Michael A Janson Dr. Tanter Political Science 472 9 December 1996 Query: Why is Libya engaged in chemical weapons development? What evidence is there to indicate that development is continuing? I. INTRODUCTION A. Outline I. Introduction A. Outline B. Overview II. Theoretical Orientation A. Deterrence and Coercion B. Assumptions Concerning Rationality C. Controllability and Calculability as Factors in Deterrence Success D. Motivated and Unmotivated Bias in Threat Perception E. Prospect Theory III. Evidence Across Time and Space A. Historical Overview B. The Tarhunah Facility C. Circumventing Deterrence: Underground Facilities D. Repercussions of the Persian Gulf War E. U.S. Bias F. Libyan Bias G. The Quest for Arab Power Goes Underground IV. Implications for Theory and Policy A. The Twilight of Deterrence Theory - Time for Deconstruction B. Searching the Mind of Qadaffi: Rationale and Risks C. Persuading for Humanity D. Requirements for Strategy E. Peace Through Advanced Weapons Development F. Multilateral Solutions to Global Problems G. Legal Issues H. Conclusion V. Endnotes VI. References B. Overview "Today, there is no greater threat to our nation's, or our world's, national security, than the illicit spread of weapons of mass destruction." Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) March 1996.[1] In the Spring of 1996, the United States government announced that Libya was building the world's largest underground chemical weapons facility. Anti-American articles dominated the Libyan press. Shortly after, the Pentagon leaked to the American media that contingency plans had been formulated for the destruction of the Libyan facility. The plan was for a low-level nuclear bombardment. Subsequently, Libya ceased construction. This paper will attempt to present the evidence for Libyan chemical weapons production and to evaluate the motivations behind such development. Whether we like it or not, (or whether we know about it or not), the U.S. may be using a nuclear first-strike coercive policy towards Libya. Evaluation is of the utmost importance. II. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION A. Deterrence and Coercion Deterrence is a process by which an actor induces another actor to maintain the status quo by not doing something. "Deterrence by threats" causes an actor not to take action because of expected punishment. "Deterrence by denial" denies an actor the abi lity to take an action. In reference to weapons of mass destruction, "Deterrence remains the first line of defense against NBC [Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons] ... US superiority in conventional forces cannot be expected in all circumstances to deter war, or the use of NBC weapons after the war has begun...Nuclear weapons remain the ultimate sanction and vital element of deterring NBC use. For this reason, it is necessary to resist further attempts to delegitimize US possession and poten tial use of nuclear weapons." [2] Coercion is a process by which an actor induces another actor to change the status quo by ceasing to do something or by initiating action. Coercion can be performed by threat or denial. I will primarily use the term deterrence in reference to U.S. acti ons to prevent the development of chemical weapons because U.S. generally seeks to prevent a future attack. However, some of the topical situations are really coercive. When Libya was not moving ahead, the U.S. was in a deterrence situation. This can be compared to the coercive dynamic of when Libya was moving ahead. Since Libya had prepared a location, pu rchased material, and construction was occurring, U.S. policies threatened to disrupt the status quo. Consequently, an inherent difficulty in constructing a policy towards Libya is that the U.S. is in a coercive situation that have both coercion and det errence elements. Coercion requires leadership to justify changing the status quo, while deterrence situations require policies that sustain the norm. B. Assumptions Concerning Rationality Assumptions concerning rationality are the foundation of attempted explanations of international behavior. If an actor is assumed to be acting rationally, then an explanation of the decision making process may rely primarily on the actual external envir onment such as windows of opportunity and tangible threats. If an actor is assumed to be acting irrationally, then an explanation of the decision making process (if at all possible) will have to rely primarily on internal stimuli such as felt needs and basements of fear. Some scholars have approached decision-making in a Rational Choice model. The Rational Choice model focuses on external threats and opportunities. [3] More recent scholarship has argued that due to cognitive limits, imperfect information, misperception and bureaucratic politics, actors exhibit Bounded Rationality. The Bounded Rationality approach to decision making incorporates internal characteristics of an actor. This paper will assume that Libya acts with some degree of rationality. The Bounded Rationality model will be the investigative lens by which the logic of Qadaffi's actions will be attempted to be understood. Although popular news sources have often quipped that Qadaffi is "insane" or "crazy," careful analysis reveals deliberate strategic choices indicative of rationality. Qadaffi's actions may have been of ambiguous logic, but he has historically responded rationally to tangible threats. An prime example is Libya's actions in response to U.S. concerns about chemical facilities at Rabta. In the 1980s the United States "led the charge" against the Rabta chemical weapons facility in Libya. After threats and military confrontations, Libya retreated in February of 1989 when the pressure was on. In March of 1990, a fire was reported to