Randall A. Juip Political Science 472 December 9, 1996 juip@umich.edu www-personal.umich.edu/~juip ************************************ *Cuba: AmericaÕs Cold War Hangover.* ************************************ On January 1, 1959, the world was changed, in a small way, forever. Outlaw, rebel, and political mastermind Fidel Castro became the Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba on that day through well-planned revolt, and set forth on a path that would eventually lead to open antagonism with CubaÕs neighbor to the North, the United States of America. But Cuba did not only antagonize the United States: most democracies around the world have chilled relations with Cuba in the past 30 years, and are only now beginning to warm up. The tail of CubaÕs roguish path continues: in 1961, Castro proclaimed himself a dedicated Marxist-Leninist, dooming himself and Cuba to diplomatic isolation as the United States broke off relations with him. In July of that year, the United States took a hard-line stance, and eliminated the Cuban sugar quota, immediately eliminating more than 80% of the Cuban sugar export to America, sending a clear message that Castro was out of line. The Soviet Union, to foster a growing relationship with CastroÕs Cuba, immediately picked up the sugar that was unsold as a result of the United StatesÕ action. Outlawing any representative democracy, prohibiting freedom of speech, press, assembly, and countless other fundamental rights, and forming an one-party, repressive regime, Castro was a pox on the western hemisphere. Months after Cuba and the United States diplomatically separated, then-President John F. Kennedy sent hundreds of volunteer Cuban exiles to Cuba in the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, again a clear signal. First conceived in the Eisenhower Administration, and later reaffirmed in the Kennedy Administration, ÒOperation MongooseÓ was a paramilitary operation involving $13 to $14 Millions dollars, CIA-trained Cuban exiles, and a reneged pledge of air and naval cover from President Kennedy. The Bay of Pigs Invasion was a major blight in the history of Cuban- American Relations. Castro was not to be compromised. In 1962, Castro nationalized more that $1.25 Billion of American enterprises in Cuba, effectively sending his own message to Washington. In response, the United States imposed tough, comprehensive, and thorough economic sanctions on Cuba. The Kennedy AdministrationÕs reasoning was threefold. First, it was hoped that sanctions would be a strategic signal to Castro; a message that clearly stated American opposition to the growing Cuban/Soviet alliance, an alliance that would seriously threaten US National Security. This was unacceptable, from any number of positions. Secondly, the sanctions were reciprocity for CastroÕs nationalization of American business in Cuba. Many bureaucratic forces pushed for this. Thirdly, and most troubling to the American government, Castro had taken the first steps in supporting violent, indiscriminate, and far-reaching revolution throughout the Americas, part of Òa continental struggle against Yankee Imperialism,Ó as Castro labeled it. As if the economic considerations were not contributive enough to the escalation of tension in the region, May of 1962 also saw the Cuban Missile Crisis, an attempt by the Soviet Union to place Nuclear Missiles a mere 90 miles from the US Coast. In response, President Kennedy blockaded the island, and in tense negotiations deterred the Soviets from completing their armament of CastroÕs Island. Since then, the United States has taken a hard-line approach in dealing with Castro and Cuba. In the 30 plus years since economic sanctions toward Cuba have become official United States policy, with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, tensions have worsened, as have the retributive sanctions that the United States has imposed on Cuba. In 1963, the United States enacted the Trading With the Enemy Act. In 1978, the Export Administration Act was passed, and the Cuban Democracy Act was made into law in 1992. Since then, the Helms-Burton Act (known formally as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996) of 1996 became law, closing ever tighter sill the economic stranglehold that the United States has imposed on Cuba. It is clear that the United States has used the embargo as a tool in its attempt to undermine the rule of Castro, and to help bring Democracy and freedom to Cuba. However, things are not as simple as they once were. Throughout the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States wisely imposed embargoes and other sanctions on Cuba for obvious reasons. Of the three original reasons for embargo (increased Cuban/Soviet relations, CastroÕs nationalization of US property and denial of freedom to his citizens, and the support of revolution in the Americas against ÒYankee imperialismÓ), only CastroÕs oppressive regime remains to justify action. The Soviet Union, under