The creation and implementation of foreign policy in the Middle East is a problem which has long plagued American politics. The center of this debate during the 1980's was the Oval Office and remains so today. Most recently, U.S. Chief Executives have encountered a foreign policy dilemma: should the United States follow a "balance of power" strategy vis-vis Iran and Iraq as exemplified by the Reagan/Bush administrations, or simultaneously attempt to contain both powers, a policy often referred to as "dual containment" practiced within the Clinton Administration?(1) Each option has been attempted, each has gained supporters and critics, and to a greater or lesser extent, experienced both successes and failures. To decipher which of these policies is more likely to accomplish the set U.S. goals and ultimately prevail (if either), it is necessary to examine the circumstances which led to the execution of each policy, the cost and benefits of pursuance and finally the overall effectiveness of balance of power and dual containment consecutively. The Reagan/Bush Years Former President Ronald Reagan will long be remembered not only for his quick wit, jelly beans, and economic plan, but also for his foreign policy. Supporters credit him for quelling the communist threat and the downfall of the Soviet Union, while critics charge him with the responsibility of a soaring deficit and scandalous dealings during the Iran-Contra affair. In the midst of the Cold War, the Reagan Administration faced a difficult security problem in the Middle East. While the war between Iran and Iraq continued to wage, the United States was fighting a battle to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a stronger foothold in the region. By optimizing on Iraq's slowly disintegrating relations with the U.S.S.R (2), the United States could take advantage not only of the international edge to be gained against the Russians, but also of the economic benefits of an opening to Iraq. Additionally, the Reagan Administration was faced with the prospect of an expansionist Islamic Revolution which threatened the security of American relations in the region, particularly with respect to the stability of Saudi Arabia (3). The balance of power policy chosen to counter the communist and Islamic expansionist threat (4), and expand markets to benefit U.S. business interests, also allowed American policymakers the flexibility to manipulate the scales, in order to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon which could ultimately threaten U.S. credibility and security. To achieve this, trade credits were issued, military assistance offered and diplomatic relations normalized. The U.S. Agriculture Department Commodity Credit Corporation granted over 400 million dollars in guarantees to Iraq, expanding U.S. agricultural exports and assisting a financially bankrupt Iraq. Dual-use weapons were provided, including helicopters and trucks, as well as valuable intelligence information, while the United States was simultaneously applying sanctions to Iran (5). Pursuing a balance of power strategy also could potentially alleviate the large economic burden of maintaining a strong U.S. military presence in the Middle East, which would be necessary to contain both Iran and Iraq. By relying on one to counter the other, the U.S. could free its resources for other purposes. Conversely, domestic-politically balance of power was a risky strategy as exemplified by the resultant Iran-Contra scandal. Due to inconsistencies inherent in a balance of power policy, it is ideologically troublesome to defend. The difficulty lies in convincing the American public that the "enemy of our enemy" can truly be our friend (6). By allying itself with Iraq, a long standing enemy of the United States, the Reagan administration opened itself to criticism. Alhough pragamatically productive, the strategy of siding with a former enemy is ideologically dangerous, and therefore to be efficient must sometimes be cloaked in idealistic reasoning. The Bush Administration followed closely in the footsteps of its predecessor, continuing the strategy by supporting Iraq to counter IranUs strength. National Security Directive 26, issued by President Bush in October of 1989 accentuated the administration's intentions in the Middle East, specifically with regard to Iraq. This simply was to achieve "normal relations between the United States and Iraq" which the Bush Administration assumed "would serve our longer term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East" through the use of "economic sanctions and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and increase our influence with Iraq" (7). Aside from the domestic-political ramifications associated with the strategy, balance of power as applied by the Bush Administration had further negative consequences, which can perhaps be blamed upon the execution of the policy rather than any flaws inherent in the strategy itself. For balance of power to be a successful approach, the balancer must be sensitive to the relative strength of each country in order to realize when the scales have tipped too far. The United States was not responsive to the need for this adjustment in the late 1980's and early 1990's. Deterrence