Randy Gidseg Political Science 472 Professor Tanter A Lack of Deterrence: America and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded its neighboring country of Kuwait. On November 29, 1990, the Security Council of the United Nations issued Resolution 678 in which it set a deadline of January 15 for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and called for the "use of all necessary means" to force the Iraqi withdrawal after the deadline expired.1 Iraq would not withdraw and on January 17, at 3:30 A.M. Gulf time, Allied forces began "Operation Desert Storm", a massive air offensive designed to liberate Kuwait from Iraq. On February 24, with the situation well in hand, United States (US) and coalition forces launched a ground offensive against what remained of the Iraqi army. Within 72 hours Iraq was compelled to withdraw and cease fire unconditionally. Given these events and the quickness with which they occurred, Òthe Gulf War is generally and rightfully considered a military success.Ó2 In hindsight, however, the ease of this victory brings forth the question of whether the war could have been avoided all together. Couldn't Saddam Hussein have seen the terrible mistake the invasion would be for Iraq? How could Saddam have so grossly underestimated the power of US military forces? Wasn't Saddam deterred by the great power and display of commitment by the US? Apparently not. But whose fault was this? Was Saddam Hussein simply ignorant or blind to deterrent actions by the United States? Or could it be that such actions were never taken by the United States? These questions are of central importance in explaining why Saddam decided to invade Kuwait and how such a conflict can be avoided in the future. Thus, the question that must be asked is whether or not the actions of the United States, prior to the invasion of Kuwait, acted as a viable deterrent threat to Iraq? And if not, why didn't the United States attempt a more vigorous policy of deterrence? Of fundamental importance to answering this question is an understanding of the concept of deterrence. Essentially, deterrence can be defined "as a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh the benefits."3 Thus deterrence seeks to force another state to maintain a certain behavior or prevent them from changing their behavior. Prime examples of deterrence include: Òmaintaining strategic nuclear forces on some sort of alert, stationing large numbers of [US] forces in Europe and Korea, and the US Navy sailing the high seas to signal US interests and a readiness to act on their behalf.Ó4 Two things are fundamental in ensuring that a state's deterrent threat is credible- "a challenger's estimate of a defender's capability and resolve."5 Here, a challenger refers to a state desiring to alter the status quo, while the defender refers to a state wishing to maintain that status quo. A state's capabilities will include their military forces, their various options, resources at their disposal and economic forces to support their efforts. A state's resolve is measured not only by the willingness to use force, but by the other side's perception of that willingness. True commitment to using force will not deter unless the other side believes that you will actually carry out that threat. Although some would argue that capabilities are less important than resolve, the fact is that both are key elements in creating the most viable deterrent threat possible. Thus, a most important question is whether or not US capabilities, coupled with resolve, were enough to serve as a viable deterrent to Iraqi leaders debating aggression towards Iraq? In questioning the viability of US actions in deterring Iraq, it is important and necessary to focus, not only on the actions immediately preceding the conflict, but to the general relationship between the two nations in previous years. When viewed from this standpoint, it becomes painfully clear that United States actions were in no way a deterrent; rather, US policy actually focused on embracing Iraq. Since the dawn of the Reagan era, approximately 1982, until well into Bush's term, early 1990, "American leaders had viewed Iraq as a quasi-ally."6 This view was primarily the result of US fears concerning the emergence of Iran as an Islamic fundamentalist state. Such a state, in direct opposition to American views and ideals, in such an important area of the world, due to its huge concentration of oil and access to the Persian Gulf, presented an obvious threat to US interests. "The Iranian menace threatens American civilians and military personnel in the Gulf" and "is a risk to other inherently valuable targets like Western petroleum products transiting the Gulf and other sea-lanes of communications."7The US feared the spread of IranÕs fervent fundamentalism to other nations, within the region, that were friendly to the United States. Thus, Iraq was seen "as a kind of a fire wall against Iranian fundamentalism."8 The war between Iraq and Iran further exacerbated this threat to US security. If Iraq lost the war to Iran, then Iran would emerge as the greatest power in the Gulf, and thereby greatly reduce US influence in the region and dramatically shift the balance of oil, in a way that disadvantaged the United States. Thus it was in the best interests of the United States government to support and "ally" with Iraq for the purpose of essentially containing Iran and the spread of it's anti-American and anti-democratic views and power. This prolonged policy towards Iraq was essentially that of a balance of power approach. The US acted as a "balancer between the two" nations of Iraq and Iran so that "neither could dominate the Gulf."9 In order to keep Iran's power in check, the US sought to balance that power with the power of Iraq. By using one against the other, the US sought to alter the power structure so that both countries would essentially contain the other and thereby prevent a hegemon