CUBA AND HELMS-BURTON PS472 FINAL PAPER GENE KESELMAN The Cold War is over. The monolithic institution of the Soviet Union is now a memory a half of a decade old, and Communist governments have fallen from the ranks of the plentiful, to an endangered species. The USSR's old sidekick Cuba, although still lead by the consummate US enemy Fidel Castro and still Communist at heart, is but a pale reflection of the important strategic enemy it once was. "Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world." Cuba is not known to have sponsored any international terrorist incidents in 1995. Havana's focus now is to forestall an economic collapse.1 However, on top of Rogue State status, and already heavy sanctions against Cuba that seem to be outdated to everyone in the world except the United States, the United States Government (USG) recently approved the controversial Helms-Burton Act. This paper will be a critical and theoretical examination of why the USG passed the Helms-Burton act in light of international dissension, Cuba's impotence, and the absence of any concrete foundation for an obsolete isolation policy THEORY To consider the Helms-Burton situation on a level that goes beyond mere historical perspective, one must establish a general framework of applicable theoretical concepts which can be applied to situations and can help in the analysis of the actions. The theories most applicable to Cuba will be those dealing with rational decision making and threat perception -- theories that will contradict or support the US's hard-line stance toward Cuba. Rationality and Decision Making Decision making involves reduction in uncertainty and simplification of complexity. For leaders to be held responsible for their decisions, they must be capable of rational thought. An actor must identify his options, estimate the likelihood of success, trade off expected cost and benefit to establish expected value and is rational if he or she chooses "the most efficient choice - - that alternative that promises the highest expected value, either highest benefit or lowest cost".2 This is the rational choice model of foreign policy decision making and it pays minimum attention to internal characteristics of other actors, and tends to black box others, assuming they will seek rewards and avoid punishment. Although this is the easiest to apply, it tends to make many assumptions, and isn't necessarily the best indicator of rational judgment in a real world context. A second theory, bounded rationality, "investigates departures from rationality because of factors like perceived controllability and calculability of risk". This approach says that one should look at the internal attributes of actors that may bias perception of threat and opportunity, and thus is full of constraints on rationality.3 For the purposes of this paper, we will attempt to use bounded rationality, but will fall back on the rational choice model for it is the easiest to apply without in depth knowledge of both actors' motivations. In this context, one can analyze the actions of the USG and distinguish between rational and irrational decisions. Unitary Actor and Bureaucratic Politics To understand rational decision making, one must first determine who the decision maker is because this is critical to understanding the actions taken by a state in the context of rationality. One crucial characteristic of the USG is that it does not function as a unitary actor under a single leader. The United States has a system where many actors impose their opinions and influence on the formation of laws, treaties and agreements. This does not allow for any one set agenda in terms of political interaction, and is referred to as a bureaucracy. "In a bureaucratic politics approach, players see different faces of issues, propose competing ways to resolve value conflicts, and have varying time horizons for action success". Bureaucratic politics lead to irrational decision making because rational decisions are easily lost in the system and often take a back seat to intra-governmental disputes. There is no single overarching interest, rather many bargaining games by players in positions who compete over how to define 'the National Interest'. "They seek to maximize organizational and personal interests" rather than national interests, and therefore make irrational decisions relative to an actor who is only looking out for the welfare of the state.4 Cuba, on the other hand is a state headed by the epitome of a unitary actor. Fidel Castro rules as the sole decision maker in all aspects of Cuba's existence and the final and only word in policy decisions. However, his is not a system devoid of irrational behavior. Because Castro has absolute power in Cuba, he is in a position to not only look out for the welfare of his country, but also for his own personal welfare. Having total autonomy, he is not willing to give up his position even at the cost of his country and his people. His is an example of extreme personal loss aversion (which will be discussed later), which often leads to irrationality. With such a degree of unitary control Castro is unchecked in his reign, and can allow personal issues to interfere with the interests of his country. Prospect Theory and Heuristics Also key to understanding rational decision making, Prospect Theory and Heuristics are so called 'short cuts to rationality' and involve some sort of personal perspective by the actor that leads to the possibility of irrationality. Prospect theory says that "losses are so salient in people's mind that they will put more on the line to avoid losses, in spite of possible gains". It is an anchoring mechanism, meaning that the actor takes a reference point situation, and then compares all possible outcomes to that situation, and any outcome where the actor drops below the reference point is highly unattractive. Here we see a possible explanation for why leaders engage in risky and sometimes illogical acts. If a leader is bent on avoiding losses, or so fearful of losing from the reference point, he will risk more to avoid this loss. Equally as important, are the concepts of motivated and unmotivated biases. The actor defines a reference point situation, and then either consciously or unconsciously assumes that all current and future situations will bear resemblance to the references point. In short, the actor either sees what he wants to see with motivated bias, or sees what he thinks he should see with unmotivated bias. "It is the motivated/unmotivated framing of events that will determine what type of path a leader chooses. when the biases take place and certain outcomes are heavily emphasized, then it is the mere gain/loss, according to prospect theory, that will motivate a leader to be non-value maximizing", or irrational.5 Threat Perception Threat perception is related to rational decision making in that an actor must decide what kind of threat his adversary poses to him or her. The same biases and shortcuts that apply to rational decision making, also apply to rational threat perception in that "misperception of threat derives from distorted information processing", and can be considered irrational. The two kinds of possible threat are strategic and intrinsic. The first relates to threats that are aimed at things such as credibility, integrity, image, commitments, and other intangibles that can still be very important to a state. The latter relates to actual tangible resources such as troops, land, technologies, and the like.6 EVIDENCE The United States first imposed a full trade embargo on Cuba on February 3, 1962, after the Kennedy Administration became convinced that Castro was moving rapidly toward the establishment of a totalitarian regime in alliance with the Soviet Union. The legal foundations of the US economic embargo on Cuba are the Cuban Assets Control Regulations declared in 1963 pursuant to the Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917. Both the US embargo and the Organization of American States sanctions against Cuba remained in force through the early 1970's . In 1974 "pressured by congressional and academic groups sympathetic to the Castro Regime, President Gerald Ford began exploring improved relations with what many were proclaiming to be a reformed Cuba." However, this process quickly stopped when Cuba moved 40,000 troops to Angola. Then in 1976, newly inaugurated President Jimmy Carter sought to moderate Castro's foreign policy and to improve Cuba's human rights record by initiating a process of rapprochement. Despite Carter's good intentions, "the process of rapprochement was halted once more when in 1978 Castro sent approximately 15,000 troops to Ethiopia". These and other events "would become a prelude to the re-strengthening of the US embargo during the administration of President Ronald Reagan, who entered the office intent on reversing the tide of Soviet-Cuban advancement throughout the Third World".7 In 1992, the US congress passed the bipartisan Cuban Democracy Act (CDA). The Torricelli Bill, as it was also called imposed strong sanctions on Cuba and against countries assisting Cuba. The Bush administration opposed the CDA, arguing that it would create problems internationally for the United states while having little impact on the Cuban Economy, but the bill received the strong backing of then Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton, who also received some $300,000 in campaign contribution from the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). The vote in the UN General Assembly in November of 1995 was 117 to 3 to condemn the embargo.8 Then came the tragedy of February 24th 1996. After the shootdown of two small planes of US registry by Cuba in the Florida straits on that date, the United States responded with The Helms-Burton legislation, passing the US Senate and House by overwhelming bipartisan margins of 74-22 and 336-86, respectively. Secretary of State Warren Christopher condemned the shootdown as a blatant violation of the Chicago Convention on International Airways, and "while Bill Clinton had opposed the Helms-Burton legislation before the plane incident, he reversed course and endorsed the thrust of the proposal". However, nothing was said by Christopher or by any other administration spokesperson about "previous penetrations of Cuban airspace by the same exile group, Brothers to the Rescue, whose plane was shot down on February 24". The Brothers to the Rescue had a long history of goading Cuban authorities with their overflights, and Havana had complained to Washington of these overflights many times and insisted that it take all necessary measures to prevent them. However, the US took no measures to curb the repeated penetrations although "the same Chicago convention cited by Secretary Christopher stipulates that each country must prevent the planes of its registry from violating its neighbor's airspace". Further, many saw through Clinton's flip flopping on the Helms-Burton issue for what it was, just an attempt to woo the Cuban exile community vote in Florida and New Jersey, two battlegrounds in the next election.9 A central fallacy in Helms-Burton is that long before conditions on Cuba reach a boiling point from the supposed strife that the embargo will cause, Castro would "open the escape valve and allow tens of thousands of Cuban refugees to head North. Helms-Burton, in sum would work against the most basic interest and objective the United States has in Cuba: that the population remain in place". Another fallacy is that prior to Helms-Burton, most of the sanctions imposed by the US against Cuba were the result of executive orders and thus could be modified or removed by the president himself. However, under a late provision of Helms-Burton "which to the astonishment of all, was accepted by the President, all sanctions imposed under the Trading with the Enemy Act, and that is an overwhelming bulk, were codified". In other words, they can only be modified or removed by an act of Congress, and Congress itself determines the conditions under which that might take place. The tactic the president had spoken of as 'carefully calibrated responses' was dead. "Indeed, even if Cuba tomorrow held fully open democratic elections for its national assembly, there could be no response from the United States if Castro won a set in those elections because Helms-Burton rules out engagement with any government that includes Castro". The bill itself is also filled with controversial provisions such as the one mandating reducing any US assistance to Russia by the same amount that Moscow pays Cuba for the electronic listening facility still operated by the Russians at Lourdes, near Havana. But none are as controversial as Title III, which gives "wealthy Cuban-Americans a privilege not enjoyed by any other group of naturalized citizens: they can now sue foreign companies in US courts over properties they lost in Cuba before they became US citizens". However, many foreign businessmen and businesses have had their lawyers examine Title III and have come away convinced that it will not stand up in court - and thus that no one is likely to be paid anything.10 Further, although supposedly aimed at tightening the embargo, Helms-Burton in fact caused the United States serious problems internationally, and affected the Cuban economy little if at all. The outcry in the international community against Helms-Burton was quick to come, and intense. "International reaction to Cuba's faux pas might have been stronger and longer lasting had it not been for passage of the Helms-Burton Bill which redirected anger from Havana to Washington".11 United States allies stated that they were "solidly opposed to what they see as a US effort to meddle in their affairs", and Jacques Santer, president of the European commission said: "We do not believe it is justifiable or effective for one country to impose its tactics on others and to threaten its friends while targeting its adversaries".12 The countries of the Organization of American States, which had excluded Cuba from the organization in 1962 as part of an American diplomatic effort to isolate Fidel Castro, singled out the United States and criticized the extension of the economic embargo against Cuba as a probable violation of international law.13 Many allies were also quick to point out that the United States had opposed such 'secondary boycotts' when Arab nations sought to penalize companies that did business with Israel. CONCLUSION "What is it about Cuba that causes American leaders to react so irrationally?".14 Cuba since the downfall of the Soviet Union has been in a state of economic disarray. The Soviet Bloc accounted for 85% of Cuba's foreign trade until 1989. Between 1989 and 1993, Cuba's imports declined from $8.1 billion to $1.7 billion. Open unemployment in 1988 was 6%, and grew to somewhere between 10% and 18% in 1992.15 Despite some indications of economic growth, gross domestic product is still only about two-thirds the 1989 level, and total foreign trade about one-forth the 1989 level.16 Cuba is in no position to maintain any sort of security threat to the United States, regardless of its vicinity or Communist government. Any arguments against this point would be strong evidence for irrationality powered by an unmotivated bias on the part of the USG, and an inability to think of Cuba aside from the Cold War reference point. "Clearly then, security interests are not the key. It would now be illogical to disrupt our important relationships with other countries over Cuba. Indeed avoiding such problems should now be the principal objective of our Cuba policy".17 Experts within our government were very well aware of the backlash that would come from the international community in response to Helms-Burton. In fact, that backlash had been growing since the passing of the CDA. Further, inherent in Helms-Burton is the suffering of the Cuban people, who will be the inevitable losers in an increase of sanction against Cuba. And it can also be pre-concluded that after 30+ years, Castro will not give up the position of ultimate power in Cuba very easily (unitary actor problem) and that "the bottom line is that Castro would have to be removed by force of arms. And with weapons enough to arm a militia force over 1.5million strong, a civil war would be appallingly bloody and destructive".18 Avoiding all these things should now be the principal objective of our Cuba policy. However, our Cuba policy has been anything but an avoidance of these things. What has been the motivation behind the continued path of irrationality? More than likely, the United States is being riddled with bureaucratic politics (i.e. Clinton and other trying to get reelected) and looks to protect strategic interests, as Castro's stand against the United States is seen to "challenge US credibility, resolve, and commitments".19 However, this stand has been in the most part a struggle for survival in the wake of repeated attempts by the USG to 'sanction Cuba to death'. Cuba has tried to open up relatively normal relations with many countries, and is in the midst of economic reforms that open up to market-like systems. Further, Washington has normal, even cordial relations with a whole series of countries that are no more democratic than Cuba, and whose records on human rights abuses are far worse than Cuba's: China, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. As recently as five years ago, US officials were still saying that the obstacles to a more normal relationship with Cuba had to do essentially with Cuba's foreign policy. That was what was said, but all those obstacles "have now been removed and the cold-war context in which we once analyzed all Cuban actions has evaporated". None of that has made any difference. Rather than reducing pressures against Cuba, our governments has increased them.20 The United States continues to ignore any good in Cuba's actions, and seeks out irrational reasons to isolate. Mike McCurry, in a White House Press Briefing said this of Helms-Burton: "Fidel Castro is an outlyer in history now and is a relic of the past. And he needs to understand that the force of history in this century and into the next century lies with those democratic nations that, through peaceful means, advance commerce, advance market economic. In short, he needs to get with it. And that is the message of the Helms-Burton Act. What we would suggest kindly to our trading partners is that the devastating tragic violation of international law by the Cuban government when it shot down these two unarmed planes is testimony to how preposterous is the suggestion that you can somehow or other moderate the behavior of Fidel Castro's regime through economic commerce".21 A statement like that seems more fitting in a time of Krushev's and Kennedy's. It speaks of the inability of the United States Government to put aside Cuba as its main adversary so close to home, and to start pursuing interests that much better serve its purpose, and cause a lot less harm without reason. 1 "1995 Pattern of Global Terrorism - Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism". Http://www.usis.usemb.se/terror/TERSST.HTM 2 Tanter, Raymond. "472not1.doc". PS472 Homepage. Http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not1.txt 3 Tanter, Raymond. "472not13.doc". PS472 Homepage. Http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not13.txt 4 Tanter, Raymond. "472not8.doc". PS472 Homepage. Http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not8.txt 5 Tanter, Raymond. "472not24.doc". PS472 Homepage. Http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not24.txt 6 Tanter, Raymond. "Roguecub.doc". PS472 Homepage. http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/rogue/cuba.chapter 7 De Varona, Adolfo Leyva. "Propaganda and Reality: A look at the U.S. Embargo Against Castro's Cuba". The Cuban American National Foundation, September 1996. Http://www.canfnet.org/canf- lib/embg_eng.txt 8 "Clinton May Find Unhappy Partners at Economic Summit". Associated Press, July 25 1996. Http:/www.sddt.com/files/librarywire/96...ines/06_96/DN96_06_25/DN96_06_25_fa.html -- Smith, Wayne S. "The US - Cuba Imbroglio". Center for International Policy Report, May 1996. Http://www.us.net/cip/imbroglio.htm 9"Clinton May Find Unhappy Partners at Economic Summit". Associated Press, July 25 1996. Http:/www.sddt.com/files/librarywire/96...ines/06_96/DN96_06_25/DN96_06_25_fa.html -- Smith, Wayne S. "The US - Cuba Imbroglio". Center for International Policy Report, May 1996. Http://www.us.net/cip/imbroglio.htm 10 Smith, Wayne S. "The US - Cuba Imbroglio". Center for International Policy Report, May 1996. Http://www.us.net/cip/imbroglio.htm 11Smith, Wayne S. "The US - Cuba Imbroglio". Center for International Policy Report, May 1996. Http://www.us.net/cip/imbroglio.htm 12"Clinton May Find Unhappy Partners at Economic Summit". Associated Press, July 25 1996. Http:/www.sddt.com/files/librarywire/96...ines/06_96/DN96_06_25/DN96_06_25_fa.html 13 "European Union Protests Cuba Policy". The American Observer. Http://www.soc.american.edu/observe/116matt.htm 14Smith, Wayne S. "The US - Cuba Imbroglio". Center for International Policy Report, May 1996. Http://www.us.net/cip/imbroglio.htm 15"Statement of the Honorable Mark L. Schneider, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Latin America and Caribbean Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs". March 24 1994. Gopher://gaia.info.usaid.gov/00/regional_country/lac/cuba/cubadone.txt 16 "Cuba Human Rights Practices, 1995". US Department of State, March 1996. Http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/cuba.htm 17Smith, Wayne S. "Cuba After the Cold War; What Should US Policy Be?". Center for International Policy Report, March 1993. Http://www.us.net/cip/coldwar.txt 1Smith, Wayne S. "Cuba After the Cold War; What Should US Policy Be?". Center for International Policy Report, March 1993. Http://www.us.net/cip/coldwar.txt 19Tanter, Raymond. "Roguecub.doc". PS472 Homepage. http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/rogue/cuba.chapter 20Smith, Wayne S. "Cuba After the Cold War; What Should US Policy Be?". Center for International Policy Report, March 1993. Http://www.us.net/cip/coldwar.txt 21 "White House Press Release: Press Briefing by Mike McCurry". The White House Virtual Library, March 12 1996. Http://library.whitehouse.gov/Retrieve-plain.cgi?dbtype=text&id=6265&query=Cuba