United States Coercive Policy During the Gulf Crisis From Sanctions to Brute Force James R. Kanary II Political Science 472 Professor R. Tanter December 9, 1996 On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces led by Saddam Hussein invaded the neighboring country of Kuwait. The United States and the United Nations condemned the invasion and the atrocities that were being carried out by Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army. Both the US and the UN responded quickly with economic sanctions that were meant to coerce Hussein into giving up the Kuwaiti territory. However, after more than five months, Hussein failed to comply with any UN resolutions and war appeared to be the final option for the allied forces. On January 16, 1991, the allied forces began to bomb military targets in Iraq and Kuwait-- symbolizing the end of the use of economic sanctions as the sole coercive tool towards Iraq. One question that arises from the Persian Gulf War is: Why did the US add military force to its coercive policy towards Iraq instead of just continuing to support economic sanctions? Before attempting to answer this question, it is important to examine some of the theoretical aspects underlying the USG's approach to containing "rogue states" such as Iraq. In doing so, the steps that lead up to coercion will be outlined as well as some assumptions regarding the rationality of the actors involved. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION Search and Persuasion Essentially, a country will try to contain an adversary in the least expensive way possible. Following the guidelines of search, persuasion, and strategy, an actor will try to avoid containment policies that use up a great deal of military force or resolve. Assuming that the actor is rational and self-interested, they will choose a policy that avoids military force and testing the actor's resolve or reputation. Finding other ways to resolve a conflict, or searching for alternatives is the cheapest method in dealing with an adversary because there is no threat to capabilities or reputation. The idea behind the "search" method is to discover or invent a new alternative that is jointly consistent with the opponent and the actor itself (PS 472, NOT5.DOC). The only costs involved would be the intelligence needed to find out the preferences and values of the adversary in order to find the best alternative. Searching for alternatives usually comes before the next step in dealing with an adversary: persuasion. If a solution cannot be found immediately, then the actor will make the adversary aware of circumstances or outcomes that are out of the actor's control. The key to persuasion is making sure that the adversary knows that the outcomes of a particular course of action are out of the persuader's control (PS 472, NOT5.DOC). The more successful the search is in finding the values and preferences of the adversary, the more successful the persuasion process will be because it can make the adversary aware of a relevant outcome or benefit that it may not have known about before. Deterrence and Coercion If search and persuasion fail to bring about the desired outcome, the actor must rely upon the strategic methods of deterrence and coercion. Deterrence is defined as action taken to force an actor to maintain a certain behavior or to prevent them from changing their behavior (Bailey, Midterm Review). An actor can deter by rewarding acceptable behavior of the adversary (assurance) or by threatening to punish the opponent to prevent unacceptable behavior (deterrence). Also, an actor may choose to deter by denying another actor the opportunity to take a specific course of action. An actor uses deterrence by denial by enhancing their own capabilities or reducing the capabilities of their opponent. If deterrence fails, then the final step before an "all out war" is coercion. Coercion seeks to get an actor to take an action or to undo prior action (PS 472, NOT6.DOC). One way to coerce is to compel the adversary by using punishment short of brute force to force them to do what the coercer wants them to do. Compellence requires that the punishment be required until the other acts, rather than if he acts (Schelling, p. 70). Another way to coerce is to induce brute force upon the opponent in order to change their behavior (Bailey, Midterm Review). The types of deterrence and coercion differ in degree of intensity and difficulty. The four modes can be arranged from easiest to most difficult to carry out, as follows: assure, deter, compel and induce (Blechmen and Kaplan, p. 107). Thus, any rational actor who follows a strategic containment policy after the failure of search and persuasion would begin to deter with assurance and continue with the more difficult modes if necessary. Later on, this paper will deal with the changes in the United States GovernmentÕs coercive policy towards Iraq. Rationality The degree of rationality of each actor involved is important and certain assumptions about rationality should be made. In the instance of search and persuasion, it would be useless to attempt to persuade an irrational actor because they may not want to act in the most efficient manner. ÒDecision makers are rational if they choose the most efficient choice, that alternative that promises the highest expected value, either highest benefit or lowest lossÓ (PS 472, NOT 1. DOC). If a rational actor attempts to search for the values and preferences of an irrational actor so as to better persuade them, their