from dominating the region. So in order to even the balance and prevent Iraq from losing the war, the USG (United States government) supported Iraq in a variety of ways. For instance, "to help strengthen Iraqi defenses, the Reagan and Bush administrations had provided Hussein's regime with economic credits, secret intelligence data, and military-related technology."10 Furthermore, the Bush administration supplied Iraq with "dual-use equipment" and got Iraq removed from the terrorist list.11 So as long as Saddam "behaved within certain parameters," the United States would ensure that "it would be worth his while."12 Over the years, this relationship between Iraq and the US led Iraq to increasingly view the US as an ally. As long as Iraq successfully balanced against Iran and was generally supportive of the US, Iraq could expect to receive support in return. Such support was of great benefit to Iraq, taking the form of military and economic assistance. The nearly unconditional support of the US was tested numerous times and each time the "friendly" relationship remained unscathed. Although it can be said that the US maintained this policy merely in it's own interest and to protect it's own security, the US did so at a very high price. Saddam and his regime committed numerous atrocities over the years that the USG was aware of, but simply chose to overlook. The US continued to fund Iraq "even though the Iraqis were known to be harboring Palestinian terrorists" and "even though they were known to be attempting to buy equipment that could only be used for subversive purposes like building nuclear weapons."13 Saddam's human right violations were equally as contemptible as he "was a man who had used chemical weapons against his own people" and "murdered thousands of people" as well."14 For instance, according to the US Department of State, Òin 1992, numerous ShiÕa civilians from Southern Iraq reportedly were arrested and removed to detention centers in the central part of the countryÓ and then later ÒexecutedÓ.15 However, Saddam was still perceived as the "lesser of two evils" compared to the Ayatollah and so as long as Saddam acted within very broad parameters the US would continue to make it "worth his while."16 Because the USG continually turned a blind eye to such atrocities, over time Saddam came to believe that he could get away with murder (and in many cases he did). Each time the US overlooked one of Saddam's atrocities it further reinforced the notion that not only was the US friendly and supportive of his regime, but it would not intervene in his affairs or pursuits of power. Initially then, US policy towards Iraq was part of the overall containment approach that had been applied to the Soviet Union. The policy of containing the Soviet Union grew out of post World War II fears and actions that saw the Communist Soviet government as "determined to 'impose its absolute authority on the rest of the world.'"17 Such an imperialist and expansionist view of the Soviet Union forced US leaders to see the world as a zero-sum game in which any advantage gained by the Russians was a loss to the United States. Essentially, US policy-makers came "to believe that the international system was an increasingly polarized, unstable one in which a setback in one locale could have profound destabilizing effects in other locales as well."18 Thus, US policy was directed to counter and contain the expansionist efforts of the Soviet Union, whenever and wherever it became necessary. A primary method through which the US sought to accomplish this task was through the use of deterrence, which took many forms. In numerous countries, especially those of Western Europe, the US stationed a number of US troops in order to show the USSR that we cared about the future of those countries and that the US would be involved, militarily, in any threat to their security. Furthermore, in various instances, the US military actively supported democratic countries and promoted democracy in countries whose freedom and existence was threatened by Communist powers. The US was also very clear about its intentions concerning actions of the Soviet Union. On numerous occasions, statements by the President or other high ranking officials were made to let the Russians, and the world, know what position the US held on various issues. The US took great efforts to ensure that the purpose of their own actions were clear and that the consequences of others actions were clear so that deterrence would work at an optimum level. Above all, it was clear to the Soviet Union that any use of nuclear weapons would be met by an equal display of force, eventually leading to a spiral of escalation and Mutually Assured Destruction. These various policies managed to keep relations between the US and Russia confined to nothing more than a "Cold War." Thus, a long term understanding was reached between the two countries that prevented them from directly engaging each other militarily. This overall containment approach towards the Soviet Union had direct effects on US positions and interests in the Gulf. Here, US policy towards Iraq was largely determined by US policy towards Iran. Iran's radical fundamentalist regime, which threatened the US, was also being supported by the Soviet Union. Like the US, the Soviets had great interest in assuring a favorable balance of power in the Gulf region. Thus, in order to balance and contain Iran, the US supported Iraq in order to make it a stronger and more capable power to counter a growing Iranian threat, supported by the USSR. Although this relationship would seem to make conflict less likely, what it really did was make Iraq less afraid. Iraqi leaders understood that the preservation of an Iraq, that successfully balanced against Iran, was of great importance to the US. The USG knew this too, and therefore refrained from taking actions Iraq could have interpreted the wrong way; this included various policies