Norman Hannawa PS 472 Term Paper Due 12-9-96 PresidentAs ClintonAs Foreign Policy on North Korea: Sticks vs. Carrots "The Fourth Pillar of our preventive defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems," said Secretary of Defense William Perry at the Pacific Basin Economic Conference in May of 1996. This has been one of the United States fundamental goals in East Asia, the middle East, and former Soviet Union. This paper will analyze US policy, primarily during the Clinton administration, concerning the North Korean nuclear weapons program. I will focus on several major questions that I will attempt to answer by the end of this paper. First, why has the United States moderated its stance against North Korea and its nuclear weapons program during the last three years? Specifically, why did both the United States and North Korea sign the "Agreed Framework" of 1994? Finally, if the current US policy does not work or has already failed, what steps can and should the United States take to coerce North Korea into complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? I will first start off by explaining a background of the US-North Korea Conflict that has taken place during the Clinton Administration. Afterward I will proceed to formulate a theoretical overview of the conflict discussing the theories behind my arguments. Then I will proceed to examine the rational behind the decisions of both North Korea and the US. Following this examination, I will analyze whether or not the US foreign policy concerning North Korea has been successful or not. Finally, I will make my policy recommendation on what the future policy of the US should be. In order to write this paper concisely and succinctly without loading it with too much of an explanation of the theories or terms, I wrote the paper with the assumption that the reader understands the theories and terms of the course. Furthermore, in analyzing the North Korean decision making processes, I will analyze speeches by Kim Jong Il, the current North Korean leader. However, because of the isolated nature of the DPRK and the lack of information on the country, I will also have to attribute past North Korean actions and policies to the current regime. Background of North Korea - United States Relations The evolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis dates back to the 1980As. The DPRK constructed a 5 megawatt nuclear reactor fueled with natural uranium, which became operational in 1986. Even though the DPRK joined the NPT in 1985, it was able to maneuver around International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections for over three years. Finally in 1989, North Korea shut down its reactor for three months and was suspected of removing enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs. The DPRK also signed a denuclearization accord with South Korea in 1991 in which the two nations pledged not to produce any more nuclear weapons. In June 1992, the IAEA was finally able to inspect reactor sites at the Yongbyon facilities, and concluded that North Korea must have reprocessed to separate plutonium, a weapon usable fissile material, from uranium thereby gaining the ability to produce a nuclear weapon. When the IAEA, in 1993, tried to force North Korea to allow inspections at two sites, North Korea refused and announced that it was withdrawing from the NPT. However, North Korea never really withdrew from the NPT. These violations of the NPT forced the US to take a hard line stance against North Korea. The Foreign Assets Control Regulations, authorized under the trading with the Enemy Act of 1950, established economic sanctions against North Korea. American companies and people are prohibited from selling or buying goods from North Korea. Following North KoreaAs spring 1994 uploading of fuel from its five megawatt reactor, the Clinton administration pushed for UN sanctions. A trip by Former President Carter in June 1994 lead to the Geneva Talks of 1994. On October 21, 1994, The US and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, which resolved the nuclear issue. This agreement is the foundation of the current Clinton Administration policy in dealing with North Korea. As a signatory to the Agreed Framework, North Korea agrees to freeze its existing nuclear weapons program under IAEA safeguards, eventually dismantle the existing reactor, transfer out of North Korea a group of fuel rods which the US says contain enough plutonium to make four nuclear bombs, permit regular inspections by the IAEA, and allow "at some undetermined date in the future" inspection of two sites suspected of containing undeclared amounts of waste from past nuclear production. The US agrees to arrange for the international financing and supply of two modern nuclear reactors to North Korea for electricity production at cost of $4 billion, supply quantities of heavy oil to North Korea, and ease economic and trade restrictions. Compared to the tough US policy prior to June 1994, this agreement represents a departure from the earlier policy of "sticks" into what is becoming a policy of "carrots" that rewards North Korea for acceptable behavior. Before debating as to whether this policy has been successful I will analyze the reasons behind the decisions by both countries to negotiate with each other. Therefore I will now turn to an explanation of the theoretical overview of the actors and basic theories of how nations and leaders behave in the the international arena. Theoretical Analysis There are many theories that deal with the behaviors of actors in the international arena. However, I will discuss those that I feel do the most concise job or explaining the behaviors of the US and North Korea specifically. The first concept I would like to discuss is rationality. Rationality describes how mush an actor is in control of his/her own country or the situation they are involved in. There are