search will be useless because the irrational actor does not conform to the norms of a rational decision maker. In the event of deterrence, it may be beneficial for an adversary to be perceived as irrational because they will show more resolve. An irrational actor cannot be deterred by threat of punishment because they do not fear the same things that rational actors fear. It is easier to deter someone who is high on the rheostat of rationality. By the same token, coercion may be unsuccessful against an irrational actor because they would not seek to minimize loss and give in after punishment or brute force is induced. It is not safe to assume, however, that all actors that are not irrational are completely rational in their decision making. All actors are bounded rationally because it is impossible for any actor to make a completely analytic decision that involves a comprehensive search for alternatives and a complete evaluation of the situation. In Psychology and Deterrence, Jervis, Lebow and Stein point out that an actor may have a motivated bias to see what they want to see or an unmotivated bias to see what they expect to see when perceiving threats (p. 24-27). These assumptions concerning rationality were crucial in determining the effectiveness of the US approach to Iraq as a rogue state. LOGICAL STRUCTURE: EVIDENCE ACCROSS TIME AND SPACE Now that the theoretical background surrounding the United States use of search, persuasion, and strategy has been reviewed, the degree to which these methods were used against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait can be measured. For the purpose of answering the question posed at the beginning of the paper, more emphasis will be placed on analyzing the USGÕs use of coercion against Iraq. Search, persuasion, and the deterrence strategy all failed in preventing the invasion of Kuwait. The US had to use coercive strategy on Iraq because they wanted to change an action that was already taken. In using this policy, the Bush Administration demonstrated a new, post-Cold War doctrine for dealing with the rogue state of Iraq. Michael Klare describes the new policy with the following: [T]he Bush administration turned its back on the Europe-oriented, anti-Soviet strategic doctrine of the Cold War era and embraced the new, Third World-oriented doctrine...Under the earlier doctrine, Washington would have viewed Kuwait as a secondary theater of operations that could be fought over only if the United States retained sufficient strength to counter Soviet provocations in Europe; now, however, a place like Kuwait could become the center of geostrategic conflict, leaving the President free to deploy there any US forces he considered necessary. Cold War doctrine would also have required Bush to avoid certain aggressive actions in the Gulf lest he trigger a chain reaction of events leading to World War III; now, he was relieved of any such constraints (Klare, p. 41). Now it is necessary to examine the coercive policy of economic sanctions and the addition of military force in dealing with Iraq. Unitary Actors It is safe to assume that Saddam Hussein and President George Bush and the US Government are unitary actors. First, Hussein is the dictator of Iraq and was the main decision maker for his country. All the major decisions go to the unitary actor, and that person, whether rational or irrational, will make the decision. Throughout the Gulf Crisis, other leaders, including President Bush acknowledged the fact that Hussein was the figurehead and main decision maker for Iraq. Likewise, Bush was the unitary actor representing the United States Government. As President of the United States, Bush is more likely to be influenced by bureaucratic politics, but it is safe to assume that his decisions reflect those of the US Government. In fact, following the invasion of Kuwait, Òthe President, the Secretary of State and other US officials engaged in an exhaustive process of consultation with other governments and international organizationsÓ (Congressional Digest, p. 68). This may appear to take away from the idea that Bush is a unitary actor, but in fact it shows that the President and the USG worked together in unison. The establishment of unitary actors on both sides is crucial in examining the effects of coercion. In Rogue Regimes, Professor Raymond Tanter points out historical examples of coercion through economic sanctions that proved to be irrelevant because of the lack of a unitary actor. In one such case, the American economic sanctions for the rehabilitation of Iran were irrelevant because Iran lacked the quality of a unitary actor. ÒBecause of the Iranian revolution, there was no ÔIranÕ to coerce: The Shah was on the run, the government was in disarray, and Mullahs were assassinating pro-Western military officersÓ (Tanter, p. 8). Thus, without a unitary actor, coercion is useless except for strictly retributive purposes. Furthermore, if there is not a unitary actor to direct the coercive policy toward, then the coercer cannot expect to receive compliance from one source. The Coercive Policy of the US and UN Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Appendix 1), the UN Security Council Òshall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken...to maintain or restore international peace and security.