Today, in the post Cold War era, there is a new order in
international security policy for the United States.  Whereas the main
concern for the United States was the containment of communist nations, in
particular, the Soviet Union during the period following World War II
through to the time of the collapse of the Communist Block, the main
threat of the 1990's appears to exist in the form of a variety of mainly
small nations.  Professor Michael Klare quotes a Pentagon critic as
saying, "with the demise of the Soviet Union, threats to stability in key
regions throughout the world have become America's principal military
concern."(Klare, p108)     Out of this ideology has come the "Rogue
Doctrine" which basically is a "characterization of hostile third World
states with large military forces and weapons of mass destruction
capabilities."(Klare, p26)  These countries or "outlaw nations" have been
classified as "hostile to the United States or its allies, as sponsoring
or condoning terrorism, and as having pursued the acquisition of chemical
or nuclear weapons."(Kale, p132)  At present officials under the Clinton
administration have identified the five countries of North Korea, Iran,
Iraq, Syria, and Libya as current rogue threats.
	The last of these five outlaw states, Libya, has consistently been
a black spot on the United States' map of international relations with
other nations.  Since the revolution in Libya in 1969, establishing
Colonel Muammar el-Qadhafi as the country's chief of state and head policy
maker, conflict has existed between the two regimes.  Ideologically
tension has resulted from Qadhafi's intense calling for Arab control over
the Middle East and his contempt for the Western presence there, the
continued support of Israel being one common complaint.  In addition,
Colonel Qadhafi has shown support to various militant groups and terrorist
organizations such as Palestinian groups Black September and Abu Nidal as
well as Western organizations such as the Irish Republican Army.(Harris,
p89)  According to Mr. Harris these efforts have been designed to "de
stabilize moderate, pro-
Western governments."(Harris, p89)  Along with the involvement with
international terrorism Libya has tried to gain technology for the
production of nuclear and other chemical weapons from nations including
India, France, China, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and in fact, the United
States itself as early as the mid 1970's.(Harris, p91)  While national
security terms like "Rogue Doctrine" have been coined in the post Cold War
era, it has been the above actions which have highlighted Libya as this
kind of rogue outlaw nation for the last twenty years.
	Even during the anti-Soviet Cold War the United States has focused
attention on containing Libya's rogue behavior.  It has made efforts to
end Libya's support of terrorism and to stop its continual development of
weapons of mass destruction.  However, Qadhafi has resisted these U.S.
attempts by continuing in the development of chemical weapons, and
allegedly involving itself in acts of terrorism, including the bombing of
Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland.  The question is why has the United
States been unsuccessful in coercing Libya to change its rogue behavior
and deterring it from acting as such in the future?  I intend to
investigate why Libya has continued to act as an outlaw nation despite the
United State's coercive and deterrent efforts.
	In trying to analyze the international security relationship
between Libya and the United States it is necessary to build a framework
of strategic theory.  The attempts at either stopping an opponent from
doing something or getting that opponent to do something involve the
concepts of deterrence and coercion.  Deterrence is a "process where a
defender seeks to get a potential initiator not to take an action."
Coercion "seeks to get a defender either to take an action or to undo
prior actions."(Tanter, note6)  For example, President Clinton,
threatening Sadam with possible military action if he enters the
established no fly zone, hopes to deter Hussein from committing some
action.  On the other hand, the buildup of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was used to send a message to Baghdad
that Sadam better pull his troops out of Kuwait.  In this case the Bush
administration clearly wanted Iraq to undo its actions of the occupation
of Kuwait.  Different strategy theorists have incorporated certain
concepts into deterrence and coercion theory to better explain its success
or failure.  Some, like Thomas Shelling, feel that in addition to
capabilities established resolve and credibility of one's threat are
crucial for an initiator to take the threat seriously and possibly back
down.  Thus, perceptions and believability are the deciding factors of
whether a country can deter an enemy.  Theorists George and Smoke add that
the ability to calculate and control risks involved in standing up to a
threat is the important factor in whether or not a deterrent or coercive
effort will fail.  If an initiator can figure out his losses involved with
what a defender threatens and he is willing to withstand a greater amount
of loss, then the initiator will not back down and deterrence fails.
Finally, authors Jervis and Stein argue that there are psychological
