Brian Kirby 11-30-96 Poli. Sci. 472 Sec. 1 Libya: Rogue Outlaw Since the end of World War II, United States foreign policy had been concerned with one thing: containing the threat of communism during the Cold War. Then the unthinkable happened. Following the improving relations in the mid-to-late 1980Us between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall came crashing down. A wave of democracy spread throughout Eastern Europe. The United States was singing the praises of victory in the Cold War. The communist threat had been defeated. However, this posed a new and unique challenge to American foreign policy. While the rest of the international community was welcoming the end of the Cold War and the prospects for lasting peace, there were several outlaw states, or rogues, that were determined to denounce capitalism and express their dislike for the new U.S.-led world order. Now these states had been doing this during the Cold War as well, but their threats were overshadowed by the dominant U.S. concern of containing the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. With the Soviets no longer the force they once were, the American focus now was on ending the threat of terrorism and chemical weapons proliferation that the rogue states stood for. It has been argued that the United States used the threats of the rogues as a justification for their high defense budget. Regardless of that argument, terrorism was on the increase and more fanatical leaders were gaining access to nuclear and chemical weapons technology. One of the primary rogue actors that has been and still is a big concern of U.S. foreign policy is Libya. Led by their harsh dictator, Col. Moammar Qaddafi, Libya has been behind numerous terrorist activities that have led to the loss of countless innocent lives. In addition, Qaddafi has supported radical revolutions in neighboring African states and around the world. He has attacked the U.S.-led Western capitalist movement and has criticized the U.S. as attempting to dominate the world community by spreading its influence throughout the globe. The terrorist and chemical weapon threat from Libya has come to the forefront of U.S. policy particularly in the past ten years or so. I believe part of this is due to the disappearance of the Soviet Union, as I mentioned earlier. However, the radical actions of Qaddafi need to be checked and this thinking has led to several resolutions put forth by the United Nations in an attempt to deter Libya from their continued support of international terrorism. This leads to a very important question that I will attempt to answer. Despite continued pressure from the United Nations, Libya has continued to be linked to terrorist actions. In addition, there has been recent overwhelming evidence that Libya is currently constructing a new chemical weapons plant. The pressing question here is why does deterrence, in particular U.S. deterrence, fail to keep Libya from complying with UN resolutions regarding terrorism and chemical weapons production? I believe that to understand LibyaUs continued defiance to conform to international policies, you have to understand the history and thinking of it fanatical leader, Col. Qaddafi. Even before he came to power, Qaddafi had visions of overthrowing the monarchy that was set up after World War II. He was particularly interested in following strong Arab nationalist leaders, such as Nasser in Egypt. A key mistake by the Libyan regime at the time was to allow Qaddafi to join the Libyan army. He had an extensive record with the police at that point, and now he was supposed to be protecting a king that he wanted to overthrow. Qaddafi was adamant in his refusal to cooperate with the British who were training the Libyan army at the time. This illustrated his strong anti-West sentiment, which would lead to his strong anti-American feeling that would be present later. A Qaddafi-led coup took place in September, 1969, which was relatively bloodless. In his address to the Libyan people following the coup, Qaddafi stressed the peopleUs desire to get rid of the corrupt regime that was full of extortion and treachery. Less than a year later, LibyaUs new leader asked the U.S. and Britain to evacuate their bases in Libya, attempting to rid his country of all Western influence. QaddafiUs rogue policies have been very evident in LibyaUs foreign intervention actions. One of particular importance was his desire to assassinate his fellow Arab leader, King Hussein of Jordan. Qaddafi saw Hussein as a Rmoderate, pro-imperialistS king and believed that getting rid of such a leader was the best way to a possible solution to the Palestinian problem. However, other leaders did not share QaddafiUs desire to oust Hussein and the plan was aborted. Col. Qaddafi currently supports some 50 terrorist organizations and subversion groups, in addition to 40 radical regimes in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. One way that he does this is to recruit foreigners working in Libya to stir things