Ó Following the invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660 (Appendix 2), calling for the immediate withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On August 2 President Bush drafted Executive Order 12722 (Appendix 3), which froze all Iraqi assets within the United States. This order represented the initial coercive action taken by Bush in order to demonstrate to Saddam that the US Government is opposed to any action taken by Iraq against Kuwait. This coercive measure sought to change the behavior of Iraq. In Executive Order 12723 President Bush froze all Kuwaiti assets in order to prevent Iraqi interference with those assets (Appendix 4). Later that week, on August 6, the United Nations Security Council reconvened in order to discuss further action against Iraq. Resolution 661 was the result of this meeting. This resolution established economic sanctions against Iraq as well as occupied Kuwait. It reads: ÒAll states shall prevent the import of all commodities and products originating in Kuwait or IraqÓ(Appendix 5). This coercive measure was intended to strangle the Iraqi economy which is so dependent on oil. The members of the Security Council assumed that Hussein would withdraw from Kuwait because not only was Kuwaiti oil worthless, so was Iraqi oil. The intentions of resolution 661 were to remove Iraq from Kuwait through peaceful means, and Saddam Hussein decided to test the resolve of UN member nations including the United States. He assumed that the resolve of the west would fade with a decrease in oil supply and steep hikes in oil prices. However, an increase in Saudi Arabian oil on the market prevented such action from happening. The sanctions wound up taking their toll on the people of Iraq, while Hussein benefited from anti-American sentiment in Iraq due to UN sanctions. On August 9 president Bush followed up with Executive Order 12724 (Appendix 6), which forbid any American from transactions involving Iraqi goods. With this Executive Order, Bush made sure that all Americans abided by UN resolution 661.The same day, the Commander in Chief officially notified Congress that he was deploying US forces to Saudi Arabia to prevent an Iraqi invasion. On October 1, 1990, both the House and Senate approved resolutions (H.J. Res. 658 and S.Con.Res.147) supporting the deployment of troops to the Gulf, but emphasizing that the support did not authorize the use of force (Congressional Digest, p. 73). The United Nations security council passed resolution 665 on August 25 which called for a naval blockade in order to insure compliance with resolution 661 (Appendix 7). As defined by the Geneva Accords, a naval blockade is an act of war. However, the US and the UN used it as another ÒpeacefulÓ method of coercing Iraq into giving up Kuwait. Resolutions 661 and 665 demonstrated the will of the Security council and the United States to use economic sanctions with the aid of military force to enforce international peace under Article VII of the UN Charter. In a letter to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, President Bush outlined the goals of the coercive policy that ensued after the invasion of Kuwait. ÒFrom the beginning of the Gulf crisis, the United States has consistently pursued four basic objectives: (1) the immediate, complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait: (2) the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait; (3) the protection of U.S. citizens abroad; and (4) the security and stability of a region vital to U.S. national security. In pursuit of these objectives, we have sought and obtained action by the UN Security Council, resulting in twelve separate resolutions that have been consistent with US objectivesÓ (Congressional Digest, p. 68). Thus the goals of the strategy were clear and the US waited for the economic sanctions to coerce Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The economic sanctions did take their toll on the Iraqi economy. Only nine days after the sanctions went into effect, Bush declared: ÒThe sanctions are workingÓ (Newman, p. 48). The efforts resulted in a very substantial reduction of the volume of trade to and from Iraq, and significant shortages in their financial resources. The sanctions shut off 97% of IraqÕs exports and 90% of its imports and prevented Iraq from reaping the proceeds of higher oil prices or its seizure of the oil fields in Kuwait (Congressional Digest, p. 69). However, Bush noted that the most vital Iraqi industries did not appear to be threatened and Òeconomic hardship alone is highly unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in IraqÓ (Congressional Digest, p. 69). Furthermore, the sanctions would have had little effect on the ability of the Iraqi Army to defend Kuwait because IraqÕs infantry and artillery forces could maintain a relatively simple, low-tech weaponry system. Thus, economic sanctions would only effect the high maintenance levels of the Iraqi war machine, such as air forces and air defenses (Congressional Digest, p. 69-70). Playing the Game of Chicken: A Test of Will Following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the enforcement of economic sanctions by the US and the UN, Saddam Hussein and George Bush became involved in a game of Chicken. Unlike the prisoners dilemma, both sides were able to communicate, and could see what moves the other actor was making. Both sides were headed straight for each other, and the first to swerve from their path would lose. According to Glenn Snyder, ÒThe spirit of a chicken game is that of a contest in which each party is trying to prevail over the other (Snyder, p. 84). The common interest in chicken is something that is manipulated as a