Jeff Walker The United States And Iraq As Actors In The Gulf War The United States and Iraq are two very different countries in almost every aspect of categorization. From their populations, religion, and gross national product, to their age, government and size it can be argued that the two have little, if anything, in common. Yet both are considered states and each has it’s place in the world’s sphere of interaction. And all states, even the US and Iraq, have to have some form of leadership that makes the important decisions that each country must face. In this paper the question will be raised, “in terms of leadership, how different can Iraq and the United States be?” Looking through the context of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm conflict between the two states the question of leadership, whether unitary or not, will be examined in both theoretical terms as well as examples of real world behavior. Terms and ideas of a theoretical persuasion will be examined and both countries will be held up to that light to decide whether or not it is a good prognosticator of future actions. The paper will start with an overview of basic security theory pertaining to the two countries in question. The idea of a rational actor will be examined, as will the ideas of deterrence, search, and persuasion. The next section will focus on these ideas as expressed through the United States and it’s policy towards the rogue state Iraq and will question the ideas of unitary government, conflicting views, and legal authority. Finally, the paper will conclude with a summary of what has been exchanged between the two states and what future policy initiatives should be taken. Starting Point: Theoretical Orientation In looking at the United States and Iraq some theoretical perspectives must first be engaged, beginning with the idea of a unitary rational actor and working through alternatives and actions. The ideas of compellence and deterrence will also be examined and analyzed in retrospect to the two states. The first and central question that needs to be addressed is that of the actor of a state; specifically who or what it is? Is either country driven by a unitary actor or are they controlled by many different ones? In looking at the United States was then-President Bush the only person in charge of American foreign policy or were there others that influenced the actions of the country? Were institutions such as the Congress, the military, or even some of Bush’s aides planning strategy? In Iraq was Saddam Hussein the only one controlling the country or were others in the shadows taking action? While it was common knowledge that Hussein was a dictator could there be others that influenced his strategy? The rational actor is not someone who is in total control of any situation. A rational actor is also not someone who makes all the right decisions, or even a right decision--after all, there are many interpretations of what would be a “right choice” and what would not be. A rational actor is characterized by the steps of his decision making, not it’s final outcome. There are many ways to be considered rational, and every way also has the counterpoint of irrationality as well. For example, it is considered rational action to acknowledge and survey all relevant information before making a decision. Conversely, it would be considered irrational to purposely ignore or not look at information important to the given situation. Some keys to acting rational are: Can the United States be considered a rational actor? Can Iraq? The answers to these questions can be deceivingly simple or very complex; especially if it is found that one or each of the countries did not have a unitary actor but rather several or even many. If Bush was considered rational it cannot be assumed that his military leadership was as well. Is a majority of a country’s actors enough to make it a rational one and if so, how could it be considered completely rational? The ideas of search, persuasion, and strategy come into play in the field of international relations. Each of these concepts is key to understanding the relationships between countries and the actions those countries take. The terms are used in the arena of conflict, when one country is in disagreement with another and is trying to influence it a certain way. These are a few options available to the country in the intimidator role, and that country plans it’s policy accordingly. The idea of persuasion has a country try to persuade it’s opposition to undertake or not a certain action without any real control of the outcomes. The persuader can suggest that by acting a certain way rewards or good things might come to the opposition but without any say or guarantee over those rewards. For example, if the United States wanted Iraq to take an action, say to begin growing oranges, it would try to convince them of the potential benefits that such an action would entail. These benefits, like plenty of orange juice, can not be controlled by the US since there is no room for them to act. The idea of persuasion is usually a first tactic used because it’s usually inexpensive to the persuader and once bargaining escalates into strategic measures it is hard to go back. Strategy is usually used when persuasion does not bring the desired effect, that is compelling or deterring an action, on a country’s opposition. To compel is to use threats, conclusive or inconclusive, to