elements which effect deterrence or coercion's success or failure.  If
there are misperceptions or if messages are perceived in an unintended
manner, the threat may not be clearly established or it may be
overestimated to a point where the actor feels cornered.  As a result, the
actor may not be deterred.
	Weaving throughout these camps of deterrence theory is the idea of
rationality.  Decision-makers are considered rational if they "choose the
most efficient choice or alternative that promises the highest expected
value."(Tanter, note1)  In making these choices the rational person makes
assessments and calculations of things such as likelihood of consequences,
cost benefit analysis, and likelihood of success.  In characterizing how
rational an actor acts there is said to be a rheostat of rationality, or a
continuum of low rationality to high rationality.  If one is low on the
rheostat, then he is acting with very little regard for the various
calculations and estimations described above, whereas a person high on the
rheostat follows very closely those steps in his decision-making process.
Because an actor's rationality determines how he understands and
calculates variables in a given conflict situation, how rational the actor
is indicates whether or not he makes any value judgment about a threat
when making decisions and therefore, whether or not the threat will
prevent the actor from taking a certain action.  Thus, someone low on the
rheostat of rationality cannot make assessments of gains and losses, or
any calculability of risks.  As a result, one cannot deter this person.
Since successful coercive and deterrence are based on the idea of a
communicated message in which an adversary identifies and understands
consequences for his actions, standing high on the rheostat of rationality
is of crucial importance.
	When trying to understand situations of conflict like that between
Libya and the United States it is also important to identify the players
in the game as acting as unitary actors.  When leaders make a decision to
take some kind of action or to set some sort of warning for an enemy the
message must not be filled with mixed signals reflecting individual
interests or points of view.  The message should appear as if coming from
one individual with clear intent rather than appear like a collaboration
of signals.  In Libya's case Colonel Qadhafi is the head of the party and
representative body of the people.  He is basically in a dictatorship
role.  Because he is the top decision-maker for Libyan affairs and policy,
when Libya, or Qadhafi, sends any message or makes any action it is
behaving as a unitary actor.  In the United States it is more complicated
because powers are spread over different branches of government.  Thus, it
is important that groups in Congress, for example, line up there vectors
with the president and his administration so the U.S. sends a clear signal
to the opposition.  The theory is that if different bodies are in conflict
or not presenting one clear message, than the opposing leadership such as
Qadhafi may not comprehend a threat or will not respect the threat's
credibility and therefore, will not comply.
	Looking at Libya's continued resistance to Western pressures, many
theorists may argue that elements of something known as Prospect theory
can explain why Libya has done this.  Prospect theory deals with what
leaders and decision-makers value as they proceed in the decision/making
process.  The theory explains that leaders value losses more or are
concerned more about losses than they are with gains.  One might say that
Sadam Hussein was more worried about losing Kuwait's valuable resources by
backing down to U.S. demands for withdrawal than he was about the gains he
may have received if he did comply.  In this reasoning a country valuing
losses more significantly than gains is similar to a cornered animal.  The
actor here may not be acting high on the rheostat of rationality, making
the correct assessment and analysis of the situation.  Because the actor
values the losses by complying more, he will not comply and deterrent or
coercive efforts fail.
	Since seizing power in 1969 Muammar al-Qadhafi has pushed for an
optimal society under a form of socialism governed by the laws of Islam.
Extending beyond the conventional boundaries of his own nation though have
been Qadhafi's plans for bringing together a united society of all Arabic
peoples.  His claims that "only in total Arab union can there be Arab
strength; and the Islamic faith is necessary to create that
union."(Cooley, p101)  Seeing himself as the destined leader to bring the
union together, Qadhafi initiated friendships and alliances with other
nations such as the Sudan, Syria and Egypt.  At a meeting in Cairo in 1970
there formed the Confederation of Arab Republics which Qadhafi referred to
as a "close community" and the "core of Arab unity."(Cooley, p103)  At
central issue for the Libyan head of state has been the elimination of
Israel in order for Arabs to reclaim their rights to the Palestinian
homeland.  According to Qadhafi Israel represents "the last and most
odious of the Western colonial implantations in the Arab body politic."
Furthermore, he asserts that "anything that contributes to the cause is
right and just...anything that works against it must be circumvented or