Gorbechev, and Yeltsin has cut Cuba off. There is no longer any significant Soviet/Cuban relationship. Castro no longer engages in expeditions, as he did in Ethiopia, Angola, and other countries. What, then, is the justification for tightening the noose around CastroÕs regime? Why would the United States continue to follow a policy that seemingly has no foundation? Should the United States continue to isolate Cuba? These are weighty questions, but in asking them, more issues arise: Has the United States employed all its strategic options? Have American diplomats and policymakers fully explored search and persuasion strategies, and have we as a nation used carrots or sticks in dealing with Castro? Would a rehabilitative or a retributive policy work better in the pursuance of American Policy Goals? And what, exactly, are those goals? Does the United States have the resolve to continue itÕs policy against Cuba, in light of these aforementioned changes, and in the face of increasing International condemnation? Are our policies sending clear signals to Castro, and is he even rational enough to perceive them properly (as Natalie Merchant might say, Òhe rules a crowded nation inside his mind...)? In order to begin to answer these questions, a short discussion of current United States policy will be necessary, in addition to an evaluation of strategy and policy options. This paper will examine events, policy, and the actors in an effort to determine what shape future American policy should take. Due to the constraints of space and time, I warn the reader that the discussion will be no means complete, but the material covered will be sufficient to answer the question: Should the United States continue its policy of retributive sanctions towards CastroÕs Cuba, taking into consideration the changing world stage and the increasing international (and to an extent, domestic) pressure to the opposite? Vital to this study are two of the more recent American policy initiatives: the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and the Helms-Burton Act (formally the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act) of 1996. CDA was passed into law with bipartisan support and the blessing of then presidential candidate Bill Clinton. The Helms-Burton Act, passed in 1996, met similar bipartisan and Presidential support. The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1995 formalized the formerly vague policy, stating clearly that the democratization of Cuba would occur from a largely internal process, but also recognizing that this internal process requires some amount of ÒassistanceÓ from the international community. Stated objectives of CDA include the Òpeaceful transition to democracy in Cuba,Ó the opposition Òto human rights violations of the Castro regime,Ó and the Òcalibrated reductions in sanctions as a measured response to positive developments in Cuba.Ó Simply put, CDAÕs goal was to isolate Castro and his regime, while simultaneously expanding external communication and governance options to the Cuban populace. The CDA not only officially outlined US Policy toward Cuba since the 1960Õs, but also effectively tightened the noose around CastroÕs regime. US subsidiaries would no longer be allowed to transact business in Cuba, closing a major loophole in previous legislation, and costing CastroÕs regime more than $600 Million in trade. The CDA also excluded any ship which made port in Cuba from docking at an American port for a period of 180 days. Additionally, CDA gave American policymakers the right to consider assistance to Castro and Cuba when evaluating other countries for debt relief and other assistance programs. The Cuban Democracy Act also provides for an opening of communications between Cuba and the United States once Castro is removed from power, and a provisional government is placed in power -- one that satisfies the United StatesÕ requirements of free and fair elections and a guarantee of basic civil and human rights. The aim of these sanctions, obviously, has been to remove Castro from power in Cuba, to restore democracy, and barring that, to make his rule as difficult as possible. CDA represented, for United States policymakers, efforts of search and persuasion towards Cuba. In selecting a strategy towards Castro and Cuba, American policymakers attempted to make Cuba abandon its policies, and adopt a new set of values that are more closely correlative with American, and arguably international values. In order to coerce Cuba, however, the United States must stand firm: it must show resolve and capability, it must send clear, unmistakable signals to Castro, and it must assume that Castro is rational enough to perceive those signals properly. Additionally, US policymakers must show Castro exactly what he has to lose (assuming that he is operating from a basement of fear as opposed to a window of opportunity -- more on bounded rationality later in this discussion). Finally, American Òpolicy wonksÓ must allow