Sarah Lockyer 350-80-1009-7 Political Science 472 Prof. Raymond Tanter The United States and Cuba : Policies Worth Evaluating ÒCuba is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist incidents in 1995.Ó1 ÒCuba no longer is able to actively support armed struggle in Latin America or other parts of the world because of severe ongoing economic problems.Ó2 ÒCuba's heavily statist economy remains severely depressed as the result of its own inefficiencies and the loss of massive amounts of economic aid from the former Soviet Bloc.Ó3 These observations, that clearly point to a country in decline do not seem to coincide with most nations of rogue status. According to Michael Klare, author of Rogue Regimes and Nuclear Outlaws, a rogue state is a Òhostile (or seemingly hostile) Third World state with large military forces and nascent weapons of mass destruction capabilities...bent on sabotaging the prevailing world order.Ó4 According to The Military Balance 1993-1994, Cuba possesses no nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or ballistic missiles.5 Therefore, because Cuba does not possess these capabilities, nor the economic means to gain these capabilities, it is not consistent with the definition to classify Cuba as a rogue regime. ÒCuba poses no threat to the United States, nor does it present any problem that could possibly outweigh in importance relations with countries such as Canada, Mexico, France, Great Britain and Russia.Ó6 ÒThe major trading partners of the United States have expressed concern and anger over the Helms-Burton legislation. Title III of the legislation is viewed by every major country as detrimental to its relations with the United States.Ó 7 ÒTrying to coerce other countries to join the embargo is offensive to American allies and unlikely to succeed.Ó8 With these clear and vocal objections from allies, the United States, with the passing of the Helms-Burton Act, has imposed even stricter sanctions upon Cuba, bringing more international isolation upon this neighboring island. For over thirty years the United States has tried and failed to coerce Cuba into a democratic state through the imposition of economic sanctions. So why, in this post Cold War era, and with no support from their allies has the United States continued the policy of strict containment and economic isolation? To begin to answer this complex question, it is important to first delve into some theoretical concepts. The US - Cuban relationship can begin to be understood through the theories of Rationality and Threat Perception. Rationality deals with how well an actor chooses policy in order to maximize itÕs gains and minimize itÕs losses. Through a rational decision making process, an actor will identify itÕs options, estimate the likely consequences of those options, consider cost, benefit, and likelihood of success, then select the option that will promise the highest gain or lowest loss.9 However, to analyze the rationality of an actor such as the United States, it is important to look at the character of the actor in question. Because the United States subscribes to a bureaucratic politics approach, many misperceptions arise, which clouds rational decision making capability. In bureaucratic politics, players see different faces of issues, propose competing ways to resolve value conflicts, and have varying time schedules for action success, therefore, finding the best option is difficult.10 Decision making in general is the reducing of uncertainty and the simplification of complexity, so the United StateÕs political system, with the many view points being taken into account, actually reduces the chance of rational decision making.11 In much a different scenario, the Republic of Cuba has acted as a unitary actor since Castro took power. Cuba is a totalitarian state controlled by President Fidel Castro, who is Chief of State, Head of Government, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. However, eventhough Castro acts as a unitary actor, miscalculations can occur especially due to the fact that political opposition is outlawed in his Republic. Castro, as a unitary actor is not capable of analytical decision making, which would take in all view points and search for the best solution, he is only capable of cognitive decision making which includes constrained search, sub-optimal revision, and incomplete evaluation.12 Due to probable errors in judgment, and the lack of opposition, totally rational decision making cannot be assumed on CastroÕs part neither. Many misperceptions are common place in AmericaÕs threat perception of Cuba. Threats can be assumed to be one of two things: intrinsic or strategic. Intrinsic threats challenge homelands or citizens, while strategic threats challenge resolve, credibility or commitments. The influence of American domestic politics, American ideology, and American interests all play a role in AmericaÕs threat perception of Cuba. The Cuban American National Foundation is one lobbyist group that supports a strict policy against CastroÕs Cuba. The CANF is the largest Cuban-American organization in the United States and its efforts support a very strong trade embargo against the communist regime of Castro. The CANF, comprised of many exiled Cubans, realizes the threat of Castro as an intrinsic challenge. Their efforts go towards the protection of Cubans everywhere. Along with efforts from the Free Cuba Political Action Committee, these