up in their homelands and build centers for Libyan influence there. He provides these groups with financial aid, weapons, and training for terrorist warfare. This is also demonstrated in his position on the Palestinian struggle, in which he is firmly against a compromise. LibyaUs terrorist agenda is to bully or coerce neighboring states to adopt QaddafiUs fundamentalist policies, and this shows in their backing of the Palestinians and opposing a peaceful settlement with Israel. A serious issue surrounding QaddafiUs policies is his interest in acquiring a threat that would make him a legitimate force not only in Africa but around the world: the nuclear bomb. He was refused in this effort by China, so he then looked to Russia to support his nuclear aspirations. Qaddafi had recently had a fallout with Egypt, so he was looking for an ally in this region. However, the only real principle that Qaddafi and the Soviets agreed on was their dislike of RWestern imperialism.S With some recent diplomatic and military failures in supporting rebels in Tanzania and Ethiopia, it was pretty easy to see why the Russians could not take Qaddafi seriously. He demonstrated a sloppy approach to foreign policy and an over-eagerness to throw money to just about any revolution. Libya has several links to terrorist actions in the past, which have isolated them from the rest of the world. One example was the arming of the Black September terrorists when they killed 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. Others include financing violent rebel groups in Ethiopia and the Philippines and setting up training camps for anti-Zionist terrorist bands in the Libyan desert. The primary target of Qaddafi in his terrorist actions has been the United States. The U.S. government has repeatedly attempted to use deterrence and coercive diplomacy in dealing with the Libyan terrorist threat. This came into the spotlight as U.S.-Libyan relations further deteriorated with the election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. Presidency in 1980. Reagan objected to the training camps that were being set up in Libya for various Palestinian terrorist groups. Qaddafi was being blamed for being behind several bombings and other terrorist actions. Secretary of State Haig and President Reagan were in agreement that Qaddafi was a RcancerS and needed to be removed. Reagan began to take action in 1981, when all Libyan diplomats were thrown out of the U.S. and the Libyan embassy was closed. Reagan also ordered the stoppage on importing Libyan oil. The impending crisis between the two countries finally erupted in August, 1981 when U.S. warships crossed QaddafiUs Rline of deathS near the Libyan coast. Two U.S. planes shot down two Libyan fighters in a demonstration of resolve by Reagan. Qaddafi proceeded to respond with several terrorist actions, starting with a bombing in Rome by a group with strong Libyan connections in September, 1984. In October, 1984, a P.L.O.-sponsored group seized the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, which was also supported by Qaddafi. In November of 1984 a U.S. military shopping facility was fire-bombed and a month later there were terrorist attacks on international airports in Vienna and Rome, in which five Americans were killed. Qaddafi was also behind these attacks. Reagan again responded with a clear message to Libya. In March 1986, 30 U.S. ships and 200 planes crossed the Rline of deathS once again and clashed with Libyan forces. Qaddafi maintained his tit-for-tat response. A month after the last U.S.-Libyan clash, a TWA airliner was bombed, killing 4 Americans. The group responsible for the bombing claimed that this was revenge for that U.S. action along the Libyan coast. QaddafiUs next reaction was the one that put Reagan over the edge. On April 5, 1986, the LaBelle discotech, a club that was frequented by U.S. servicemen in West Berlin, was bombed, killing 1 U.S. serviceman. A message that was sent to a Libyan group in East Berlin from Tripoli about the bombing convinced the U.S. government of certain Libyan involvement. As we analyze the situation, however, that assumption made by the U.S. government may not have been correct. Long after the incident at the discotech, West Germany provided proof that Syria, not Libya, was behind the bombing. That message that was intercepted by the U.S. tying Libya to the bombing may have been planted to get the U.S. to respond. In addition, the U.S. had a motivated bias to see Libya as being behind the bombing. This way, the U.S. could justify any later action that it would take against Libya in retaliation for the bombing. The U.S. was seeing what it wanted to see in this situation, leading to the motivated bias. The later action that I just spoke of occurred less than a month later. Shortly after the discotech bombing, President Reagan ordered 60 tons of bombs to be dropped by U.S. warplanes on Tripoli and Benghazi. Col. Qaddafi was the target of this bombing in the hopes of killing him. Though the Libyan leader was spared in this attack, many Libyan civilians were killed. This U.S. retaliation also may have had some unintended consequences. Several governments of non-aligned nations and all Arab leaders condemned the attack, which resulted in growing sympathy for Libya, which was precisely what the U.S. wanted to avoid. However, the U.S. attack did seem to serve its purpose. Several radical terrorist groups in Libya had their phones disconnected. Many of the extremist leaders were placed under close watch. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Col. Qaddafi distances himself from many radical terrorists that had given him the tarnished image around the international community. LibyaUs support of state-sponsored terrorism has been the main concern of U.S. foreign policy in dealing with Libya. More recently, however, there has been reason to believe that Qaddafi has been engaged in another act that could have catastrophic effects on the movement toward a peaceful new world order. What I am speaking of here is the suspected development of chemical weapons by Libya. The U.S. fears that such powerful weapons falling into hands of a radical leader like Qaddafi would almost certainly lead to a dangerous situation throughout the Middle East. The stage for this was set when Libya refused to sign the 1993 UN convention banning chemical weapons. They were 1 of 18 mostly Middle Eastern countries to do so. According to U.S. intelligence, Libya is accused to building a chemical weapons plant inside of mountain about 40 miles southeast of Tripoli to manufacture nerve gas and other chemical weapons. Libya has denied these charges of building the plant, claiming that it is just Ranother lie by U.S. intelligence.S According to Libya, what the U.S. believes is a weapons plant is really an irrigation system, and the tunnels in the suspected mountain are being used to bring water from aquifers in the desert to cities along the Libyan coast. The U.S. governmentUs strategy in dealing with this has been to come right out and dismiss LibyaUs denial as Rnonsense.S Defense Secretary William Perry stated that the U.S. would not allow the plant to begin operations and that it would by vulnerable to U.S. military strikes. With possible completion in 1997 or 1998, this plant would be the largest underground chemical weapons facility, and it already stores most of LibyaUs 100 ton stockpile of chemical weapons. The U.S. Director of Central Intelligence John M. Deutch labeled Libya as a Rrogue nationS that poses a threat to the world. There is no doubt that if a radically led country such as Libya were allowed to utilize chemical weapons, they would certainly pose a threat to the world, in particular the U.S., whom Libya has often targeted in its terrorist attacks. Qaddafi has also recently purchased scud missiles from North Korea, another Rrogue nation.S These could be used to threaten neighbors or crush any opposition that Qaddafi faces internally. Col. Qaddafi controls the Libyan government as a unitary actor perhaps more than any other leader controls a nation. He single-handedly controls the policy of his country and some of his actions have led to LibyaUs isolation from the rest of the world. To understand how Qaddafi operates, it is important to look at the principles of his strong fundamentalist regime. His governmental principles are based on strong Islamic and Arab ideas. He desires a political system to establish a Rthird wayS that is superior to capitalism and communism. Qaddafi uses assassination and intimidation to control and influence his enemies abroad. In addition, he has been known for his harsh control and repression of minorities and banned ethnic groups within his own country. The Libyan dictator has been cited for several human rights violations, and the situation worsened in 1994. Qaddafi ordered a security service crackdown after a coup attempt failed in 1993. He strictly enforced the outlaw of rights to free speech, property, fair trials, and other liberties that we often take for granted here at home. At least 17 people were hanged in 1994 for their suspected roles in the T93 coup attempt. Qaddafi also instituted the death penalty for political offenses or for suspicion of having principles opposed to his government. The United States government often acts as a unitary actor in responding to Libya, though they are usually at the forefront of the multi-lateral United Nations. UN sanctions demand that Libya take steps to end state-sponsored terrorism. However, according to the U.S. State Dept., they took no real steps in 1993 to do so. The UN has also demanded that Libya take full responsibility for the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing in 1988, and pay compensation to the families of the victims of that disaster. Libya, however, has made no real attempts to disassemble its terrorist network. Col. Qaddafi has reiterated his support of radical Palestinian groups that are opposed to a peace accord with Israel. He has also threatened to