of deterrence previous to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. By the time it became apparent that such an attack would take place, previous US policy prevented the US from taking action. Up until this time, "there had been no suggestion that we [the US] were going to undertake any political or diplomatic activity to issue a warning or a threat to him [Saddam]."19 Thus, US leadership feared an escalation of conflict through miscalculation and was therefore "uneasy about starting military actions that might make a bad situation worse."20 The other Arab states similarly felt that "such an exercise risked the very crisis it was designed to avoid."21 In other words, a strong display of military force by the US in order to deter Iraq could easily have been perceived by Iraq as a provocation for war. The US had spent years and a great deal of money in attaining a "friendly" relationship with Iraq and did not wish to risk it over a well educated guess, that could have turned out to be wrong. Strong actions, based on a wrong conclusion, could have severely upset the delicate balance in the Gulf, pushing Iraq farther away from the US into the hands of the Soviet Union as well as altering the balance of power in the Gulf towards Iran- an event that the US certainly opposed. After the invasion of Kuwait, however, US policy would "turn away" from its "anti-Soviet strategic doctrine" and towards a "new, Third World-oriented doctrine" that placed smaller threats by such countries at the forefront of potential threats and military concern.22 Nevertheless, prior to the Iraqi invasion, Iraq was seen primarily as a balance to the power of Iran, necessary to keep Iranian power from expanding and further threatening the United States. Given the generally good relations between the US and Iraq, throughout the 1980's and into the 1990's, it is reasonable to state that such actions did not constitute a viable deterrent threat. Rather, they served to convince Iraq that the US would not intervene in Iraqi affairs. This policy of embracing Iraq and general non-interference in Iraqi affairs continued into the short term, even up to the day Kuwait was invaded. Hence, US actions, immediately preceding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, also did not constitute a viable deterrent threat. As already mentioned, a primary element in establishing a successful deterrent threat is the balance of capabilities between the two states. Successful deterrence is more likely "when the potential attacker (Iraq) believes that the probability of military success is relatively low and that the costs of using military force to achieve its objectives are high."23 The most effective way to alter this calculus in one's favor is to increase the level and amount of military forces, specifically the immediate and short term balance of forces. Immediate forces refer to those "land forces of the potential attacker in a position to initiate an attack and those land forces of the defender.. in a position to repulse such an attack."24 Similarly, short term forces are "the capacity of the attacker and the defender..to augment the immediate balance of forces by mobilizing ground and airforce manpower as well as the first class of trained reserves."25 By increasing the balance of short term and immediate forces in the favor of the defender (Kuwait), the US could have decreased the likelihood of a quick, easy military victory for the attacker (Iraq) and raised the costs of military conflict. This change could logically have led to a change in the Iraqi decision making process as the costs of invading Kuwait would have been drastically increased. In this case, prior to the Iraqi attack, the US took no such measures. Additional troops were not deployed and "the pre-positioned ships were some days away from being in the region."26 Although the US conducted "an in-flight refueling by US tankers of UAE (United Arab Emirates) combat aircraft" as a small demonstration of support, basically no efforts were made by the US to increase the military balance in its favor.27 Furthermore, US failure to alter the military balance was a primary indicator of a lack of commitment to Kuwait. In the art of commitment, if a state wishes to show resolve it seeks to convince an adversary that it has no alternative but to support its ally.28 In essence, a state seeks to show resolve by "burning the bridge" and thereby moving "into a position where one clearly cannot yield."29 An excellent way to accomplish such a task is to station ground forces on the ally's territory; because such forces are not easily deployed and are less easily removed they portray a great deal of commitment.30 However, such actions were not taken by the United States. Even a less impressive display of commitment such as the deployment of naval forces, which are easily maneuvered, was not undertaken. By the time US policymakers began to seriously consider taking action, the closest "carrier could not have gotten there that quickly and the pre-positioned ships were some days away from being in the region."31 Although the US did posses significant amounts of nuclear weapons, such weapons were essentially useless as Òthey are inappropriate for small scale actions and therefore of no use in deterring relatively minor attempts to change the status quo.