means of coercion, not something that is mutually sought (Snyder, p. 84). In the case of Iraq and the United States: Iraq loses the game if it backs out of Kuwait; and the US loses if it allows Iraq to violate international peace and security. Demonstrating resolve is crucial when playing chicken and both actors showed a great deal of resolve. First, Hussein increased his resolve by displaying irrationality. He made it clear that he was willing to divert the small amount of supplies that were allowed into the country to his military forces at the cost of depriving his civilian population (Congressional Digest, p. 69). While not giving into UN sanctions, Saddam Hussein showed more resolve by increasing his military force. During the five months following the start of the economic sanctions, Hussein increased the size of Iraqi forces in Kuwait by 450,000 personnel and continued to fortify the border with Saudi Arabia (Congressional Digest, p. 96). The five months before the war also gave Iraq time to produce more weapons of mass destruction. Even with a crippled economy, Hussein chose to not to minimize loss by continuing to build up his forces. The more time that the US gave to the economic sanctions, the more time Saddam Hussein had to fortify his position and build up forces. If the US continued to wait for the sanctions, they risked the increase in leaks in the sanction enforcement system. The US also showed that it was not willing to back away from its commitment by increasing its military force and continuing to support the resolutions set forth by the United Nations Security Council. The US demonstrated its resolve by supporting UNSC Resolution 678 (Appendix 8). On November 29, 1990, the UNSC adopted Resolution 678, authorizing Member States Òto use all necessary meansÓ to force Iraq out of Kuwait unless it ended its occupation by January 15, 1991. Thus, by giving Iraq an ultimatum, the US Òthrew out its steering wheelÓ and eliminated the possibility of swerving away in the game of chicken. Similarly, Iraq continued on its path by fortifying its position and demonstrating its commitment to keeping Kuwait. The tension was building, and both actors continued on a straight, fast path towards collision and the worst possible outcome: war. The Legal Authority of Coercion In order for coercive measures to be considered valid, they must be derived from some kind of higher authority. Legal authority includes: United Nations resolutions, Executive Orders, legislative measures and constitutional authority. The first two origins of authority have been discussed in detail in the previous section on the game of chicken but some more details should be noted. Most of the legal authority for the coercive measures placed upon Iraq came from resolutions set forth by the United Nations Security Council, whose power is recognized in Article VII of the UN Charter (Appendix 1). The US obligation to the UNSC is outlined in the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA). The UNPA prescribes the domestic internal arrangements within the US Government for giving effect to the US participation in the United Nations and sets up the framework for complying with the commitments which the US assumed upon ratification of the UN Charter (Franck and Glennon, p. 700). The Executive Orders given by President Bush were in support of the UN resolutions. However, Thomas Franck and Michael Glennon point out that the President does not derive his power to make these orders or to use force from the UN Charter. ÒUnder United States law, the President can therefore claim no authority to use armed force from either the United Nations Charter or the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA). A permissive Security Council resolution, such as Resolution 678, has no effect on the domestic allocation of war-making powerÓ (Franck and Glennon, p. 708). ÒWhat the President constitutionally needs from the United States Congress, he cannot get from the United Nations Security CouncilÓ (Franck and Glennon, p. 708). Thus, the Commander in Chief needs domestic approval in order to use military force as a means of coercion. Since UN Resolution 678 did not authorize the President to use force, he needed approval of Congress. Under Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution: ÒThe Congress shall have Power...to declare WarÓ (Appendix 9). Before using military force on Iraq, President Bush was also responsible for obeying the War Powers Resolution (Appendix 10). The Resolution was passed in 1973, due to the ambiguous legal status of the Vietnam war and it requires that the President report to Congress when the US enters into Òhostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by circumstancesÓ (Appendix 10). For example, on August 9, 1990, the President provided a report of the deployment of US Armed Forces to fully inform Congress and be consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Franck and Glennon, p. 598). In January of 1991, the 102nd Congress was acting in the spirit of the War Powers Resolution when it called for a debate and vote as to whether or not to go to war with Iraq if Hussein did not remove his forces from Kuwait by January 15 (Congressional Digest, p. 67). Bureaucratic Politics On January 12, 1991, the US Congress approved a resolution giving the President authority to go to war. However, the resolution was not achieved without a fair amount of bureaucratic politics. The vote that gave Bush the green light to go to war was initiated