This is a moment in which the United States would best speak with one voice in making it clear to Saddam Hussein that unjustified behavior cannot be accepted. We are confident that Saddam Hussein knows how gravely we take the situation. -White House Spokesman Mike McMurray, 2 September 1996[1] On 6 August 1990 United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 banned all commercial trade with any business in Iraq, and froze all Iraqi assets abroad. It prohibited all financial dealings, loans, and other payments to or from Iraq. Shipments of weapons and military hardware were forbidden outright[2] . These sanctions were a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. That invasion has since been repelled, but these measures remain in effect today, even if there is some question as to their effectiveness. The United States is the chief proponent of maintaining these penalties, and in November of this year these sanctions were renewed for another sixty days.[3] There are implicit and explicit reasons for punishing another person. There may be retributive or rehabilitative rationales, retroactive or proactive intents. The goals of the sanctions may be to deter or to contain. Ideology also plays a part when there may be a compelling moral reason to respond to anothers action, or when there is need simply to make someone else pay for what they have done. Certainly the rivalry between the United States and Iraq today is a factor of all these. At the heart of the matter is the question ÒWhy is Saddam Hussein just simply not learning to play with the other children?Ó A Puzzle SaddamÕs non-compliance is the story from the United States point of view. There is the flip side of the coin, from a vantage point in Baghdad, where Saddam Hussein no doubt has a very different opinion on things. Understanding the current situation involves trying to look at events from both perspectives. Why is the United States currently locked into an adversarial position with Iraq?. Is the United States trying to rehabilitate Iraq, and deter future acts of aggression, or is the persistence of basically ineffective measures indicative of a retributive or punitive intent? Why is Iraq incrementally challenging the coalition imposed measures? Is this an example of deterrence failure by the United States, or in fact is Saddam Hussein acting out of a fear of a military coup from within? If Hussein is acting out of fear, are his actions approximately rational, and is he even amenable to persuasion or deterrence? The puzzle involves the reasons why the United States is choosing to act as it is, and why these measures do not seem to be resulting in compliance. A Story and some supporting evidence from the United States. Why is the United States pursuing the actions it is and what role does ideology play in those decisions? Actions the US is currently pursuing. Under the provisions of the United Nations Resolution 661 a series of punitive measures was imposed on Iraq for her invasion of Kuwait in 1990[4] . A subsequent resolution, 687, the Gulf War cease-fire resolution, links the lifting of the oil embargo to Iraq's full adherence to U.N. weapons demands[5] . The United States, mainly supported by Great Britain, is the most vocal of those who would ask for a continuation of these sanctions, although in the years since the Gulf War the desire to resume trading with Iraq and her vast oil reserves has grown more attractive by the day. Not attractive enough, though, at least until Iraq demonstrates a willingness to submit to reliable U.N. weapons inspectors. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, declared on 25 August 1995 that the Security council was a Òlong wayÓ from lifting the sanctions, and that the United States still has enough support within the Security Council to block any attempt to eliminate the punitive measures[6] . The United States also maintains a vast amount of military capabilities in the Persian Gulf and in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, ostensibly for the purpose of containing Iraq. These forces are used for routine patrols of the two no-fly zones in Iraq as well as for the not so routine missions like the launching of over forty cruise missiles against Iraqi military locations in mid September 1996[7] . ÒThe United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people,Ó said American Defense Secretary William Perry on 30 November 1996, Òbut as long as he (Saddam Hussein) is the leader of the country, I see no basis for normal, friendly relations.