Ó32 Using or even threatening the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power, not actively using biological or chemical weapons, would have largely been condemned by the international community as far too harsh and excessive acts of violence. Furthermore, the use of nuclears would have essentially ended a near fifty year absence of their use in warfare, drastically altering the world order, and was thus not a highly likely or credible option. Hence, US capabilities were too few and far between to give credit to any type of threat, a threat which would have been weak to begin with. Furthermore, General Colin Powell, in reminiscing on these events preceding the invasion, was doubtful "if anything would have been gained...in the absence of a clear political message that linked these [uninitiated] deterrent actions to some overall strategy."33 Unfortunately, a "clear political message" was lacking along with a favorable balance of military capabilities. What political message there was, essentially robbed the US of its resolve, and thus further added to a lack of a viable deterrent threat. As previously mentioned, a state's resolve is as important, if not more so, in establishing a real deterrent. In the words of Thomas Schelling, "deterrent threats are a matter of resolve."34 In this case, US resolve was as lacking as was it's capabilities. Would the US use force to stop Iraqi expansion? By 1990, after years of friendly relations and American nonintervention, Iraq had little reason to believe that the US would intervene on behalf of Kuwait. The US maintained this line of nonintervention right up to August 2, 1990. On various occasions, the USG had opportunities through meetings and negotiations to take a strong position against Iraqi aggression and in support of Kuwaiti sovereignty. Such a position was never taken and US resolve was barely an issue because it was completely lacking. US diplomatic policy during this time period simply articulated "the prevailing White House view" and embracing policy that the US had been following up to that point. Overall, the US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, expressed US concern over Saddam's "bellicose attitude" and the "various statements he had issued regarding his intentions toward Kuwait."35 Such "concern" hardly constituted a deterrent threat and on July 25, 1990, Glaspie went so far as to basically say that the "US had no direct vested interests in Arab disputes including the border dispute that Saddam had with the Kuwaitis."36 Statements such as these took away any chance that the US may have had of portraying resolve. General Wafic Al Samarrai, Head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, was well aware of the US lack of resolve and commitment to Kuwait and is Òconvinced that the USA did not take a decisive and tough line to deter Saddam from doing this invasion.Ó37 In fact, statements such as Glaspie's were probably interpreted by Hussein as "sufficient diplomatic inference to conclude that officials at the highest levels in Washington would not object strenuously to an Iraqi takeover of Kuwait."38 Essentially then, the US lacked the capabilities and the resolve to institute or carry out any type of viable deterrent threat to Iraq. As the evidence accumulates it becomes easier to see that perhaps Saddam was not as damned insane as people think, he may, in fact, have been quite rational in taking the actions he did. But was he? Before answering this question it is necessary to fully comprehend the notion of rationality in decision making. In determining rationality, an individual must be considered independent of the values that they hold and pursue. Therefore, although a decision can easily be regarded as evil, or morally wrong, that decision must be considered, regardless of these facts, and instead based on the efficiency of the decision. A decision can be both evil and rational.39 In further defining rationality, there are three necessary components: first, the unitary actor; second transitive preferences; and third, the maximization of expected utility among choices. When all three components are met, a decision can be said to have been rational. Thus, one can use these criteria in assessing the rationality of Saddam's decisions. First, were the decisions of Iraq being made by a single individual (was Iraq acting as a unitary actor)? Although such a decision may be influenced and affected by outside information, or pressures in the end it must be made by a single individual. In the case of Iraq, a dictatorship, essentially all decisions regarding Iraq are made by its leader Saddam Hussein. According to the US Department of State, Òpolitical power in Iraq is concentrated in a repressive one-party apparatus under the domination of Saddam HusseinÓ who Òwields decisive power as Chairman of the RCC (Revolutionary Command Council)...which exercises both executive and legislative authorityÓ and through his status as Secretary General of the Regional Command of the ABSP (Arab BaÕath Sociality Party) and by being the President of the Republic.40 Although the level of influence may vary, SaddamÕs tremendous power make Iraq's decisions essentially his own, and thus Iraq is a unitary actor. Second, did Iraq make decisions according to transitive preferences, was there a consistent ordering/ranking of preferences among alternatives? This is a more difficult question and one that deserves increased attention. Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was not a hasty and unintelligible decision. In August of 1990, Saddam was faced with a multitude of problems that demanded attention and successful resolution if was he to stay in power. At the forefront of his problems was the falling price of oil on the world market. Saddam blamed the decreased price on Kuwait, and during the Arab Summit in May 1990, he claimed that: Òsome countries have increased their oil production superficially, without any economic reason. This has led to a drop in our revenues. Each dollar less in price means one billion in revenues for a year. We have fought a very long war, it was a very costly one and in this war we defended your security. If you do not mean waging a war against Iraq, please stop it.Ó41 Saddam considered the actions of Kuwait to be bordering on an act of war against Iraq. By July 17, Ònothing had changedÓ and Iraq believed that Kuwait was acting in an Òarrogant, irresponsible provocative manner.