varying degrees of rationality; that is there is a rheostat of rationality. The more rational an actor, the higher that actor will be on the rheostat of rationality. On the other hand, an actor that makes a decision that appears irrational will be located low on the rheostat of rationality. Individual decisions can also be located at different points on the rheostat, and these decisions may even diverge from the general characteristics of the decision makerAs rationality. A decision by an actor(s) who thinks analytically through the options available and the constraints on the nationAs actions is usually considered to be a rational decision. However, an actor who combines certain cognitive biases such as misperception, motivated and unmotivated biases, etc. will be plagued by irrational decision that are less thought out than rational decisions. In my paper I will label the decisions of the US and North Korea as either low or high on the rheostat of rationality. Moreover, an important concept that affects the degree to which decision makers act in a rational manner is the concept of a unitary actor. A unitary actor is one which makes its decisions in a single minded fashion. This actor is more rational and less susceptible to biases. In order to determine whether the decisions makers of North Korea or the US act in a unitary fashion, I will examine the decision making process of each country looking for such factors as the bureaucratic, governmental, and ideological, influences on those decisions. In addition, two important factors of nations foreign policies are their strategic and intrinsic interests. Strategic interests are those that are abstract, or intangible such as resolve, credibility, and ideology. Intrinsic interests are those that are tangible and essential to the foreign policy of a nation such as territory, the security of allies, and economic interests. In order to understand why either the US or North Korea take a particular course of action it is important to identify their strategic and intrinsic interests. Finally I will also discuss several other theories ad how they help explain the decisions of the leaders of the states in my study. The first of those theories is called Prospect Theory. The gist of this theory is that people worry more about their losses than their gains. An actor chooses a reference point, or anchor, and then measures how a decision will result in gains or losses from that point. Loss aversion, a concept that explains prospect theory, occurs when an actor is more willing to take risks to avoid losses than they are to make gains. Another important concept, the endowment effect, states that people demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire that same object. Sanctions are an important part of the relationship between the US and North Korea. An important question to ask is whether the sanctions are enforced for retributive or rehabilitative purposes. Sanctions enacted against a state for rehabilitative purposes serve to punish the state while at the some time giving it incentives to improve its behavior and return to the "community of nations." Conversely, retributive sanctions are enacted against a state for the sole purpose of punishment and to display resolve and credibility. I will analyze the US sanctions on North Korea while taking these concepts into account. I will now move to a specific examination of the decisions and actions of North Korea and the US using the theoretical overview above as a tool that helps explain each the rational behind the decisions. US and North KoreaAs Decisions and Actions I will analyze the various decisions of the US and North Korea in a four part process. I will first apply the general theretical framework to explain the general policies of both sides. Then, I will focus on the reasons behind the US and North Korea policies prior to the Agreed Framework. I will then move to an analysis of the reasons that the US and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in 1994. Finally, I will examine the rational behind these two countriesA policies since the signing of the Agreed Framework. As I mentioned above, I will apply various theories to my interpretations. US Policy First, it is important to point out that the US leadership can be considered high on the rheostat of rationality. However, the leadership does not always act as a unitary actor because of internal pressures from various agencies, bureaucracies, and branches of government. This means that US decision making can sometimes be plagued by cognitive biases that result from the different goals and behaviors of each actor within the government. The US has obvious strategic and intrinsic interests in the East Asia and the Pacific. The US has several intrinsic interests in the Area including the protection of its major allies: Japan, South Korea, and Thailand, sustaining economic growth and access to foreign markets, and assuring stability over the long term. The US recognizes that nuclear proliferation, especially in North Korea, is a great threat to security in the region. In a speech to the National Press club, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the US has a four part strategy for a peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific one of which being the security of major allies like South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Thailand. Christopher went on the state that the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea is a vital interest to the US and South Korea security, so a nuclear free Korean Peninsula can also be considered an intrinsic interests of the US. Furthermore, Assistant Defense Secretary Nye looks to the region as an area of strong economic growth of which the US will play a key role. Nuclear proliferation could threaten this economic growth which thereby threatens US intrinsic interests. The USAs strategic interests include supporting democracy and human rights which serve American ideals. Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that "Liberty has found a home throughout the Asian and Pacific Regions , and the United States is pledged to being there to protect and secure that liberty for all who desire its blessings." Moreover, as a key foreign power in the region, the US must always show resolve in order to uphold its credibility in the region. Critical in understanding North Korea policy goals is the concept of the Juche ideology. "Juche" is an ideology based on self-reliance, and it dominates the economic, political , and social fabric of the country. This Juche ideology was applied to all aspects of Korean life by Kim Il Sung, and Kim Jong-Il himself advocated Juche as the overriding ideology of the country. This ideology of self dependence has lead to the isolation of North Korea as illustrated in a speech by Kim Jong-Il. He stated to the youth of the country that they should uphold the ideology of the Juche and "sharpen their vigilance against the infiltration of all manners of anti-socialist ideas and bourgeois mode." This ideology is a basic strategic interest for North Korea. Juche also states that the people must obey their supreme leader as a parent that takes care of them. Therefore, even though the leadership of North Korea is considered to be low on the rheostat of rationality, it can be considered a unitary actor with Kim Jong-Il making most of the decisions. In order to determine the intrinsic interests of North Korea, it is necessary to analyze speeches and actions by Kim Il Sung and the current leader Kim Jong Il. Kim Il Sung applied the Juche ideology to his policies. Kim Jong-IlAs critical national policy issues include strengthening the economy, maintaining political stability, and protecting national security. Because of a decrease in economic support from the former Soviet Union and China, the North Korean economy has taken a downturn resulting in severe shortages in food, oil, raw materials, and. electric power. North Korea relies heavily on foreign imports for crude oil, cooking oil and food. North Korea also seeks a better economic relationship with Japan to compensate for the decrease in trade with China and the former USSR. As early as 1983, Kim Jong-Il stressed that "vigorous efforts should be made in all the branches of the national economy to improve technology, mechanization, and automationTthereby modernization the national economy." Another important intrinsic interest for Kim Jong-Il is national security in the form nuclear weapons. In 1983, he stated that "they (the US) have brought to South Korea a large number of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction and turned South Korea literally into a huge powder keg, into a base for nuclear war." The Juche ideology of self reliance plays strong role in national security matters as North Korea maintains twice as many troops as South Korea and more equipment. Furthermore North Korea sees a nuclear program as deterrent to the US and South Korea, which fits under the ideology of self-reliance. Pre-Agreed Framework In 1994, US intelligence believed that North Korea produced enough plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon. James R. Woosley, the Director of Central Intelligence in 1994, claimed that "North KoreaAs attempts to develop a clandestine nuclear capability, together with its military preparations and arms transfers to other countries, threatens its neighbors and our fundamental national security interests." Since a nuclear free Korean Peninsula was a major intrinsic interest of the US, the Bush Administration designated the North Korea nuclear program as "the greatest threat to satiability in the region" and formulated the "Team Spirit" military exercises with South Korea. This was an example of the type of pressure that the Bush Administration used to coerce North Korea into abiding by the NPT treaty. In fact the Bush administration made it clear that positive gestures would follow in the event of sustained North Korea good behavior. This policy of "sticks" resulted in the 1991 Denuclearization Accord in which both North Korea and South Korea pledged to refrain from processing nuclear fuel or building nuclear weapons. However, when the Clinton Administration took power, it veered sharply in the direction of concessions and conciliation. William Perry outlined a new plan of preventative defense against rouge states like North Korea, and he called for the use of coercive diplomacy and carrots. In 1994 talks between the US and North Korea were held to resolve the nuclear weapons standoff. In these talks, coercive diplomacy came in the form of threats of economic sanctions against North Korea if it did not stop reprocessing fuel and the promise of assistance in commercial electricity production if it did stop. This policy resulted in the Agreed Framework of October 1994. During the time of transition between the Bush administration policy and the Clinton Administration policy, the North Korea leaders were acting to promote their security interests. North KoreaAs strategic interests have pushed the country toward adoption of a nuclear weapons program. The North Korea leaders acted out of "a basement of fears" because they feared being destroyed at the hands of the Americans and South Korea. In fact many analysts believe that South Korea would defeat North Korea in a war, especially with US support. Therefore, the leaders of North Korea feared for their countryAs national security at the hands of the US and South Korea. The formulation of a nuclear weapons program allows North Korea to have a cost effective nuclear deterrent and strategic equalizer with South Korea and the US while at the same time sticking by its ideology of self-reliance and soothing the fears Agreed Framework of 1994 Based on the Clinton administrationAs Foreign Policy of more carrots