U.S. policy. The united states took action to change North KoreaUs unacceptable policy, but did not attempt to induce their compliance with military action. Another example of the United States employing rational choice theory in diplomacy occurred recently with the expected test-firing of a medium range missile that could hit Japan, greatly increasing the target envelope for North Korea. Both strategic and intrinsic interests were at stake with the testing of the Rodong I missile. The security of AmericaUs ally Japan presents a very large strategic interest. The security and peace of the Korean peninsula is also threatened by the testing of the Rodong I missile. With vital interests at stake and a need to be cautious around the volatile North Korea, the United States used persuasion to accomplish its goal. The New York Times Reports that RAmerican diplomats are reported to have strongly pressed North Korean counterparts to cancel the test.S17 The diplomatic process of making North Korea believe that it is in their best interests to comply with U.S. demands is an excellent example of persuasion in a delicate situation. The diplomatic pressure more than likely involved some measure the amount of humanitarian aid that North Korea is receiving to deal with the famine from the U.S. and its allies. The most important element of this type of persuasion is that it leaves the decision up to the country being persuaded. North Korea was in control of its own destiny; if it canceled the test it would be in a more favorable position to receive greater amounts of aid (presumably). Additionally this example serves to question the hypothesis that the U.S. is acting out of a loss aversion mindset. In this instance the United States was willing to risk the loss of stability to gain more protection for its allies. It should be noted that the risk taken was minimal, but according to prospect theory one should be risk averse when dealing with gains. There was no inherent danger of a loss over one missile test. The action was done simply to gain more protection for allies. North Korean Perspective Understanding the North Korean mindset will be helpful in orienting a policy proposal for the region. A sample of the mistrustful outlook of the North Korea Community comes from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). RThe US policy is aimed at stifling the DPRK with brute force. We are eagerly watching the United States because it may mount a surprise military action against the DPRK on some preposterous pretext while deliberately aggravating the situation.S18 This mistrust is typical of a regime that appears to be the picture of irrationality. The political ideology of RjucheS or self reliance is an integral part of their isolationist attitude. Also key are the traditional qualities of Koreanism. Koreanism would seem to have roots in Confusionism according to the Japan International Affairs Institute. RThe Korean tradition favors Rbenevolent government, loyalty, filial duties, and patriotism, and worship of the ancestors among othersS.19 The Korean tradition also favors a long mourning period. And in the case of Kim Jong IlUs father Kim Il Sung, who died on July 8, 1994, the mourning period has been extended to an unusual three years.20 The mourning period may explain why Kim Jong Il has not assumed his fatherUs position of general secretary of the Korean Workers Party and state president. So, are we to dismiss North Korea as a questionably rational state that is best regarded as a subject for Rreligious studiesS as some have suggested?21 In light of the seemingly non-analytical reliance on ideology and religion, the tempting answer for the policy maker is to classify North Korea as a state low on the Rrheostat of rationalityS. To best examine this question, one must look at whether Kim Jong Il is a unitary actor. The dual factors of Kim Il SungUs death and a poor economy provide an excellent reasoning for the lack of assuming power. Think about the parallel situation in the United States with elections and the state of the economy. It is a distinct disadvantage for an incumbent president to go into an election with the economy in bad shape. The same should hold true for Kim Jong Il. Maseo Okonogi, a professor of political science and Korea expert at TokyoUs Keio University, states that RHeUs in charge. (Kim Jong Il)- The economy needs to improve for him to be officially inagurated.S22 If Kim Jong Il is indeed in charge is he a unitary actor? The answer is not yet. The surprising answer to the question of who Kim Jong Il shares his power with would seem to be his father. The Supreme PeopleUs Assembly, acts a parliament in form but has no real power other than to back the commands of the RGreat LeaderS. It seems that the only one that could contend with Kim Jong Il for power is Kim Il Sung. But, it is not a competition; its more like a symbiotic relationship. The longer Kim Jong Il stays out of office the more it Rmystifies, and elevates the post of leaderS.23 So, not only does this prove that Kim Jong Il is a unitary actor