Ó42 Relations between the two countries were further worsened, in July, when Kuwait agreed to lower their production of oil, but only until the fall of 1990; not enough time to help an extremely damaged Iraqi economy. As these relations worsened, Iraq and Kuwait attempted to negotiate a settlement. Iraq had three demands: first, that Kuwait provide 2.4 billion dollars in revenue, from oil fields in disputed territory; second, that Kuwait provide 12 billion dollars to Iraq for the depressed price of oil in the world market; three, that Kuwait cancel a 10 million dollar debt accumulated by Iraq during the Iran and Iraq war; and four, that Kuwait lease disputed islands in the Persian Gulf to Iraq.43 Faced with such aggressive and unreasonable demands from Iraq, Kuwaiti leaders would not concede to them and heated negotiations between the two countries continued. At this point, Saddam was well aware of his alternatives, Iraq could either continue with the negotiations or pursue a more aggressive policy through the use of military force. Eventually, not only was Saddam able to rank these preferences, he was able to choose the option that most maximized his expected utility. Expected utility is made up of two components: one, the weighing of the costs versus the benefits of a specific choice; and two, the probability of achieving that desired policy or outcome. In deciding whether or not a decision was rational, an actor must choose the best option, that which has the highest expected utility (low costs, high benefits, and high probability). It is evident that Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was indeed that choice that most maximized his expected utility. Why? Saddam's other option would have been to continue in the negotiations and hope to attain all of his demands. However, this appeared to be an extremely unlikely occurrence. Kuwait had already shown it's unacceptance of Saddam's demands and other Arab states were failing to support Saddam in his goals. Furthermore, Iraq's constant complaining and excessive demands were beginning to attract the attention of it's "ally," the US, which, although remaining uninvolved, did not look fondly on Saddam's exploits and was unlikely to facilitate the pursuit of his objectives. Thus, the achievement of Iraq's four demands, through diplomacy, seemed very unlikely and thus warranted a new course of action, namely military force. Compared to diplomacy, the risks associated with military force were calculable and could be controlled and avoided, a vital condition in challenging deterrence according to George and Smoke.44 Specifically, the use of military force promised low costs with high gains and at a high probability. Militarily, the Kuwaiti army was insignificant in comparison to Iraq's and presented no real problem to successfully invading Kuwait. Thus, the military costs in invading Kuwait were minuscule. The interference of the US seemed extremely unlikely given their lack of interest, threats, and commitment; and as of August 1, US forces were still in no position to alter the balance of forces in a way that could prevent Iraq from overrunning the country. And although third party mediation from other Arab states might have convinced Kuwait to concede, no hope was in sight and such an event seemed very unlikely, given the failure of negotiations numerous times. Thus, Iraq had a very high probability of defeating Kuwait and at a low cost. In the same way, Iraq faced numerous benefits from using force. Through force, Iraq would be able to attain all of its previous demands, giving Iraq: greater access to the Gulf, from control of the disputed islands; cancellation of their Kuwaiti debts; a favorable change in Kuwaiti oil production; increased power and intimidation of "Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states-and as a result" Iraq could "dominate the world's energy markets."45 Most importantly, by attaining Kuwait, Saddam hoped to achieve a reduction of discontent in the country due to the improved economic conditions that would result from controlling Kuwait and its resources. Saddam saw Kuwait as Òthe salvation from the poor economic state that resulted from the war with Iran.Ó46 Further prompting Saddam to use force was the low expected utility of not using force. By 1990, the economic situation in Iraq was deeply troubled. With the end of the war between Iran and Iraq, Iraq scaled down itÕs military from about Òone million soldiersÓ to Òhalf and even less than half.Ó47 Eventually, the Iraqi army Òwas not larger than 350 or 400 thousand soldiers,Ó leaving more than half a million soldiers to return to Iraq and enter a job market where there were no jobs.48 This created a very unstable situation in Iraq which combined with the huge Iraqi debt accumulated from the Iran-Iraq war, to create a state of political unrest. This political unrest climaxed in a series of coup attempts against Saddam and his regime.49 By doing nothing, aside from diplomacy, Saddam's goals would remain out of his reach and further exacerbate an already worsening situation. Furthermore, by doing nothing, the economy was likely to worsen making his position even more unstable.50 Thus, the expected utility of using force was very high (and the expected utility of not using force was very low) for Saddam and therefore, given Iraq's unitary quality and transitive preferences, the decision to invade was rational and likely.51 It can then be said that Saddam used force because the expected utility of doing so was greater than the expected utility of not doing so. Thus, Saddam's decision to invade appears rational. According to classical deterrence theory, leaders "leap through windows of opportunity."52 Because all leaders are trying to maximize their gains, when presented with an opportunity to do so, they will take that opportunity. In the case of Iraq, such a "window of opportunity" appeared to be wide open when the United States failed to provide Iraq with a viable deterrent to invading Kuwait. Because Saddam felt that "the