Jason Hernandez Professor Tanter PS 472 - Term Paper United States Foreign Policy Towards Iran: Too Many Sticks, Not Enough Carrots INTRODUCTION The United States has an opportunity to revitalize and redefine its foreign policy objectives that will carry the current Administration and the nation into the twenty-first century. The appointment of former United Nations ambassador Madeline Albright to the position of Secretary of State brings with it the possibility that the Clinton Administration will rethink America's objectives and interests in the world. A top priority on that list, demonstrated by the Administrations fervent dedication, is the pursuit of Middle East peace. The complexities of peace negotiations in the Middle East requires the brokers of peace to be clear in their objectives, skilled veterans of foreign negotiation and possibly most important, it is required that they be patient. These challenges will face the Administration and the nation for several years to come. Past achievements of peace negotiations and the success of the current Administrations efforts at peace make the next four years critical to a durable and comprehensive peace. In short, US foreign policy is at a crossroads. One nation that will remain in the forefront of politics in the volatile Middle East is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran remains a rogue nation in the eyes of the United States and is treated as such by the Administration's foreign policy. The United States currently pursues a policy of containment towards Tehran. This containment policy, however, has not been the historical policy approach the United States has taken towards the Islamic state. Iranian presence in the Middle East remains a formidable challenge to Middle East peace and US foreign policy objectives. Since Iran, like other rejectionist states, will play an important role in the Middle East it is imperative that US policy in the region be carefully tailored and most importantly, it must meet its objectives. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the historical and theoretical issues that define US foreign policy towards Iran. Evaluation of contemporary policies and the factors that influence them will be carefully scrutinized as justifications for a containment policy. The main question this paper will address is whether the United States policy of containment of Iran is the best foreign policy for the United States to pursue? To answer this question I will first provide a historical review of US foreign policy towards Iran to provide a framework for the current containment policy. A consideration and discussion of US objectives in its policies directed to Iran will include a discussion of strategic and intrinsic interests. The theoretical motivations for US policy will also be considered within the context of specific aspects of a containment policy, including bureaucratic politics, terrorism, religious motivations, domestic politics, rationality and deterrence. CONTAINMENT: ORIGINS, INFLUENCES United States foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War sought to contain the Soviets through military alliances. US policy towards Iran demonstrated the US desire to prevent Soviet influence from infiltrating the region. With the assistance of the British in 1953, the US participated in "Operation Ajax" which successfully returned the young Shah Reza Pahlavi to his throne. Pahlavi was placed back in power to replace nationalist prime minister Muhammad Mussadiq who had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This act seemed to be a lesson to would- be nationalist challengers and a clear attempt by the West to protect the free flow of oil, a strategic interest of the United States. The replacement of the Shah by the United States demonstrated that the US was determined to protect its interests and insulate the region from further Soviet influence. Until the late 1970s, when the Shah of Iran was ousted from power, Iran was an American ally that the US protected from external influence. With the fall of the Shah and the rise of the 1979 revolution, Iran quickly became an American adversary. The dynamic shift in Iran came not from the Soviet Union but rather from within the Islamic nation. The 1980's were marked by a policy of "balancing" by the United States where the US would balance Iran and Iraq against each other. The close of the 1990's, however, lead to a shift in US policy from balancing to dual containment. The United States, under the power of the Clinton Administration, has continued a policy of dual containment towards Iran and Iraq. The United States' perception of the Iranian state derives from and builds upon itself from a motivated bias. The United States labels Iran as a rogue nation and is suspicious of all her actions because of a motivated bias where the US sees what it wants to see. Michael Klare suggests that this psychological principle explains a certain level of "threat magnification" of the Iranian state by the Pentagon. Klare argues that the fall of the Soviet Union meant that exorbitant military budgets were coming under closer scrutiny and were scheduled to be scaled back. In a function of bureaucratic politics, where domestic institutional forces such as the Pentagon formulate threats to justify military budgets, Klare argues that Iran was constructed as threat to justify higher levels of military spending. Klare contends that clashes with states like Iran have become "articles of faith among US policymakers." The motivated bias that the US has towards Iran continues to build upon itself to the point where containment is rationalized as the only option