and less sticks, US entered into an agreement with North Korea in 1994 regarding the nuclear program of the DPRK. The Agreed Framework (the exact obligations of both sides on p. 3-4 of this essay) has been hailed as a great foreign policy achievement of the Clinton Administration because North Korea is to halt its nuclear program. Ambassador-at-large, Robert Gallucci called the Agreed Framework "an important step toward resolving the North Korean Nuclear issue" and "increasing stability and fostering economic growth in the region." In order to come to a breakthrough with North Korea, the US gave up certain concessions like the light water reactors and an easing of sanctions. The rational behind the US decision to agree to the framework is very simple: giving away concessions is a better result than the continuation of the North Korea nuclear program, which threatens the military and eonomic security of US allies and interests. Therefore, the US looked on their concessions as a necessary part of ending the nuclear threat to a very important region in terms of economics and alliances. After the Agreement was signed President Clinton claimed that the agreement allows the US to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, which are an important part of US security and stability around the world. Furthermore as a world hegemon Clinton felt obligated to protect the interests of fellow democracies like South Korea in the region. Like the US, North Korea viewed the Agreement as very important to its economic interests. The North Koreans are to receive a $4 billion dollar light water reactor project and improved economic relations with the US and the rest of the world. Therefore Kim Jong-Il used the nuclear facilities as an effective lure that captured international attention and helped ease the economic plight of his country. Furthermore, the agreement served as an important tool that brought North Korea back into the fold of international trading allowing him to accomplish his goal of improving the technology of the country. Finally, Kim Jong-Il saw the agreement as a golden opportunity to gain very much while giving up very little. In terms of intrinsic interests, Kim Jong-Il gained some prestige by making his regime look lie one that is willing to return to the international community of nations and uphold the basic principles of the international law and the NPT. Post-Agreed Framework The US is now carrying out its obligations under the Agreed Framework. The US has begun fulfilling its obligation to create an international consortium, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), that would be responsible for providing North Korea with 2000 megawatts of light-water-reactor generated electricity. Furthermore, the US has taken actions to ease the sanctions on North Korea by adding items such as cdAs, cd roms and news service to the list of items that can be traded between the US and North Korea and enabling the US media to establish branches in Pyongyang. An inherent part of the Clinton policy is that North Korea will fulfill its obligations contingent upon the US carrying out its part of the bargain. Therefore, in order to deter North Korea from backing out of the Agreement, the US has followed through or begun following thorough on its obligations. On the other hand, the story in the DPRK is quite different. The regime in North Korea wants to stay in power. The Agreed Framework will help Kim Jong-Il stay in power because the easing of sanctions will provide North Korea with the ability to resurrects its faltering economy. Furthermore, the Framework does not really require North Korea to fulfill any obligations for a number of years. North Korea will not have to dismantle its old graphite nuclear reactors for nine to ten years, and it will not have to permit IAEA inspections for at least five years. Because of the delayed inspections, North Korea can consolidate what plutonium it has and build one more nuclear bomb within the next three years, something that will go a long way to giving KIM Jong-Il the deterrent threat he desires. This allows Kim Jong-Il to accomplish his second goal, which is to provide for the national security of his country. Even the head of the IAEA, Hans Blix, was displeased that the agreement does not require North Korea to accept immediate inspection of the two nuclear dump sites; he stated that "many thing can happen in the diplomatic life of states within a number years." Therefore, North Korea is not required to do anything under the frame work except freeze operations in its reactor while the US provides economic support in the form of heavy oil and the light water reactor project. Policy Analysis After analyzing the Clinton policy over the past several years, I have come to the conclusion that, first, the administration was operating with certain motivated biases. Therefore some of its decisons were not very rational. William Perry took the stance before he was made Secretary of Defense that he favored a policy of carrots over a policy of sticks with regards to North Korea because the carrots are a small price to pay for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the White House veered from the tough stance of the Bush Administration in favor of more coercive diplomacy. However in their desire to come to some sort of agreement, the US leaders "saw what they wanted to see" and did not take into account all of the factors of the agreement. They overlooked the fact that the CIA already believed that North Korea had a nuclear bomb, and they also backed down on their earlier insistence than the DPRK immediately prove full accounting of the plutonium it has already produced. Therefore, the administrationAs actions have resulted in a one sided framework that benefits North Korea while allowing them to retain their nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, the administration has lost