Frederick Kahn Political Science 472 Professor Raymond Tanter December 9, 1996 The United States vs. Its Allies: The Dual Containment of Iran and Iraq In the Spring of 1993, the United States government announced a shift in policy with respect to Iran and Iraq. Instead of playing the role of balancer between the two nations as it had done throughout the previous decade, it labeled both nations as rogue states and set out to contain them. The containment policy is based on the assumption that both states are hostile to United States interests and should therefore be contained. For the past three years, the United States government has continually reaffirmed its staunch stance towards the approach of dual containment. However, it has done so with wavering support from its allies. This begs the question; Why has the United States adhered to the policy of dual containment despite wavering support from its allies? This paper will examine U.S. sources of perception of Iran and Iraq to try and answer the above question. In particular, it will focus on bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and presidential ideology. The format I have chosen is the logical structure. First, I will define important political terms, and discuss theory relevant to the case. This first section will especially focus on assumptions about rationality. Secondly, I will provide a brief historical account to bring the reader up to date with the events surrounding the dual containment policy. Then, I will delve into the sources of U.S. perception about Iran and Iraq, to try and show why the United States continues to adhere to the policy despite wavering support from its allies. Finally, I will discuss implications of the reasons behind dual containment for theory and policy. Definitions and Assumptions about Rationality The following section will define important political terms, and discuss theory with an emphasis on assumptions about rationality. The term containment with regard to a nation generally means; to contain, limit, and isolate the aggressive, violent, or unacceptable behavior of a country. The containment of a nation seeks to limit it from partaking in actions considered unacceptable by international standards. States in the post Cold War era that are currently being contained are referred to as rogue states. A rogue state is characterized as a hostile third world country with large military forces, and which has acquired or is in the process of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. 1 Weapons of mass destruction include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Furthermore, a rogue is considered to be opposed to the spread of democracy, has hegemonic ambitions, and circumvents world conventions concerning nuclear and chemical proliferation. 2 A rogue also poses a threat to both the strategic and intrinsic interests of nations. Strategic interests are generally regarded as intangibles such prestige, commitment, resolve, and credibility. Intrinsic interests are tangibles such as oil, and military capabilities. A nation which acts as a balancer seeks to maintain the international balance of power. If the international balance of power is in equilibrium, the balancing state remains unconcerned about rivalries between other states. However, if one state gains enough power to threaten the equilibrium, the balancer joins the weaker side to maintain the balance of power. Balance of power applies principles such as the enemy of my enemy is my friend. 3 This strategy involves aligning with an enemy to prevent a mutual foe from disturbing the balance of power. Containment is grounded in the use of deterrence and coercion, while balance of power only entails deterrence. Deterrence is a process by which a defender seeks to stop an initiator from taking an action. There are two forms of deterrence, denial and threat. Deterrence by denial is aimed at affecting the initiators capabilities. Deterrence by threat is aimed at the initiators motivations and intentions. Thomas C. Schelling in his book Arms and Influence, demonstrates the difference between the two forms of deterrence via the example of burning bridges. 4 If a defender is being chased towards a bridge, he has the option of either crossing it and burning it behind him, or stopping before the bridge and burning it so he cannot flee from the initiator. In the first scenario, the defender crosses the bridge and burns it, therefore affecting the ability of the initiator to further chase him. The defender has deterred the initiator by affecting his capabilities and has engaged in deterrence by denial. In the second example, the defender stops short of the bridge and burns it, thus relinquishing the initiative. By doing so, he has established his commitment and resolve to fight leaving the choice of whether there will be battle or not up to the initiator to decide. By trying to influence the motivations and intentions of the initiator, he has practiced deterrence by threat. Coercion is a process by which an initiator seeks to instigate the defender to take an action or modify a previous action. Like deterrence by denial, coercion is aimed at motivations and