for the United States to pursue. The establishment of a "Rogue State Doctrine" has made these motivated biases easier to accept. By brandishing Iran as a nuclear outlaw, a direct sponsor of international terrorism, a threat to the free flow of oil, an enemy of American values and a determined disrupter of the Middle East peace process, the US has effectively convinced itself that Iran is the "New Enemy". These views of Iran are pervasive and easily accepted by political leaders, multiple domestic lobby groups and the American public. Once one accepts that Iran is a rogue state it becomes easy to accept that all of Iran's actions are designed to disrupt peace and security. The result is that US policymakers and the public see what they want to see in the regime. This motivated bias directs policy efforts to contain Iran. This bias, however, may be defensible. Although Klare maintains that Iran is not a real threat to the US, a consideration of the evidence demonstrates that Iran is a real threat to the West and its interests. The Iran-Iraq war decimated Iranian capabilities and Iran is currently attempting to rebuild its forces with assistance from China and Russia. This is a verifiable fact that is not tainted by any bias, what Iran's intentions or Iran's reasons for its buildup remain subject to debate for some. Iran's military buildup program presents alarm to the United States and justifiably so. Iran is not an ally of the United States and does seek to limit US influence which could be most readily achieved through a control of the flow of oil. A stronger military capability may allow Iran to do precisely that and "hit the West where it hurts" in the words of one Iranian official. Motivated biases may unduly influence US policy to a certain degree but much of the Iranian threat is real. IRANIAN CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY Iranian capabilities, although limited, do pose a legitimate threat to the United States. Iran possesses chemical and biological weapons, its armed forces stand at 473,000, owns 700 tanks, and 293 combat aircraft. These forces don't include newer acquisitions from the Chinese and Russians. Iran has recently modernized its naval forces in the Gulf to present a more potent adversary. A British frigate on January 6 spotted an Iranian naval vessel test-firing an anti-ship missile that had never before been seen in the Gulf. Analyst concluded the missile was the low-flying Chinese C802, a worrying presence in the strategic sea lanes used to export one third of the worlds oil. Its navy has two Russian-made Kilo-class submarines, ideal for the shallow waters around Hormuz, a third is on its way. It also has five Chinese Houdong fast-attack boats, with more on order. New military acquisitions make Iran a threat to cut off oil shipping lanes. Particularly worrying are the new exercises the Iranian military is training for. Military officials report that exercises, including amphibious landings, are becoming more sophisticated. This points to preparations for a future attempt to cut off the shipping lanes. Capabilities are important but credibility is more important because capabilities are useless unless your adversary believes you are likely and willing to use them. Iran's critical risk is high, meaning that Iran is willing to accept considerable loss to achieve its objectives. Consider the historical evidence of Iran's critical risk : a US embargo, several sanctions by each US president, a military containment policy and vast isolation of the regime has not tempered Iranian will. Iran continues to support terrorism, seek nuclear weapons, and challenge the United States. Iran's willingness to substantially curtail oil, its key source of revenue, demonstrates a high critical risk to fight against "The Great Satan". For this reason, Iran is afforded a great amount of threat credibility by the US. Graham Fuller and John Arquilla argue in an article in Orbis from the Fall of this year that credibility of force emerges from "national will" born of historical experience and perspective, national myths, sense of destiny, and perceived ethnic or religious mission. Strong Iranian perceptions of American colonialism, isolation and immorality make Iran's national will to use force very credible. Iran is also believed to have a clandestine nuclear program. As an envoy from Tehran to the United Nations explained in 1992, Iran's military build-up results from its defensive strategy and a need of a balance of power in the region. President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani has clearly stated that Iranian militarization is a direct result of American presence in the region, Rafsanjani stated, "We will never allow another power, whether from this area or from outside, especially America, to become the gendarme of the oil-rich and prosperous region of the world... We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons. From now on, you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task." Senior advisor to Iran's foreign minister on arms control issues, Hassan Mashadi, has argued that in the tough security environment which Iran lives is enough reason to "devote scare resources to nuclear research." The clerical regime in Iran is determined to become a full fledged nuclear weapons power. Despite economic difficulties and declining oil prices, it has devoted billions of dollars of scarce hard currency to finance large-scale nuclear purchases from Russia and China. Given the mounting dissent inside Iran, the ruling mullahs may see nuclear weapons as their best insurance policy for survival. The Tehran regime has expanded its secret nuclear