Jeffrey Finkelstein Political Science 472 Professor Raymond Tanter Fall 1996 Gulf War an Analysis of Deterrence and Coercion In 1979 the president, Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, was replaced by Saddam Hussein, and once more the political situation flared into hostilities with Iran. The Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980, lasted for eight years and had a crippling effect on the economy of both countries. Before Iraq had a chance to recover economically, it was once more plunged into war, this time with its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The invasion was the result of many factors including a long-standing territorial dispute, and Iraqi troops overran the country on 2nd August 1990. The UN security council condemned the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and demanded a complete withdrawal by 15th January 1991. When Iraq failed to comply with this demand, the Persian Gulf War ensued, with allied troops led by the US launching an aerial bombardment on Baghdad. The war, which proved disastrous for Iraq, lasted only six weeks, and a cease-fire was announced by the US on 28th February 1991 (Arab Net). Was the Gulf War inevitable along the rational decision making calculus of deterrence theory? Why can a war like the one in the gulf occur again? In order to answer this question, we must examine the decision making process by Saddam Hussein with specific reference to the Iran-Iraq war, we must also examine the United States Government approach toward rogue states such as Iraq, along with that of Kuwait, and the United Nations deterrence, coercion, and ability. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION Our point of departure will examine the theoretical perspectiveÕs involved in analyzing international security relations between the USG and the ÒrogueÓ actor of Iraq. In order to provide theoretical reasoning behind decisions made on part of either actor, we must determine the orientation of the actors involved. We will begin by discussing the idea of a unitary rational actor, and we will follow this approach by discussing the concepts involved with deterrence theory, coercion theory, as it relates to the gulf war. In order to understand and analyze the decisions made by a state, it is important to understand the nature and orientation of the actors involved. Is each country controlled by a unitary actor or are many different actors involved. In relation to the Gulf War we must examine whether President Bush was acting as a unitary actor or were their others that influenced the actions of the United States. These could be policy makers in Congress, the military of White House aides. On the Iraqi side was Saddam Hussein acting in a dictatorial fashion or were there other actors involved in SaddamÕs decision making process. Rationality is not defined in terms of sanity, rationality is based on the choice of a unitary actor in taking steps using rational decision making calculus in order to achieve the most beneficial outcome in a situation. Rationality deals with transitive preferences, choices made rationally have consistent ordering if A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C than A is preferred to C. A rational actor measures his expected utility among available choices. Rationality depends on the choices that will benefit you the most and hurt you the least. Inconsistencies with rationality arise from misperception, inaccurate/incomplete information and biases. Misperception is sometimes related to inconsistency in rational choice. If misperception is due to inaccuracy of available information, then it is not inconsistent because the actor using available information thought they were making an optimum decision. If leaders misinterpret information it is inconsistent with rational choice. Rationality does not imply right choice; it implies the best course of action giving preexisting conditions. Biases in evaluating information is inconsistent with rational choice because the actor selectively choose to ignore existing factors. Rationality is determined by the ability to optimize benefits and minimize costs. Changes in risk attitude affects the degree of rationality which is employed within a given situation. Decision makers are more risk accepted if they are willing to take losses in hope of expected gains. Conversely, decision makers are risk adverse if they view expected losses more than expected gains. A loss of a thousand dollars would be weighed more heavily than a gain of a thousand dollars. It is important to note that goals of policy and how choices are made are different in that goals of an actor are not judged on terms of rationality whereas the choices an actor makes are binded by rational decision making. SEARCH AND PERSUASION The concepts of search, persuasion and strategy are integral in determining the actions between international actors on policy. A country acting rationally would like to avoid containment policies which require resolve and credibility of threats. A search should result in finding a way to test an adversaries resolve and commitment without engaging in high costs, such as military conflict. Search reveals negative information about unacceptable options. Search is less revealing of your values than is strategy, which displays positive information about preferred options. Search is an excellent prelude to persuasion (PS 472 NOT5.DOC). A search can yield valuable information as to the values and resolve of an adversary actor. Without