failure leading to the subsequent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990, was in part a direct result of a deficient implementation of the balance of power strategy. Rather than realizing that the balance had in fact become unbalanced, officials in the Bush Administration continued lending support to an Iraqi regime that had become openly hostile even days before the invasion. A meeting held at the Presidential Palace in Baghdad on July 25, 1990 between April Glaspie, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Saddam Hussein reveals one of the diplomatic errors committed by the Bush Administration prior to the invasion of Kuwait. In the transcripts from this meeting, Glaspie is reported as saying, I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I have lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your other threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instructio to ask you, in the spirit of friendship - not confrontation - regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to KuwaitUs borders?(8) Hussein responded by explaining that negotiations had been planned with Kuwait and that upon Kuwaiti compliance, nothing would happen. However, if unable to reach agreement, Rthen it will be natural that Iraq will not accept deathS(9). To which Glaspie replied, We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960's that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.(10) Glaspie's was not the only controversial diplomactic statement in the days prior to the invasion. When asked by a journalist at a Washington press conference on July 26 if there had been any U.S. protest to the amassing of troops along the Kuwaiti border, State Department spokeperson Margaret Tutweiler answered, "I am entirely unaware of any such protest". And in his testimony to Congress on July 31, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs John Kelly stated that the "United States has no commitment to defend Kuwait and the U.S. has no intention of defending Kuwait if it is attacked by Iraq"(11). Saddam's actions serve as evidence that the balance was no longer balanced, and statements issued by Administrations officials provide that the United States allowed this to happen. Balance of power, however, practiced effectively and efficiently, taking into consideration intelligence information and economic costs and benefits may be the most pragmatic, but ideologically difficult foreign policy to defend with regard to Iran and Iraq for rational choice actors. Balance of power successfully fulfilled its purpose in countering the existing Soviet threat, retaining market freedom, and effectively preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon, it also led to the Iran-Contra Affair, leaving a blight on the American presidency and is partially responsible for the failure of deterrence immediately prior to the outbreak of the Gulf War. Therefore, execution of the policy is key to its efficiency. Clinton's Dual Containment Policy With the change of administrations, so too came a change in foreign policy toward the Middle East. Rather than applying the Renemy of my enemy is my friendS strategy, the Clinton Administration believed and still believes that both Iran and Iraq are our enemies and should be recognized as such. Therefore, the Administration seeks to simultaneously constrain Iran and Iraq. With the end of the Cold War, the Clinton Administration has not been faced with the necessity to confront and counter the previously existant Soviet threat in the Middle East. Retaining regional stability, prevention of nuclear proliferation, and expansion of free markets in the Gulf, however, are issues with which the Clinton Administration must grapple (12). Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs argues that the Rbasic strategic principle in the Persian Gulf region is to establish a favorable balance of power, one that will protect critical American interests in the security of our friends and in the free flow of oilS (13). Lake criticizes previous administrationsU foreign policy strategy regarding Iran and Iraq, citing the overthrow of the shah of Iran and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as evidence that the approach had quite simply been RdisastrousS. He then goes on the explain the Rlogic of dual containmentS, the basic premise being that because both countries are adversarial towards U.S. interests, both must be regarded as hostile to the United States and therefore, require containment. The accomplishment of simultaneous containment can be achieved, according to Lake, due to advantageous circumstances that currently prevail. First and foremost, as mentioned before, the Soviet threat has been eliminated, and therefore the United States need no longer consider the foreign policy implications that once existed in a bipolar world. Secondly, the capabilities of both Iran and Iraq have been diminished, which restricts the possibility of militarily confronting the power of the U.S. Lastly, the Gulf Cooperation States and other regional powers have strong relations with the Unites States (14). Clinton foreign policy officials, however, rely heavily on the assumption that these circumstances do in fact exist