influence another state to take a certain action. For example, if the United States wanted Iraq to take an action, say shutting down it’s chemical weapons plants, it would threaten to use economic sanctions against them. If those threats did not get through and the action was not taken the threat level could rise to one of military action that would hopefully make the message more clear. In contrast, to deter a state is to convince it not to take a certain course of action through similar avenues (ie: threats and the like). There are many ways to deter a country from taking an action but the concept is usually thought of in militaristic terms. Using an example along the same lines if the United States wanted to deter Iraq from building nuclear weapons facilities it could threaten to take the issue up with the United Nations Security Council. If that did not get the message across the US could then raise the stakes by threatening to use stealth fighters to bomb the facilities and their surrounding installations. Much of strategic theory rests on the culpability of the aggressor and the amount of courage the affected state has. In general, the idea of a successful strategic action, that is one where the desired results are received but the threat is never carried out, rides on the idea that the initiating country will make good on it’s promises. Many times an aggressor will be bluffing when trying to strategically influence an adversary, yet will a country take the chance to find out? Traditionally the United States has been fairly good on keeping it’s promises or not backing down; one only needs to witness the Bay of Pigs incident to realize that most of the time in the international arena America means business. Before moving on to look at more real world concerns involving empirical evidence of the interaction between the two countries there is one last diplomatic option to look at--the idea of search. The idea of search is to look for other avenues to get desired actions or compromises between countries. Search involves looking for new ways to deal with other countries or looking for solutions that were previously undiscovered. With many of the old ideas of policy leading to combat the concept of search can be important to the future of all international relations, not just those between Iraq and the United States. Logical Structure: Evidence Across Time And Space In this section, the paper will focus on empirical evidence of interaction between the United States and Iraq, with an emphasis on the Gulf War between the two nations beginning with a chronological timeline of the war and then focusing on the role players in each of the countries. This idea of leadership will be broken down in terms of who did what and finally if any could be considered unitary and rational. Gulf War Chronology (Dates and hours are in Riyadh time) July 1990--Internal Look, a US war game, shows Saudi Arabia could be defended against Iraqi invaders, but at terrible cost. August-- 2nd Iraq invades Kuwait 5th President Bush declares invasion “will not stand” 10th John Warden first meets with Schwarzkopf in Tampa to outline proposed air campaign September-- 18th Schwarzkopf asks four Army planners to begin work on ground offensive. November-- 29th UN Security Council authorizes use of “all means necessary” to eject Iraq from Kuwait. January 1991-- 9th James Baker meets with Tariq Aziz in Geneva in an unsuccessful effort to find a peaceful solution 12th Congress authorizes the use of force 15th UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal 17th Allied attack begins with Apache strike at 2:38 A.M. 29th Iraqis attack Khafji and other border positions. Allied pilots begin flying combat air patrols to thwart Iraqi flights to Iran February-- 1st last Tomahawk missiles are launched in attack on Bahgdad airfield 7th CIA, in daily intelligence brief, notes large discrepancy between Washington and Riyadh regarding destruction of Iraqi armor in air attacks 21st CIA and Pentagon officials meet at White House to air differences over battle-damage assessment. Bush sets deadline of noon, February 23, for Iraqi withdrawal 24th Ground attack begins 25th Scud destroys barracks in Al-Khobar killing twenty-eight Americans and wounding ninety-eight 26th Iraqis flee Kuwait city 28th Cease-fire takes effect at 8 A.M. March-- 2nd 24th Infantry Division fights Hammurabi Division as it flees; destroys six hundred vehicles 3rd Schwarzkopf meets Iraqi generals at Safwan 5th Most POW’s are released June-- 8th Victory parade in Washington After one looks at the timeline of the conflict between the two countries many questions arise; most notably who is responsible on each side for this situation? Was only one individual responsible for controlling the destiny of his country or did many individuals take part in the planning, decision making, and executing? Did that single leader or that group of leaders act in a rational fashion? These are a few of the questions that will be confronted in the next section, with first a look at the United States, then at Iraq. Back in the late eighteenth century, the men who founded the United States tried to set up a government that was so complicated and safe that no one individual could control all of it’s resources. Responsibilities were delegated to certain parts of the proposed government in such a way to make things as even and equal as possible. Now, in the late twentieth century