development program to the point where it has reached a highly dangerous state. Assistance from China has placed Iran Ron the verge of acquiring the ability to produce enriched uranium.S China's transfer to Iran of a "cyclotron", which is capable of making enriched uranium, is one of the few final ingredients that Iran needs to become a nuclear power. Iran is now only a few steps away from developing a nuclear program. The Iranian threat also derives from Iran's support of international terrorism. Multiple sources confirm Iranian support for terrorist organizations that harbor their command in Syria. Former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher believes that Hamas, a Palestinian terrorist organization, is also under the tutelage of Iran. "Hamas receives its greatest backing from Iran. It provides financial backing, tactical advice, and we see the Iranian hand in the conduct of the various terrorist groups." Iran has publicly stated its support for these organizations. A 1993 report by the US State Department cites Iran as the "most active and dangerous" sponsor of international terrorism. The effectiveness of these terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, Hamas is believed to have Iranian connections despite Iranian denial, is very high. In early March, Israel was ravaged by four bombings in eight days that left 75 dead. Terrorism provides Tehran with the capability that most nations lack, to disrupt world events through indirect acts that can leave devastating impressions. Most worrisome is that if Iran develops nuclear weapons that the world may be at the mercy of state sponsored nuclear terrorism. These capabilities and potential developments make Iran a threat to the United States despite Klare's claim that the threat is constructed by domestic politics and bureaucratic politics. The potential for a nuclear Iran remains real and will pose great difficulties for the region, especially for Israel. Nuclear weapons in Iran could bring the Israeli bomb "out of the basement" as Israel attempts to deter Iran, a move that would likely accelerate nuclear proliferation the region. Israel may chose to follow the 1981 precedent of striking an Iraqi nuclear reactor. Such a provocative act by Israel would likely unravel the peace process. The control of proliferation and the forward progress of the peace process are strategic interests of the United States. To preserve those interests, the US must follow a policy that controls Iranian proliferation, preserves the free flow of oil, and reduces the regimes desire to sponsor terrorism. CONTAINMENT FLAWS: TOO MANY STICKS, SANCTIONS, RETRIBUTION Anthony Lake described US containment policy in 1993 by saying that the US would seek to "isolate such states and cut off their access to sensitive military technology and be prepared to strike back decisively and unilaterally." This containment policy, defined by attempts to isolate rogue states such as Iran through sanctions, a severing of diplomatic ties and looming threat of military retaliation has replaced a balancing approach. This containment policy is based too strongly on isolation, an approach which is not the most effective for the US to pursue. This form of containment is too extreme and limits US policymakers options. Appeasement is not the solution either, these approaches are at opposite ends of the spectrum. The answer lies between these two approaches. Containment is an appropriate policy to pursue when it is effective but not when its effectiveness is questionable and it is continued for the sake of being continued. The US should pursue selective policies of containment and also constructively engage Iran. A more balanced approach is likely to produce more results for the US. The problem lies in that current US policy relies too heavily on sticks at the expense of carrots. The theoretical concept of search is where two nations look for compromise before taking direct action. The current containment philosophy circumvents this process. As long as the United States views Iran as a terrorist state, the US will continue along its policy of never negotiating with terrorists. When dealing with Iran over issues like terrorism, it is best that the US pursue a containment policy. Keeping Iran on the list of states that sponsor terrorism sends Iran a clear signal that using terror as a means of political representation is not tolerable. Negotiation over terrorism is not an option. Other issues that are part of the US-Iran relationship, such as the peace process, are tainted by an all or nothing containment policy. In attempting to completely isolate the regime the United States limits its options and ability to engage Iran, an avenue which may be more fruitful that the status quo's attempt to isolate Iran. Sanctions. The most important question surrounding sanctions is, when are they appropriate? Sanctions generally serve one of two purposes, they can be rehabilitative or retributive. Sanctions that seek to rehabilitate try to punish behavior that arises from a "window of opportunity". Actions that arise out of windows of opportunity signify an action that approaches bounded rationality and that the act was unitary. This means that Iran would have acted out of a rational calculation of expected gains and benefits from seeking nuclear weapons, for example. If Iran sought fissile material from Russia and the decision to purchase it came from Rafsanjani or the ruling party, for example, then this is an example of when rehabilitative sanctions are justified. The aims of such sanctions would be to rehabilitate the regime so that Iran would no longer pursue nuclear