and will remain constant. Martin Indyk, now the U.S. Ambassador to Israel and former National Security Council senior director for Near East and South Asia, further outlined the conditions necessary for sucessful dual containment: The coalition that fought Saddam Hussein remains together, and as long as we are able to hold that coalition together and maintain our military presence in the region, as long as we succeed in restricting the military ambitions of both Iraq and Iran, and as long as we can rely on our regional allies--Egypt, Israel, Saudi, the GCC, and Turkey--to preserve a balance of power in our favor in the wider Middle East region, we will have the means to counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes (15). As time goes on, however, it has become increasingly evident that the United States is losing alliance support. On September 3, 1996, the United States launched missile attacks against Iraq in response to an Iraqi challenge to no-fly zones. The U.S. missile launch did little to deter future Iraqi aggression as evident in the renewed Iraqi attack near Irbil on the 5th of September, but did much to draw criticism from U.S. allies. Not only were the actions of the United States condemned by Arab nations (16), but also by Germany and Russia, which cautioned the U.S. against further escalation, and especially France. A statement released on September 4th by French Foreign Ministry spokesman Yves Doutriaux accentuated the division between the French and Americans, RWe have our position and the Americans have theirs. And we donUt share their viewsS (17). Support for the isolation of Iran has been even more difficult to obtain from the international community, and even within the American business sector. Japan and Europe have refused to follow the United States lead by isolating Iran economically, which would require them to abandon a thriving market which accepted over $10 billion in imports from Europe and over $2.5 billion from Japan in 1992 (18). Additionally, American companies wish to expand their revenues in trade with Iran. Boeing, an American aircraft manufacturer, sees potential profits in sales to Iranian airlines , and American oil companies continues to buy Iranian oil outside of the United States (19). In this respect, unilateral sanctions are not effective, and simply deprive American business of possible profit. By signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act into law on August 5, 1996, President Clinton pandered to election year one-upmanship and further denied business transactions with Iran. The House bill introduced by Representative Gilman in March of 1996, is RA bill to impose sanctions on persons exporting certain goods or technology that would enhance IranUs ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources and for other purposesS(20). This bill, along with sanctions against Iran which were originally imposed during the Reagan years and have been tightened during ClintonUs presidency, continue to remain in place and can only serve a retributive purpose, as they are no longer intended to rehabilitate (21). According to Raymond Tanter, in Rogue Regimes, within the confines of domestic politics, sanctions for purposes of retribution are Rgainful and risk-freeS, although they can be damaging with regards to international politics as sanctions may endanger the unity of alliances (22). In the height of campaign season, and with the memory of multiple suspected terrorist activities, including the recent downing of Flight 800 and the June bombing of a U.S. base in Saudi Arabia, fresh in the minds of American voters, the Clinton Administration was more concerned with the impression left on Americans visiting the voting booths on November 5th, than the reactions of the international community. The Japanese expressed their reservations about the strengthened U.S. sanctions against Iran at a press conference held by Prime minister Tomiichi Murayama. Murayama explained that although a tough stance should be taken towards terrorist activity, Japan would proceed cautiously and hoped to encourage Rmoderate elements in Iranian societyS(23), giving no guarantees that America would gain Japanese compliance. European Union members had a similar, if not stronger reaction than the Japanese. Arguing that a more approriate forum to combat terrorism would be through the U.N. or NATO, an angered Europe warned that it would retaliate if the U.S. continued with the measure (24). "Ultimately it will not have an impact," Hodges of the London School of Economics said. "(The sanctions) will be counterproductive because (they) will degrade the bonds of cooperation that exist between the U.S, Europeans, Japanese and other major trading and investing countries around world." (25). Retribution may have its place in foreign policy, but rational actors must weigh the costs and benefits involved in enacting a retributive policy. In this instance, the Clinton Administration may gain domestic-politically, but loses economically on a forgone market, jeopardizes credibility and security in alliance relations, and risks indefinitely damaging its reputation internationally if forced to back down on a policy. Terrorist activity likely will not decline, as