[8] Ó The capabilities are in place. The resolve is there to use them. The reasons why are not immediately clear. Why act at all? Why strike and not embrace? The role of ideology. Is there an American solution to every world problem? What are the motivations for the United StatesÕ attempts to extend her sphere of influence around the world? On the strictest level those reasons are more than just the outcomes of a rational decision making process. Costs are weighed and benefits are analyzed but ideology also plays a key role in American decision making, from the President all the way down to the single voter. Professor Raymond Tanter of the University of Michigan notes that: Ideals provide an incentive for rehabilitation: American presidents believe they have a virtual fiduciary responsibility to change the behavior of foreign leaders, i.e., to rehabilitate them. This tradition derives from the idea that occupants of the Oval Office have a right to sit in judgment over and to change the behavior of their counterparts abroad.[9] Ideology plays a role in two parts of the process. First, ideology can be a significant force behind domestic influences on the American political system. There may be a pressure from the public or lobbying groups on the President or other decision makers. In a democracy, the President and the government cannot with impunity turn a deaf ear to the to the voices of the many, or the vocal. Domestic pressure to act comes particularly from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), who monitor the situation in Iraq and seek to influence the implementation of American foreign policy. They publish frequent periodicals and have the sympathies of many decision makers. In their bi-weekly newspaper in mid-September they reported that the Israeli Foreign Ministry issued a statement endorsing the U.S. action against Iraq, saying "Israel supports the steps taken by the United States. Israel is aware of the dangers embodied in the policies and actions of Saddam Hussein, and of the importance of an unambiguous reaction to Saddam Hussein, aimed at causing him to cease his aggressive policies.Ó[10] Is the American government listening? Earlier this year, for the first time, data from American surveillance satellites is beginning to be released to the Israeli government, for the purpose of helping warn Israel public defense forces in the event of an attack from Iraq[11] . Such a action could constitute a reply in the affirmative to AIPACÕs diligent requests for response. Secondly, ideology may play a role in how America views her opponents. There might be a tendency to be forgiving of RussiaÕs crushing of the rebellion in Checnya, but a pre- disposition to view the Iraqi movement against Erbil with anger. Saddam Hussein, in particular, has become demonized in the American psyche. This is in part because of the Gulf War, and the public relations benefits obtained from comparing ones enemy, as George Bush did, to Adolf Hitler.[12] By demonizing ones opponent though, one loses flexibility to treat that party as the situation may merit. This is an unmotivated bias where you see everything Saddam Hussein does as evil because you expect to see that. You also lose some flexibility because when faced with an opponent so obviously defined as ÒrogueÓ, one might face the necessity for action. It would be worse not to act in such a case, for the fear of appearing weak. It helps in the case of Iraq for the United States to frame this not as an argument between two equally sovereign nations but for Iraq to be described as though Saddam Hussein was the by all and end of Iraqi life. Iraq may or may not be a unitary actor, but from the public relations standpoint it is advantageous to lump the entire Iraqi people under the guise of the evil dictator Saddam. Saddam is Iraq, and Saddam is evil, so it follows that..., and other such progressions. Sanctions are imposed to punish Saddam but the extent to which they punish the Iraqi people and not Saddam himself can be conveniently ignored when you cannot differentiate between the two. Why primarily sanctions and only occasionally military force? Can the apparent unwillingness to use greater force, particularly land forces, be interpreted as a lack of resolve? Or is the continued preservation of sanctions and air patrols a proof of high credibility? Does the fact that the United States is not using more military force indicate ambivalence or bureaucratic infighting? Military force by its nature is usually unambiguous and reflects a unitary decision making process. For force to employed in the first place though there must a clear coupling of political and military objectives. In the absence of a more pressing threat, this has been hard for the President to accomplish. Author and Newsweek correspondent Colonel David Hackworth notes that ÒMorality and U.S. law aside...we canÕt just kill Saddam.Ó[13] Incrementalism has been a safe policy for the U.S. to pursue, and the military responses to Iraqi aggressions, although disproportionate, are no longer on the level of the Gulf War. This cautious approach may be partially a response to domestic political pressures not to become embroiled in an untenable military conflict, especially for a vendetta. Are the sanctions and limited military reprisals then signs of weakness or resolve? Hackworth calls them Òhalf measuresÓ[14] , but certainly they are having some effect on Iraqi internal politics. Parts of Iraq are starving, and this is evidenced not only human rights articles like the front page story from the Detroit Free Press[15] but are also inferred from IraqÕs final compliance with the U.N. demands under the terms of the Òoil- for-foodÓ deal. American credibility is an issue not only when American intentions are challenged, but also when American measures are ineffective. There is the pressure not just to act but to act potently. Although one might derail American actions as Òless than what might be neededÓ for the achievement of American goals, certainly for the U.S. to go much further would be to part company with the international laws and U.N. resolutions calling on the world community to penalize Iraq. There are the dual conflicting notions that sanctions are ineffective and harm U.S. credibility and the idea that when the U.S. strictly enforces these sanctions it raises U.N. credibility. What is the legal authority for the imposition of Sanctions? Initially these sanctions were imposed in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. That invasion was repelled but at the end of the Gulf War the U.N. further linked these sanctions to Iraqi compliance with demands to disarm and the destruction of IraqÕs weapons of mass destruction.[16] Furthermore, the creation of the two Òno-flyÓ zones in Iraq offer an administrative restriction upon Iraq, the violation of which would warrant further punishment. It takes more than just a U.N. Resolution to draw the United States into action. Sometimes compelling moral reasons come first and are followed by the paperwork later. Sometimes there is first the law and then the authority to act. Nevertheless, the mandate of a the will of the United Nations offers some legality to the U.S. policies. The legitimacy of the U.S. behavior is more than just a factor of the resolve of the Security Council though. In fact, in the years since the Gulf War the support for sanctions and keeping Iraq at arms length has been dwindling. The coalition which defeated Saddam then is fragmenting. Saudi Arabia would not allow U.S. warplanes to cross their air space en route to Iraq during the cruise missile strikes in September.[17] Another key ally in the region, Turkey, has began to question the mandate for U.S. northern air patrols over Iraq.[18] U.S. support in the United Nations and among the key gulf allies is considered, but it is more often the case that action occurs when the U.S. possesses the willingness and capability to act alone. The State Department has indicated that the U.S. will use their veto in the Security Council to halt any attempt to lift the sanctions.[19] Secretary of Defense William Perry has stated that the deployment of stealth fighters in Kuwait is part of a continuation of a policy of Òstrong deterrenceÓ[20] and warned that the U.S. response to Iraqi actions would be Òdisproportionate with the provocationÕs which were made against us.Ó[21] National Security Directive 26 of 3 October 1989 declares that the U.S. government should propose and maintain Òeconomic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.Ó[22] The President has been clear. ÒOur policy (of maintaining sanctions) will be the sameÓ[23] and continues on today. The implicit and explicit goals of U.S. action. From the fact that the various departments are in rough agreement with the President, and absent any objection from the other branches of government, one can infer a relatively unitary approach by the U.S. government. This is consistent with the idea that the U.S. government is acting in an approximately rational manner. Yet is it possible for the U.S. government to be a unitary actor but be motivated by ideological intents, as some of the evidence above suggests? A way to narrow the question would be to determine exactly if these sanctions are rehabilitative or retributive. Rehabilitative sanctions would only make sense if the opponent is acting out of a window of opportunity. Is that the case with Iraq? Why are the U.S. measures apparently ineffective? Are the U.S. sanctions retributive in measure and not meant to force compliance, or is Saddam Hussein operating out of a basement of fear and is not amenable to rehabilitative deterrent threats, or both? Some theoretical perspectives. Considering the stated and implied U.S. goals, have the U.S. measures been effective in deterring or coercing Iraq? If the sanctions were applied for rehabilitative purposes, then the following criteria must be met, that the opponent must be operating from windows of opportunity, that both actors must be approximately rational, and that the costs of enduring the sanctions must be higher than the benefits of resisting them. If the sanctions are being applied for retributive purposes then ideology could play a much greater role in the decision making process and the actors need not be rational. In such a case the opponent could even be operating out of a basement of fear. If the adversary, in this case Iraq, can be shown to be operating out of a basement of fear, then rehabilitative sanctions would not make sense, as the opponent is not amenable to persuasion. Deterrence could be expected to fail. I believe though that this is a case where Saddam Hussein is operating out of a series of internal fears, and as such the U.S. measures may seem ineffective because they are held to a rehabilitative standard, when in fact they are effective because they are meant for retribution. These two ideas act in combination, that Saddam is not seriously listening to U.S. overtures, and that the U.S. is not as concerned about changing Saddam as much as punishing him. Is Saddam insensitive to the U.S. signals? To what degree is Saddam rational, that is, is he weighing the costs and benefits of his actions, or is he responding to internal anxiety? There is some evidence for both assertions. SaddamÕs measures have been incremental in nature. He has not done anything on the level of the invasion of Kuwait that prompted the Gulf War. These could be "limited probes" of George and Smoke type.[24] Is Saddam initiating a "controlled crisis in order to clarify the defenders commitments"? [25] If this is the case then one would expect Saddam to over time challenge the U.S. repeatedly and with increasing intensity, but never a direct challenge. There is some evidence that this is what is happening. Saddam initiated the attack on Erbil just before the oil-for-food deal was about to be concluded. Immediately Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali decided to Òhold offÓ.[26] By the end of November, after only relatively minor responses to Erbil, the deal was completed. That might be interpreted that Saddam was testing the strength of U.N. and U.S. credibility, and that he found it lacking. The implication for the U.S. is that better search and persuasion methods by the could bear fruit, and yield a better deterrent outcome. Or it could be interpreted differently. Final Iraqi agreement to accept the inspections terms of the oil-for-food deal could mean that Saddam is at the bottom of his bag of tricks, and that he was virtually forced to comply because of the terrible conditions in Iraq. UNICEF, the U.N. Children's Fund, has estimated 4,500 children under five years of age are dying each month from hunger and disease in Iraq and the U.N. World Food Program says about 180,000 children under five are malnourished.[27] Is Saddam responding finally responding to the internal famine? That could have been evidenced if he had accepted the oil-for-food deal sooner, and not caused its delay by the new attacks against the Kurds. It is perhaps more clear that Saddam has a bias to look inward when one examines sources that claim that Saddam is responding to internal threats and unrest from within that threaten to topple him. The attack on the Iranian backed faction of the Kurds in Erbil could have been a response to an Iranian incursion into that region last July, and an attempt to eliminate any Iranian rebels left behind.[28] Reports also of several coup attempts since the Gulf War, including ones involving top generals, might have influenced Saddam to Òflex his musclesÓ to remind his own Republican Guard that Òthere is a price to be paid for crossing him.Ó[29] Saddam Hussein receives significant public relations benefits by continuing to test U.S. resolve. He is benefited not just by proving to his Republican Guard that he is still in charge, and by raising national pride by challenging the U.S., he also gains ground with his Arab neighbors. ÒHeÕs trying to divide the coalition and win his way back into the Arab heartÓ said State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns.[30] Dividing the coalition would have the benefit of eliminating bases for the U.S. troops in the region. ÒYour good name was tarnished," says Professor Amatzia Baram of Israel's Haifa University, a leading Iraq expert, about SaddamÕs routing of the CIA advisors in Erbil. "U.S. credibility and reputation for protecting its friends has suffered a terrible blow."[31] While Saddam might gain from making the U.S. look incompetent in the Gulf, its more vague if he would benefit from a U.S. absence. SaddamÕs tenure as leader of Iraq, now that the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf War are over, if a function of how well he controls his own military. What little control he does have would collapse in the absence of a U.S. threat. Thus the only types of challenges Saddam could offer the U.S. would be incremental ones. Any greater dare would risk his precarious position. Implications for U.S. policy and theory My conclusion is that Saddam is weighing his fear of loss of internal power more than he is weighing the possible gains he could make by complying with U.S. demands. SaddamÕs risk acceptant behavior is consistent with this type of submission to prospect theory.