Castro a way to maneuver out from beneath the sanctions -- they must allow him a way out. This reasoning also applies to the most recent article of United States/Cuban Foreign Policy, the Helms-Burton Act, formally known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. In producing more legislation, the United States has reaffirmed its resolve -- sent a clear signal to the world that we are not budging one inch, and that Castro will be the one who will fold. More on this later. Since the 1992 passage and enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act, Castro has reacted negatively. Things have worsened all over the country: Medicine is in short supply across the island-nation, CubaÕs infrastructure are still incredibly lacking -- housing, public transportation, and telephone networks are decaying at an alarming rate. Since CDA, unemployment has become even more rampant than it was. A decided shift to agriculture has been observed, to the contrary of CastroÕs desire to diversify the economy. Machinery, petroleum, and spare parts are in high demand. Castro has lashed out at the United States, defiant of the Cuban Democracy Act. And, he has lashed out at his own people. In July of 1994, a collective of boat people comprised mainly of women and children were attacked by the Cuban military. As women pleaded and children begged for their lives, high-power water hoses were used to wash them over the sides of the boat and into the open ocean, where many of them died. This spawned many uprisings, the most virulent occurring in Havana, where a number of protesters were jailed. To mourn the deaths of the boat people who were killed by the regime, a group of Cuban exiles traveled in boat to the sight. They were rammed by the Cuban military. Most significantly, Cuban MiGs shot down two Cuban-American pilots on February 24, 1996. These pilots, flying for the Cuban anti-Castro group ÒBrothers to the Rescue,Ó were American citizens, and although there is much disagreement as to where they were shot down (Cuban airspace versus international), there was no lack of consensus that Castro was again flagrantly out of line. In less than a month after the Cuban-Americans were shot down, President Clinton signed the Helms-Burton Act, or the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 into law. Named after Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, North Carolina), and Representative Dan Burton (Republican, Indiana), the legislation seeks fulfillment of a number of clearly-stated objectives, all designed to send a clear and unmistakable message to Castro. President Clinton, at the signing, declared that Òthe yearning of people for freedom will not be denied.Ó The Helms-Burton Act moves to internationalize the Cuban trade embargo. Unchanged, the Helms-Burton Act tightens sanctions against Cuba by punishing states who conduct trade with Cuba. In doing so, the United States effectively closes any open loopholes that, in the past, have allowed American corporations to conduct business with Cuba through the use of Multi-National Corporations. More specifically, Helms-Burton makes permanent the 30 year old trade embargo against Cuba that, formerly, required Presidential approval every year. It also gives US citizens the right to sue foreign companies for selling stolen property that they formerly owned in Cuba, and provides for a grace period for these companies to dispose of said property. The Helms-Burton Act remains in effect until the President determines that a democratically elected government has taken seat in Cuba, without Fidel or Raul Castro, and allows the President to withhold aid to countries supporting Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act seeks a number of clear goals. First, and foremost, it seeks to design a framework for United States national security, from which a workable defense can be formulated against threats from the Castro regime. More specifically, it seeks to prevent acts of terrorism, end political punishment for citizens of Cuba who wish to leave as a result of CastroÕs oppressive regime, and to protect against the theft of American property. Secondly, Helms-Burton looks to protect United States citizens against economic confiscation by Castro, and against the illegal sale of the property confiscated. Third, Helms-Burton looks to encourage free and fair democratic elections in Cuba, supervised by United Nations observers. Fourth, it seeks to provide an extension of the CDA, in an extension of some policy framework that would allow the United Stated provide support to Cuban citizens in the formation of a new government in the event that Castro is deposed. Fifth, it looks to bring the international community closer together in cooperatively sanctioning Castro. Lastly, the Helms-Burton Act seeks to assist Cubans in regaining their rights to freedom, democracy, human rights, and economic prosperity. Very ambitions, the Helms-Burton Act met almost immediately with international