to be, it also proves that he is high on the RrheostatS by using the ideological and religious forces existent in his culture to strengthen his credibility and prestige. Kim Jong IlUs behavior with regards to the United States and South Korea assures that he must be placed high on the RrheostatS. First, Kim Jong Il pursued a policy of brinkmanship that fooled the U.S. into thinking that North Korea was irrational and must be complied with. It has been argued above that the United States fears a implosion or explosion by North Vietnam. The more unsettling scenario would probably be the implosion, because a more hardline government (the military) could come to power. But, in a totalitarian regime hardship and strict adherence to state policies are nothing new, and certainly a Rbasket-case economy need not trigger anti-government rebellions.S24 By appearing to be a Rrunaway trainS with an unstable domestic political situation the Pyongyang government successfully persuaded the United States that it was in its best interest to give billions of dollars worth of nuclear reactors, humanitarian aid and other concessions. And in continuing the role as the runaway train and refusing IAEA inspections, North Korea is still free to pursue a secret nuclear program over the next ten years (timeframe until the 1994 Framework is complete) to add to its regional security and influence.25 Conclusions and Policy Recommendation The years of isolation have given the North Korea regime alot of time to think about what they will do when they finally meet their old friend the United States. Since the Korean War, the United States has pursued a policy aimed at isolating North Korea. A possible reason for this U.S. policy was retribution for the humiliation suffered in the Korean War. It might also be possible that North Korea is pursuing a retributive policy toward the United States for the years of isolation. So, as we turn to the analysis of why the United States and North Korea pursue their respective foreign policies it is important to remember the distinction between rehabilitative and retributive goals. Rehabilitative goals are aimed at changing a partyUs behavior. Retributive goals are aimed at righting a wrong that has or is perceived to have been committed. The distinction between these two goals also comes into play when measuring success. Retributive goals are successful as soon as they are implemented. The United States felt good about punishing North Korea with isolation after the Korean War since it felt that it was righting a wrong. The rehabilitative approach is not nearly as effective since effectiveness is contingent upon the behavior change of the party acted against. The U.S. policy attempting to make a nuclear free Korean peninsula is an example of a rehabilitative policy aimed at changing North KoreaUs behavior. The effectiveness of the U.S. policy is contingent upon whether or not North Korea dismantles their nuclear facilities and is not conducting a secret nuclear operation. The dismantling of the facilities may happen according to the ten year plan offered by the 1994 Agreed Framework, but the secret nuclear operation may go undetected until completion. The risk of a secret program hurts the effectiveness of the framework but does not destroy it. Almost no nuclear non-proliferation measure can provide 100% verification of compliance, so the framework is at least a good step towards a nuclear free Korean peninsula. In looking at North Korea policy one must assume that to some extent their policy towards the U.S. may be retributive in goal. The extensive amount that Pyonygang has asked for in exchange for its nuclear program may reflect the anger felt by the North Koreans for four decades of mistreatment. Due to the closed nature of North Korean society, the only evidence that can be found to substantiate this claim is in the tone of the articles written about America. Across the board, all of articles from the KCNA reflect a distrust of U.S. intentions bordering on paranoia. The only other state that illicits such a reaction from the DPRK is the Republic of Korea. On the other hand it is also in the best interest of North Korea to extract monetary reparations due to their current economic condition. The poor economy of the North makes whatever it gets from America all the sweeter. We should recall from above that even if the situation is as bad as it seems, Kim Jong Il may not really need the U.S. because of the nature of life in a totalitarian regime makes revolution unlikely. The realities of the motivations and theoretical frameworks of these two powers poses an interesting question for future policy. If the hypothesis of this work is correct that the United States is not acting out of a Prospect Theory mindset, then the current policy of pursuing slow steps to carry out the 1994 Agreed Framework, urge a four-party meeting of North Korea, South Korea, China and the United States, and deter future aggression by North Korea is suitable for achieving U.S. goals. The rationality of both actors should not be as much