eradicated."(Cooley, p101)  The United States, shining as the strongest
representation of the Western presence, particularly with its role in the
creation and maintenance of Israel, became the "demon" standing in the way
of Qadhafi's total and unconditional Arab unification.  
	Proponents of a prospect theory explanation could argue that
Qadhafi's commitment to leading an Arab unification is behind Libya's
ability to resist United States efforts to change and prevent Libya's
rogue behavior.  The reasoning is that Qadhafi has feared losses more than
he has valued gains.  Because of his strong idealism for the cause of Arab
unification, he has advocated using any means to achieving those goal.
Therefore, he would see the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and the use of terrorism as tools providing him leverage against more
powerful adversaries like the United States.  Although the larger and
stronger United States may make threats to Qadhafi that he not participate
in these activities and make reparations for any past action, or face
possible economic or military consequences, Qadhafi may fear experiencing
greater losses if he complies with U.S. demands.
	As leader of the quest for Arab autonomy and power in the Middle
East region, Qadhafi's major established objective has been to stand up to
Western aggression and domination in the face of the goal of Arab unity.
Directly complying with a Western demand would contradict the basic
foundation on which he has built his leadership role in the Arab world.
Thus, he would not only face political humiliations at home, but he would
be eroding his credibility in the eyes of his Arab partners.  In addition,
compliance with the United States would also mean the elimination of
Libya's tools of disrupting and resisting Arab enemy's or Western
sympathizers.  Because Qadhafi made such intense commitments in the
language of anything that contributes to the cause is just, not trying to
use these means in his fight also goes against the initiatives that he
preached for an Arab revolution.  As a result, Libyan compliance would
also result in severe losses in capabilities and additional political
damage.  Prospect theorists would then argue that Qadhafi has feared these
losses, the losses resulting from compliance, above all else in dealing
with U.S. demands.  Therefore, Qadhafi, fearing losses from compliance
above all else, theoretically can not be deterred.  There is nothing that
the United States can do or could have done to diplomatically coerce or
deter Libya from acting as a Rogue.
	Although this sinario appears to be a nice clear picture of
Libya's and Qadhafi's value system, the theory implies some powerful
assumptions about Qadhafi's rationality.  The theoretical basis for
prospect theory itself calls a decision-maker's rationality into question.
By a leader fearing one set of consequences more strongly than others he
or she may fail to make full use of the various calculations and
analytical processes of decision-making.  Thus, the leader acts from a
point relatively lower on the rheostat, and the result may be irrational
decisions.  However, it is a difficult to say that Colonel Qadhafi simply
acts irrationally.  He has made different calculated decisions in working
toward his goal of unity.  As an example, after the downing of a Libyan
airliner by Israeli jet fighters, Qadhafi aligned himself with Egypt,
about to engage Israel in a war along Israel's southern borders.  Trying
to convince Egypt that there should be some joint action in response to
the airline incident, Qadhafi served a variety of his interests.  Siding
with Egypt would demonstrate commitment to the Arab unification, while
also helping to demonstrate his commitment to the elimination of Israel
from the Middle East scene.  On top of all of this was the justification
of the airplane shooting which Mr. Qadhafi could base any involvement or
action to the rest of the world, the United States included.  Instead of
explaining Qadhafi's continued rogue behavior in the context of some
element of irrationality, we should consider an explanation involving
rational decision-making in a particular environment in which Colonel
Qadhafi has operated.
	In understanding Libya's persistence in engaging in rogue
behavior, evidence over a number of years suggests that answers come from
analyzing Libya's position in the international community, both in
economic and political stature.  For different actions or situations of
non-compliance countries and organizations such as the United States and
the United Nations have subjected Libya to a host of sanctions.  In the
early 1990's British and American sources allegedly connected Libya to
involvement in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in 1988.
Two Libyan are suspected of planting the cassette bomb on the Pan Am jet.
With this discovery the U.S. and British governments pushed for Libya to
release these two men into international custody to be tried for the
crime.  However, Libya has yet to comply.  The United Nations, supporting
British and American requests, adopted resolutions demanding Libyan
cooperation in the release of the two suspects.  After Qadhafi refused to
comply The United States and Britain called for sanctions against Libya
until the release was completed.  The United Nations then drafted two