weapons. Retributive sanctions are appropriate for when a nation acts out of fear. These acts are not as rational as acts that come from a window of opportunity. Acts of fear do not necessarily follow the same evaluation of expected gains and the consideration of potential drawbacks to acting. These acts may also be less unitary than acts from a window. Retributive sanctions are most appropriate for these situations because they send a message that such acts can not be tolerated, much like rehabilitative sanctions, they differ, however, in their effect. Retributive sanctions don't seek to change the way Iran acts but simply to punish for its actions. The US containment policy under the Rogue State Doctrine has almost exclusively pursued a retributive approach when sanctioning Iran. This approach is flawed for several reasons. First, when it comes to sanctions, you need the right tools for the right job. For the purposes of proliferation and the continued free flow of oil, retributive sanctions are not appropriate. Decisions by the Iranian government to proliferate and possibly cut off the flow of oil through the Straight of Hormuz appear to be rationally deduced actions rather than acts of fear. Rafsanjani's stated objectives of weapons acquisition would seem to suggest that these decisions are unitary, that he has control over these policy choices. These choices are validated by Rational Choice theory. The regime is maximizing its utility by choosing the policy that derives the most gain. Weapons proliferation and disruptions in the flow of oil are designed to disrupt the peace process or "hit the West where it hurts". Iranian leaders have presented a unified and unitary support for proliferation and the elimination of US influence in the Gulf. The probability of achieving these objectives is reasonably high and would likely stall peace negotiations or economically handicap the US. Given that Iran is acting out of a window of opportunity, the implementation of retributive sanctions is inappropriate since the US seeks to rehabilitate Iranian behavior. On May 6, 1995, President Clinton issued an executive order which prohibited American oil companies from investing in the Iranian oil and gas sector. This executive order was made into legislation on August 5, 1996 as the Iran and Lybia Sanctions Act. These sanctions serve a retributive purpose. They were implemented to let Iran know that its sponsorship of terrorism and proliferation goals are unacceptable. They were not implemented for any specific act or recent behavior of the regime. The sanctions seem to have been a reinforcement of the Rogue State Doctrine. Sanctioning a rogue state like Iran is also rather politically salient, a decision which the President and Congress were quick to make in an election year. Second, the economic nature of US sanctions is not the key to changing Iranian policy. The US trade embargo on Iran has had a real but limited effect. The embargo seems to have caused a temporary loss in oil revenue and a plunge in the value of its currency, the rial. These economic setbacks, however, have not transformed Iranian behavior. Iran still sponsors terrorism, perhaps more fervently as a result of enhanced containment policies as suggested by Klare, and still pursues nuclear weapons. The Iranian leadership often repeats Ayatollah Khomeini's phrase that his revolution was "not about the price of melons." Economic hardship is a condition which Iran has brought upon itself by sabotaging the oil industry during the revolution. This suggests that economic punishment does not even serve a retributive objective. Third, the effectiveness of US sanctions is greatly diminished by the lack of US allies commitment to respect US sanctions. South Africa seeks to serve as Iran's oil marketing outlet for Africa. In a step specifically aimed at countering the US embargo, Moscow signed a ten-year strategic agreement with Tehran at the end of 1995, dramatically stepping up its nuclear, military and industrial cooperation with Iran. Chinese and Russian military transfers have assisted in making Iran a more formidable opponent in the straights. Sanctions, however, are politically palatable since there is such vast agreement that Iran is a rogue state for which punishment is always acceptable. Domestic politics are heavily influential in the construction of US policy towards Iran. AIPAC, the American Israeli Political Action Committee, is particularly supportive of efforts to contain and debilitate Iran. Neil Sher, the President of AIPAC, has presented several testimonies in the Congress that are all supportive of tighter sanctions against Iran. AIPAC was a fervent supporter of the ILSA sanctions. Although a competing business lobby fights most containment policies the overwhelming support for fighting terrorism, supporting the Israeli government and preventing the export of radicalism is too powerful for politicians to resist. US security policy magnifies the threats of the Rogue State Doctrine. Klare presents the argument that the United States enhances the threats from rogue states because regimes fear being the target of US military force because of containment policies. He describes Iran's support of terrorism to be manifested in a David versus Goliath mentality. Kenneth Timmerman believes that as the US heightens its containment policy Iran responds with more terrorism. In a recent trip to the Middle East, Secretary Perry stated that if Iran launches an attack on the US fleet that all of Tehran's "navy is going to be submarines." This a clear example of an attempt by the US to deter Iran. Secretary Perry is attempting to deter Iran by promising