opposition. Challenging American resolve, the United Nations again condemned the embargo on Cuba, for the fifth year in a row. The UN resolution was phrased such that it called on all countries to cease the practice of focusing economic sanctions on any single state. Only Israel and Uzbekistan voted with the United States, and for the first time, all 15 European Nations voted against the US. Concerned with potential violations of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the European Economic Union also condemned the American policy. Fearing a negative effect on European business interests in Cuba, the EEU threatened to challenge Helms-Burton under GATT provisions, at the World Trade Organization, and under common international law. Canada also objected to the extra-territoriality of Helms-Burton. Claiming the act extended, unlawfully, United States law to other jurisdictions, Canadian Trade Ministers will challenge Helms-Burton under North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provisions. International, European, and Canadian opposition to Helms-Burton has been significant and vehement, however, the United States has refused to yield its position. With the both the CDA and the Helms-Burton Act, the United States has demonstrated resolve: we have shown, in the face of international pressure, that we are committed to staying out course. In the face of this pressure, the United States has not only maintained the noose around CastroÕs regime, but has tightened it, as well. Cuba poses no serious threat to United States intrinsic interests. The specter of terrorism looms ever-present, as does the security of American troops in Guantanamo Bay. Cuba, according to Michael Klare, does not even rate the title of ÒRogue State,Ó in that it does not have a large military force or weapons of mass distruction (although there is some small amount of scholarly debate over whither Castro has kept a couple of Soviet ICBMs left over from the Cuban Missile Crisis). It is clear that Cuba poses little or no threat to the United States in an intrinsic sense. Therefore, there must be some strategic interest that would compel the United States to maintain a 30-year old policy of economic isolation. Sanctions demonstrate United States capability and resolve. They also limit CastroÕs effectiveness, on a number of levels. Tightening the economic noose denies CastroÕs regime the resources necessary to Òexport revolution to Yankee imperialism,Ó in addition to making Cuban citizens unhappy with their current state. United States policy also is slowly strangling the Cuban economy. CubaÕs industrial sector is suffering grave shortages of spare parts and raw materials. Many Cuban factories and manufacturers have closed, due to a lack of both supply and demand. The Cuban economy is on its last legs, and the American sanctions are highly contributive to this. Another, rather large reason for the continuance of Cuban sanctions is the human rights situation. International diplomats have declared that Cuba is lacking in basic protections or rights, including freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and most notably, freedom of speech. Authorities continue, on a daily basis, to punish and imprison political dissidents. The situation is unacceptable, and the United States has taken a strong stand against it. The United States has clearly demonstrated a strong resolve and commitment to continuing economic sanctions. However, one must wonder if Castro is capable of receiving these messages, that is, one must evaluate if Castro is a rational actor or not. It is well recognized that he is a unitary actor. CIAÕs World Fact Book declares that Òthere is little in Cuba that Castro does not have direct control over.Ó Additionally, there is significant evidence to suggest that United States policy initiatives fail in their attempts at coercing Castro. It is important to note that US policy was effective on a number of levels. First, Castro was, and is unable to export revolution to other nations in our hemisphere. Because our economic sanctions have crippled his economy, Castro has also been unable to lead other countries down the path of Communism. The threat credibility was high that the United States would take action against countries allying with Cuba. This was proven any number of times, and was reinforced with the CDA and Helms-Burton. However, the strategy of coercion has been decidedly ineffective in dealing with CastroÕs regime. Castro, instead of operating from the window of opportunity that was presented to him in US policy initiatives, entered a basement of fear. He has backed into a corner where tough decisions are made, based not on the possible gains, but on a fear of loss. Castro so valued his own influence and position that he has consistently made decisions based on a fear of losing that -- even when such decisions put economic prosperity out of his reach. He is incredibly resistant to American efforts. ÒWe have been patient for over 34 years, and now patience is more important than ever,Ó Castro declared on a Havana radio address. The abandonment of Soviet economic and political support should have had a Òcold shower effectÓ on Castro, but instead made him back further into his corner. He has made too many statements regarding CubaÕs refusal to fold to American pressures, and by doing so, has put his own credibility and resolve at risk. Ò...Whoever knows the history of the Cuban revolution is aware that it can not be threatened, or intimidated, or brought to its knees, not even if 1000 missiles were pointed at us,Ó declared a defiant Castro on Cuban television in 1994. Since Castro weighs losses more heavily than gains, sanctions are likely to have little effect on him. He is not perceiving signals sent by the United States policymakers correctly. Because Castro is operating from a basement of fear, that is, from a position of loss-aversion, he is low on the rheostat of rationality. As with all other decisionmakers, Castro employs heuristics to make policy, and thus limits his available options. CastroÕs loss- averse stance demonstrates his bounded rationality, and his lack of soluble options. The United States is not dealing with a rational actor. It can be argued that sanctions fail against Cuba on three levels: First, the international community is vehemently against sanctions and embargoes. Secondly, the American business community stands in opposition to the sanctions, as well. And thirdly, sanctions only serve to back Castro further into his corner -- and give him justification to further criticize the United States. The UN has consistently voted against the American policy. They criticize the restrictions on free trade and on their individual collective economic security. Canada, and the European Economic Union both stand in opposition to the American embargoes. American Business is also in opposition, citing the losses to foreign firms in the race to invest in Cuba. They want the government to lift the embargo so they will have an opportunity, as well, to enter the untapped market. This not only is incredibly frustrating for policymakers, but the bureaucratic opposition of American business interests also serves to seriously undermine future US policy credibility. Castro also uses the sanctions to vilify the United States on the international stage. There are a number of reasons that the United States should abandon its policy. So why does it continue? The reason is simple and straightforward: too much is at stake to simply shift direction now. The United States would lose too much face if it were to abandon its 30 year policy of economically shutting Cuba off. The question is no longer containment. The failure of the Soviet model has shown the world that communism is ineffective. The United States can not stand to see its credibility threatened in an era where it is establishing itself as a world leader in a new world order. Were we to fold in Cuba, perhaps next would be China. And then Bosnia, and Iraq, and Libya, and North Korea. The message sent to the rest of the world would be too damaging to our reputation and to our credibility. We are, in effect, operating from a position of loss-aversion as opposed to one of gain-maximization. But we have limited our own options, and must now continue. The only logical path for the United States to take is to continue to impose sanctions on Cuba. Search does not work with Castro. Persuasion has failed. Castro has demonstrated that he can only be coerced with extreme means. The carrot has failed, it is time to bring out the larger stick to beat the last remnant of the Cold War into the history books. The embargoes are beginning to have effect. Hard currency levels are at their lowest in years. We have, after all, only been able to observe the effects of sanctions for 5 or 6 years now, since the abandonment of Cuba by the Soviet Union. We are only now beginning to see the effects of them -- an opening of markets, currency exchange, etc... The CDA and the Helms-Burton Act both move, impressively, to limit CastroÕs influence, while simultaneously providing a way out. The US should continue -- pushing for the rights of Cubans, pushing for human rights, and pushing for freedom, democracy, and liberty. Were we to abandon that policy, our credibility as a defender of human rights, as an advocate of freedom and liberty, and as the worldÕs premier defender of democracy would be badly damaged. The unwavering stance of the United States against Cuba will, hopefully, one day pay off. As of yet, the policy set forth has been only marginally effective in coercing Cuba to change. However, it can be hoped that change will come to Cuba, eventually. The people of Cuba deserve freedom, and it is the responsibility of the United States to continue in its efforts to provide it to them. BIBLIOGRAPHY Background on US Blockade of Cuba. Cuban Solidarity Homage. 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