sanctions resolutions, one in 1992 and one in 1993.  The first, UNSCR 748,
made limitations on aircraft that could take off and land in Libya, bans
on the transactions and trades of weapons, and made other related
sanctions to the Libyan national airlines as well as reduce its diplomatic
representation.(U.N., Res748)  The major restriction in the second, UNSCR
883, is that countries freeze all financial resources going to Libya or
any funds derived from sale of products or other items in exchange.
However, a key exception is that the "measures imposed by paragraph 3
above do not apply to funds or other financial resources derived from the
sale or supply of any petroleum or petroleum products."(U.N., Res883)
	While the sanctions certainly put limitations on Libya's ability
to conduct its aviation and realize circulation of financial capital, the
core of Libya's economic survival was untouched.  The petroleum industry
accounts for 99 percent of Libya's economic resources.(ArabNet)  Thus, it
follows that if one hopes to diplomatically coerce Qadhafi into compliance
through economic pressure, one would surely want to target its most
important industry.  However, the U.N. resolutions specifically avoid
making any sanctions at all in relation to oil.  In doing so the U.N.
allows Qadhafi the ability to maintain close to the status quo without
having to make any concessions that would damage his position.  Since the
sale of oil provides such a large percentage of resources and this source
of resources is not affected by the international sanctions, Qadhafi knows
that he can withstand the threat of those other restrictions.  As a
result, Libya can avoid complying with the resolutions.  The coercive
efforts fail.
	The United States, as a separate actor, has also faced similar
difficulties in gaining Libyan compliance with respect to the release of
the two bombing suspects.  With the failure of the United Nation's
resolutions and sanctions the U.S. has joined with Britain to try to
establish sanctions of their own, "including a block on oil exports."(A
Blast..321:51)  The only problem with this threat is that according to
this article in The Economist, "Britain records little trade with Libya,
America virtually none."(A Blast..321:51)  Sanctions on exports will
unlikely pose any real threat to Libya if we, the United States, do not
purchase any Libyan exports as it is.  Because of this condition, it is
almost impossible for the U.S. threats of economic restrictions on Libya
to have any credibility without the wide support and more crucially the
participation of other nations who hold a larger stake in Libyan trade.
From a Schelling point of view if the U.S. threat holds little credibility
and is meaningless, then it will fail to change Libya's behavior.  In
trying to avoid this predicament, the United States has found insufficient
assistance from those other nations.  Countries like Italy and Germany,
who receive some of their largest amounts of oil from Libya have been very
reluctant to support or participate in any kind of petroleum embargo.(A
Blast..321:51)  Again, the fact that Libya just does not need the United
States for trade and the latter's lack of support for an all out embargo
have neutralized the ability to use coercive diplomacy in the area of
economics to change Libya's rogue status.   
	Aside from economic conditions, the political arena of the
international community can explain Libya's resistance to U.S. deterrent
and coercive endeavors.  In contending with the United States in various
confrontational situations, Qadhafi has attempted to create certain
perceptions in the Arab world as well as in the whole international
community about his position in relation to that of the United States.  In
a number of cases, particularly through the mid 1980's into the present
decade Qadhafi has molded a given situation in such a way as to portray
Libya as simply a victim of the superior power and aggression of the
United States and the Western world.  After the Libyan terrorist attack
involving American citizens in 1986 President Regan ordered a bombing raid
on Tripoli, Libya's capitol city.  The image that came out of Libya was
that of willful destruction and a disregard for human life.  This image
caught much of the European community, many of whom "condemned the raid
when it was learned that some American bombers missed their targets and
killed civilians by mistake."(The Duel...310:33-34)  The perception
created was that the stronger bully attacked a much smaller and weaker
country, barely able to defend itself against the attack.  
	Evidence suggests that Colonel Qadhafi crafted a similar portrayal
of the situation involving the conflict between two American F-14's and
two Libyan MiG fighters in 1989, which resulted in the destruction of the
two MiGs.  The shooting occurred because the Libyan jets continued
pursuing a collision intercept course even after the F-14's had made
maneuvers to evade contact.(Magnuson, p19-20)  Indications were that
Qadhafi had deliberately sent the pilots into an engagement that was a
"one sided fight", as both were shot down before ever really getting a
shot off. (Magnuson, p20)  Surely Mr. Qadhafi did not feel like just
wasting two airplanes, he doesn't have that many to spare.  It is evident
that he wanted to again demonstrate his victimization at the hands of the