have decimated the facility. The CIA later reported that the fire was a strategic "hoax" to ward off U.S. attack. "In 1990 Gadaffi shut down the Rabta plant after Washington threatened to attack it with warplanes and publicly identified European companies t hat had provided equipment. But U.S. satellites soon discovered that Rabta's equipment had been moved and stored in underground bunkers a mile away." [4] As this example illustrates, Libya has acted deliberately to prevent or provoke attacks in the pas t. Calculated action is a function of rational thought, and thus Qadaffi does not warrant consideration as an wholly irrational actor. Internal factors must also be taken into account. Qadaffi has vehemently supported the notion of Arab unity and he has supported malicious anti-western groups. Fellow Arab leaders have called him "sick" and unpredictable. [5] He has a "anarchist-Leni nist" belief system that may have led him to take greater risks than the average person. [6] The ideological influences of Qadaffi warrants our consideration of Qadaffi as not a wholly rational actor. Qadaffi uses strategic means to further ideological ends. This confluence of rationality and irrationality yields an actor somewhere in the middle of the "rheostat of rationality." The precise degree of rationality is difficult to assess because the Li byan government does not provide opportunities for outside investigation into decision making processes. [7] What we do know is that Qadaffi dominates the government and is alone in executive responsibility. [8] C. Controllability and Calculability as factors in Deterrence Success The research of Messrs. George and Smoke reveals that, "The initiator's belief that the risk of his action are calculable and that the unacceptable risk of it can be controlled and avoided is, with very exceptions, a necessary (though not sufficient) con dition for a decision to challenge deterrence, i.e., a deterrence failure." [9] These two factors lead to deterrence failures because actors attempt to strategize around deterrent institutions. The opposite proposition has also been supported by research. Messrs. George and Smoke write, "The initiator's belief that the risks of options available to him are not calculable or controllable is usually a sufficient condition for deterrence success, with respect to those options." [10] When an actor cannot not adequately ascertain the possible risks involved in action, the actor will most likely be deterred from such action. D. Motivated and Unmotivated Bias in Threat Perception Action is dependent on perception. How an actor perceives their environment determines how they interact with that environment. Jervis, Lebow and Stein argue that bias in perception comes in two forms. Unmotivated biases are "the products of the comp lexity the environment and the inherent limitations of our cognitive capabilities." [11] Motivated biases are the products of the "emotions generated by that personal needs and severe situational dilemmas pose." [12] E. Prospect Theory Prospect Theory is a relatively recent development in the area of international security affairs. Coming from a more psychological base, Prospect Theory seeks to explain actions by exploring extra emphasis placed on perceived losses. When an actor is f aced with a feeling of loss in the status quo, they will be more likely to take risks that outweigh the benefits. The psychological phenomena occurring is that losses are much more keenly felt than gains. [13] III. EVIDENCE ACROSS TIME AND SPACE A. Historical Overview Libya was first colonized in 12th century BC by Phoenicians. The Carthaginians took control in 6th century BC. Roman conquest of Carthage in the second century BC put Libya under Roman rule into the fourth century AD. After a brief occupation by the V andals beginning in 455 AD, Byzantium administered the area until the middle of the sixth century BC. After an Arab seizure in 643 AD, the land was rarely controlled for a lengthy period of time until Turkish capture in 1551. The Italo-Turkish war that began in 1911 resulted in the annexation of Libya to Italy. In 1947 the UN General Assembly approved Libyan Independence and the measure became effective in 1951. In the fifties and sixties, Libya did not play a major role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The oil boom of the 1960s brought massive amounts of wealth to the fledgling republic. During the late 1960s, Libya was racked with instability and finally succumbed to a military coup in 1969 when Colonel Muammar al-Qadaffi seized power. Qadaffi quick ly became a powerful leader that instituted many Islamic laws and established many socialist policies. Libya became a vocal supporter of Arab unity and anti-western mentalities. In the 1980s, Libya was hostile towards the U.S. and Israel and engaged in terrorist activities. In 1981, the U.S. downed two Libyan jets. In 1986, the U.S. bombed facilities in retribution for suspected terrorist bombings. Libya aggressively pursued weapons of mass destruction throughout the eighties and into the nineties. A UN resolution banning arms sales and flights to Libya was enacted in 1992 in response to suspected Libyan involvement in the downing of a civilian airliner over Scotland. The Patterns of Global Terrorism - 1995 released by the U.S. State Department indicates that Libya continues "to support groups violently opposed to the Middle East peace process, some of which engage in acts of international terrorism...In November 1995 a Libyan dissident resident in London was brutally murdered; the Libyan expatriate community accused Tripoli of involvement in his death." [14] B. The Tarhunah Facility On February 27, 1996, the New York Times published a relatively small editorial about the prospect of Libya "completing the world's largest chemical weapons plant." The article mentioned that the plant might be "impregnable" as it was buried deep in a m ountain near Tarhunah. [15] On February 28, 1996, the Libyan newspaper Al-Shams reported that the U.S. paper was reporting lies and fabrications as "deliberate cover for Israel's arsenal of chemical weapons." The article additionally indicated that Liby a had been vindicated of previous U.S. indictments about the Rabta chemical facility since Rabta had successfully produced pharmaceutical facilities in recent years. [16] On April 1, 1996, Time magazine published an "exclusive report" about Libya's attempt to build an underground nerve gas plant. Time reported that the CIA had been on the case since 1992. The CIA had "waged an intensive covert battle to prevent Gaddafi from finishing the new factory." The "global network" of suppliers had been disrupted, but unfortunately the disruption only served to "delay the inevitable." CIA Director John Deutch testified to Congress that Libya was building the "worlds largest und erground chemical-weapons plant." Time reported: "Gaddafi appeared to have received some topflight help in designing the plant so it would be virtually impregnable. CIA clandestine officers suspected that he had got hold of blueprints the former Soviet Union used to build its large network of underground bomb shelters during the cold war. Only a direct hit by a nuclear warhead on top of the mountain could take out the plant. Sneaking a conventional bomb through the front door would be impossible, and a precision-guided projectile fired from an attack jet or a cruise missile could never be programmed to twist and turn its way into the mountain's entrance and destroy the equipment inside. The entrance is located in the middle of a long, narrow valley between two mountain peaks. A two-lane road wide enough to accommodate two tractor-trailer trucks side by side runs into the entrance. But less than a hundred feet inside, the two lanes split around a giant rock wall. The lanes rejoin on the other side into a huge chamber for the factory. Other chambers that c onnect to the main one are being dug. The Pentagon's Joint Special Operations Command, which oversees Delta Force and seal Team-6, studied the Tarhunah layout and concluded that a commando raid would be a suicide mission." [17] The CIA had slowed down construction by stopping German boring machinery spare parts to be acquired by Libya, but Libya had continued to gain material and labor from Thailand. The result would be "an unstable international outlaw [that] will have the me ans for limitless manufacture of weapons of mass destruction." [18] On April 3, 1996, "In an implicit threat to use military force, Defense Secretary William Perry said today the United States would not allow Libya to complete an underground chemical weapons production facility. Perry made the remark to reporters after discussing the factory with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak." [19] Secretary Perry would not elaborate on the evidence supporting the claims, nor on the U.S. contingency plans in the matter. Throughout April 1996, the Libyan press derided the American media and American official statements. The Libyan papers argued that it was non-sensical for Qadaffi to build a controversial chemical weapons plant because he had enough problems with the pu blic already. The Libyan papers called for public evidence to back up American claims. The Libyan media reported that on-site investigations had revealed nothing sinister in the project at Tarhunah, forty miles south of Tripoli. On April 18, 1996, the New York Times published another article about the Tarhunah facility. This article mentioned that Pentagon planners were considering the use of a small nuclear weapon if diplomatic efforts failed to stop construction. "As a last resort, the use of a `small' nuclear weapon that could penetrate the mountain and destroy the plant without exterior fallout has not been dismissed. The U.S. expects to have such a weapon by 1997 -- a year before the plant might go into operation." [20] On April 24, 1996, the Los Angles Times reported that Pentagon scientists saw atomic weaponry as the only capable means for a deterrence by denial policy. "One of the Pentagon's top scientists said Tuesday that if the United States wants to destroy a su spected chemical weapons plant in Libya, as it has threatened, it will have to use nuclear weapons because ordinary bombs cannot penetrate the underground site...Smith said Tuesday that the military is trying to develop a conventional warhead capable of p enetrating underground sites but currently has only a nuclear warhead, known as the B-61, that is capable... `If we wanted to destroy the Libyan plant , B-61 will be the nuclear weapon of choice,' he declared...The scientist's comments constituted one of the few times since the Cold War ended that a Pentagon official has even implied, at least publicly, that the United States might resort to nuclear weapons." [21] On May 30, 1996, the Washington Post reported that Egyptian President Mubarak had declared that Egyptian inspectors had found "no evidence" of a chemical weapons facility at Tarhunah. In response, the US Department of State Briefing on May 30, 1996 reaf firmed the US's viewpoint that the facility was dangerous and clarified the American position. Briefer Nicholas Burns indicated that "We never said there were chemical weapons at Tarhunah. We've never claimed that. We've never claimed it's an operation al facility. What we have said...is that there's very good reason to believe that this facility is under construction for the purpose of harboring a chemical weapons, and that is the purpose of the very mysterious facility at Tarhunah...We