the Gulf War put that theory to the test with many individuals with different ways of thinking wanting to take part in the operation with many different views on how it should be handled, if it should be handled at all. When looking at the United States the first position that comes to mind is the office of the President, during the war period George Bush. When polled many felt that Bush was almost the sole commander of the US forces and the principal policy maker as well. Given this assumption it would seem clear that Bush would be at least a unitary, if not rational leader. But this is not so, mainly because there were many other people that had a very direct effect on how the conflict was carried out; from more visible military men like Powell and Schwarzkopf to the less visible Congressional leaders such as Nunn and Mitchell. President Bush had an astronomically high approval rating during the Gulf War because many felt he handled it in a very professional way. In truth, he handled it by almost not handling it at all, leaving much of the military planning and tasks to his military leaders (1). This hands off strategy seemed to have worked fairly well, it was remarked that the war was fought in a very professional manner (2). Bush was always with his many advisors, both from the military and his own cabinet, and every decision was made in a group fashion. His only major operational command of the entire war was the calling of the cease-fire, and that was only done after he was told he could do so(3). At first there was no real unified front as far as agreeing on a course of action to take in response to the Iraqi invasion; the White House was careful to come across in the right fashion in accordance with the military. Richard Cheney, then the Secretary of Defense, remembers initial talks with the military on how to proceed in the crisis. “I think we (in the Bush administration) had it right, but in those early stages when you’re deploying forces and planning the operation I think there was a legitimate reluctance there from some to say you know, are these guys for real? Now of course, what they found out was we were.”(4) He also remembers the early weeks of the conflict when there were “different points of view within the administration between the military and the civilians in terms of how we were going to proceed.”(5). One of the most important points of the administration in the beginning of the war was making sure that the commanders had everything they needed, keeping up their end of the bargain. “I wanted to make certain that they had everything they requested. I did not want to be in a position where the civilians had denied our military leaders the resources they said they needed to do the job...I think that there was no excuse possible for anyone in the military to say that the civilian side of the house had not supported them” (6). Yet the military was only one arm of the government that contended with the administration for control of the Gulf War, Congress and even the American public had a strong influence on what kinds of decisions were made and how things were carried out. While it was not clear if Congressional support was needed to launch any type of offensive it was certainly wanted. While Cheney commented that “..we were absolutely committed to getting Hussein out of Kuwait...(even) without authorization of the Congress”(7) the President “..felt very strongly that he wanted Congress on board and he felt he could get them on board and he was correct”(8). If things did not work out in their favor ,however, the President and the rest of the administration “..would in fact have gone forward whether Congress had supported the effort or not”(9). Most did not understand the affect the general public had on decision making within the administration; public support was important all the way from beginning to end because the conflict was not to be another Vietnam. We had the American Public here at home to worry about. Then you had the Iraqis. So if you got tough and sort of belligerent really hammering the Iraqis then the people would get nervous sometimes here at home. Public opinion would say, ‘Well gee you guys are you know, too warlike, too eager to go to war.’ If, on the other hand, you did something like schedule a meeting with the Iraqis to give them one last chance to get out, the allies would become nervous(10). At first the public was not united behind the government on the matter when it started and many questions were raised whether the United States was doing the right thing. But towards the end of the year public opinion was more focused and, at least towards the administration, helpful. “By the time we got close to the holidays the country starts to come together in support of what the President wants to do”(11). On the other end of the political spectrum lies Iraq, considered a country that is very different than the United States. While it is common knowledge that the US has different and distinct branches of government and that each of them has their own powers and responsibilities not much is known of Iraq. While Iraq has a constitution and a unicameral legislature the focus and burden of it’s politics seems to rest on one man, Saddam Hussein(12). Yet is that one man really completely in control of Iraq in a singular way that the President of the US could never hope to be? To get a fairly objective answer one needs to examine exactly which