likelihood that other states will attack," namely the US, was so small, he was provided with a "decisive incentive to attack."53 Thus, "evidently believing that the Bush administration was seeking to retain friendly ties with Iraq and was prepared to overlook a certain degree of adventurism on Baghdad's part, Hussein planned the invasion of Kuwait with no apparent expectation of a hostile military response."54 Saddam saw the chance to greatly maximize his gains, at little cost, and at a high probability and he took it. Although appearing rational, there is evidence that seeks to prove the contrary by criticizing classic deterrence theory. These critics assume that it is inconceivable for any actor to be completely aware of all relevant information and possibilities. Human beings, including decision makers, are subject to various cognitive limitations that make only a bounded rationality to decision making possible. Various internal characteristics and attributes of individuals are constantly at work and can have a great deal of affect on decision making, along with or in place of external threats and opportunities. Such an approach would have us look "at internal attributes of actors that may bias perception of threat and opportunity."55 Thus, these critics of classical deterrence theory reject the notion of windows of opportunity and believe that such "windows are illusions" and that "leaders turn toward inward into basements of felt need and fears."56 Essentially then, Saddam took the actions he did because he was acting out of fear, not opportunity. There is a great deal of truth to this statement as by August Saddam had much to be fearful of. Most importantly, the economic situation in Iraq was extremely bleak, with the dropping price of oil, huge war debts, and massive unemployment. These factors produced growing internal strife which was threatening to bring down Saddam and his regime should the situation deteriorate. Numerous coups had already been attempted and if the economic situation worsened, more were sure to follow. Therefore, a major factor in Saddam's decision to order the invasion of Kuwait was his fear of being removed from power or killed, by his own people. Such an analysis of the situation would lend itself to prospect theory. According to prospect theory, decision makers pay more attention to losses than gains when making a decision. By this logic, although Saddam had numerous benefits to be gained from an invasion, already mentioned, the losses he would incur by not invading, also already mentioned, could be considered the driving force behind his decision. Although important, such a view far too diminishes the huge role that opportunity played in the decision to invade. Saddam had extraordinary gains to be made through an invasion, which cannot be discounted. A more comprehensive and reasonable approach would say that both fear and opportunity played large roles in driving Saddam to reach his decision and take the actions that he did. The opportunity to maximize his gains was at its optimum, considering the US had made no efforts to stop him, and the need to achieve those gains, due to fear of domestic unrest, filled him with a pressing sense of urgency to take action. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein made a rational decision to invade Kuwait. Given that this decision was so rational and now seemed almost inevitable, it would stand to reason that the US should have anticipated the attack and been prepared for it. Numerous evidence points to the fact that the US did in fact anticipate some kind of an attack and that the US was prepared for such an attack.57 The USG had amassed numerous sources of intelligence indicating a massive buildup of Iraqi forces along the Kuwaiti border. Furthermore, despite a White House committed to preserving it's friendly relationship with Iraq, the pentagon had long since foreseen the possibility of a Third World threat to US security, specifically from Iraq. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense (DOD) had "decided that rising Third World powers like Iraq would gradually replace the Soviet Union as the primary threat to US security."58 This assumption led the DOD to order the Pentagon to come up with a plan to attend to this kind of a contingency. In March of 1990, a "detailed blueprint for a US-Iraqi war in the Kuwait/Saudi Arabia area" was assembled which "covered every aspect of a future conflict."59 Thus, "the basic concepts for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were established before a single Iraqi soldier entered Kuwait."60 Although the US could foresee these events, and was planned for them, it still chose not to pursue a more vigorous policy of deterrence for a variety of reasons, already discussed. Furthermore, misperception played a key role in preventing the US from instituting a stronger policy of deterrence. Even though US possessed "satellite photos and other intelligence which suggested an Iraqi build up in the Southern part of Iraq" such movements were largely discounted by those in power as "an armed threat really for the purpose of achieving some diplomatic or political objective."61 It was largely assumed that this buildup of forces along the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border was being used by Iraq as a means of coercive diplomacy, "intended to pressure Kuwait on a number of matters, most importantly levels of oil productions and price."62 Contributing to this belief, that Iraq's maneuvers would not lead to conflict, were the numerous messages being told to the US government by other Arab states. Essentially, these various leaders were giving the US government assurances "of a nature that said not to worry, yes there's a bit of problem, yes, you know the Iraqis are posturing, but they would not attack an Arab brother, you should not worry about this."63 These messages combined with the belief that Iraqi intentions were merely