United States.  At the time of the incident a Libyan official claimed that
"the Navy (U.S. Navy) attacked two unarmed reconnaissance planes," even
though Security Council pictures told a different story, that the fighters
were, in fact, armed with missiles.(Magnuson, p19)  However, the Libyan
claims still aimed at creating a perception in the world view that once
again their small nation was provoked, attacked and bullied by the larger
power.
	Finally, another example of this Libyan perception development was
used during a conflict involving a chemical plant in the city of Rabta,
suspected of producing chemical weapons.  Beginning in the late 1980's and
into 1990 the United States had expressed concern over a huge chemical
manufacturing plant that it believed was producing materials used for
chemical weapons.  The Bush administration "called upon the world
community to support 'vigorous efforts to stop the operation.' " (Wiegele,
p115)  President Bush left open the option of attacking the plant in order
to put it out of commission.  Mysteriously, there was a fire at the plant
in March of 1990.  Qadhafi immediately accused the United States of
deliberately sabotaging the plant, since they had publicly called for its
destruction. (Wiegele, p116)  Mr. Wiegele indicates that soon after the
fire occurred, however, reports were hitting the U.S. of a possible hoax
in connection with the fire, and that the plant was still possibly in
operation.  Assuming that this theory is true, the demonstration by
Qadhafi that the plant is not operational is a very calculative move.
Qadhafi may have been moved by an unmotivated bias of seeing what he
expected to see, in that he expected a U.S. attack on his facility, having
already experienced previous raids such as the one in 1986.  The supposed
destruction could prevent a U.S. attack from trying to accomplish the same
goal while at the same time still provide an opportunity to single the
United States out as the aggressor responsible for the fire.  Once again
by manipulating perceptions, Qadhafi portrays his county as the victim of
Western aggression.
	However ridiculous these attempts may seem the perceptions of
Libya become very significant to how successful an enemy is at coercing
and deterring it.  When an actor threatens to take a course of action if
an adversary refuses to comply with a set of demands the decided course of
action may be met with approval or disapproval by fellow actors in the
game.  How a country views the initiator will determine whether or not the
country will approve of and support an actor's threat.  One might argue
that is should not matter whether other nations approve of your stance in
a diplomatic conflict, only changing your adversary's behavior while
avoiding military conflict should matter.  It is not that simple to say
"let's just threaten to nuke Tripoli if Qadhafi does not comply"
regardless of what other nations will think and say.  There are hosts of
interrelated interests involved in the United States' relationship with
the international community which could come into conflict given a
diplomatic policy like the above.
	As Professor Tanter has discussed,  it is necessary to have the
certain vectors and interests aligned together in order for
decision-makers to initiate diplomatic policy. For example, vectors of
political interests need to align with business interests, which may need
to align with interests of alliances.  It would be difficult politically
for a U.S. policy-maker to call for a boycott of a country that the
American business community had a vested stake and interest in.  Business
interests would become policy-maker's interests.  On the same note, it is
equally difficult for decision-makers to initiate policy which conflicts
with an interest or ideal of an ally nation.  The course of action would
interfere with the mutual considerations on which the alliance is based.
In the case of the ongoing conflicts with Libya it is this the alignment
of these vectors which limits the United States' abilities to achieve
successful strategic diplomacy
	As Libya takes on the role of victim in the eyes of the
international community, many countries including U.S. allies do not
support the use of force against Qadhafi for not complying in issues such
as the release of bombing suspects and the development of a chemical
weapons plant.  Germany and Italy for whom Libya provides a crucial
resource may not support any U.S. threat severe enough to jeopardize
Libya's ability to provide them with their oil.  Supporting such an action
or the threat of such an action is clearly not in either country's
interest.  If the United States went ahead with the diplomatic policy and
confrontation insued that, in fact, hurt Italy's and Germany's interests,
then the U.S. risks fracturing its alliance with those nations.  As a
result, the fracture could injure military and trading interests with both
countries as well as other strategic interests such as the U.S. integrity
and credibility of commitment to its allies.  The interest of its allies
do become part of the United States own interests when trying to
diplomatically influence Libya.  Thus, the United States leaders have
faced limitations in what they can credibly threaten to the rogue state.
There has been open discussion about the possibility of using nuclear