a question as the motivation of the actors. The answer to the central question posed by this paper is that the United States continues to isolate North Korea because of retributive goals designed to right wrongs from long ago. It is also concurrently postulated by this work that in response to the years of isolationist diplomacy by the United States, North Korea is seeking its own type of retributive justice for the isolation. The first real possibility for change in the region is tied to a rehabilitative policy sought by the United States, the 1994 Agreed Framework. The framework may have dubious effects on nuclear proliferation, but it is a step forward in reversing a trend of retributive policies. The policy the United States should adopt is as follows: 1) Lift all economic sanctions on North Korea 2) In exchange the Democratic PeopleUs Republic of Korea will open four way talks with South Korea China and the United States in pursuit of a unified Korea. This approach should serve as a gesture of goodfaith on the part of the United States. The measure should also be tied to the ascendance of Kim Jong Il to the full position of leader. This gesture should assist Kim Jong IlUs ascendance and tie America with the new leader of North Korea. End Notes 1 Tanter, Raymond, R472not1.txtS, class notes, PS 472, University of Michigan, September 1996. 2 Hoon, Sim Jae, RCult ClassicS, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 18, 1996, p. 15 3 Noland, Marcus, North Korea's International Economic Relations, Social Science Japan No.7 August 1996, via Internet (http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/center/SSJ/SSJ7/Noland.html) 4 Gibney, Frank, Jr., RFacing Hunger PangsS, Time International, July 15, 1996 Volume 148, No. 3, via Internet (http://pathfinder.com/@@ES6p9AcA6FUkdorD/time/international/1996/960715/nkorea.html) 5 Macko, Steve, RHow N Korea Would Invade S KoreaS, The American Reporter, No. 293, May 5, 1996, via Internet (http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/nk-army.htm). 6 Perry, William J., Secretary of Defense, RTen Things I Never Imagined Doing Five Years AgoS, Business Week Forum, US Department of Defense Publications, Volume 11, Number 2, Jan. 18, 1996, via DEFENSELINK, Internet (http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/pubs/di95/di1102.html) 7 Carpenter, Ted Galen, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Cato Institute, RStaying Out Of Potential Nuclear Crossfires, Policy Analysis No. #160; November 24, 1993, via Internet (http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/us-nucpo.htm) 8 Energy Information Administration, RNorth Korea: BackgroundS, July 1996, via Internet (http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html) 9 Carpenter, Ted Galen, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Cato Institute, RStaying Out Of Potential Nuclear Crossfires, Policy Analysis No. #160; November 24, 1993, via Internet (http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/us-nucpo.htm) 10 Kristof, Nicholas D., RNorth Korea May be Set to Test-Fire Missile Able to Reach JapanS, New York Times, October 22, 1996, p.A11. 11 Burns, Nicholas, U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, Nov.8,J1996, via Internet (http://www.kimsoft.com/dprk.htm) 12 Newsweek, RReds on the RocksS, Sept. 30, 1996,p.40. 13 Lord, Winston; Mccurry, Mike; and Kristoff, Sandy, White House Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, November 24, 1996, via Internet (http://library.whitehouse.gov/Retrieve.cgi?dbtype=text&id=7557&query=north+korea) 14 Holloway, Nigel, RPolitical Fission: Washington Divides Over Nuclear IssueS, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 25, 1996, p.22 15 Ibid. 16 Perry, William J., Secretary of Defense, RFulfilling the Role of Preventive DefenseS, US Department of Defense Publications, Volume 11, Number 44, Jan. 18, 1996, via DEFENSELINK, Internet (http://www.dtic.dla.mil/defenselink/pubs/di95/di1144.html) 17 Kristof, Nicholas D., RNorth Korea May be Set to Test-Fire Missile Able to Reach JapanS, New York Times, October 22, 1996, p.A11. 18 KCNA, RPaper urges US to clarify its positionS, No. 092004, Pyongyang, Sept. 20, 1996, via Internet (http://www.kimsoft.com/news/960920.htm) 19 Japan International Affairs Institute, Kim Jong Il and His Strategic Goals , October 12, 1995, via Internet (http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/kim-stra.htm) 20 Hoon, Sim Jae, RCult ClassicS, Far Eastern Economic Review, July 18, 1996, p. 14 21 Ibid. p. 15 22 Ibid. p. 14 23 Ibid. p. 15 24 Ibid. 25 Carpenter, Ted Galen, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, The Cato Institute, RStaying Out Of Potential Nuclear Crossfires, Policy Analysis No. #160; November 24, 1993, via Internet (http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/us-nucpo.htm) Selected Bibliography Schelling, Thomas, RArms and InfluenceS, Yale University Press, 1966. Special Thanks to the PS 472 Fall 1995 papers of Russell Bailey and Jason Jun for guiding the organizational structure of this work.