intentions. Both deterrence and coercion rest on the threat of pain, suffering and even total military annihilation. However, threats that are made by one actor must be perceived by the other actor in order to be work. An actors establishment of commitment and resolve does not guarantee that the opposing party will interpret these signals as they were meant to be understood. To gain a better understanding of threat perception, I now turn to rational decision making. Decision making involves the reduction of uncertainty and the simplification of complexity. Uncertainty is a consequence of insufficient information while complexity results from value conflicts. Two models which attempt to demonstrate the human decision making process are comprehensive and bounded rationality. Comprehensive rational decision making is the course by which decisions are made which yield the most efficient choice. It is based on the system of analytic decision making, by which decisions are made by identifying all available options, estimating the likelihood of the consequences of each option by considering costs, benefits, and likelihood of success, trading off all the potential costs and benefits to establish the expected value, and finally selecting the option which maximizes potential gain and minimizes loss. 5 Because rational decision making is a process by which decisions are made, the values the decision maker holds or pursues are irrelevant. 6 Whether the decision maker is good or evil does not have an affect on the rational decision making process. The comprehensive rational decision making approach as it relates to threat perception purports that any threat by one actor towards another actor would be completely understood. Because the receiving actor has the ability to analyze every iota of information available to him in the most systematic way possible, it is impossible that the threat would not be captured. However, psychologists have shown that the human capacity for comprehensive decision making is constrained by our cognitive structures. This limited form of decision making is called bounded rationality. Bounded rationality does not imply that humans are irrational, but that our decision making process is not without constraints which limit our ability to make the most efficient choice. The limits of our cognitive structures are evident by the way humans approach the reduction of uncertainty and simplification of complexity when making decisions. Two examples of bounded rationality are unmotivated and motivated biases. 7 An unmotivated bias is the reliance on salient events which have occurred in ones past to make a decision. The result is that you see what you expect to see. A motivated bias involves increasing the value of preferred options and decreasing the value of undesired ones. By bolstering the preferred options and discounting the undesired ones, you see what you want to see. Comprehensive and bounded rationality imply that there is a rheostat of rationality against which we can measure the rationality of decision makers. On one end of the rheostat is comprehensive rationality or the process which yields the most efficient choice. On the other end is irrationality which marks no form of rational decision making at all. In between the two extremes are levels of bounded rationality which describes the way in which most human decisions are made. It is important to mention that if a person is incapable of rational decision making, he cannot be held accountable for his actions because he is unable to process any information. Finally, I would like to emphasize the importance of the unitary nature of a state. In laymen terms, the unitary nature of a state is the degree of one-mindedness by which it makes decisions. If a states decisions are made by one person, then it is considered unitary. Otherwise, similar to the rheostat of rationality, there are degrees of unity by which a states decision arises. For example, if a states decision making process involves several influential members with competing interests, then the final outcome is a result of politics. Determining the unitary nature of a state is important because the rationality of a states decision is the aggregate rationality of all of its decision making components. For instance, if only one person is responsible for decisions, then we need only to study the rationality of that one person. However, if decisions are made multilaterally, then we must account for the rationality of each element of the decision. A Brief History I now turn to a brief history of the events surrounding the dual containment policy. This section is supposed to provide the reader with historical evidence of the United States adherence to the dual containment policy despite its allies decreasing support for it. I have divided this section into three parts. First, I provide a quick synopsis of the dual containment policy, and the Clinton Administrations publicly declared reason for adopting it. Then I show separate evidence of the deteriorating support for the policy by Americas allies, first with respect to Iraq, and then Iran. In the Spring of 1993, the new Clinton Administration announced that the United States would no longer play the role of balancer between Iran and Iraq. In his May 18th speech to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Martin Indyk, the special assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, announced that the strength of the United States friends in the region, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-would allow the United States to counter both regimes. 8 The containment of both states was part of greater policy of containment of all rogue states including Cuba, North Korea, and Libya, in addition to Iran and Iraq. The policy is best summarized in a 1994 article in Foreign Affairs by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake: The end of the Cold War and the emergence of newly independent states in eastern Europe have the potential to enlarge dramatically the family of nations now committed to the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the promotion of collective security. For the sake of both its interests and its ideals, the United States has a special responsibility to nurture and promote these core valuesAt the same time, our policy must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic valuesAs the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually transform theses backlash states into constructive members of the international communityWe seek to contain the influence of these statesby isolation, sometimes through pressure, sometimes by diplomatic and economic measuresWe encourage the rest of the international community to join us in a concerted effort. 9 The containment policy with respect to Iraq was well supported by the international community after Iraqs invasion of Kuwait. On April 3, 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 687 demanding that Iraq destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons under the supervision of a U.N. special commission. 10 In addition, the resolution imposed an embargo on the purchase of Iraqi commodities and products, and restricted the sale to Iraq of all items except food and medicine until it should comply with the U.N. demands. The United Nations was attempting deterrence by denial by trying to destroy Saddams capabilities of attacking its neighbors. It was also trying to coerce Saddam to comply with the resolution by linking the lifting of the embargo with his explicit acceptance of the resolutions demands. Aware that Iraqs major source of foreign currency comes from the export of oil, the Security Council placed a provision in the resolution allowing for the periodic sale of oil by Iraq, in exchange for humanitarian goods such as food and medicine, which was to be distributed under the supervision of the United Nations. In addition to Resolution 687, the United Nations passed Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991 condemning the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, and demanding that it immediately end all of its human rights violations. The resolution was in direct reference to the ferocity with which Saddam put down two Shia Muslim revolts in the southern Iraq, and Kurdish rebellions in the North, which attempted to overthrow his government soon after the war. It also referred to a long history of human rights violations by Saddams regime. For example, In 1988 he ordered the invasion of the Kurdistan region killing many of them by gassing. 11 In the South, home to 500,000 Marsh Arabs, Saddams army often killed innocent fisherman and villagers in his attempts to flush out Iraqi Shia rebels which took refuge in the area. 12 As a result, there are today roughly 650,000 Shia Iraqis taking seeking refuge in Iran. In 1991, the U.N declared the airspace north of the 36th parallel a no-fly zone, for the Iraqi air force, to deter Saddam from attacking the 3.5 million Kurds in the North. Once again, the U.N engaged in deterrence by denial. The zone was patrolled by British, French, and American fighter jets based in Saudi Arabia and Southern Turkey. Furthermore, the C.I.A began covert operations helping Kurdish opposition groups seeking the overthrow of Saddam. These groups are believed to include the Kurdistan Democratic Party (K.D.P), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (P.U.K), the Iraqi National Congress (I.N.C), and the Iraqi National Accord. 13 The K.D.P and the P.U.K were created after an election by the Kurds in 1992. The Kurdistan Democratic Party is led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan by Iranian backed Jalal Talabani. Although both men vowed to work together towards the overthrow of Saddam, they have been in a personal power struggle since the election, and in 1994 the fighting turned into a killing war, Barzani seeking at times to fix a deal with Saddam Hussein, while Talabani has support from Iran. 14 Based in London with offices in northern Iraq, the I.N.C has a small army of little value, as well as the Iraqi Broadcasting Corporation from which it beams pro-democratic and anti-Hussein radio and television propaganda. 15 It is believed that the C.I.A provides technical help to the I.N.C for the production of the videos and radio broadcasts they disseminate. 16 The Iraqi National Accord is an opposition group based in Amman which has tried to make contact with Iraqi military insiders who it was hoped one day would revolt. 17 In 1992 the United Nations ordered another no-fly zone, this time below the 32nd parallel. It was intended to deter Saddam from staging another attack on Kuwait by affecting his capability to do so. However, between 1993 and the present, the United States has strengthened its resolve and commitment to contain Iraq, while its allies have not. Several situations have arisen in the last few years which demonstrate the divergence of U.S. and allied policy, and left the United States almost alone its quest to contain Iraq. In 1993, the Kuwaiti government uncovered a failed 1992 plot by Iraq to assassinate then President George Bush on his three day visit to Kuwait. In response, President Bill Clinton ordered an investigation by the F.B.I and C.I.A to verify the report both of concluded the report was valid. In retaliation, the President ordered an air strike on June 26, of 23 Tomahawk missiles, on the headquarters of Saddams intelligence organization, the Mukhabarat. 18 Then in a radio address later that evening, the President gave his justification for the attack. He told the American people that the plot was no impulsive or random act, and that the attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans. We could not and have not let such action against our nation go unanswered. A firm commensurate response was essential to protect our sovereignty; to send a message to those who engage in state-sponsored terrorism; to deter further violence against our people; and to affirm the expectation of civilized behavior among nations. However, President Clinton did not consult the Security Council until after the missile attack. 19 In October 1994, Saddam sent thousands of his elite troops toward the border of Kuwait. Immediately, the United States dispatched 15,000 troops to the region and warned Baghdad that it would resort to force if it crossed the 32nd parallel. 20 Once again, this was done without consulting the Security Council first. In addition, the only ally which immediately stood by the United States was Britain. 21 In November 1994, Russia and France pressured Iraq into recognizing the sovereignty and frontiers of Kuwait, because both states were interested in easing the embargo so they could begin collecting billions of dollars of Iraqi debt. 22 There was also evidence of strained relations between France and U.S., over Iraqi policy in the National Security Council. At the Security Council meeting after Clintons unilateral reaction to Iraqi troop movements in the southern Iraq, French Defense Minister Francois Leotard stated that Clintons action was not unconnected to domestic politics. 23 Defending the Presidents actions, Madeleine Albright, Washingtons ambassador to the United Nations snapped back: Ludicrous, ill-informed, and counterproductive. 24 Then, at the same session, the Americans had to forgo a heavy weapons exclusion zone they wanted in the South because of French opposition. 25 In March 1995, France opened a diplomatic office in Baghdad, the first of the coalition forces to do so. 26 Furthermore, Frances two main oil companies, CFP-Total and Elf Aquitane began working out preliminary deals to give both companies key stakes in Southern Iraqi oil reserves. 27 Both are calculating that the embargo will soon disappear, and when it does they intend to be in position to maximize profits. Furthermore, Russias Zarubezh Oil and Gas Construction Co. drafted a $1.5 billion contract for work in Iraqs oil patch to begin as soon as the embargo is gone. 28 On August 22 1996, Saddam Hussein sent units of his Republican Guard, at the request of the Kurdish K.D.P party, into the city of Erbil in northern Iraq. On September 3, President Clinton responded to Iraqs new incursion by ordering an attack of 27 Tomahawk and AGM-86 missiles, on military installations in southern Iraq, from U.S. ships in the Gulf. 29 He also ordered an extension of the southern no-fly zone 60 miles to the north, from the 32nd to the 33rd parallel. The following day, he ordered another air strike of 17 Tomahawk missiles to destroy targets which had not been destroyed in the first attack. 30 However, the air strikes again went unsupported by most of Americas allies. Turkey and Saudi Arabia refused to allow the United States to launch air strikes from their military bases, and the only two countries which outwardly supported the strike were Britain and Germany. France, while not explicitly condemning the strike continued to urge the suspension of the U.N. approved plan to allow Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil to buy medicine and food, which the United States had shelved. The containment policy with respect to Iran has primarily been a unilateral effort by the United States. Most of Americas allies have never supported the containment of Iran, and unlike Iraq, there is no U.N. ban on trade with Iran. Therefore, many foreign countries ignore U.S. pleas to adhere to the containment policy, and continue to build economic and political relations with her. For example, the Russians are helping build four Iranian nuclear reactors. 31 In addition, Germanys export credit agency has offered hundreds of millions of dollars of export guarantees to German companies doing business with Iran. 32 Other countries which have well established business connections with Iran include France, China, Italy, as well as Japan. However, international political and economic support of Iran continues in the face of her continual support of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction programs. Examples of Iranian sponsored international acts of terrorism include the 1983 marine barracks bombing in Beirut, which killed 241 marines; the 1983 suicide bombing at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 40 people; the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina; and the 1994 bombings of a Jewish institution in Argentina and Israeli embassy in London. 33 As a result, Iran has been on the U.S. State Departments list of states supporting international terrorism for over a decade. In addition, Irans annual military expenditure is believed to straddle the range of $2 billion to $3 billion. 34 She already possesses chemical weapons, may already have begun the limited production of biological weapons, and could possibly begin producing nuclear weapons as soon as the turn of the century. The C.I.A has suggested that Iran may be allocation up to $1 billion a year on its nuclear program alone. 35 Frustrated with her allies contempt for the containment policy in light of Irans rogue behavior, the U.S. has decided to punish them for doing business with Iran. In 1996, America enacted an extraterritorial law known as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to try and coerce her allies to comply with the containment of Iran. At the signing ceremony, President Clinton remarked, We come together around a common commitment to strengthen our fight against terrorism The Iran and Libya sanctions bill I sign today will help deny those countries the money they need to finance international terrorism We will continue to press our allies to join with us in increasing the pressure on Iran and Libya to stop their support of terrorists. We already have acted ourselves, through our own sanctions, and with this legislation we are asking our allies to join us with more effectively. 36 I leave the implications of this act for the section devoted to legal issues. Sources of U.S. Perception about Iran Iraq The United States clearly perceives both the states of Iran and Iraq as rogues. Thus, the question why does the United States continue the policy of dual containment with respect to Iran and Iraq, despite the declining support of its allies, needs be answered by taking a look at sources of U.S. perceptions about both states. This section presumes that the policy is not a result of unitary action, but of the competing interests of influential U.S. decision making sources. Therefore, I will now examine bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and U.S. presidential ideology to demonstrate that the combination of the three drive the U.S. perception of Iran and Iraq as rogues. In his 1995 book, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, Michael Klare argues that the Pentagon created the rogue state threat out of thin air to justify Cold War levels of defense spending in the post Cold War era. 38 He suggests that towards the end of the Cold War, the Joint Chief of Staff, General Collin Powell, realized that the only threat left to the United States were rising third world regimes whose military power did not pose a large enough threat to the United States to justify the Cold War military establishment. 39 In addition, in March 1990, Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee recognized that the fall of the Soviet Union had rendered the Pentagons proposed spending plans by a threat blank,-an unrealistic description of future enemies. 40 Therefore, he ordered the Pentagon to devise a threat realistic enough to maintain the current defense budget. The Pentagon did not have many options. Second world countries such as the Soviet Union were no longer posing a threat to the United States, instead seeking economic aid and membership in N.A.T.O. 40 Therefore, the Pentagon resorted to creating a rogue state threat of third world nations which were recklessly amassing weapons of mass destruction and had hegemonic ambitions. However, as demonstrated by Raymond Tanter in his book, Rogue Regimes, Klare is on thin ground in suggesting that the Pentagon invented the rogue state threat; he is on even thinner ground in suggesting that rogue regimes only seek weapons of mass destruction and partake in terrorism because the U.S. singles them out. 41 For example, as described in the history section of this paper, both Iran and Iraq both engaged in terrorism and sought weapons of mass destruction before the end of the Cold War. They also posed a threat to U.S. strategic and intrinsic interests in the Middle East. In the early 1980s, Revolutionary Iran was behind the kidnapping of several Americans both in Iran and Lebanon, while Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 posing a strategic threat to the flow of oil from the Middle East. Finally, Klare even undermines his own assumption in his book by stating that there is no tangible evidence to prove Collin Powell ordered the creation of the rogue threat. 