credibility in dealing with North Korea. The embargo placed on North Korea in 1950 can be considered retributive sanctions. However with its policy of carrots, the Clinton Administration has transformed these sanctions into rehabilitative sanctions. That is, the sanctions prior to the current administration were stringent no matter how good the DPRK behaved which displayed US resolve and credibility especially to its allies in the Asia-Pacific. However the current sanctions can be eased if North Korea abides by the Agreed Framework thereby giving the DPRK incentives to rehabilitate, or come back to the "community of nations." This seems to be smart policy. However, the Clinton Administration went too far easing the sanctions too much. Thus, in the eyes of Kim Jong-Il, the US resolve on the issue was lacking. He took advantage of this lack of resolve. For example, recently a North Korean submarine crew infiltrated into South Korea. Normally this would be considered an act of war, but the Clinton Administration has reacted timidly thereby encouraging more daring efforts by Kim Jong-Il. In fact, this lack of resolve is hurting US credibility with our major ally, South Korea. Seoul officials are condemning ClintonAs policies as appeasement. The main problem with the whole framework is that nothing is really set in stone. This gives Pyongyang, a regime has a history of reneging on agreements, another chance to receive its profits without doing any real work. Even ambassador-at-large Robert Garlucci admitted that the agreement is not a treaty that both sides have to obey. Furthermore, the framework "buys North Korea time to conceal its any weapons it may already have and produce weapons with stored plutonium from its old reactors. Pretty much North Korea is being paid handsomely for returning to the non-nuclear obligations it had it had already taken on when it signed the NPT treaty in 1985. With a lack of definite requirements on that the DPRK must obey, the US has sacrificed the future for small gains in the present time period; those being the nuclear freeze by North Korea. Also, during this time period it appears that the Clinton administration is risk acceptant concerning the North Korean nuclear program. The reference point in this case is that the Clinton administration thought that the status quo should be a North Korea with no nuclear weapons arsenal. Allowing North Korea to continue with its nuclear program would be considered a loss. Therefore, the administration tried to negotiate the Agreed Framework Deal. The Agreed framework is full of risks on the part of the US if one looks at it closely. The indefinite time periods for inspections and the lack of any real mechanisms to force North Korea to comply with the treaty are all risks that the US took in order to protect its interests in the region. However, these risks have not paid off for the US because North Korea is not complying with the agreement. For example, on Sept. 20, the UNAs IAEA, in a vote of 70-0, declared the DPRK to be in noncompliance with pledges to allow for international monitoring on certain nuclear facilities. Therefore I have come to the conclusion that the USAs current policy of carrots is not working to deter North Korea form pursuing a nuclear weapons and threatening allies in the region. Now the question is: What policy changes should the US make. Conclusion: Policy Recommendations With the North Korean economy in near ruins, the US gave Kim Jong-Il and his regime breathing room with its economic aid package. Therefore the US should use this vulnerability as a pressure point to force North Korea to comply with US demands. First, the US should definitely use more sticks and less carrots. That is, force North Korea to allow inspections to determine whether or not they have any nuclear weapons or plutonium stored. These must be challenge inspections that allow the IAEA to inspect any area of the country that they want. Any carrots such as the light water reactor or heavy oil should be suspended until North Korea complies with these arrangements. Also, in order to verify that the DPRK is committed to peace the US should also withhold the carrots especially if the DPRK does not comply with a secvtions of the framework that calls on them to resume productive dialogue with Seoul. The Us cannot succomb top demands by the DPRK for a bilateral agreement only between the US and North Korea. Only with an agrremmnt betwen South Korea and North Korea will there be peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, Clinton should warn North Korea that if it vontinues to violate both the spirit and letter of the Framework, it will put at risk further implementation of the Framework Agreement on the USAs part. In the long run if the DPRK further breaches its obligations under the Agreed Framework, the Clinton administration must take harsher actions. Under the "Omnibus Export Administraton Act of 1994 Title II," the president can impose sanctions on any country that violated the NPT treaty. UN sanctions may not work. However a multilateral coalition made up of China, Japan, and Russia (North KoreaAs main trading partners) that ceases trade with North Korea may have a chance of finally toppling the current regime which is hobbled by economic problems. Furthermore the US should clearly affirm its defense commitments to its allies, South Korea and Japan, though an upgrading of the US military presence is not necessary. Overall, the Clinton administration should not completely abandon the Agreed Framework. However it must be able to recognize if the DPRK really plans to comply with the agreement. If not, then the previous policy of isolating and pressuring North Korea should be reinstated especially with the harsh current economic conditions in North Korea. The Clinton administration must remember that "when your opponent is against the ropes, you must not back off in the slightest bit."