a successful search, persuasion will be less effective and based on either misperception or misinformation. A successful search will yield an adversary's view of likelihoodÕs and/or values for events so that an adversary prefers and chooses an option favorable to me. Persuasion works on events under opponent's control. Persuasion yields less information about an actor's values than strategic action. Events relevant to persuasion are NOT under the actor's control. If no control, no equivalence between value and probability. The key to persuasive action is making sure that the adversary knows that the outcomes of a particular course of action are out of the persuaderÕs control (PS 472 NOT5.DOC). Strategy is used when search and persuasion fails to yield results. Strategy concerns the use of deterrence and coercion. Deterrence is to take an action to force an actor to maintain a certain behavior or to prevent them from changing and existing one (Huth 15). An actor can deter by rewarding acceptable behavior of the adversary, this course of strategy is called assurance. An actor can also deter by punishing an adversary for unacceptable behavior, this strategy is called deterrence. Deterrence by denial is the ability of an actor to deny an opponent the means to take on an action by either increasing their own ability and capabilities or reducing the capabilities of their opponent. Coercion is the next step taken after deterrence fails. Coercion seeks to get a defender either to take an action or undo prior actions (PS 472, NOT6.DOC). The threat that compels rather than deters often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts, rather than if he acts. This is because the only way to become committed to an action is to initiate it. Coercion or compellance unlike deterrence has to be definite: We move, and you must get out of the way. A deadline must be stated in order for action on coercion to be instituted. LOGICAL STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE ACROSS TIME AND SPACE With an understanding of the theoretical background of rationality and strategy we must look at the question at hand: Was the Gulf War inevitable along the rational decision making calculus of deterrence theory? In order to analyze the question we must examine the domestic politics in relation to expected utility and provide reasoning for SaddamÕs rationality and the deterrence and coercive actions taken on part of Kuwait and the United States toward Iraq. IraqÕs disputes with Kuwait ranged from century old territorial claims, debts incurred during the Iran-Iraq wars and OPEC prices and production levels. In order to understand SaddamÕs actions, we must examine the chronology of events leading up to the invasion of Kuwait: May 1990-summit of Arab States. Saddam complained at the low price agreements of oil involving Kuwaiti government July 10, 1990-agreement signed by OPEC to cut oil production and drive the price of oil up. Kuwaiti officials said they would only follow agreement until the Fall. July 16, 1990-Iraq and Kuwaiti officials negotiate demands:1. $2.4 billion in disputed border oil fields. 2.Provide $12 billion for depressed price of oil on world market. 3.Kuwait to cancel $10 billion loaned during Iran-Iraq war. 4. Lease of island (Bubian) to Iraq. Iraq was building up forces on Kuwait border. IraqiÕs issue statements about not heeding demands(Aman 38). July 19-24, 1990-United States makes policy statements about Persian Gulf. July 25, 1990-Saddam meets U.S. Ambassadors/outcome inconclusive. Aug 2, 1990-Iraq occupies Kuwait Nov 8, 1990-US announces 150,000 more troops in Gulf Nov-Jan 1991- US, France, United Nations, and Arab states try to work out a diplomatic settlement. Dec 1990-UN Security Council passes resolution that Iraq must withdraw by January 15 or any means will be used to ensure compliance. Jan 16, 1991:Desert Storm begins with air strikes on Iraqi targets Feb 24, 1991:Ground offensive starts/72 hours Iraq compelled to accept cease-fire and withdraw from Kuwait. In order for us to determine whether Saddam was acting rationally in his decision to invade Kuwait, we must examine the disputes Iraq had with Kuwait which led to SaddamÕs initiation of attack. In the 1930Õs Iraq became independent and disputes with Britain over Kuwait persisted. Kuwait gained independence in 1961. Iraqi claims varied from desire for all of Kuwait, but mostly limited to various islands. Disputes persisted over land borders as well. Iraq said they would settle land border issue if islands were leased or given over. These islands were important for access into the Persian Gulf which Iraq had limited access to through the Shat-al-Arab waterway of which it had to share with Iran. The post Iran-Iraq war period illustrated the tremendous debts incurred by Iraq. Iraq had a large war debt and the states wanted repayment of the $80 billion. Oil prices were low in the Iraqi perspective and exports were critical to the economy. Iraq felt other OPEC states were producing too much oil and driving prices down. Iraq viewed this as economic warfare. This period in Iraqi history showed many attempted coups and considerable levels of discontent existed among the Iraqi people. The demobilization from Iran-Iraq war was rough on the military because the economy was in such shambles their were no jobs available for returning soldiers. Expected utility was affected by domestic politics in that not using force can be a politically risky decision and to pull back can be seen as a foreign policy