for intimidation to create "mixed signals" that the US couldn't see through.64 The Gulf War, like all wars, has left its own legacy and lessons to be learned from the experience. The fundamental lesson that one must draw from the experience is the importance and value that deterrence holds for the present and future status of the United States. As the past has shown us, through the Cold War, conflict and war can be avoided and limited through the successful use of deterrent policies and strategies. In the Gulf War, the US was unsuccessful in either avoiding conflict or limiting it, as massive air power and eventually ground forces were required to end the conflict. However, in this case, it is correct to say that deterrence failed, primarily because the US didn't really try to make it work. Substantial intrinsic interests forestalled any possibility of the United States being able to mount a successful deterrent strategy. Intrinsic interests refer to those interests of the state that are tangible, and whose value is inherent. In this case, the US had a large intrinsic interest in maintaining good relations with Iraq due to the threat of Iran. Iraq's balancing position to Iran was deemed vital and integral to US security interests. Iran was a Fundamentalist state, actively in opposition to the United States, a threat to US personnel and presence in the Gulf along with "Western petroleum products transiting the Gulf."65 The importance of Iraq was also due to American strategic interests, interests whose value is not inherent. Such interests were mainly "preserving the uninterrupted flow of petroleum to the world market at prices that are compatible with the economic growth of the industrialized democracies."66 Equally important, Iran threatened "the credibility of the U.S. threat to use military force; the American resolve to remain engaged in the world; and the U.S. commitment to defend its friends against its foes."67 Thus it was imperative that the US not take actions that could upset its relations with Iraq, including actions that could have deterred Saddam. This inability of the United States to mount a substantial deterrent threat is therefore fundamentally based on prior United States balance of power policy. The threat of Iran as a possible hegemon in the Middle East was a consistent fear of US policy makers. This fear resulted in the use of Iraq as a balance to Iranian power. By siding with Iraq and supporting them militarily and economically the US successfully kept Iran in check. In such a policy, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," according to Bruce Jentleson in his book, With Friends Like These. Here, because Iraq was an enemy to Iran, Iraq was a friend to the US. Such a relationship was actively pursued throughout the Reagan and Bush presidencies until Saddam stepped beyond the boundaries of the international community and beyond those that the US had set for him. Therefore, a fundamental lesson of the Gulf War is that a balance of power approach to foreign policy may work for a time, but it can have tremendous consequences. Iranian power was kept in check but at the cost of an increasingly powerful and threatening Iraq. Eventually it was Iraq that drew US forces into combat in the Gulf, not Iran, whose previous potential threat now seems small in light of the very real threat Iraq posed to US security and, according to President Bush, to the "very essence of international order and civilized ideals."68 These circumstances provide ample support for advocating a dual containment approach for United States foreign policy towards these two countries. Presently, US policy under the Clinton administration and itÕs National Security Advisor for Middle Eastern affairs, Martin Indyk, is that of dual containment- to simultaneously contain both Iran and Iraq without the help of one against the other. Through such a policy, a favorable power balance is created by relying on AmericaÕs own strengths and the strengths of its allies. Fundamental in this approach is the use of economic sanctions, against Iraq, and various other economic and lobbying measures, against the two countries, along with requiring strict adherence to UN resolutions. This dual containment approach removes the tremendous barrier to deterrence that the US faced prior to the Iraqi invasion and would have allowed for a more vigorous deterrence policy. Essentially, the US is an enemy to both countries and no longer needs to rely on one to balance against the other. Although a more costly and difficult policy, as US resources must seek to contain both countries simultaneously, it offers increased options for the USG, which no longer must seek to assuage a belligerent nation. In addition, although it is possible that such a policy could push Iran and Iraq closer together, "local forces work to separate these two states."69 Furthermore, a primary benefit of such a policy is that it is more in line with the prevailing ideology of American democracy. On the other hand, the balance of power approach required the US to essentially switch sides, on numerous occasions, which removes ideology from the equation. For instance, in 1986, Iran was provided arms in order to secure the release of American hostages from Hizbullah guerrillas. Furthermore, the switching of sides was painfully obvious in the Iran-Contra scandal in which arms were sold to Iran in order to fund Nicaraguan guerrillas. Therefore, despite the USGÕs public support of Iraq against Iran, US policy was really to switch sides if the need arose. This switching of sides was employed numerous times by the Reagan and Bush administrations and was harshly criticized by Democratic leaders as it required no commitment to ideology. Such vacillation is not a part of a dual containment approach, "which rejects the balancing assumptions in favor of an ideological approach."70 The role of ideology is thus a major factor in dual containment, which is more consistent and amiable to American domestic politics. In a dual containment approach support is not driven by the balance of power; rather support is dictated by a commitment to American ideals and values, something that was sorely lost in the balance of power approach. 