the use of force if Iran misbehaves and attacks US forces. In a speech to US sailors in the Gulf one day earlier, Perry told them that their job was to "intimidate" Iran and Iraq. Intimidating Iran may only heighten the regime's security fears. These fears may accelerate Iranian nuclear proliferation attempts. Iran may feel backed into a corner and convinced that the only way to counter the American threat is through nuclear weapons. From the Iranian perspective, the United States is a Goliath which has bullied Iran in times when the US was not able to control the throne. The role of the US of elevating Pahlavi to the throne in 1953, the clear intentions of the US to use military force to maintain access to oil, and the military role of the US to see Iran's defeat through Iraq are all events that from the Iranian perspective would give sufficient reason to guard against the American threat. As long as US containment policy continues ineffectively to change the radical composition of Tehran, containment will not succeed. The Islamic nature of Iran makes it unlike other rogues that are not as religiously motivated. Khomeini's labeling of America as the "Great Satan" posited an absolute conflict between Islam and the West. In fundamentalist ideology, conflict with the West would be an endless struggle. The West would represent the enemy of Islam, a direct threat to Tehran and US support of Israel only elevates this conflict. As the US escalates containment policies it adds fuel to the fundamentalist fire. Iranian radicals are better able to appeal to moderate portions of the population by heightening fears of the Great Satan. This ideological and religious aspect of Iran should not be underestimated, hatred for the United States is not uncommon in Iran. Although Iran is presently more moderate than a decade ago, the radical elements of the nation continue to be in dominant positions of power in Iran. Iran's parliament, for example, represents only the ruling faction of Iran's clergy, a minute fraction of the country's population. THE BEST BALANCE: SELECTIVE CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT US intrinsic interests at stake with Iran include the safety of American citizens and the safety of military personnel. The strategic interests at stake include the flow of oil, the forward momentum of the peace process, US credibility to use force and the protection of US allies. On balance, containment policies make these interests more difficult to achieve. Although containment is needed it should not sacrifice other more constructive forms of engagement or policy options. Efforts at democracy promotion, inclusion in peace negotiations (including confidence building measures), and a more selective use of sanctions would offer a more successful combination of policies that would protect American interests. For the US to rehabilitate Iran it will likely have to force a change in the radical composition of Iran's government. The current containment policy seems only to prop up the radical elements of Iran's government and history would suggest that external attempts by the US to change the regime's leader will not suffice. An internal desire for change from the Iranian people will likely be the only possible solution to Iranian radicalism. Until this occurs, the stranglehold over Iranian politics that the clergy clings to will make US policy ineffective. In preparation for the March 1996 parliamentary elections, the Iranian Council of Guardians banned all opposition parties, including those close to the regime, such as the Liberation Movement of Iran. One step the US could pursue to facilitate democracy within Iran would be to denounce Iranian democracy and support opposition groups within Iran. The US could call for an opening of next year's presidential elections to candidates other than mullahs. Democracy promotion efforts can be facilitated through Voice of America, much like Radio Free Asia has helped advance the efforts of democracy in Asia. Exiled leaders have explained that statements supportive of free and open democratic elections by the United States would have "a tremendous impact on democratic forces inside Iran who are eagerly waiting for a green light from the US to contest more openly the legitimacy of the current ruling clique." The prospects of a more moderate ruling party in Iran will make it more politically feasible for the US to employ more of a carrots approach which could transform Iran into a more moderate state. Such actions could include the easing of sanctions, economic aid (which would require being lifted from the terrorism list) and inclusion in peace negotiations. The lack of a viable alternative in Iranian politics helps the Islamic Republic substantially to sustain power. Political opposition groups will have to be careful in their campaigns to avoid the crafty tactics of the ruling regime which has effectively silenced opposition groups. Moderate President Rafsanjani can not run for a third term in 1997, making it an appropriate time for the US to support democratic opposition groups. Timmerman suggests that the US convene a unity conference to bring democratic leaders together and present a unified front for the elections. Iran is capable of change. On Christmas Eve of last year, Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, offered to negotiate ways to put a cap on the military budget in the Gulf region following an offer to sign a non-aggression treaty with Gulf nations. Six days earlier, Rafsanjani indicated a desire to participate in confidence building measures with the United States, "We need to build up confidence among the countries in