defeat. Political opponents can use this drawback as a tool against leadership IraqÕs decision to invade can be viewed using the idea of expected utility (EU). Saddam viewed the probability of prevailing as very high. Iraq did have a highly superior military and low cost to win. EU of using force is very good for bilateral confrontation. The EU of not using force, SaddamÕs political situation was unstable and with a bad economy it was becoming worse. If other states were involved EU with all Iraqi economic factors would persist so it would be costly to not use force. Saddam Hussein calculated his risk as being lower if he could overrun Kuwait before the USG had time to change itÕs degree of commitment. The United States strategy was an illustration of lack of deterrence and explicit threat credibility. The US did not explicitly issue a military threat to Iraq before the invasion. The USG made a mild attempt at deterrence by saying the US would secure its interests. Did the United States make a military deterrent threat? There is no clear indication that the United States made a deterrent threat beyond air exercises with the United Arab Emirates. On the issue of extended-immediate deterrence the US was unable to alter the balance of forces for immediate deterrence. Saddam felt the United States would not have a military response. Was there a third party involved in effecting EU of not using force. Third party forces may have put pressure on Kuwait to reduce debts, although third party intervention did not succeed in a diplomatic sense. Overall EU of Iraq to invade Kuwait looked pretty good. The lessons of deterrence failure can be seen on US foreign policy at the time. US deterrence was weak and probably a failure if deterrence was attempted at all. The United States could not alter immediate balance of forces. The United States left diplomacy to the Arab states which hurt the credibility of US threats. The past behavior of the United States based on SaddamÕs perception of information, mainly the US attack on Lebanon in 1982 in which the US bombed barricades and then pulled out, the US illustrated little resolve then, why would they now. United States failure to practice extended deterrence in a more vigorous way resulted in the failure of deterrence. The United States felt Iraq was using a threat to use force to exert influence in negotiations. The US felt Iraq might occupy disputed oil fields which was the perceived by the USG as the imminence of a threat. The dispute between Iraq and Kuwait was not the first thing on the US agenda in respect to US foreign policy objectives. Iran was seen as more of a problem in the region at the time. The US felt they could take action without a regional basis of support. US misperceived or didnÕt understand the probability of Iraq using force. The failure to employ deterrence by the United States can be attributed to these many factors which can be seen as misperception or lack of resolve. The coercive actions taken by the United States shaped up a little differently, illustrating stronger resolve and commitment to US foreign policy objectives. The United States decision to seek Iraqi withdrawal stemmed from the issues at stake for the US foreign policy agenda. The US tried to use non-military means to get Iraq out of Kuwait. Economic sanctions granted by the United Nations granted legal authority and were supported by the US which included an oil embargo, and restricted imports. The USG was concerned with oil prices over the long term and worried about exertion of influence of Saudi OPEC policy. The US at this time had also built up military forces in the region, and begins giving clear policy statements as to their resolve in IraqÕs unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The United States was acting under a clear foreign policy in conjunction with the United NationÕs initiatives. The intervention was characterized by the USG to support a general international principle of territorial integrity. The USG also wanted to weaken IraqÕs war machine capabilities for the long term. The US wanted to eliminate IraqÕs chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities to ensure security for the new world order. The United States at this point was set on making an example of aggression on oneÕs neighbors and wished to promote regional stability in the gulf region. The actions on part of the USG to establish coercive action were taking on the tone of greater resolution then their ability to deter. In order to understand the shift to compellance by the USG we must examine Iraqi perceptions and intentions at this time in the Gulf War crisis. Leaving Kuwait would reflect badly on HusseinÕs standing domestically and in the Arab world. The US as the ÒGreat SatanÓ would not be able to deter a fundamental aggressor like Saddam. Much like Saddam the kings and queens of ancient Mesopotamia lived in mortal fear of losing face before their enemies. "He who would seize my statue, who would smash it, who would destroy its inscriptions, who would erase my name, may he be smitten by the curse of Napirisha, of Kiririsha, and of Inshushinak, that his name shall become extinct, that his offspring be barren, that the forces of Beltia, the great goddess, shall sweep down on him." Thus reads an inscription at the base of the headless statue of Napir-Asu, the wife of one of the most important 14th- century B.C. kings of Susa (Makiya 56). Was the United States threat credible by December 1990? The United States had assembled a credible