believe that t he Libyan Government is intent upon building chemical weapons capability. We think it wants to locate a chemical weapons program at Tarhunah." [22] In July of 1996, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reported that "When President Bill Clinton made a short stopover at Aviano Air Base on his way to Bosnia in January, nuking Libya was almost surely on his mind." The highest levels of the U.S. gov ernment were involved in the debate about what to do with Libya. The public discussion about contingency planning had caused dissension in the White House and general concern in Washington. [23] The issue was soon taken off the main burner, as intellige nce reports indicated that Libya had suddenly ceased construction of the weapons facility "because of U.S. concerns." [24] During the fall of 1996, media reports on Libya have been positive and negative. On the positive side, reports have indicated that the irrigation project that is linked to Tarhunah has begun delivering water to coastal cities. On the negative side, rep orts have indicated that in conjunction with Syria, Libya is working on an advanced ballistic missile program with weapons of mass destruction delivery capability that could effectively strike targets throughout the Middle East and southern Europe by 2006 . [25] After all public sources have been reviewed, I am led to believe that Libya is combining a legitimate water project with an underground chemical weapons fortress. This evaluation of the evidence relies on some degree of faith in the American intelligenc e community. Additionally, the intercepted Thai chemists and Thai chemical equipment cannot be accounted for by Libyan explanations. The water project has provided excellent cover for large scale construction. Operation of the water project is independ ent of a functional chemical weapons facility. The Libyan media claims of vindication due to lawful pharmaceutical production at Rabta have little importance. Rabta was always a dual-use facility and it has now been fully converted into a civilian pharmaceutical plant. Likewise, reported on-site in spections of Tarhunah by Libyan and Egyptian sources do little to counter U.S. intelligence claims. The massive facility has a significant amount of legitimate aspects that could be paraded to unknowing visitors. Furthermore, the U.S. has never claimed that the plant was in operation. On the contrary, the U.S. has claimed that the facility was under construction. Observers without military or engineering background would not be able to discern what construction was of lawful irrigation or of unlawful chemical weapons. C. Circumventing Deterrence by Building Underground Facilities Immediately after the 1986 bombing of Libya, Qadaffi dispersed his command centers throughout the country. Elements of the chain of command were moved to remote areas so that decapitation of the Libyan military would require an extensive campaign. In doing so, Qadaffi had tried to insulate himself from the capabilities of the U.S. military. Unfortunately for Qadaffi, the U.S. was able to continue to monitor and threaten above ground Libyan military development with satellite reconnaissance and tactical fighter elements of the Sixth Fleet. Qadaffi was "strangely silent" after the bombing as he contemplated new strategies to achieve his goals. In the 1980s, the U.S. had "led the charge" in the past against Libyan weapons development. [26] Consequently, the primary stumbling block to Qadaffi's weaponry aspirations was U.S. deterrence and coercion. The efficacy of U.S. deterrence by denial or threat hinges upon U.S. capabilities. Military capability is important because deterrence requires at least some capability and at least some credibility. If an actor cannot cause an unwanted situation to de velop, there is no prospect for successful strategic deterrence. In reference to underground targets, conventional means are becoming less and less capable and thus are becoming less and less credible deterrents. The lack of capability to destroy underground targets is not a phenomena solely of the Post-Cold War world. Munitions simply have not been able to reliably destroy even early Cold War underground missile silos. D. The Repercussions of the Persian Gulf War Throughout the Gulf War, underground Iraqi command units were able to function at mediocre levels due to a lack of capable U.S. armament. The successes and failures of the best U.S. conventional weapons were broadcast to the world during the Persian Gulf War. In doing so, the U.S. demonstrated, with the utmost clarity, the value of underground facilities. Like any other technological innovation in warfare, the use of advanced aviation warfare capabilities has had global reactions. Walter LaFeber, in The American Age, points out that American foreign policy cannot be separated from technological superi ority. From the Yankee Clipper, to the Colt 44, to the atomic bomb, America has benefited from military innovation. Unfortunately, in the era we live, our technology might not be enough to outrun, shoot down, or even bomb our threats away. "One of the biggest lessons the West's adversaries learned [from the Gulf War] was that if your command and control and missile bunkers are going to escape a massive bombing campaign, you'd better bury them deep, and the deeper the better." [27 ] Mark Yost, of The Wall Street Journal, further wrote that there were an alarming number of deep bunker facilities being built that would be invulnerable to current weaponry for years to come. Examples included continued development of Soviet undergr ound facilities the size of Washington, D.C. in the southern Urals, Iranian coastal underground missile launch sites, the above mentioned Libyan chemical weaponry plant near Tarhunah, North