[32] Because Saddam is acting out of a basement of fear, perhaps of his suffering people but more likely from his own military elements, he is not now nor will he ever be responsive to American sanctions. If the U.S. sanctions were meant to rehabilitate Saddam and bring him back into the world community, then this can be viewed as an example of deterrence failure that could be remedied by better search and persuasion methods. If the U.S. could understand what really motivates Saddam, then they could counter him more effectively. That pursuit of a better understanding of Saddam is not what has been happening though. The persistence of ineffective sanctions and the more general policies of deterrence by denial and dual containment imply that the U.S. is not so much interesting in welcoming back an old friend as they are keeping him in his place. The U.S. measures are then retributive and are effective just by their very nature. Retribution feels good just because you do it, regardless of what happens. Somebody cuts you off and traffic and you tell them to go to hell, not really ever checking to see if they did. It feels good to shout like that. The U.S. is also operating with an internal bias, the administrations receives public relations benefits from appearing to stand tall, and the ideologues are satisfied that at least some action has been taken. But if both Iraq and the U.S. are operating on internal prejudices, then neither are approximately rational. Costs and gains are not being weighed equally. Windows of opportunity are illusions because in this world you can not un-couple decision making with ideology. What could happen though is that repeated threats and posturing and sanctions from basements of fear could set the stage for a greater conflict. While occasionally succumbing to fear might not seem to be immediately harmful, it could lead to a Òsnowball effectÓ[33] where large scale involvement becomes impossible to avoid because the situation has deteriorated to such a great extent. The sad fact is that individuals suffer in this world because their leaders and nations benefit from some kind of controlled conflicts. For all the rhetoric of peace in the Gulf its hard to imagine it coming cheaply. Hostility between countries is also a factor of what is going on inside. One of the articles I read when researching this paper compared the present Iraq and U.S. situation with something Richard Nixon said in 1962. IÕll paraphrase. What would Saddam and the U.S. do if they didnÕt have each other to kick around anymore?[34] Bibliography Barry, John, and Watson, Russell. ÒRaising the StakesÓ, Newsweek, 23 September 1996. p. 34. ÒClinton and Allies weigh Iraq Options.Ó Reuters [Internet], Monday , September 2, 6:37 AM EDT, available WWW URL http://headlines.yahoo.com/headlines/special/iraq/iraq.14.html. Fedarko, Kevin. ÒSaddamÕs CIA coup.Ó Time Magazine, 23 September 1996 Volume 148, No. 15. Fineman, Howard, and Sonenshine, Tara. ÒStanding Tall, for Now.Ó Newsweek, September 16, 1996, p. 40. George, Alexander, adn Smoke, Richard. "Deterrence in American Foreighn Polich: Theory and Practice. New York, Columbia Univeristy Press, 1974, as cited in our coursepack, p. 83. Hackworth, David. ÒItÕs Time to Get Rid of Saddam.Ó Newsweek, 16 September 1996. p. 42. ÒIsrael Monitors Iraq Situation.Ó Near East Report, copyright AIPAC, 9 September 1996, available WWW URL http://www.aipac.org/ner/ner95.htm. Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. Hill and Wang, New York, New York. 1995. p. 129. National Security Directive 26, as cited by Barnett, Chris, in his paper for Spring 1996 PS472, available WWW URL http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/S96PS472_Papers/Barrett.Chris.Iraq.Endnotes. ÒPerry Says U.S. to Maintain Security in Gulf.Ó Reuters [Internet] Nov. 30, 1996, 1:34 EST, available WWW URL http://guide-p.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a0079rontc- 19961130&qt=Iraq&sv=N3&col=NW& ud3=5BBE114397D7477B30CDC66E73D314CE&kt=A&ak=allnews. Song, Anna, and Tanter, Raymond. I owe all my prospect theory understanding to them. Available WWW URL http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not24.txt. Tanter, Raymond. 472Not22.Doc. 30 October 1996. Available WWW URL http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not22.txt. Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. Chapter 2. To be published. Tucker, Neely and Turnley, David, ÒThe Dying Children of IraqÓ, Detroit Free Press, November 11, 1996, p. 7A. ÒTurkey and U.S. in talks on Iraq air patrolsÓ, Reuters [Internet] 2 December 1996 10:27 EST available at WWW URL http://guide-p.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a0984LBY537reulb-19961202&qt =Iraq&sv=N3&col=NW&ud3=5BBE114397D7477B30CDC66E73D314CE&kt=A&ak=a llnews. ÒUN Delays Iraqi Oil-for-Food Plan.Ó Reuters [Internet]. 