military force, yet Saddam questioned US willingness to take casualties, noting Vietnam. Saddam did not feel Bush would get Congressional support for the use of military force. Saddam also felt that the United States might arouse latent anti-US. sentiment from Arab coalition partners. The credibility of the threat was not seen by Saddam in evaluating his EU as a cause for defection. Saddam employed the military strategy that if the US does attack Iraq then he will take on a protracted war. Where costs would be heavy and he would compel the United States to withdraw and force them to pain reparations. If the confrontation takes place on the ground Iraq must inflict causalities on the United States. The United States plans for a coercive air strike were unequivocally resonated at the onset of the war. The United States decided that its military strategy would involve targeting upper level military and political leadership positions of Iraq to show the population just how vulnerable Iraq was. The US wanted to kill leadership or instigate dissent amongst the people to overthrow Saddam. Targets included oil fields, electricity, etc. The denial strategy employed by the US would target troops, equipment, and supplies which supported Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The impact of this coercive air power was cut short after civilianÕs were used as shields on many installations. The air power did not have the military effect the USG was looking for, mainly uprisingÕs against Saddam. Air power did succeed in coercing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, but it did so by undermining its ability to defend against the CoalitionÕs ground threat (Pape 211). The Iraqi costs of fighting the US vs. the costs of withdrawing and leaving behind military capabilities were weighed by Saddam and he felt he could cut costs, mainly save face, by not giving up and continue fighting the US(Shelling 124). On the eve of the ground campaign the US preferred to fight Iraq rather than accept incomplete diplomatic victory. The United States was confident in victory with low costs and wanted to cripple IraqÕs long term military capability. The results of coercion by the USG proved that by implementing air strikes they had achieved denial of IraqÕs war making capabilities and produced a series of diplomatic concessions. The United States was confident at this strategic stage that they would have low costs and preferred a war to ensure the stability of the region and achieve USG foreign policy objectives and illustrate resolve by making an example of Iraq. CONCLUSIONS The actions taken by Saddam can be seen by examining the basement of fears and the windows of opportunity analogies. Saddam may have seen Kuwait as a window of opportunity to get out of his basement of economic collapse. All indications point that Saddam was acting as a rational actor. His power was threatened by domestic collapse and he leaped through a window of opportunity to maintain his power as a unitary actor. Although the costs to Iraq and Saddam were at a high critical risk Saddam viewed the invasion of Kuwait as a viable foreign political decision. Deterrence by threat by the USG was perceived by SaddamÕs as weak and relied on the search he had conducted in determining US non-commitment to causalities based on the Vietnam history. Saddam also expected the USG to be divided in congress on taking military action against Iraq. Saddam felt he could achieve concessions and domestic stability through his aggressive action. The US commitment of resolve was not illustrated until the coercive stage of strategy was implemented, at which point the US used legal authority from the United Nations resolutions secure USG foreign policy objectives. Although USG helped build up Iraqi political power in the region during the Iran-Iraq war the US was unwilling to upset the balance of power in the region, and in the new world order. The USG foreign policy must ensure its nuclear strength while limiting the war making capabilities of rogue states such as Iraq. The lessons which we should take from the Gulf War are that in order for the United States to maintain the new world order they must understand the domestic situations of nations before we determine rational action in protecting foreign agendas. The quick victory has clouded military operational analysis and has allowed many to ignore the political circumstances that led to the crisis in the first place. As British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said, "Success mitigates a multitude of sins." (McKillip 46). Although Saddam was aggressing to alleviate his economic burden and maintain the power of his regime we should note that until misperceptions of aggression are calculable a war like the Gulf war is an inevitable conclusion based on the rational decision making calculus of deterrence theory. Aman Mohammed M, The Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War., Domes, 07-31-1995, pp PG. Huth, Paul K., Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, Yale University 1988. Kanan, Makiya, Aim at Saddam's face.., Vol. 10, New Perspectives Quarterly, 04-01-1993, pp 56. 1993 By Captain J. D. McKillip, Iraqi strategy during the Gulf War.., Vol. 75, Military Review, 09-01-1995, pp 46. Pape, Robert A., Bombing To Win, Cornell, 1996. http://www.arab.net/iraq/history/iq_coups.html 1996. Shelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence Yale, 1966. Tanter, Raymond, Lecture Political Science 472, University of Michigan, 1996. 6