weapons against Libya, a non nuclear power.  However, as Mr. Klare points
out in his article, although the U.S. claims it is legitimate because
chemical weapons join nuclear weapons in the category of weapons of mass
destruction, the rest of the world would view this as "an inexcusable
exercise of its power." (Nuking...p6)  He also suggests that the threat
would jeopardize arms-control progress made over the last thirty years.
Clearly, these consequences conflict with interests that the U.S. has a
vital stake in.  Thus, the true credibility of the threat is diminished,
limiting the U.S. hand further. 
	 The U.S. has also faced limitations to its diplomatic policy
toward Libya as a result of interests in the relationships among other
members of the international community.  In response to U.S. threats that
use of military force could be employed if the bombing suspects were not
handed over, members of the world community have pointed out some possible
consequences for the region.  Egypt had reported that attacks on Libya
would upset many sympathizers of Qadhafi in the Arab world and "encourage
Arab extremism, making the Arab-Israeli peace process negotiations
harder."(A Blast...p51)  These delicate attempts at trying to mend
relations among nations in the Middle East, particularly Israel, have been
of great concern for The United States' international policy.  We have
spent enormous efforts in helping to bring these various countries to the
table to discuss peaceful settlements.  Especially with our commitments to
Israel, causing any major disruptions to the balance that we have put a
vested interest in would contradict our strategic interests of credibility
and commitment as well as our interest in pacifying this region in
constant turmoil.  As a result, in trying to align our various interests
in the Middle East region, it is impossible for decision-makers to truly
take a firm stand against Colonel Qadhafi and risk disrupting the peace
process, while still maintaining our other balanced interests in the area.
Once again the international environment limits the extend to which the
United States can effectively use its capabilities as part of its
strategic diplomacy.
	For the last two decades Libya has been a thorn it the United
States' back through its persistent outlaw behavior.  During this time
Libya has managed to resist total compliance to the Unite States and other
international organizations.  Rather than focusing on Libya's leader,
Qadhafi, as just an irrational madman in trying to answer the question of
why this is the case, the events of confrontation between the U.S. and
Libya show that one needs to look at the broad context of the atmosphere
of the environment in which the events have taken place.  Economically,
the lack of trade between the two nations makes it impossible for U.S.
sanctions alone to have any effect.  Only the participation of the
international community that can effect Libyas economic resources will
provide enough influence over Libyas behavior.  The lack of this
participation in sanctions of Libyas valuable oil industry has given
Qadhafi the ability to stand his ground without incurring major loss.
Equally significant has been the arena of international politics.  Qadhafi
has been successful at creating the perception of his country as the
victim of the United States bullying.  Because of the sympathy toward
Libya and the conflicting interests involving U.S. allies, and situations
such as the Middle East peace process,  the United States has been unable
to exploit deterrent and coercive diplomacy.  Simply issuing a threat to
Libya about the use of force or an embargo on oil, for example, will not
hold real credibility, when countries will not abide by the embargo or if
the United States is unlikely to jeopardize international interests by
using its military capabilities.  For the United States to have effective
diplomatic influence over Libyas behavior, it must participate in some
kind of international cooperation to thwart Libya.  Success in the Persian
Gulf derived from the fact that America was not taking an initiative on
its own.  The combined strength and support of the international coalition
alienated Saddam enough for him to finally withdraw.  Since the United
States has inherently failed on its own to change Colonel Qadhafis rogue
behavior because of international influences, it must be the case that
only a multinational effort can finally change Libyas status as a rogue.





Endnotes

Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang,
1995.


Harris, Lillian Craig. Libya:Qadhafi's Revolution and the Modern State.
Boulder, Co.: Westview 	Press, Inc., 1986.


Cooley, John K. Libyan Sandstrom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1982.


"United Nations Resolutions." U.N. Homepage [Internet Resource], 1996.


"Libya." In Arab Net. [Internet Resource], 1996. Available:
Http://www.arab.net/Libya/Libya_ 	contents.html


"A Blast From the Past." The Economist 321, 23 November 1991: 50-51.


"The Duel Over Rabta." The Economist 310, 7 January 1989: 33-34.


"Chemical Reaction," Time, 16 January 1989, 18-21.


Wiegele, Thomas C. The Clandestine Building of Libya's Chemical Weapons
Factory. 	Carbondale, Il: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992.


Klare, Michael T. "Nuking Libya." The Nation 263, 8 July 1996:5-6.