offices he holds in the Iraqi government. According to the 1995 CIA World Factbook, Saddam Hussein holds the offices of: Chief of State, Prime Minister, Chairman of The Revolutionary Command Council, and President(13). In many eyes, Saddam Hussein was Iraq and he was what made Iraq the enemy. And what a good enemy he turned out to be. Asked to speak about Saddam and his character, former Iraqi high intelligence officer Wafic Al Samarri said: He was very nervous, hot tempered, always tense. He tried always to do something, he was restless. It’s very important for you to know something about Saddam’s character. We know him because he lived with us. He was a very evil person as early as his childhood. He lived in our district. He is very evil and he has been evil as early as his childhood. He always resorted to terrorist methods and tactics. Anyway he is a very persistent person. He has the capability to work continuously but quite often you see him very tense and tight, particularly when circumstances are pressing (14). Al Samarri has not been the only one to criticize Saddam Hussein and his personal character; as told by Rick Atkinson, author of Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. “Saddam had come to power in the late 1960’s and no one in Washington had any illusions that this was a Jeffersonian democrat. He was recognized for being incredibly ruthless. There was an appreciation for the fact that he was a man who had used chemical weapons on his own people...who murdered thousands of people”(15). It was this type of casting that framed Saddam as the ultimate enemy towards the people. According to Author Bernard Trainor this framing made it much easier for the American people to support the war effort. There was a demonization took place with Saddam Hussein, as a result of three things that I think changed American attitudes towards the aggression out there, and led ultimately to the support of the war. Number one, it was Saddam Hussein taking hostages and supposedly putting hostages around military targets. The second thing, again in relation to the hostages, is in what he thought was going to be a public relations coup, he went to the Al Rashid Hotel in downtown Baghdad to visit one of the hostage families that happened to be a British family. And there’s this very famous TV interview of Saddam Hussein sitting there patting this little British boy on the head. And the little British boy is standing there absolutely frozen with fright. And the picture that comes through is this mustached, dirty old uncle with this little boy. And the final thing was the announcement that Saddam Hussein was secretly working on weapons of mass destruction. Now this monster down in the Gulf, who has taken hostages, who frightens little boys, now has nuclear weapons, the American people started to feel this fellow was a demon, and that Bush was correct that this man must be stopped(16). Many people have regarded Saddam Hussein as tyrannical and even evil but the more important question seems to be, “is he rational”? Many sources report to the contrary, beginning with members of his own staff like intelligence officer Al Samarri. “Saddam was inclined to keep his secrets to himself. That’s why his plans were never disclosed. Such planning, nobody knew of this”(17) He was also thought to be quite paranoid, “..his psychological composition is built on suspicion. This makes other leaders quite reserved to put forth such proposals. Had you proposed to him ‘Why don’t we take Kuwait?’ He would retort ‘This is a scheme plotted with the West”(18). Many outside of Iraq questioned and were even puzzled over Hussein’s many grave tactical errors on and off the battlefield. Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor stated, “But figuring out Saddam Hussein was one of our greatest mysteries. He marched to his own drummer and frequently as this (the war) unfolded he made decisions which were sometimes inexplicable and sometimes didn’t look very smart”(19). Author Rick Atkinson framed Saddam in a similar light. “Here was a man who believed he could hunker down and ride out an attack by what was clearly the most formidable coalition of military powers since World War Two, a man who believed that the West lacked the political will to carry out through on it’s threats”(20). Atkinson feels that Hussein was fundamentally flawed as both a leader and as a rational being. “He made one strategic miscalculation after another. Everytime he had to make a major strategic decision, Saddam guessed wrong until the end of the war (to pull out of Kuwait) when he guessed right”(21). From the United States’ point of view, it is still hard to truly understand Saddam Hussein, even years later. “We (the US) got Saddam wrong in retrospect and it’s true we misjudged him in certain fundamental ways. We didn’t realize the extent to which he was deluded. Here was a man who calculated and miscalculated on a vast scale”(22). Atkinson suggests that perhaps part of the problem was America couldn’t relate to Saddam. It was difficult to conceive I think in Washington that this kind of irrationality could in fact carry one on into a war. I think there was a belief that Saddam was fundamentally rational and fundamentally recognized his position in the Middle East in ways in which he clearly didn’t. He had a megalomania about him that was difficult to appreciate in the late 1980’s and on into 1990 in Washington(23). Conclusion: Implications For Theory And Policy After looking at the theory behind actions and conflict and then analyzing the evidence presented the final step is determining what path should be followed in the future. Can it be said who are and are not unitary and/or rational actors? How has search, persuasion, and strategy been used in the Gulf War and have these actions been effective? Finally the question needs to be asked of what path do these countries take in the future, regarding themselves and each other? The main purpose of this paper was an examination of what was hypothesized to be two very different states with very different actors controlling them and this is seems to be what the evidence shows. In the introduction there were two main categories that were looked at as possible lenses to view actors, unitary and rational. Of course each of these categories has a flip side so there are really four categories in total. The end result? The two countries could not be more different in their leadership character and styles. Using the Gulf War as a model, the United States cannot be classified as a state controlled by a unitary actor, much to the founder’s delight. There were too many different people involved in decision making from top to bottom, the Administration had to work hand in hand with the Military, wanted to get Congressional approval, and even watched the approval ratings before making large scale moves. Of course this conceptualization also lends itself to being considered a rational approach, with all types of information looked at and all angles thought through before making policies or actions. By working as a large scale team, from the commanders to the infantry, the United States could be considered a model for rational action. On the opposite side of that same coin The Republic of Iraq could be classified as everything the United States is not; meaning it could be considered a state with a single unitary actor. And that actor cannot be considered a rational one. By almost any objective viewpoint, Saddam Hussein was the government of Iraq during the Gulf War, making every important decision both politically and militarily. Hussein, at times, seemed to be the only governmental figure in the entire country, at least the only visible one. When looking at his decisions, both politically and militarily, many of them were disasters. Representatives of both the United States and Iraq could not believe some of the large mistakes Saddam made and, perhaps even worse, could not even explain them. Hussein has often been characterized as an egotistical tyrant who acts on sheer emotion and never considers rational thought. Judging by his performance in the Gulf War those character sketches might not be far from the truth. The idea of persuasion and did not seem to be used within the Gulf War context but that should not be surprising. It can be safely assumed that modes of persuasion were used before the concept of military force was even mentioned but that timeframe was before the confines of this paper. The idea of deterrence was used heavily throughout the conflict, with the United States constantly upping the ante in it’s military campaign and Hussein ignoring the message each and every time until the final withdrawal. To his credit, Hussein had a very high tolerance for damages incurred and strong poker face. The only problems were that he was taking unsustainable damages and that the United States never went back on it’s threats. The idea of search also never entered the timeframe of the war in the Gulf but it should be looked at as a goal for the future. At present, there have only been a few courses of action that either the United States or Iraq can follow when dealing with each other and most, if not all of them, lead to military conflict. A large portion of this problem seems to lie with Saddam Hussein. From an objective standpoint it is easy to conclude that he is a major root of Iraqi problems. One only needs to look at the present day to see the United States using missile attacks to thwart Hussein from violating United Nations regulations. History says that he will not listen and there will be another escalation of conflict. The Republic of Iraq needs to ask itself how much longer it can afford to take the punishment for one irrational man’s actions. For the citizens of Iraq and the rest of the world, hopefully that answer is not very long. End Notes 1.Leyden, Allen; The Desert Storm Debriefing Book; Oasis Press/PSI Research; 1997 2.Ibid 3.Ibid 4.Interview with Richard Cheney; from Frontline:The Gulf War; The Public Broadcasting Network, 1996; Broadcast January 9th and 10th, 1996 5.Ibid 6.Ibid 7.Ibid 8.Ibid 9.Ibid 10.Ibid 11.Ibid 12.Portrait of Iraq; taken from The CIA World Factbook 1995; US Government, 1995 13.Ibid 14.Interview with Wafic Al Samarri; from Frontline: The Gulf War; The Public Broadcasting Network, 1996; Broadcast January 9th and 10th, 1996 15.Interview with Rick Atkinson; from Frontline: The Gulf War; The Public Broadcasting Network, 1996; Broadcast January 9th and 10th, 1996 16.Interview with Bernard Trainor; from Frontline: The Gulf War; The Public Broadcasting Network, 1996; Broadcast January 9th and 10th, 1996 17.Interview with Samarri 18.Ibid 19.Interview with Brent Scowcroft; from Frontline: The Gulf War; The Public Broadcasting Network, 1996; Broadcast January 9th and 10th, 1996 20.Interview with Atkinson 21.Ibid 22.Ibid 23.Ibid