2 September 1996, available WWW URL http://headlines.yahoo.com/headlines/special/iraq/iraq.16.html. ÒU.N. Chief to Signal Start of Iraqi Oil Plan 15:37 Dec 08, 1996 EST. Reuters [Internet] 1996. Available WWW URL http://www.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a1153rontq-19961208 &qt=Iraq&sv=N3&col=NW&ud3=8B60B863844EAACB8D57369D4BEEE35F&kt=A&a k=allnews. United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 adopted 6 August 1990 [Internet], available WWW URL http://www.worldlink.ca/~ahmed/private/un/UN-0661.txt. United Nations Security Council Resolution 686 adopted 3 April 1991 [Internet], available WWW URL http://www.worldlink.ca/~ahmed/private/un/UN-0687.txt. ÒU.S. Ambassador Says Iraqi Sanctions Long Way From Being Lifted.Ó Associated Press and The News and Observer Publishing Co. [Internet] Aug 25, 1995, 17:18 EDT, available WWW URL http://www2. nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world/082595/world592t_side2.html. Zakaria, Fareed. ÒThank Goodness for a Villian.Ó Newsweek, 16 September 1996. p. 43. 1 ÒClinton and Allies weigh Iraq Options.Ó Reuters [Internet], Monday , September 2, 6:37 AM EDT, available WWW URL http://headlines.yahoo.com/headlines/special/iraq/iraq.14.html. 2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 adopted 6 August 1990 [Internet], available WWW URL http://www.worldlink.ca/~ahmed/private/un/UN-0661.txt. 3 Tucker, Neely and Turnley, David, ÒThe Dying Children of IraqÓ, Detriot Free Press, November 11, 1996, p. 7A. 4 United Nations Security Council Resolution 661, Ibid. 5 United Nations Security Council Resolution 686 adopted 3 April 1991 [Internet], available WWW URL http://www.worldlink.ca/~ahmed/private/un/UN-0687.txt. 6 ÒU.S. Ambassador Says Iraqi Sanctions Long Way From Being Lifted.Ó Associated Press and The News and Observer Publishing Co. [Internet] Aug 25, 1995, 17:18 EDT, available WWW URL http://www2. nando.net/newsroom/ntn/world/082595/world592t_side2.html. 7 Fineman, Howard, and Sonenshine, Tara. ÒStanding Tall, for Now.Ó Newsweek, September 16, 1996, p. 40. 8 ÒPerry Says U.S. to Maintain Security in Gulf.Ó Reuters [Internet] Nov 30, 1996, 1:34 EST, available WWW URL http://guide-p.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a0079rontc- 19961130&qt=Iraq&sv=N3&col=NW& ud3=5BBE114397D7477B30CDC66E73D314CE&kt=A&ak=allnews. 9 Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. Chapter 2. To be published. 10 ÒIsrael Monitors Iraq Situation.Ó Near East Report, copyright AIPAC, 9 September 1996, available WWW URL http://www.aipac.org/ner/ner95.htm. 11 ÒIsrael Monitors Iraq Situation.Ó Ibid. 12 Tanter, Raymond. 472Not22.Doc. 30 October 1996. Available WWW URL http://www- personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not22.txt. 13 Hackworth, David. ÒItÕs Time to Get Rid of Saddam.Ó Newsweek, 16 September 1996. p. 42. 14 Hackworth, David. Ibid. 15 Tucker, Neely. Ibid. 16 United Nations Security Council Resolution 686. Ibid. 17 Barry, John, and Watson, Russell. ÒRaising the StakesÓ, Newsweek, 23 September 1996. p. 34. 18 ÒTurkey and U.S. in talks on Iraq air patrolsÓ, Reuters [Internet] 2 December 1996 10:27 EST available at WWW URL http://guide-p.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a0984LBY537reulb- 19961202&qt =Iraq&sv=N3&col=NW&ud3=5BBE114397D7477B30CDC66E73D314CE&kt=A&ak=a llnews. 19 Tucker, Neely, et al. Ibid. 20 ÒPerry says to maintain...Ó Ibid. 21 Barry, John, et al. Ibid. p. 32. 22 National Security Directive 26, as cited by Barnett, Chris, in his paper for Spring 1996 PS472, available WWW URL http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~rtanter/S96PS472_ Papers/Barrett.Chris.Iraq.Endnotes. 23 Tucker, Neely, et al. Ibid. p. 6A. 24 George, Alexander, adn Smoke, Richard. "Deterrence in American Foreighn Polich: Theory and Practice. New York, Columbia Univeristy Press, 1974, as cited in our coursepack, p. 83. 25 George, Alexander, et al. Ibid. 26 ÒUN Delays Iraqi Oil-for-Food Plan.Ó Reuters [Internet]. 2 September 1996, available WWW URL http://headlines.yahoo.com/headlines/special/iraq/iraq.16.html. 27 ÒU.N. Chief to Signal Start of Iraqi Oil Plan 15:37 Dec 08, 1996 EST. Reuters [Internet] 1996. Available WWW URL http://www.infoseek.com/Content?arn=a1153rontq-19961208 &qt=Iraq&sv=N3&col=NW&ud3=8B60B863844EAACB8D57369D4BEEE35F&kt=A&a k=allnews. 28 Hackworth, David. Ibid. 29 Kosova, Weston, and Liu, Melinda. ÒReading SaddamÕs Mind.Ó Newsweek, 23 Septmeber 1996. p. 34. 30 Kosova, Weston, et al. Ibid. 31 Fedarko, Kevin. ÒSaddamÕs CIA coup.Ó Time Magazine, 23 September 1996 Volume 148, No. 15. 32 Song, Anna, and Tanter, Raymond. I owe all my prospect theory understanding to them. Available WWW URL http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not24.txt. Of course, errors in comprehension are solely mine. 33 Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. Hill and Wang, New York, New York. 1995. p. 129. 34 Zakaria, Fareed. ÒThank Goodness for a Villian.Ó Newsweek, 16 September 1996. p. 43.