two lobby groups have proved to be major forces in Washington. Together, these two organizations have donated about $1,000,000 within the last ten years to both houses of Congress and to Presidential candidates.13 In light of these domestic pressures, and a needed popular vote from Cuban-Americans, the United States gains a lot of domestic support by standing up to Castro. It is this motivated bias, a bias that leads one to see what they want to see, in this case, seeing Castro as a large threat to intrinsic values, that leads to and increased threat estimation on the part of the United States government.14 In much the same way, American ideology and interests play a similar role in the shaping of U.S. policy. Ever since 1961 when Castro declared himself a communist, American perception of CastroÕs Cuba has been that of an international outlaw and a national threat to U.S. national security, and policy such as the economic sanctions tried to combat the threatening island. During this time, with communism as the neighbor to the U.S., intrinsic interests, such as the safety of U.S. citizens, seemed to be the main reason for such harsh isolation of Cuba. However, even with the global fall of communism and in result the poor economic capabilities of Cuba, the United States did not alter itÕs embargo and remained to see Castro as a threat to the interests of the United States. These interests, however, were strategic and included the credibility of the U.S. threat to use military force, the American resolve to remain engaged in the world arena, and the U.S. commitment to defend its allies. Because Castro stands up to Washington, he challenges U.S. credibility, resolve, and commitments.15 Because Cuba in the past has been an intrinsic and strategic threat, an unmotivated bias to overestimate the threat could exist. Unmotivated biases, which allow one to see what they expect to see, could explain the continued perception of Castro as an evil, a cold war relic and a threat to the U.S. With biases such as these and the misperceptions encouraged by bureaucratic politics, the U.S. is likely to be incapable of rational choice decision making with regards to policy towards Cuba. The biases of Castro allow him to view America as an aggressive power that threatens much more than in reality. CastroÕs Cuba could perceive the U.S. as a threat to their nationalism and intrinsic interests. When Castro expects that the U.S. will act forcibly, then he will prepare to retaliate this action whether in reality it is forcible or not. This unmotivated bias leads to overestimation of the U.S. threat. Castro also gains political benefits for standing up to the threat of the North and the so called Yankee Imperialism.16 In much the same way as Clinton receives domestic gains from supporting a strict policy against Cuba, Castro is provided with an opportunity to rally national support against a powerful neighbor. It is because of these similar benefits to both actors that overestimation of threat arises and that reevaluation of policy is not seen as an option. The U.S. increases itÕs resolve, strengthens itÕs threat credibility, and gains national support by not lifting these sanctions. On the flip side, these sanctions actually allow Castro to stay in power by not cooperating with the U.S. and forcibly ruling his regime. The last theory that should be touched upon is that of strategy. In international relations, two standard policies exist: deterrence and coercion. Deterrence tries to force an actor to maintain the right behavior or to not change behavior at al, while coercion tries to force a change of behavior or to undo an action previously taken. In respect to U.S. policy towards Cuba, coercion is the main idea. The U.S., through economic sanctions, is trying to get the Cubans to establish a democracy. Whether or not this attempt will succeed is yet to be seen. However, when bringing rationality into this subject, a coercion failure could result. It is impossible to coerce an irrational, or an even partially irrational, actor because he is not capable of being challenged by threats, a main part of coercive strategy. Even though the Cuban policy has recently become an item of discussion, mainly due to the controversial Helms-Burton Act, the relationship among these two nations goes back almost a century. In 1898, after the Spanish - American War was concluded, the United States was given the responsibility of Cuban territory for a three year span. On May 20, 1902, Cuban independence was declared. However, through the Platt Amendment, the U.S. retained the right to intervene in Cuban affairs to protect U.S. interests on the island. This amendment, which was seen by the Cubans as a way for America to remain in control was repealed thirty years later, in 1934, during the Roosevelt administration. In that same year, Fulgencio Batista, a major player in Cuban politics since 1933, now gained control of the Cuban government. Batista described himself as a "progressive socialist" but he used the communist party to take control of the labor unions. Towards the end of 1958 the United States under the Eisenhower Administration began an arms embargo on the Batista Regime which was interpreted as U.S. support for Fidel Castro and his revolutionaries who were attempting to overthrow Batista.17 Only a year later, in 1959, Castro took over the Cuban government, established his authoritarian regime and declared himself