retributive sanctions will not removed as a result of compliance. Therefore, none of the U.S. national interest are served, only the interests of individual politicians. Not only does the United States forfeit the possibility of economic gains in the Middle East by pursuing a policy of dual containment, it also risks the economic costs of maintaining a strong U.S. presence in the Gulf and extending the growth of anti-American sentiments in the region. As noted by F. Gregory Gause III in his critique of dual containment, ...the deterrent aspect of the policy requires a continued, perhaps expanding, American military presence in the gulf. The higher the American profile, the greater the risk that it would become a lightening rod for domestic discontent. (26) Additionally, by increasing its presence in the region, the United States jeopardizes not only its international reputation and defense dollars, but also plays the odds of becoming embroiled in regional and local disputes. With all the costs involved in the continuance of a dual containment policy, the Clinton AdministrationUs persisting policy can possibly be explained through a greater fear of domestic political losses rather than a focus on potential economic, international political, and reputation enhancing gains. While rational choice theorists assume that actors weigh costs and benefits equally, prospect theorists argue that actors are often driven by loss aversion, and therefore are likely to risk more to avoid loss than to achieve gain (27). If this theory is applicable to the the PresidentUs foreign policy decisions, then the decision to pursue a dual containment strategy is based on the premise that the foreign policy team is willing to risk the economic and international political gains in order to secure the support of American voters. Additionally, within the realm of domestic politics, the Clinton Administration may be playing the role of a defensive positionalist. While the Dole/Kemp duo remained a threat to his office, President Clinton may not have been focusing only on his potential losses, but also on Republican gains. In this respect, the signing of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act may have been an effort to decrease advantage to the Republicans in an election year battle to appear tough on terrorism. Because the AdministrationUs focus is set on domestic politics, it has often been criticized, for a weak, sometimes undefined foreign policy. The hard, uncompromisable line taken towards Iran and Iraq regardless of allied protest, may be in response to that criticism. Regardless of the reasoning behind Clinton foreign policy decision making processes, although ideologically popular, dual containment is pragmatically inefficient. IranUs terrorist activities have not ceased due to the change in policy, and Saddam Hussein continues to incrementally challenge U.S. restrictions. In a speech to the Iraqis on September 3, 1996, after the launching of U.S. missiles against Iraq, Hussein urged his people to resist the American sanctions and restrictions. ROh, men of our air defenses and our air hawks,S he proclaimed, from now on consider as non-existent their damned imaginary no-fly zones above the 36 parallel and below 32 parallel. Strike with efficiency and competence, in the name of God, any aggressorsU planes which violate the air space of your great country and everywhere in Iraq, now and in the future (28). Dual containment threatens to destroy American credibility and security by jeopardizing longstanding alliances within Europe and Japan, and eliminates markets available for American business interests. The Future of American Foreign Policy It is unlikely that the U.S. will soon return to a balance of power strategy vis-a-vis Iran and Iraq, although the policy was effective in a variety of manners. Firstly, American policymakers no longer fear the communist threat that once justified an otherwise ideologically unpopular foreign policy. Secondly, the impact of the Iran-Contra scandal upon an already skeptical public will not soon be forgotten. This memory, coupled with the flawed execution of the balance of power strategy in the early 1990Us is likely to pervade American policy making for years to come, overwhelming possible benefits that could be derived from again implementing such a strategy. Dual Containment, on the other hand, should be carefully analyzed, weighing the costs and benefits of continuing the policy. As a new staff enters the White House, beginning ClintonUs second term, an opportunity exists to consider the effectiveness of the current policy, examine alternatives, and implement changes. Although the international community should not dictate American foreign policy, neither should the United States impose itsU policy on the rest of the world without careful consideration of allied opinion. Because dual containment has lead to European and Japanese outcry, unavailable markets, rising anti-American sentiments in the Middle East, risks an economically costly increasing U.S. presence in the region, and has done little to quell the terrorist threat from Iran or calm Iraqi aggressions, the Clinton Administration should see the future of American foreign policy in the Middle