by a formal request from the President on January 8 asking for Congress to exercise its constitutional role in authorizing war (Congressional Digest, p. 73). Previously the President and the Congress had disagreed over whether the US could initiate war without the consent of Congress, but most members agreed that the War Powers Act gave Congress this power. Thus, before the war began, there were disagreements among the members of the bureaucratic system of the US. Those who favored giving the President the option of using force believed that force was justified if it would fulfill the four goals outlined earlier by President Bush. Furthermore, the supporters of force were convinced that Òeconomic sanctions would never succeed in persuading Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, and that the longer the sanctions were relied upon, the more likely it was that the allied coalition would collapseÓ (Congressional Digest, p. 67). On the other side of the internal political conflict, the opponents of military force were convinced that the sanctions were working and more time was needed to see the full effect before jumping into a war. The advocates of a saction-only coercive policy argued that a war could result in the permanent destabilization of the Middle East and the destruction of the harmony that followed that post Cold War era (Congressional Digest, p. 67). In the bureaucratic politics that occurred prior to the Gulf War, public opinion played a major role in shaping the US coercive policy toward Iraq. A closer analysis of public sentiment reveals that most of BushÕs moves during the crisis reflected preferences articulated by a majority of Americans (Worthen, p. 18). The Bush administrationÕs willingness to satisfy the public demand for a coercive policy against Iraq Òwent a long way toward retaining public supportÓ (Worthen, p. 20). After the political debates were over, the Senate passed Resolution S.J.Res. 2 (Appendix 11), and the House passed H.J. Res. 77 (Appendix 12), which authorized the President to use the armed forces to carry out UN Resolution 678 (Appendix 8). On January 16, 1991, just hours after the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, US and allied forces began to attack military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. In a speech to the American people, George Bush explained the US actions: Some may ask, why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear. The world could wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over five months, and we and our allies concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait....[T]he 28 countries with forces in the gulf area have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution, and have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force. We will not fail. (Bush, Speech). CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY The US coercive policy towards Iraq is consistent with several theories in international security affairs. One theory that was already explored was the game theory of chicken that explained the buildup of capabilities and resolve for both sides. For this final section, The Rational Choice Theory, the Bounded Rational Approach, and Prospect theory can be applied to the events that surrounded the US coercive policy directed at Iraq. Rational Choice Theory Under the theory of Rational Choice, all actors seek the best possible outcome and seek to maximize gains and minimize losses. In the case of the Gulf crisis, neither actor sought to minimize losses because both Iraq and the US chose the worst possible outcome: war. When a game of chicken ensued, neither side elected to avoid the worst possible outcome because neither Saddam Hussein nor President Bush wanted to swerve away from a collision. Furthermore, the actions of Saddam Hussein could not be considered rational, thus, SchellingÕs Òblack-boxingÓ of every actor as a rational actor is invalidated. Bounded Rational Approach The Bounded Rational approach provides a better explanation of the US and Iraqi behavior during the coercive policy. Both sides were bounded rationally by restraints on decision making and motivated and unmotivated biases. First, neither side was capable of making completely rational decisions because of high information costs and cognitive decision making strategies. Neither actor was able to make analytical decisions which involve comprehensive search, optimal revision, complete evaluation and value maximization (PS 472, NOT1.DOC). Secondly, Iraq had a motivated bias to believe that the US would not take the invasion of Kuwait and the refusal to abide by the UN resolutions seriously. In a July 25, 1990 interview with Saddam Hussein, US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie practically gave Hussein the green light to invade Kuwait. She told Hussein, ÒI have a direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq.Ó She also told Hussein that the US had Òno opinionÓ on inter-Arab disagreements, including BaghdadÕs border dispute with Kuwait (Klare, p. 38). Hussein probably believed that the highest officials in Washington would not object to an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait so he went ahead and invaded. Once the US responded with coercive measures, Hussein had a motivated bias to believe that the US was still unconcerned with Kuwait and would not follow through with military action. Hussein might have thought that the US was supporting the UN as a gesture, but was not really committed to using force and therefore Hussein did not take the threat of coercion seriously. Thus, Hussein only wanted to believe that the US still didnÕt care about the situation in Kuwait and would not follow through with the use of brute force as a coercive measure. Third, President Bush had an unmotivated bias to believe that Saddam Hussein was the next Hitler. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush saw in Saddam Hussein what he expected to see in any leader that acted aggressively takes over another country. Bush drew an analogy to Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime when examining the crisis in the Gulf; he accused Saddam Hussein of war crimes, and compared him to Adolf Hitler (Klare, 39). The Commander in Chief was not about to wait around for economic sanctions to take hold because he feared that Hussein may use the time to gain strength and fortify his position in Kuwait. After Colin Powell described how the US could maintain a defensive posture in Saudi Arabia while waiting for the sanctions to take effect, Bush responded by saying: ÒThanks Colin. ThatÕs useful. ThatÕs very interesting. ItÕs good to consider all angles. But I really donÕt think we have time for sanctions to workÓ (Powell, p. 467). This demonstrates that the President preferred to use military force against Iraq rather than waiting for the economic sanctions to take effect. His desire to remove Iraq quickly through forceful means may have been fueled by an unmotivated bias that made Bush expect Hussein to be the next Adolf Hitler. Prospect Theory Finally, Prospect theory can be used to explain why Hussein would not give into coercive measures. Simply put, it was more painful for Hussein to give up Kuwait than it was to gain back Iraqi economic freedom. Hussein believes that Kuwait should be a part of Iraq because it was never detached from the Ottoman province of Basra (modern day Iraq) by any decree, internationally recognized document or valid diplomatic instrument. In fact, the district of Kuwait should have been included along with the rest of the Basra province in the Iraqi state formed after World War I (Congressional Digest, p. 72, 96). Therefore, Hussein believes that Kuwait should already be a part of Iraq, so perhaps he did not see his aggressive action as an invasion; thus Hussein may not think his invasion is a violation of the UN Charter. Hussein established the reference point, which can be related to the status quo, or what a person or country thinks the status quo should be (PS 472, NOT24.txt). In this case, the concept of Kuwait being a part of the Iraqi empire served as an anchoring mechanism that held Hussein firm in light of other events and decisions. Prospect theory relies heavily on on how a person frames a situation, and what the reference point is (PS 472, NOT24.txt). Under the theory, if Hussein perceives losing Kuwait as more salient than making any sort of gain (i.e.: having the sanctions lifted), then he is loss averse and will become risk acceptant. In other words, Hussein will risk more to avoid losing Kuwait then he would to gain back economic freedom. ÒIt is the motivated or unmotivated framing of events that will determine what type of path a leader chooses. When the biases take place, and certain outcomes are heavily emphasized, then it is the mere gain or loss, according to Prospect theory, that will motivate a leader to be non-value maximizingÓ (PS 472, NOT24.txt). Thus, Hussein did not act rationally to maximize gain because he feared losing Kuwait more than gaining anything else. A Better Strategy? Perhaps the US could have used the coercive policy in a more cost-effective manner. However, it is unlikely that brute force and war could have been avoided as means to change the behavior of Saddam Hussein. The US was forced to change coercive policies because sanctions simply were not enough to coerce Hussein out of Kuwait. Critics of the USGÕs policy toward Iraq may argue that more inexpensive modes of dealing with Iraq should have been used. Search and persuasion would have proven to be useless in dealing with Hussein because even if the US found out what was valuable to the dictator, he could not have been persuaded to change his behavior by information that he was previously unaware of. It cannot be assumed that Hussein is a rational actor because he influenced by motivated and unmotivated biases and he values minimizing loss over maximizing gains. Furthermore, he was bounded rationally by information costs and cognitive decision making strategies. In the same sense, Saddam Hussein was undeterrable because he did not perceive a US threat prior to the invasion of Kuwait; he was too bogged down with biases to see reality. Actors that seek to maximize gains and minimize losses are deterrable and coercible; Hussein was neither. Saddam Hussein did not change his behavior until a full scale war broke out, thus deterrence failed and coercion through economic sanctions was unsuccessful. President Bush, the US Government, and the United Nations knew that sanctions were not enough to force Hussein out of Kuwait. Thus, they were left with no other coercive strategies other than brute force to drive Hussein out of Kuwait. In a speech to the American people on January 16, 1991, President Bush promised that the US and UN forces would not fail in removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Thanks to the addition of military force to the coercive policy, the Commander in Chief lived up to his promise.