Korean underground installations [28], and the persistent drive by the Chinese to relocate their key facilities underground "since the Gulf War." [29] Conventional deterrence has lost a great deal of effectiveness. "Were US conventional retaliatory capability truly credible, the resultant payoff in the nonproliferation realm would be a decrease in the development and proliferation of nuclear devices ( if one cannot possess a nuclear weapon without unacceptable risk, why build it?). Despite rather dramatic successes in the utilization of high tech conventional weapons in the Persian Gulf War, this display had little or no demonstrable [deterrent] infl uence on the activities of the rogue nuclear states. Conventional deterrent credibility should result in decreasing proliferation by rogue nuclear states, but this decrease has not occurred." [30] E. U.S. Bias During the Reagan administration, Libya was perceived to be a terrorist Soviet proxy. The U.S. saw Libyan actions in terms of the U.S. fear of Communist aggression. [31] Libyan support of anti-western terrorist groups combined with U.S. cognitive assoc iation with the Soviets produced a hostile perspective among the intelligence community. All Libyan actions were suspected to be subversive and menacing world peace. The U.S. paradigm was of a "crazy" leader of a "rogue state" that posed a serious threat to the international order at all times. The U.S. "obsession" with Qadaffi may be waning, but the tendency to view all Libyan actions as threatening remains. [32] Policy makers must be on guard against ingrained bias in the U.S. intelligence community . F. Libyan Bias Qadaffi has remarked that he would see "the streets of America run red with blood" and that he considered Libya in a "state of war due to the provocations of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the continued actions of American politicians." [32] The impact of past U.S. scrutiny and punishment under questionable justifications has led the Libyan media to suspect all U.S. actions as imperialistic. Even as recent as November 18, 1996, Libyan press has reported that Qadaffi called for an end to "Zionist lobby" control in America. Qadaffi also remarked that humanity was being destroyed by urban development, and he would like to get rid of all cities. [33] Policy makers must bear in mind the Libyan tendency to see all U.S. actions as hostile. G. The Quest for Arab Power Goes Underground Assessment of Libya's decision making process is always hampered by Libyan denial of outlaw activities. As Libya officials consistently deny claims of outlaw behavior, investigation into actual motivations is difficult. [34] What little light we have c omes from examination of Qadaffi's rhetorical statements and observation of actual Libyan activities. Qadaffi quests for unification of the Arab countries and enhancement of Libyan power. [35] He has stated that he seeks "WMD and missile delivery systems as a means of deterring U.S. intervention in their region." [36] Deterrence of U.S. intervention in to the region furthers Qadaffi's goals of Arab solidarity against the west. Qadaffi also seeks WMD to increase Libyan power projection capabilities. With all the talk about conventional forces, Libya's army is still "little more than a military joke...Qadaffi must realize there is no prospect that Libya can change this situatio n by improving its conventional forces, even in the long run. In contrast, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction offers Libya a way of becoming an instant regional power, and one that cannot be ignored." [37] While he has been deterred from such development in certain situations in the past (such as Rabta), the Tarhunah facility is obviously a case of deterrence failure. The work of Messrs. George and Smoke would look to controllability and calculability of risk to ascertain the reason for failure. As noted above, conventional weapons have little efficacy in this situation. Nuclear deterrence towards WMD development has been disavowed by many U.S. sources and thus lacks sufficient credibility. Eschewed nuclear options leave underground facilities impregnable. With the Gulf War fresh in his mind, Qadaffi must have seen the potential invulnerability when he began construction. By calculating the risk of nuclear attack (almost zero - by discounting U.S. resolve to launch), and by controlling the e ffectiveness of conventional attack (almost zero), Qadaffi was able to proceed with development undeterred. By designing around deterrent institutions, Qadaffi made threats and denial policies almost worthless. Conventional deterrence failure left the U .S. with few options. The U.S. could have conceivably attacked other military targets to coerce Qadaffi to cease construction. While the U.S. could have attempted to justify such attacks, they would have inevitably lacked the connectedness of punishment that garners support on the international stage. The U.S. could have possibly embarked to create a successful deterrence by threat policy by increasing the perceived risk of a nuclear attack. Such a policy would have run counter to many international norms, including the recently signed Africa Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Implausible? Yes, but it may have occurred this spring. The Pentagon leaked nuclear plans and construction was ceased shortly after. While it could be argued that Qadaffi did not take the nuclear threats seriously, it cannot be dispu ted that it had the effect of raising the stakes. By mentioning nuclear contingency plans, the U.S. clearly signaled that it was prepared to take military steps to prevent completion of the facility. Secretary Perry reified this message when he indicated that the U.S. would not allow the facility to be completed. With the U.S. indicating that it would forcefully stop production by any means necessary, the risks involved for Qadaffi became ever less controllable and calculable. Qadaffi could not adequately assess the risks of continued development, and thus deter rence was able to succeed if only for a short time. As Libya was unable to grasp the extent of U.S. resolve and capability, Libya was left guessing about the Americans' next move. If Libya could not justify risking U.S. punitive action of unknown method and extent, then construction had to cease. An alternative explanation for Libyan actions would be offered by Prospect Theory advocates. If Qadaffi was focusing more on his loss of international power since the embarrassing 1986 raid, then he would discount the risks involved in re-assertion of c hemical power. This approach may be valid, but it does not contradict any of the deterrence theory above. In fact, Qadaffi's focus on losses may be the primary motivation for maneuvering around U.S. deterrence. Consequently, it could be argued that Qad affi would be more rational if he didn't focus on his impotence, but efforts to ease the pain of U.S. involvement in Libya affairs would be very complicated. There is little reason to believe that deceptive attempts to hide the reality of U.S. power projection would not be seen as an affront to Libya. It could also be said that Qadaffi's focus on losses would have driven him to cease construction of the plant in response to U.S. calls for complete destruction of the facility. IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY A. The Twilight of Deterrence Theory - Time for Deconstruction Deterrence theory rests on the ability of one actor to create a situation that is undesirable to another actor. The threat credibility of such action is the reason why a target actor will choose to preserve the status quo. If the U.S. can no longer cre ate undesirable outcomes, then the U.S. can no longer deter. "The initial `lesson of history' that applies to deterrence in general (and the deterrence of WMD as a subset) is that the opponent must be vulnerable to U.S. deterrence pressure." [38] While the U.S. will always be able to use diplomatic and economic means to try to prevent undesirable action, the certainty of solvency with military measures will be non-existent if the U.S. becomes militarily incapable in such situations. The burrowing technology of underground facilities is progressing faster than the destructive technology of conventional penetrating munitions. It is likely that conventional weaponry will never be able to penetrate as deep as burrowing technology can s helter. In the case of conventional weaponry, deterrence theory may have reached it limit. Without any policy answers for the future, the twilight of deterrence theory may be upon us. Keith B. Payne, editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy, writes, "The U.S. capability to counter deterrent threats posed by some rogue leaders may be key to the credibility, and hence potential effectiveness, of America's own deterrent threats. The impl ication of this, again, is that deterrence by denial will be prudent approach in the absence of intelligence suggesting the contrary." As noted above, deterrence theory has relied upon some degree of vulnerability of the target. While all nations will be vulnerable to conventional attack in some degrees, some specific targets may not. A deconstruction of deterrence theory is in order. A fresh examination of the theoretical underpinnings of state to state threats may yield answers in this current era of decreasing target vulnerability. Analysis may discover that since vulnerability is the theoretical cornerstone of deterrence, then it is only natural that, after decades of enacted deterrence policies, that we are witnessing a very real global reaction. As nations have successfully thr eatened in the past (as deterrence theory predicted), now nations are escaping the grips of other nations by circumventing the very cornerstone of the matrix of deterrence. Swords led to shields, machine-guns led to tanks, and aircraft led to missile defense. Logic dictates the as successes of deterrence have amounted, transgressors have been driven to seek greater and greater levels of invulnerability. In a world without peace, if actions are to be prohibited by threats, then vulnerability must be assured. The acceptance of fission warfare, orbital laser platforms, and space-based kinetic energy weapons are the only ways to offer that assurance. B. Searching the Mind of Qadaffi: Rationale and Risks Understanding Libyan rationale and the risk it poses to the U.S. is key to formulating U.S. policy. Without adequate understanding of Libyan perspectives, the U.S. cannot hope for successful diplomatic relations. Covert and overt intelligence gathering is of the utmost importance. Risk analysis must be accurate lest the U.S. misperceive threats and be punished with dire consequences. Calculation must incorporate capability, resolve and impact. The real capability of a chemically armed Libya is a combination of productive faciliti es and delivery mechanisms. The actual resolve will rely primarily on Qadaffi's will to disrupt the international system. Understanding this element of Libya will be a function of the intelligence gathering advocated above. The impact of Libyan chemica l weapons can obviously range from next to nothing (in the case of no use) and execution of hundreds of thousands of civilians (in the case of a successful chemical warhead attack). Vigilant intelligence operations will be the only way to discern plausib le impact levels. Regardless of precise measurement, the possibility of a real threat will not go away by not thinking about it. C. Persuading for Humanity Many casual observers of foreign affairs think that the development of WMD is so costly that no informed nation would do so. Unfortunately, as evidenced by Libya, not all nations share this sentiment. Regardless of Qadaffi's belief of advantages in pro liferation, it may actually be to his disadvantage. Based on correct information, it may be possible to persuade Qadaffi that Libyan proliferation does not further the causes that he values. The cornerstone of persuasion is disadvantages out of the persuader's control. In the Americans' case, the inevitable disadvantages that could persuade Libya come from the rest of the world. Independent of the U.S., nations would have to be in a position to punish Libya for proliferation. As we have seen in the past with economic sanctions, there is a very real possibility of international cohesion to prevent further development of chemical weapons. Concrete unification of other states to act against Libya and adequate explanation of such inevitable consequences would be the foundation of any persuasion attempts. D. Requirements for Strategy In dealing with a Libyan nation with limited capabilities of producing WMD and without ICBMs, the US is not faced with the prospect of total war. Our primary concerns are US military forces, allied military forces, civilian populations, and terrorist attacks. A vigilant deterrence by denial policy may be sufficient to protect US and allied military forces. Continual monitoring and attack upon facilities engaged in production of WMD, extensive security precautions involving sequestering troops away from civ ilian populations, and placement of anti-missile batteries in key locales may reduce the risk of attack to almost zero. Civilian populations require additional steps. Counter-Intelligence operations aimed at terrorist groups, extensive internal security, and outfitting of populations with information and equipment to counter WMD threats would be necessary to reduce risks . The Sarin gas attack in the Japanese subway highlights the difficulty in protecting the masses. The Israelis have followed a similar course. The attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities was carried out mechanically and the international community was told that the Israelis had "no choice." (Israel's attack in 1981 destroyed so much of Iraq's nucl ear weapons facilities that it had to be abandoned and the program did not recover for ten years. This made the Gulf War a lot easier for the allies.) [39] The United States, if it is to rely upon this form of deterrence and security, must act as mechanically. A constant expenditure and focus will be necessary to provide deterrence by denial. If the US wishes to reduce its expenditures and energy, or quiet cries of hegemony, it may opt for a deterrence by threat policy. This policy if properly constructed, would eliminate the necessity for continual attacks, and would require little if any , direct military involvement. To be able to construct a credible threat, the US must develop a public doctrine in the event of an attack by a WMD. In the Gulf War, US soldiers were outfitted with chemical and biological protections. A solid deterrence by threat policy would have made this a pre-caution, not a necessity. The outfitting of the gear and the lack of a well-known policy did little to scare Iraq to not use WMD. If anything, outfitting and lack of policy might have induced Iraq to use WMD because the casualties would be lower and the US would have to arduously justify an ad hoc response in front of the international community. Regardless, the issue of vulnerability will remain a stumbling block. To rely on deterrence, the U.S. would either have to maintain a credible nuclear option or seek other means than direct conventional targeting. E. Peace Through Advanced Weapons Development The U.S. is currently devoting resources to surface penetrating weapon programs such as the Maverick missile. At the present time, the U.S. is without adequate conventional munitions for traditional deterrence policies. Scientist S.M. Breitling of the U.S. Air Force's Phillips Laboratory was reported to have said, "I think there will be a kind of race going on...Hardened, deeply buried targets will just get harder and deeper, and whether we can progress fast enough in the penetrator business to catch up and keep up is a problem." [40] To remedy this, the Pentagon must continue to invest in research and development of new technologies. If the U.S. can stay ahead of burrowing technology, then we may see some peace through advanced weapons development. F. Multilateral Solutions to Global Problems In the past, the U.N. has coordinated policies towards Libya with limited success. As noted above, persuasion requires the kinds of international cohesion that the U.N., N.A.T.O., and other organizations can offer. U.S. unilateral policy has been known to come under fierce criticism and endanger global counterproliferation efforts. In the ever more complicated and interconnected world that we live in, multilateral efforts towards Libya are prudent. It seems as though joint efforts cannot be so easily deligitimized as U.S. imperialism. G. Legal Issues The U.S. came under strong criticism after the 1986 bombing raid. Europeans attacked the U.S. action as a breach of national sovereignty. The U.S. justified the action as self-defense protected under the U.N. Charter. The U.S. has recently signed the Africa Nuclear Free Zone Treaty that prohibits signers from launching nuclear attacks against non-nuclear African nations. The U.S. concern about the Tarhunah facility was the major obstacle to U.S. participation in the treaty. While the U.S. may have a historical record of selective obedience to international law, it will be advantageous to the U.S. to recognize the lawful limits of power in future. Recognition of international norms makes coalition building easier and soothes feelings of resentment. H. Conclusion Libya is close to completing an invulnerable underground chemical weapons fortress. The U.S. has resorted to threatening Libya with nuclear bombardment. Although Libya may have suspended construction, deterrence has failed to prevent this predicament. Deterrence theory relies upon vulnerability. Vulnerability is vanishing. An adequate theoretical basis must be developed to counter this threat. Diplomatic efforts rely on information. Intelligence operations must be pursued. Persuasion relies upon cohesion and communication. International forums must be utilized to offer persuasive solutions. Strategy relies on vigilance. The U.S. must prep are for all contingencies and take adequate protective measures. Weapons must be developed to protect innocents from slaughter. Proliferation continues. Our technology to destroy the means of production are years behind the technology to protect those means. Proliferation has left its mark on the victims of chemical weapons in the Middle East, Africa and Japan. If we trust th e current efforts to control this proliferation, then these macabre subjects need not be discussed and we can forget the concept of nuclear deterrence for as long as we live. If we worry about the innocents that will die if our current efforts are not en ough, then we have an ethical responsibility to discuss how to deter and coerce in an unsettled world. V. ENDNOTES [1] Joseph Cirincione and Frank Von Hippel (Eds.), The last fifteen minutes - ballistic missile defense in perspective (Washington, DC: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, 1996) back cover. [2] Robert Joseph and John Rechart, "Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment," Comparative Strategy 15 (1996): 59-80. [3] Raymond Tanter, Foreign Policy Decision-Making, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not13.txt. [4] Douglas Waller, "Target Gaddafi, Again," Time April 1, 1996. [5] Thomas C. Wiegele, The clandestine building of Libya's chemical weapons factory (Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992) p. 148. [6] Francois Burgot, "Qadhafi's Ideological Framework," Qadhafi's Libya 1969-1994, ed. Dirk Vandewalle (New York: St. Martin Press, 1995) p. 50. [7] Wiegele p. 155. [8] Burgot p. 53. [9] George and Smoke, "Toward a Reformulation of Deterrence Theory," PS472 Coursepack, ed. Raymond Tanter (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Michigan Document Service, 1996) p.77. [10] George and Smoke p. 77. [11] Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) p. 4. [12] Jervis, Lebow, & Stein p. 4. [13] Raymond Tanter, Prospect Theory: Choosing to Cooperate, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not11.txt. [14] U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995, http://www.usis.usemb.se/terror/tersst.htm. [15] A. M. Rosenthal, "On My Mind; Shall We Wait and See?," New York Times, 27 February 1996: A23. [16] Libya: Paper Denies Western Claims Regarding Chemical Weapons, U.S. Government Foreign Broadcast Information Service Reports, 2 February 1996, page 17. [17] Waller. [18] Waller. [19] Perry: U.S. won't allow Libya to complete chemical arms plant, The Associated Press, http://www1.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world/040396/world3_27632.html. [20] A. M. Rosenthal, "Relaying warning to Libya," New York Times News Service 18 April 1996: http://www2.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/voices/041896/voices3_894.html. [21] Art Pine, "Only A-Bomb Could Destroy Libya Plant, Scientist Says," Los Angeles Times 24 April 1996: A7. [22] "U.S. Reiterates Concern About Chemical Plant," Africa News Service 31 May 1996, http://www.afnews.org/ans/north/north.libya.80039468999.html. [23] William M. Arkin, "Nuking Libya. Libya's Tarhunah chemical weapons facility," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 52.4 (1996): 64. [24] Mark Yost, "The Underground Threat," The Wall Street Journal 23 July 1996: A22. [25] Bill Gertz, "Serbia is helping Libya with ballistic missiles, CIA says," The Washington Times 12 November 1996: A3. [26] Wiegele p. 113. [27] Yost. [28] See "North Korea's Tunnel Vision," The Washington Post 6 February 1994: page C7. [29] Yost. [30] Gregory Pickell, "Strength in an Unsettled World: the Role of Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear Nonproliferation and Deterrence," Comparative Strategy 15 (1996): 81-96. [31] Bob Woodward, Veil: the secret wars of the CIA 1981-1987, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987) 417. [32] Mohammar Qaddafi; Libyan Strongman, http://www.emergency.com/qaddafi.htm [33] Reuters News Service. [34] Wiegele p. 155. [35] Burgot p. 49. [36] Keith B. Payne, "Deterring the use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction: lessons from history," Comparative Strategy 14 (1995): 354. [37] Anthony Cordesman, Weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, 1991. [38] Payne p. 350. [39] See A. M. Rosenthal, The New York Times 27 February 1996, page A23. [40] Yost. VI. SELECTED REFERENCES Arquilla, John. (1995). Bound to Fail: Regional Deterrence after the Cold War. Comparative Strategy, 14, 123-135. Burgat, Francois. (1995). Qadhafis's Ideological Framework. In D. Vandewalle (Ed.), Qadhafi's Libya (pp. 47-63). New York: St. Martin Press. Cirincione, Joseph and Hippel, Frank Von (Eds.). (1996). The Last 15 Minutes - Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. Cooley, John K. (1982). Libyan Sandstorm. New York: Holt, Reinchart and Winston. El Warfally, Mahmoud G. (1988). Imagery and Ideology in U.S. Policy Towards Libya. 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