East through a lens of change. Additionally, within the realm of domestic politics, the Clinton Administration may be playing the role of a defensive positionalist. While the Dole/Kemp duo remained a threat to his office, President Clinton may not have been focusing only on his potential losses, but also on Republican gains. In this respect, the signing of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act may have been an effort to decrease advantage to the Republicans in an election year battle to appear tough on terrorism. Because the AdministrationUs focus is set on domestic politics, it has often been criticized, for a weak, sometimes undefined foreign policy. The hard, uncompromisable line taken towards Iran and Iraq regardless of allied protest, may be in response to that criticism. Regardless of the reasoning behind Clinton foreign policy decision making processes, although ideologically popular, dual containment is pragmatically inefficient. IranUs terrorist activities have not ceased due to the change in policy, and Saddam Hussein continues to incrementally challenge U.S. restrictions. In a speech to the Iraqis on September 3, 1996, after the launching of U.S. missiles against Iraq, Hussein urged his people to resist the American sanctions and restrictions. ROh, men of our air defenses and our air hawks,S he proclaimed, from now on consider as non-existent their damned imaginary no-fly zones above the 36 parallel and below 32 parallel. Strike with efficiency and competence, in the name of God, any aggressorsU planes which violate the air space of your great country and everywhere in Iraq, now and in the future (28). Dual containment threatens to destroy American credibility and security by jeopardizing longstanding alliances within Europe and Japan, and eliminates markets available for American business interests. The Future of American Foreign Policy It is unlikely that the U.S. will soon return to a balance of power strategy vis-a-vis Iran and Iraq, although the policy was effective in a variety of manners. Firstly, American policymakers no longer fear the communist threat that once justified an otherwise ideologically unpopular foreign policy. Secondly, the impact of the Iran-Contra scandal upon an already skeptical public will not soon be forgotten. This memory, coupled with the flawed execution of the balance of power strategy in the early 1990Us is likely to pervade American policy making for years to come, overwhelming possible benefits that could be derived from again implementing such a strategy. Dual Containment, on the other hand, should be carefully analyzed, weighing the costs and benefits of continuing the policy. As a new staff enters the White House, beginning ClintonUs second term, an opportunity exists to consider the effectiveness of the current policy, examine alternatives, and implement changes. Although the international community should not dictate American foreign policy, neither should the United States impose itsU policy on the rest of the world without careful consideration of allied opinion. Because dual containment has lead to European and Japanese outcry, unavailable markets, rising anti-American sentiments in the Middle East, risks an economically costly increasing U.S. presence in the region, and has done little to quell the terrorist threat from Iran or calm Iraqi aggressions, the Clinton Administration should see the future of American foreign policy in the Middle East through a lens of change. ENDNOTES 1) For a full description of the separate stategies, see Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes, the Iran chapter, to be published. 2) Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam 1982-1990, New York: W.W. Norton, 1994, p. 37. 3) Ronald Reagan, An American Life: The Autobiography, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990; p. 411. 4) Tanter, op.cit., chronicled the decisive steps in the decision to implement the balance of power strategy. 5) Jentleson, op.cit., p.42-47 6) Jentleson, op.cit., p. 15 7) National Security Directive 26 as quoted by Jentleson, op.cit, p. 94 8) Web site ROperation Desert Storm: Outright Disinformation SchemeS, created by David Fingrut. http://www.worldlink.ca/~ahmed/private/desert_st/gulf-war.html#April 9) Ibid 10) Ibid 11) Ibid 12) Barbra Conry, RAmericaUs Misguided Policy of Dual Containment in the Persian GulfS, Cato Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing No. 33. November 10, 1994. 13) Anthony Lake, RConfronting Backlash StatesS. Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, No.2. 14) Ibid. 15) Conry citing Indyk, op.cit. 16) CNN Web page, www.cnn.com. See Iraq September 3-5, 1996 17) Ibid 18) F. Gregory Gause, RThe Illogic of Dual ContainmentS. Foreign Affairs, Volume 73, No. 2 19) Ibid 20) Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, H.R. 3107. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR3107: 21) In depth discussion of rehabilitative versus retributive sanctions can be found in the Iran Chapter of Rogue Regimes. Tanter, op.cit. 22) Ibid 23) CNN, op.cit. September 1996. 24) Ibid 25) Ibid 26) Gause, opt.cit., p. 62 27) Anna Song, ps472.not 24. 28) Speech by Saddam Hussein to the Iraqi people, see CNN, opt.cit. September 1996.