this region and countries in other regions. Confidence building measures are favorable not only to countries in the Persian Gulf but also to other countries." The confidence building tactic with Iran was endorsed early in October of this year by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. American attempts at isolating Iran may have succeeded in bringing Iran out to seek for compromise. Iran may have begun the process of search, where a desire to compromise replaces direct action. There was no official response by the US to Iranian desires to "talk things over" or make some deals. In fact, that same week the House passed legislation to fund a covert operation to overthrow Iran's Islamic regime. Later in August of 1996, the US Congress approved the ILSA. It appears that the United States is ignoring virtual offers by Iran to rehabilitate its behavior. Iranian conciliatory offers can only last so long. In a game of tit-for-tat, where defection seems to be the only option, Rafsanjani has taken a harder line after the escalation of sanctions. On November 24 of this year, he proposed a budget which increased spending by 35%, declaring "The sanctions have failed." On the 11th of that same month, Iranian officials told Reuters that Iran was not willing to engage with the United States. This raises the question of whether Iran's concessions can be seen as genuine. Motivated biases, bureaucratic politics and domestic politics are influential factors that raise suspicion and caution when looking to Iran. Attribution theory would help explain why Iran's actions that are not characterized by their rogue label are looked upon as tricks or deceptions. Attribution theory holds that policymakers assign other leaders actions to the people themselves rather than the situation. Policymakers never see anything genuine in the actions of your adversary. With respect to Iran, AIPAC and other domestic constituencies depict Iran as a state that can not be trusted and is bent on regional domination. Politicians can bash Iran with little political fallout and can gain substantially by fighting terrorism and anti-American states. The certainty effect states that a perceived guarantee of limited success is a more likely choice even though a possible big payoff may exist because decisionmakers tend to be risk averse. Sanctioning Iran is not politically risky, there is a certainty to containment but anything else is a gamble. The Pentagon can not let Iran become anything other than an extreme rogue state with only the most destructive intentions, otherwise, military budgets will decline. These biases will continue to debilitate containment because they do not allow the US to do anything other than contain Iran. US sanctions are not going to successfully protect American interests if retribution is not replaced by some rehabilitation and engagement. Selective support of sanctions is needed. To economically isolate Iran, the United States will need the support of nations that engage in commercial exchanges with Iran like Germany, Italy, France, Japan, Russia and China. Policies like the Helms-Burton Act, passed on March 4 of last year by the Congress, which sanction foreign companies and individuals who do business with Iran have only angered allies and harmed free trade principles. Anthony Cordesman, senior Middle East expert for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has gone so far as to say that US containment policy has succeeded more in isolating the US from its allies than containing Iran. To preserve the strategic interest of a nuclear free Iran, the United States must change its containment philosophy. The further the United States isolates Iran, the greater Iran feels insecure and desires nuclear weapons to provide enhanced capabilities and a credible nuclear threat. Sanctioning Iran economically will not succeed because Iran will continue to pursue its civilian nuclear program and continue to divert this technology for proliferation aims. Iran is also in good standing with the NPT and IAEA and takes full advantage of scholarship programs that are useful for the development of sensitive nuclear sciences that can be used to build a bomb. Relying on international norms to prevent Iranian proliferation would be sophomoric. The United States must forge strong policies and commitments from other nations to not sell Iran the sensitive equipment needed to make a nuclear bomb. Fear is a strong motivation for Iranian proliferation: fear of US containment, fear of the marginalizing effects of the peace process and fear of its regional foe Iraq. US policies that enhance these fears are detrimental to non-proliferation goals. One carrot the US could offer to quell this situation is the sale or transfer of light-water reactors, following the North Korean precedent. Light -water reactors are relatively proliferation safe and would help fight the losing battle of preventing Iranian proliferation. If Iran is a determined proliferator, which statements by Iranian officials would support, it is more likely than not that Iran will be able to circumvent international controls and American sanctions sometime in the future. The United States needs to look past dual containment if its interests are to be protected. Containment policies sacrifice and rule out other policies that may be more effective in achieving US objectives. In a fervent attempt to isolate Tehran the United States is sacrificing free trade, the support of its allies, fueling Iranian anxiety and elevating terrorism across the globe. Iran does not appear to be ready to collapse from US pressure. 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