Prime Minister. When Castro seized power, he made it clear that he was the hope of a nation, the one who could bring about change and democracy. In 1959, in Washington D.C., he stated that ÒWe are against all kinds of dictators, whether of a man, or a country, or a class, or an oligarchy, or by the military. That is why we are against communism."18 However, the Kennedy administration feared that Castro was trying to establish an alliance with the Soviet Union and trying to spread communism in the West.19 Two major conflicts arose out of this perception, the first, in 1961 and the second only a year after. In 1961, Cuban exiles trained and armed by the C.I.A., landed at the "Playa de Giron" otherwise known as the Bay of Pigs. Due to leaks within the State Department, the Cuban government had prior knowledge of the invasion and were ready for the attack. In addition, to preserve "plausible deniability" the Kennedy administration reneged on its pledge of air and naval support. Cuban exile troops were left on the beaches with no support and many died or were imprisoned.20 This fiasco and the Kennedy administration's perceived or actual indecisiveness led directly into the next conflict known as The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. During 1962, in February, the U.S. placed a full trade embargo upon the Republic of Cuba fearing a strategic Soviet Union alliance with the neighboring island. The Kennedy administration was not far off; within a few months, evidence was found that the Soviets were placing missiles in Cuba that would give the USSR the ability to accurately target U.S. assets and population centers. After intense negotiations between Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviets removed the missiles, showing that American resolve was stronger than Soviet threat credibility. However, the resulting Kennedy-Kruschev pact also guaranteed Castro's rule for the next thirty years. During the 1970Õs and 1980Õs Castro continued his dominance over all parts of Cuban life. He embarked on military adventureism in Africa and Latin America. Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador were just a few nations that experienced revolutionary "struggles" aided and abetted by Cuban arms and or Cuban troops. Castro also practiced many human rights violations which led many to flee towards American shores. The state that Cuba was in resulted in a wave of refugees, the most famous known as the Mariel boatlift. Castro in an attempt to taint these exiles, mixed in mental patients, homosexuals, and criminals into the mass of refugees. However, these elements totaled less than 5% of the over 125,000 Cubans that entered the U.S. during the Reagan Administration.21 During the 1990Õs CastroÕs violations became common knowledge not only to the developed nations but to his own people through the spreading popularity of Radio Marti. Many human rights groups publicized events, such as the incident on July 13, 1994, when a group of refugees, primarily women and children, was attacked by the Cuban coast guard. According to eyewitness accounts the women begged for the lives of their children, however, Castro's henchmen responded by using high pressure hoses to wash the women and babies overboard to their deaths. The coastguard then rammed and sank the ship.22 Only two years later on February 24, 1996, two Brothers to the Rescue Planes were shot out of the sky by Cuban MiGs. Brothers to the Rescue is a small, non-profit corporation, which conducts humanitarian missions searching for rafters in the Florida Straits, through the efforts of a core group of 70 pilots, observers and volunteers from numerous countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, England, France, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Switzerland, the United States, Venezuela, and ever former Cuban rafters themselves.23 Within three weeks of this event, President Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (LIBERTAD) into law. Throughout this brief history of U.S.-Cuban relations just presented, relations among the two nations remained consistent but the conditions set by the U.S. for rapprochement with Cuba changed dramatically. In the 1960Õs, the main objective of the Kennedy administration, in regards to Cuban policy, dealt with intrinsic interests, mainly, national security.24 There were only two conditions set forth by the Kennedy administration in order to satisfy U.S. interests : Cuba must end efforts to spread revolution and completely sever military ties with the Soviet Union.25 At this time, the United Sates was interested only with CubaÕs actions within an international context. However, in the 1970Õs with the Carter administration, conditions changed slightly. Along with the previous conditions set forth by Kennedy, it was added that Cuba must show greater respect for human rights and the Cuban military must be withdrawn from Africa.26 Movement now began towards American critique of Cuban domestic procedures. In the 1980Õs, with cold war politics dominating foreign policy, the Reagan administration once again focused on the Cuban alliance with the Soviet Union. During these eight years, the U.S. message was that if Cuba remains an ally of the communist Soviets then relations between Cuba and the U.S. will be limited. However, the U.S. did agree that if Cuba removed it troops from Africa, stopped supporting revolutionary activities in Central America and elsewhere, reduced itÕs military ties with the Soviet Union, and improved itÕs human rights practices, then the U.S. could begin to establish a new relationship and possibly begin to lift the embargo.27 These conditions implied that the U.S. would respond positively, or with ÒcarrotsÓ, to improvements by Cuba in these areas. It was not just the U.S., however, that took it upon themselves to insist change within Cuba. Throughout the 60Õs, 70Õs and 80Õs, the international community encouraged the U.S. and itÕs foreign policy, and there were no objections to this embargo through the U.N. Therefore, this embargo could be said to be a multilateral or collective action because it had the legitimacy of international consensus, hence a rehabilitative action.28 However, from 1989 to the present, Cuba has made some movements toward improvement without receiving the promised ÒcarrotsÓ from the U.S. Cuba did withdraw itÕs troops from Africa beginning in 1988 and there were improvements in human rights practices acknowledged in the State DepartmentÕs human rights report of 1989.29 Even more, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1992 and the end of the cold war definitely changed the world stage. The security concerns that had shaped U.S. policy toward Cuba for the last thirty years were gone, Cuba no longer had the capabilities to be a security threat. However, the Bush and Clinton administrations did not respond in kind. Instead, more conditions were established as the U.S. put forth a ÒstickÓ. Cuba now had to hold open elections and become a democracy before the U.S. - Cuban relations could move forward. This new condition put forth by the U.S. was embodied within the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. The expressed objective of the CDA was to further isolate the Castro regime in order to weaken its repressive apparatus and to increase pressure for democratic change on the island. At the same time, it seeks to decrease the isolation of the Cuban people by opening up telephone, mail and other means of communication with the island and by allowing the regulated shipment of medication and other humanitarian aid to the Cuban people from the United States.30 This Act, unlike the previous embargo during the cold war, was frowned upon by the international community. A November 1995 vote in the U.N. General Assembly was 117 to 3 against the U.S. embargo, and no other government cooperates with the trade sanctions.31 Even more, the CDA has been recently complemented by the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (LIBERTAD) which was sponsored by US senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Dan Burton (R-IN). LIBERTAD is part of a series of punitive measures directed at the regime of Fidel Castro. The act, also known as "Helms-Burton" passed the U.S. Senate and House by overwhelming bipartisan margins of 74-22 and 336-86, respectively.32 This Act gained immediate attention, and much controversy surrounded the United StateÕs legal right to enforce an act such as this. The main issue being questioned by the international community, mainly the European Union, is Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. This title would permit U.S. citizens and firms to sue in U.S. courts to obtain compensation from non-U.S. firms that, through investment or trade, `traffic' in the properties or enterprises seized decades ago by the Cuban government.33 Many trading partners of the U.S. consider the law a violation of international trade agreements established by the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement. Article 102 (c) of NAFTA states that the objective of the free trade area is to increase, substantially, investment opportunities in their [the member states] territories.34 The Helms-Burton Act clearly goes against this objective. The fact that this new Act could, if enforced, punish other states for non-compliance with a purely American policy. This blatantly refutes the general U.N. principle of sovereignty to each state. This lack of international support, especially from allies, would point to the U.S. pursuing a purely unilateral action. This type of individual and non-popular action could be seen as retributive in means.35 A retributive sanction emphasizes the importance of symbolic actions; in the U.S.Õs case, a need to save face. As Senator Dole stated, ÒU.S. policy toward Cuba has consequences around the globe. The world is still a dangerous place. Adversaries are watching our response to the murder of American citizens. Our response is being noted--by Russian hard-liners, by North Korean generals, by state sponsors of terrorism in Teheran and Tripoli, by Serbian leaders, by the Chinese military eyeing Taiwan. Timidity only emboldens our enemies.