1Resolution 678 (1990), of the UN Security Council gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s90/32 S/RES/678 (1990) 2Hass, Richard. Intervention. Carnegie Endowment, 1994, p. 109. 3Huth, Paul. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. Yale University Press, 1988, p. 15. 4Hass, Richard. Intervention. Carnegie Endowment, 1994, p. 19. 5Stein, Janice Gross. Psychology & Deterrence. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, p. 35. 6Klare, Michael. Rogue States & Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, p. 37. 7Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. 8Atkinson, Richard. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/atkinson/1.html 9Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. 10Klare, Michael. Rogue States & Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, p. 37. 11Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. 12Atkinson, Richard. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/atkinson/1.html 13Atkinson, Richard. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/atkinson/1.html 14Atkinson, Richard. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/atkinson/1.html 15US Department of State. Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1993. gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0F-1%3A6256%3AIraq 16Atkinson, Richard. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/atkinson/1.html 17Herring, George C. America's Longest War. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996, p. 14. 18George and Smoke. Deterrrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 117. 19Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 20Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html Tanter, Raymond. Lecture notes, 472not12.doc, October 9, 1996. 21Hass, Richard. Intervention. Carnegie Endowment, 1994, p. 32. 22Klare, Michael. Rogue States & Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, p. 38. 23Huth, Paul. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. Yale University Press, 1988, p. 35. 24Huth, Paul. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. Yale University Press, 1988, p. 58. 25Huth, Paul. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. Yale University Press, 1988, p. 60. 26Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 27Hass, Richard. Intervention. Carnegie Endowment, 1994, p. 32. 28Tanter, Raymond. Political Science 472 review session, October 21, 1996. 472not.2.doc 29Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, 1966, p. 44. 30Tanter, Raymond. Political Science 472 review session, October 21, 1996. 472not.2.doc 31Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 32Post, John. Confer item #30. 33Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 34Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, 1966, p. 42. 35Atkinson, Richard. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/atkinson/1.html 36Atkinson, Richard. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/atkinson/1.html 37Samaraii, Wafic Al. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/samaraii/1.html 38Klare, Michael. Rogue States & Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, p. 38. 39Tanter, Raymond. Notes from lecture, 472not.1.doc, September 9, 1996. 40Department of State. Iraq Human Rights Practices, 1993. gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0F-1%3A6256%3AIraq 41Aziz, Tariq. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html 42Aziz, Tariq. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html 43Huth, Paul. Lecture on September 24, 1996. 44George and Smoke. Initiation Theory and the Condition of Deterrence Outcomes, p. 529. (PS 472 Coursepack, p. 77) 45Hass, Richard. Intervention. Carnegie Endowment, 1994, p. 32. 46Samaraii, Wafic Al. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/samaraii/1.html 47Aziz, Tariq. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html 48Aziz, Tariq. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/aziz/1.html 49Huth, Paul. Lecture on September 24, 1996. 50Huth, Paul. Lecture on September 24, 1996. 51Huth, Paul. Lecture on September 24, 1996. 52Tanter, Raymond. Lecture notes from October 9, 1996, 472not12.doc. 53Snyder, Jack L. Psychology and Deterrence. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, p. 160. 54Klare, Michael. Rogue States & Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, p. 37-38. 55Tanter, Raymond. Lecture notes from September 16, 1996, 472not13.doc. 56Tanter, Raymond. Lecture notes from October 9, 1996, 472not12.doc. 57Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 58Klare, Michael. Rogue States & Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, p. 36. 59Klare, Michael. Rogue States & Nuclear Outlaws. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, p. 36. 60US Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1992), p. 351. 61Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 62Hass, Richard. Intervention. Carnegie Endowment, 1994, p. 31-32. 63Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 64Powell, Colin. Interview on Frontline, January 9 and 10, 1996. http://www.boston.com/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/powell/1.html 65Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. 66Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. 67Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. 68Bush, George. Address to the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore Md., August 20, 1990, as transcribed in Current Policy No. 1294 (US Department of State). 69Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. 70Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes.