NORTH KOREA: Let Time Heal the Wounds PS472, Professor Tanter Dec 9, 1996 Kaname Kuniyuki Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself in the midst of a completely new world order. As a lone superpower power, the United States saw the emergence of several small, developing countries capable of challenging the United States Militarily. These rogue states, as Michael Klare would soon come to describe them as, presented the United States' newest international security problems. Some of these countries are Libya, Palestine, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Of these rogue states, North Korea is one that has posed serious security dilemma concerns for U.S. defense analysts. Following the end of the Korean Conflict, the atmosphere of U.S./North Korean relations has been extremely tense and volatile. Although Korea had been out of the spotlight for several years following the Korean Conflict, in 1984 it reemerged as a legitimate national security concern for the United States when it gained the ability to produce weapons grade plutonium. 1 This paper will attempt to answer the following questions: why does the United States' North Korean policy include providing humanitarian aid to an impoverished North Korea, while at the same time, isolating the North Korean Government from the international community? Do these two different approaches hinder or help the achievement of U.S. economic and political goals on the Korean Peninsula? U.S. relations with North Korea have been very complicated and tenuous. On one hand, the United States government has sought to isolate Korea from the international community. The U.S. government has imposed several economic sanctions on the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea. However, on the other hand, the U.S. government has also provided humanitarian aid to the North Koreans during the recent famine outbreak in North Korea. The U.S. government has also engaged in the Agreed Framework of 1994, in which the U.S. government promised North Korea the following: two Light Water Reactors for electricity production; heavy oil; an easing of trade and economic sanctions; and an attempt to normalize their relations. Under the Agreed Framework, the North Koreans promised to "freeze" their nuclear program, cooperate with the transfer of weapons-grade plutonium out of North Korea, and submit themselves to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Again, however, the U.S/North Korean relationship is strained. This time, the North Koreans are complaining that the United States government is not moving fast enough with its share of the bargain.3 In typical North Korean fashion, their government has warned that it may return to its "peaceful" reactor that had been making weapons-grade plutonium. The United States' overall goals for the Korean Peninsula, according to Mark Minton, Director of the Office of Korean Affairs, are "to build a durable peace on the peninsula as a key contribution to regional stability, and to facilitate progress by the Korean people toward national unification."4 In addition to this statement for a stable peninsula, its is implicit that the North Koreans do not continue with their nuclear reactors. In order to discuss this "carrots and sticks" policy of the United States, we will examine the different perspective that both sides have. We will begin with the United States' perspective first. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION In this section of the essay, the rationality of the United States and the North Korean governments will be analyzed. A rational actor is defined as a decision maker who considers all options and their corresponding cost and benefits, then chooses the option that will maximize the benefits while keeping the costs low. Rationality is a process of decision making, and does not place values on the moral outcomes of a decision. Therefore, a decision maker cannot be considered irrational if he happens to make a morally corrupt decision that maximizes his gains while maintaining low costs. At the same time, psychological misperception and biases will be considered when assessing the rationality of the actors. Another important theoretical point that will be discussed is whether the government or the United States and North Korea operate under unitary actors or whether the bureaucratic model applies to their situation. A unitary actor acts in a single-minded fashion, and is also measured across time. In order to determine whether an actor is unitary, one must be able to know the actor's motivations, biases, and whether that actor is influenced by other external actors. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE First, one must establish whether the U.S.-North Korean policies are made by a unitary actor or a bureaucratic model. This is a relatively easy question to answer. The United States government, while led by the President, is not a unitary actor, as evidenced by the many branches and departments of government. For instance, in matters of foreign policy with North Korea, the President would rely on information provided by the Office of Korean Affairs, and on advice from his security council. Also, Chong-Ki Choi argues that the relations between the U.S and Korea "depend not only on the underlying realities, but also on the views of the American people."5 This was the case particularly in the early 60s during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Is the United States government rational in its approach to North Korea? This is a very controversial question, as there are those who argue that the U.S. is following a path of "appeasement," much like the one that Chamberlain followed shortly before the beginning of World War II. Others argue that these open conciliatory gestures are helpful in facilitating the decline of North Korean socialism. Before proceeding with this topic of U.S. rationality, one ought to review the U.S. goals for North Korea, and the region in general. As outlined earlier, in regards to North Korea, the United States wants to create an environment of "durable peace on the [Korean] peninsula" and facilitate the process of unification.6 On the regional level, the U.S. has turned to a "four part" strategy.7 The first part of this strategy calls for the solidification of ties with the U.S.'s "core" alliances in the region. These "core" states include: Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The second step in this strategy involves the U.S. pursuing a policy of engagement with the other regional powers in East Asia. The third element of the "four part" strategy, requires the construction of a stable regional economic infrastructure that can maintain growth and assure long-term stability. Finally, the fourth part of this strategy involves the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region. The current U.S. security mission has moved from a "Japanocentric" strategy that sought to simply "maintain an effective and stable balance of power and credible deterrent force to contain Sino-Soviet expansion in East Asia" during the Cold War.8 Now, with the U.S. government goals for the region, clearly delineated, we can examine the rationality of their actions in their relations with North Korea. This section will argue that the United States government is not acting in a rational manner in respect to its relations with North Korea. The U.S. government is bound to offer humanitarian aid, for to withhold aid would be contrary to the ideals upon which this nation was founded. The U.S. is operating out of a basement of fear when it comes to North Korean security relations. This is evident as the North Koreans have been able to successfully use brinkmanship to acquire their goals. For instance, the U.S. has not taken a hardline stance when faced with a North Korean threat of military action. Can the U.S. government's actions be explained by the prospect theory? Perhaps. The United States certainly has a lot to lose should they go to war with North Korea. Currently, the combined U.S.-South Korean armed forces are outnumbered by the North Korean armed forces 665,000 to 113000000.9 Also, North Korea possesses several medium and long range missile systems that are capable of striking Seoul.10 Were there to be a war on the Korean Peninsula, the economic stability of the region would be shaken. Not only would Seoul suffer tremendous damage, but there is reason to believe that Japan, host to U.S. military bases, would suffer damage as well. THE NORTH KOREAN PERSPECTIVE It is more difficult to assess the rationality of the North Korean Government. The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea is an intensely secretive society that has relied on a policy of self-reliance for the past fifty years. This policy of self-reliance was a key element of the late Kim Il Sung's reign as the Great Leader. A principle concept of this self-reliance is an ideological concept known as Juche. For the North Koreans, Juche is a matter of pride. In a 1983 speech, Kim Jong Il commented, "If they are to maintain an independent stand, they must implement the principle of Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-support in the economy, and self-reliance in national defense."11 Juche is the essence of the North Korean identity. In a more recent speech on August 27, 1996, Kim Jong Il extolled the importance of Juche to North Korea's youth. "Young people," he said, "must take the lead in socialist construction, defend the homeland, and the people..."12 Kim Jong Il added "On the basis of the principles of juche, comrade Kim Il Sung defined the young people as a fresh militant contingent that constitutes the driving force of the revolution, and a powerful force that propels social progress."13 The Japan International Affairs Institute (JIAI) describes juche as "full and undivided reinstatement of Korea into the world community, which in turn requires the national restoration of Korean values through the Korean peninsula."13 JIAI further states that another important fact to understanding the identity of the North Korean people is understanding that "they are first Korean, second Korean, third Korean, and fourth socialist."14 This strong sense of national identity is evident in the following statement by Kim Jung Il: "The young people must highly value and ardently love socialism, the lifeblood of the Korean people, and smash every attempt of the imperialists and reactionaries to disintegrate Korean socialism."15 In this quote, socialism is referred to as if it were distinctly Korean. A third factor to take note of in understanding the North Korean perspective is understanding their love of the Great Leader, the late Kim Il Sung. Although he died in 1994, he has perhaps become an even stronger force in North Korean politics and North Korean ideology. The JIAI states that "Kim Jong Il and the Korean people are fiercely proud to be the children of the great founding father, the late Kim Il Sung..."16 In order to understand the importance of the memory of Kim Il Sung, one also must understand the importance of filial piety, loyalty, and worship of ancestors in North Korean society. These customs, that were adopted from Chinese Confucianism, may also present an explanation for why Kim Jong Il has yet to officially take over the Presidency in North Korea. While many western analysts suspect that Kim Jong Il has been using this time to build his power base, or display to the world that he does not need to hurry to establish his power; Asian analysts from the JIAI argue that Kim Jong Il is merely following the tradition of samnyon-sang (three-year mourning), a ritual that one observes following the death of a parent.17 The JIAI states that "Kim Jong Il is following this time-honored tradition in a display of his fervent loyalty..."18 to his father, the founding father of the DPRK. Is it possible to determine whether or not Kim Jung Il is a rational actor? An analysis by JIAI suggests that the younger Kim is a surprisingly brilliant tactician. The JIAI cites the following characteristics of Kim's foreign policy that make him particularly crafty: "hit-and -run, keeping the opponent in the dark about his possible moves, prompt response, and striking the opponent off balance, dragging it into the prescribed battleground where he can dictate the outcome of the battle."19 Simply put, the JIAI call his tactics "Lure-fishing".20 The examples that the JIAI gives to support this claim are the 1994 Agreed Framework and the June 13 Kuala Lumpur statement. Both agreements promise technological aid to North Korea, as long as it keeps its nuclear reactors in a permanent state of "freeze." The JIAI argues that Kim Jung Il used the Yongbyon nuclear reactor to lure the United States into a position where it had to agree to the terms of the two agreements.21 ANALYSIS OF CURRENT U.S-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS First of all, one must begin by acknowledging the serious split between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea. For the most part, the relations between the two countries were dictated by the Kim Il Sung, who ruled North Korea for nearly fifty years. Kim Il Sung "harbored an unremitting hostility toward the United States, fueled by memories of U.S. intervention in the Korean War and continued support for the anticommunist leadership of South Korea.22 This disdain for the United States has transcended to his son, the new leader of the DPRK. In a 1983 speech, Kim Jung Il stated: "If imperialism is to be ultimately destroyed and the victory of the world revolution is to be won, the anti-imperialist, anti-US struggle should be intensified." 23 Who has come out on top? North Korea? or the U.S.? At first glance, it appears that the United States has made great headway in improving its relations with North Korea. The United States has invited North Korea to participate in Four Party talks involving the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, and China. Attempts such as these, to establish a dialogue between the U.S., South Koreans, and North Koreans, have been made since 1988, when the Reagan administration first opened its doors to what they termed a "Modest Initiative."24 Then, in 1992, former-President Bush hosted the first high-level meeting between U.S. and DPRK officials.25 Also, the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was built as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework, signed by the U.S. and North Korea. This organization is charged with implementing nuclear provisions of the Agreed Framework, including the supply of oil and Light Water Reactors to North Korea. It is currently under U.S., Korean, and Japanese leadership. KEDO acquires its funds through international fundraising efforts.26 According to Mark Minton, KEDO is physical proof of the U.S. government's solid commitment to helping improve its relations with North Korea. Has the U.S. government's "carrots and sticks" policy proven effective? The answer would have to be "no." The U.S. has not established a definite nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Neither the 1994 Agreed Framework, nor the June 13 Kuala Lumpur Agreement, guarantees by law that North Korea will maintain a nuclear-free position. Meanwhile, North Korea is receiving 500,000 tons of heavy oil per year until the new Light Water Reactors are built, and U.S. economic and trade sanctions against it have been lessened. Furthermore, North Korea still maintains a large standing army and has a stockpile of enhanced Scud missiles and are developing multi-staged missiles that would be capable of hitting targets as near as Seoul, and as far away as Guam.27 Adding to the tensions is the recent grounding of a North Korean submarine in South Korea. This incident has led to South Korean demand for an apology before it sends any more humanitarian aid to the north. The incident has also hampered the construction of the Light Water Reactors.28 In light of these developments, it is clear that before the United States can pursue its agenda of uniting the two Koreas, it must first find a way to settle the differences between the two nations. POLICY CONCLUSION What policy course should the U.S. Government implement in regards to North Korea? Should it continue to seek dialogue through concessions of humanitarian and monetary aid, while at the same time isolating North Korea with economic sanctions? Or, should the U.S. decide on one course and pursue it with all its focus? While it is admirable that the U.S. seek conciliatory measure to open dialogue, U.S. decision makers must pay more attention to the reality of the North Korean psych. U.S. decision makers must realize that the North Korean ideological concept of Juche, that was established under the reign of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung, still has a strangle hold over North Korea's population, and its youth in particular. The problem of unification does not rest between the United States government and North Korea. Rather, it is a matter to be settled by the two Koreas. Another important problem to consider is the assimilation of North Korea with its industrialized and technologically advanced neighbor. Should the two Koreas be brought to the same level of technological advancement before unification can begin? This question has already been posed; and, while no solution has been formulated, President Kim Young Sam, in a policy speech on August 15, 1996, has elucidated three principles to guide a peaceful unification of the peninsula: the South would not take advantage of the North's present economic difficulties; Seoul wanted Pyongyang to join the international community; and peaceful reunification should be achieved without either side imposing its will on the other.29 Reports from the JIAI, state that Kim Jung Il is very interested in reunification; however, he is wary, and wants North Korea to come away with the best outcome that it can. What then, can the U.S. hope to do? I argue that the U.S. should continue its attempts to establish diplomatic dialogue with North Korea, and provide humanitarian aid. The U.S. might also want to consider bilateral arms reductions to help ease the tension along the DMZ. Playing a game of chicken, or challenging the DPRK in brinkmanship would only spell disaster for the region. In an evaluation of costs and gains, the North Koreans should have a higher critical risk than the U.S. government's threat capability. After all, the North Koreans have nothing to lose but their strong national identity and pride; whereas, the U.S. would lose the economic stability of the region should South Korea suffer heavy damage.