Ó36 However, if U.S. resolve is the only issue, will Cuba ever change? However, the problem of whether or not retributive sanctions will actually change behavior is yet to be answered. A retributive action is self-effective, that is not the issue; the issue is whether or not a rogue nation would ever change behavior in lieu of the fact that the sanctions will never be lifted. In Cuban-American relations, Cuba was more willing to cooperate when the sanctions were rehabilitative, as during the cold war, this is shown by the improvements made by Cuba in the 80Õs. However, in this post cold war era, Cuba has proven to be less than cooperative with U.S. objectives. In reality, there is no need for Cuba to cooperate. Nations such as Canada, Mexico and the EU, agree to trade with Cuba, lessening the need on CubaÕs part of U.S. economic support. These sanctions also provide such isolation to the Cuban people that Castro holds as much control as ever. When applying this to coercive strategy, the U.S. has exhausted all of itÕs options with the signing of The Helms-Burton Act, mainly Title III. Uncertainty over the application of Title III could serve as a deterrent to trade with and investment in Cuba. By waiving the implementation of Title III, the United States would reserve full implementation for a later date, thereby retaining an instrument to pressure the Cuban government on an ongoing basis, and a means to retaliate should the government break international law once again.37 A perfect example of what could have been Òthe threat that leaves something to chance...Ó (Tanter, Lecture). So why, when considering coercive diplomacy does the U.S. seem to be acting irrationally and choosing to keep the embargo? The U.S. could be maintaining the embargo for reasons such as strategic and intrinsic interests, the human rights issue, or simply objections to Fidel Castro. During the cold war, the embargo created a huge drain of resources on the Soviet Union, who was almost supporting Cuba single-handedly, through trade, subsidiaries, and military assistance. The U.S. could have seen the embargo as a victory against the most powerful cold war opponent. Even today, the U.S. might view Cuba as a strategic location, one that cannot be easily given up to the influence of other nations whether friends or foes. While Òspheres of influenceÓ and Òsatellite statesÓ are long gone, the U.S. could still want to monopolize the Western hemisphere. However, it would be next to impossible for Cuba to pose any real security threat to the U.S. so intrinsic issues should be overlooked. Strategic interests also play a big role when evaluating U.S. policy. According to the U.S. precedent of standing firm against communism and totalitarian regimes, it would be difficult for the U.S. to lift the embargo now with regards to the utter contempt that Castro has shown towards the U.S. embargo. The U.S. has always held high resolve, and U.S. threats could only weaken if the embargo was lifted. However, with no support from the international community the U.S. will not save face by maintaining the embargo. Instead, the U.S. will make enemies of friends and possibly decrease credibility with regards to commitments. The human rights violations could be another reason why the U.S. has continued this hard line policy. Countless violations by CastroÕs regime stands against U.S. principle. The recent shootdown of the two civilian planes, Òmirrors the lawless behavior at home [Cuba]...Cuban authorities continue to harass, threaten, imprison, defame, and physically attack those who seek to express an independent point of view.Ó38 Could CubaÕs attack on basic human rights be the reason for extending the embargo into a different world from where it came? It canÕt be, at least not if U.S. diplomacy would like to stay consistent. The U.S. trades and invests heavily with China, a nation known for harsh human rights violations. If the U.S. is willing to overlook China then why canÕt it overlook Cuba? Perhaps the best explanation lies in the infamous Fidel Castro. Castro embodies a survivor, a cold war relic, a possible loss on AmericaÕs record. He has ruled Cuba through many presidential administrations, and many attempts at his life and he has never once given in to the U.S. stance. Castro has turned the U.S. embargo as a way to keep control over Cuba. He has behaved irresponsibly in the international community and that is difficult to forgive.39 While it would be politically risky to lift the embargo all at once, reducing the tensions and starting negotiations could be a good change. Liberty and democracy in Cuba have not been advanced by the legislation of the Helms-Burton Act, and, in some cases, the Castro government has been strengthened and political repression has become more intense.40 As Eastern Europe showed us not so long ago, introduction to the Western civilization is the quickest way to win democracy. The Soviets are now eating Big Macs and wearing LeviÕs, what better way to gain support for a democracy than introducing the American dream. Cuba has not changed for the last thirty years and it will not change now, especially with the same policy. It is time to open the markets of Cuba to let them taste the West and then threaten sanctions if democracy does not proceed. The Helms-Burton Act could better be used as a bargaining chip than as legislation. 1 Press release; April 1996, 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism - US Department of State [Online] Available: http://www.usis.usemb.se/terror/TERSST.HTM 2 ibid. 3 CIA World Fact Book 1995 [Online] Available: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/95fact/cu.html 4 Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. pg. 26, Hill and Wang. 1995 5 ibid. Table 5.1, pg. 134 6 Smith Wayne S. Current History. ÒShackled to the Past:The United States and CubaÓ Latin America (2/96) [Online] Available : http://www.enews.com/magazines/chistory/archive/020196.1.html. 7 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT, PUBLIC LAW 104-114 -- HON. LEE H. HAMILTON (Extension of Remarks - July 11, 1996) [Online] Available: http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/1?r104:./temp/~r104SaqX:b0:helms+burton+act 8 CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 927, CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY [LIBERTAD] ACT OF 1996 (House of Representatives - March 06, 1996) [FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, MAR. 2, 1996] [Online] Available: http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/2?r104:./temp/~r104WN56:e24777:eu+us+relations 9 Tanter, Raymond. 472NOT1.DOC. [Online] University of Michigan, Political Science 472. 1996. Available : http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not1.txt 10 Tanter, Raymond. 472NOT8.DOC. [Online] University of Michigan, Political Science 472. 1996. Available : http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not8.txt 11 For more on Decision making see Tanter, Raymond. 472NOT3.DOC. [Online] University of Michigan, Politiacl Science472. 1996. Available : http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not3.txt 12 Tanter, Raymond. . 472NOT1.DOC. [Online] University of Michigan, Political Science 472. 1996. Available : http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not1.txt 13 Cuban American National Foundation Homepage. [Online]. Available : http://www.canfnet.org/ 14 Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. Chapter Six:Cuba. 1996 [Online] Available : http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/rogue/cuba.chapter 15 ibid. 16 Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. Chapter Six:Cuba. 1996 [Online] Available : http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/rogue/cuba.chapter 17 ibid. 18 Background Notes:Cuba. Country Background Notes. U.S. Department of State. Published by the Bureau of Public Affairs [Online] Available: gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0F- 1%3A2976%3ACuba%2C%2011/94 19 De Varona, Adolfo Leyva. Propaganda and reality: A Look at the U.S. Embargo Against CastroÕs Cuba. [Online] Available : http://www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embg_eng.txt. 20 Brief History of Cuba. [Online] Available : http://www.bridge.net/~cardiaz/histcuba.html 21 ibid. 22 De Varona, Adolfo Leyva. Propaganda and reality: A Look at the U.S. Embargo Against CastroÕs Cuba. [Online] Available : http://www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embg_eng.txt. 23 Background and Information on Brothers to the Rescue, Inc. Brothers to the Rescue Homepage. [Online] Available : http://www.hermanos.org/docs/background.html 24 Smith Wayne S. Current History. ÒShackled to the Past:The United States and CubaÓ Latin America (2/96) [Online] Available : http://www.enews.com/magazines/chistory/archive/020196.1.html. 25 ibid. 26 ibid. 27 ibid. 28 For discussion on rehabilitative and retributive actions see: University of Michigan, Confer. PS472. item 89. 29 Smith Wayne S. Current History. ÒShackled to the Past:The United States and CubaÓ Latin America (2/96) [Online] Available : http://www.enews.com/magazines/chistory/archive/020196.1.html. 30 De Varona, Adolfo Leyva. Propaganda and reality: A Look at the U.S. Embargo Against CastroÕs Cuba. [Online] Available : http://www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embg_eng.txt. 31 Smith Wayne S. Current History. ÒShackled to the Past:The United States and CubaÓ Latin America (2/96) [Online] Available : http://www.enews.com/magazines/chistory/archive/020196.1.html. 32 De Varona, Adolfo Leyva. Propaganda and reality: A Look at the U.S. Embargo Against CastroÕs Cuba. [Online] Available : http://www.canfnet.org/canf-lib/embg_eng.txt 33 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT, PUBLIC LAW 104-114 -- HON. LEE H. HAMILTON (Extension of Remarks - July 11, 1996) [online] Available : http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/1?r104:./temp/~r1044L7s:e0:helms+burton+act 34 North American Free Trade Agreement. Article 102: Objectives. [Online] Available : http://the- tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/Nafta/01.objective 35 For discussion on rehabilitative and retributive actions see: University of Michigan, Confer. PS472. item 89. 36 CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 927, CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY [LIBERTAD] ACT OF 1996 (House of Representatives - March 06, 1996) [Online] Available : http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/6?r104:./temp/~r1040aTn:e4328:helms+burton+act 37 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT, PUBLIC LAW 104-114 -- HON. LEE H. HAMILTON (Extension of Remarks - July 11, 1996) [Online] Available : http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/1?r104:./temp/~r104uLRQ:e8074:helms+burton+act 38 U.S. Department of State Briefing: 1995 Country Report on Human Rights Practices. [Online] Available : gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/OF-1%3A22373%3Azzzbrief 39 Smith Wayne S. Current History. ÒShackled to the Past:The United States and CubaÓ Latin America (2/96) [Online] Available : http://www.enews.com/magazines/chistory/archive/020196.1.html. 40 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CUBAN LIBERTY AND DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ACT, PUBLIC LAW 104-114 -- HON. LEE H. HAMILTON (Extension of Remarks - July 11, 1996) [Online] Available : http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/1?r104:./temp/~r104uLRQ:e8074:helms+burton+act