support extreme Islamic groups in neighboring Algeria and Tunisia for not supporting him against the UN sanctions effort. Finally, Qaddafi has vowed to strike back against those who enforced these sanctions against him, namely the United States. The Pan Am Flight 103 bombing was one of the most disastrous terrorist attacks in history. That was one of the main reasons for the UN sanctions that were imposed on Libya. Col. Qaddafi claims that the U.S. and Britain were drawing out this affair in order to impose the sanctions on Libya beginning in 1992. This idea was best summed up in a quote from the AP by Qaddafi on November 1, 1996: R The United States doesnUt want to resolve this affair so they can exploit it politically.S He insisted that Libya was willing to resolve the situation by encouraging the two nationals responsible for the bombing plot to turn themselves in to the U.S. In fact, Libya had offered to turn them in last year if their trial would take place in a neutral country under UN supervision. This offer, however, was rejected by the U.S. and Britain. Qaddafi claimed that the families are the victims of U.S. and British Revasiveness.S It appears that the Libyan leader is charging the U.S. with using this issue as a political pawn to demonstrate its influence over world politics. In a speech given to the Tunisian parliament, Qaddafi said that the U.S. and its allies are like the RRoman Empire threatening to conquer North Africa again.S He also predicted that like Rome, the U.S. would eventually disappear. He finally called on the entire Arab world to stop the American RdevilS that he believes is aiming at controlling the world. A recent strategy that the U.S. has initiated in dealing with Libya centers around a new set of economic sanctions. On August 5, 1996, President Clinton approved sanctions on foreign companies that invest in Libyan and Iranian oil sectors. This was carefully thought out by U.S. policymakers and it was done under the pretext that this would help to curtail Iran and Libya from their support of terrorism. However, bureaucratic politics has played a role in determining how these economic sanctions will play themselves out. The legislation that was initiated by the U.S. contradicts international law, in particular the UN charter. According to the charter, economic sanctions are not an acceptable method to achieve political aims. Critics of the sanctions also point to the fact that Libya has officially re-affirmed to the UN that it denounces terrorism. Libya has also cooperated with the international community in respect to the Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, despite U.S. allegations to the contrary. The fact that the U.S. has taken it upon itself to go RaboveS international law and impose sanctions on non-U.S. companies has angered many of its European allies. Many European countries are worried that these sanctions will hurt their economies by putting a limit on their oil trade. Beyond this though, they are taking exception to the fact that the U.S. is pretty much telling them who they canUt trade with. This indeed appears to violate the laws of sovereignty that allow each nation to determine their own foreign policy decisions. In particular, France has stated that these steps taken by America against their European allies Rwould not go unpunished.S Britain also has warned the U.S. not to follow through on the sanctions within the European Union. The European Council is currently considering retaliatory measures if this legislation becomes law. Italy is particularly upset with the U.S. for this, as they do not have as advanced an economy as France and Britain and cannot afford to lose valuable oil trading. The Italians have threatened to RblacklistS U.S. companies if it went ahead with implementing this law. They have also threatened retaliation against the U.S. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act has also caused some outcry in the country of Libya itself. According to the Libyan news agency JANA, the U.S. sanctions are seen in Libya as a form of Rstate-sponsored terrorism.S Libya sees this as an Rinhuman act targeted against the Arab Libyan people,S sighting the damage it will inflict on the Libyan economy. It is also seen as a Rdeclaration of economic war against the States of the European Union.S An interesting point concerning the denouncing of these U.S. sanctions centers on the seemingly world-wide support against the U.S. on this issue. This seems to be enhancing unity throughout Libya that is being fueled by the international communityUs stand against the sanctions. It is almost as if Libya is benefiting from the sanctions as relations between the U.S. and their European allies are becoming strained on this issue. This may hinder the U.S.-led attempts to establish peace and security throughout the world. We have seen that Libya under Col. Qaddafi has been involved in several situations that justify Libya being classified as a rogue state. The U.S. has attempted to contain Libya several times, whether it be through military force or economic sanctions. However, we now get back to the question of why deterrence has failed to keep Libya from complying with UN sanctions. First of all, there is the issue of rationality. We have talked at length about degrees of rationality and from what I have found in my research, Qaddafi can be likened to another leader we have looked at extensively, Saddam Hussein. An irrational person cannot be successfully persuaded, and this may have a good deal to do with why the U.S. coercion and deterrence policies have failed to this point. Col. QaddafiUs radical actions have shown that he demonstrates a low degree of rationality. He, like Hussein, is primarily interested in maintaining his power grip on his country. Also, he is determined to undermine the attempts of what he sees as a bullying United States government to harness his power. Qaddafi sees the U.S. as being controlled by multi-national companies and special interest groups and their commercial goals are what controls U.S. foreign policy. This leads to thinking that QaddafiUs irrationality is part of the reason why U.S. attempts at coercion and deterrence have failed to achieve Libyan compliance with UN sanctions. President Clinton looks like he is going to stick with a policy of coercive diplomacy in dealing with Libya as he enters his second term. In a speech to Congress at the beginning of this year, Clinton reiterated the fact that the crisis between Libya and the U.S. that led to declaration of national emergency in January of 1986 is still unresolved. He pointed out that the Libyan government has continued their actions and policies that support terrorism despite UN security council resolutions. The President claimed that such actions pose an ongoing threat to the national security and vital foreign policy interests of the U.S. With this in mind, Clinton believes it is necessary to maintain economic pressure on the Libyan government to reduce their support of international terrorism. In my opinion, the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., namely the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, are not worth alienating our important allies in Europe. It is pretty clear that past sanctions and UN resolutions have not coerced Libya to abandon their radical policies, and in some cases it has helped to fuel Libyan resistance to U.S. pressure. Qaddafi is a fanatical leader who does not appear to be coercible. He seems to be too caught up in his desire to be opposed to the U.S.-led West and his quest for power. Plus, as we have seen, sanctions have only helped to build support against the U.S. from even their strongest allies. U.S.-led deterrence only seems to light a fire under Qaddafi and helps him to find more issues on which to attack the United States. So if Qaddafi doesnUt seem to be coercible and U.S.-led deterrence has failed thus far to keep Libya from complying with UN resolutions, what seems to be the best policy approach in dealing with that rogue state? Since Qaddafi does not appear to respond to external threats, I believe that the only way that he can be contained is by internal pressure. Indeed, there are several Islamic fundamentalists challenging the leadership of Col. Qaddafi, and they have launched large-scale military operations in eastern Libya. They are seriously questioning the legitimacy of the Qaddafi regime, as Libya has become more internationally isolated than ever because of the UN sanctions. The armed forces of Libya are in poor shape, mostly from a lack of parts caused by the sanctions. So you could say that indirectly, the sanctions are having a positive effect for the West. However, the internal threats that Qaddafi faces are becoming more prominent. Col. Qaddafi is seen worldwide as the Rprototypical fundamentalist.S Ironically, he now sees LibyaUs radical Islamic movement as his most serious threat. For that reason, I believe that an internal collapse of the Qaddafi regime seems to be the best hope of the U.S. in successfully eliminating the rogue threat of Libya. Bibliography Blundy and Lycett. Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution. 1987. Gottfried. Libya: Desert Land in Conflict. 1994. Internet Sources: 1. U.S. Dept. of State, April, 1994. RPatterns of Global Terrorism, 1993.S 2. U.S. State Department Human Rights Report, 1994. 3. RLibya Offers to Discuss With U.S. Chemical Weapons Charges.S AP writer Mariam Sami. April 11, 1996. 4. RHuge Chemical Arms Plant Near Completion in Libya, U.S. says.S N.Y. Times News Service. February 24, 1996. 5. Documents Center on Professor TanterUs homepage: Middle East Network Information Center. AP reports from October 31 and November 1, 1996. 6. Documents Center on Professor TanterUs homepage: JANA- The Official Libyan News Agency. July 26, August 5, and August 7, 1996. 7. RAs Khadafy Celebrates 27 Years, His Fundamentalist Challenge Grows.S James Bruce. 1996. 8. Thomas website: Congressional Records of 104th Congress. Senate- January 3, 1996.