42 Therefore, while it unlikely that the Pentagon created the rogue state threat, it is quite possible that the Pentagon overestimates the rogue threat to maintain levels of Cold War spending. In the other words, the Pentagon has a motivated bias, its budget, to perceive Iran and Iraq as more threatening to U.S. intrinsic and strategic interests than they really are. They see what they want to see. Another source of rogue state perception is domestic politics. For instance, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act signed by the President on August 5, 1996 was championed through Congress by the American Israel Political Action Committee. 43 AIPAC is the largest pro-Israel lobby in the United States and is a major advocate of promoting the rogue state threat to maintain the steady flow of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. Founded soon after President Truman recognized Israel in 1948, AIPAC has ever since enjoyed increasing influence in Washington. Some of its accomplishments include the first American aid package to Israel in 1951; persuading Congress to block the sale of arms to Iraq in 1954; persuading President Kennedy to overturn the U.S. arms embargo against Israel in 1962; the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which blocked trade concessions for the Soviet Union in 1975 until it allowed the free emigration of Jews; the U.S. Israel free trade agreement in 1985; aid to Israel in 1986 which converted U.S. loans to Israel into grants; the 1992 U.S. loan guarantees to Israel to help with the absorption of more than 600,000 Ethiopian and Russian Jews; and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in 1986. 44 Today, AIPAC has a membership of over 55,000 people, a multi-million dollar annual budget to fund its activities, and a large influential lobbying staff in Washington D.C. Its activities involve monitoring over 2000 hours of U.S. Israel related hearings; holding over 1000 meetings between their lobbyists and congressional offices a year; in 1994 they met with over 600 congressional candidates; they have met with over 3,000 congressional candidates in the last decade; and currently work with 50 committees and subcommittees, and with 100 federal agencies, and departments in the development of policy. 45 In 1992, the United States made U.S. loans to Israel contingent upon its participation in a land for peace negotiation with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Expecting to absorb over 600,000 immigrants in the following several years, the Israeli government complied with Americas demands out of desperation for the foreign assistance it needed to fund immigrant housing and resettlement programs. However, the Declaration of Principles signed by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat reduced the Palestinian threat to Israel. It also decreased the overall threat to Israel by many of its former opponents. For instance, the peace process led to a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1994. The overall decline of the threat to Israel by its neighbors, has been accompanied by the increasing cost of the absorption of Russian immigrants and U.S. manufactured weapons systems. Over the past six years, Israel has become home to more than 600,000 immigrants placing a financial burden on the Israeli government which has forced it to divert a portion of its defense budget to resettlement programs. In 1986 defense spending was 17.3% of GNP while by 1993 it had been cut to 9.1% of GNP. 46 Therefore, current U.S. military assistance helps ease the financial pain the Israeli defense force has suffered as a result of the costs involved to resettle new immigrants. In addition, owing to the rising cost of U.S. weapons systems, the real value of the overall American aid package has declined more than a third since 1985. 47 Thus any cuts in the aid package will further compromise the budget of the Israeli Defense Force and in light of the 30% cut made to the U.S. foreign assistance budget over the past decade, Israel has a legitimate concern that these cuts might one day involve her $3 billion portion. It is therefore quite possible that A.I.P.A.C. has a motivated bias to overestimate the threat of both Iran and Iraq to the United States and Israel. Financially burdened by the resettlement programs, and suffering from the decrease in purchasing power of the current U.S. loan package, Israel wants the United States to continue to support her financially. However, Israel is also aware that the decrease in threat to her by her neighbors has made it more difficult to justify the $3 billion aid package in Congress. Considering that the foreign assistance budget has already been cut by 30% over the last decade, Israel perceives a possible cut in her portion of the budget as imminent. Therefore, A.I.P.A.C. which is the largest pro-Israel lobby in the United States labels both Iran and Iraq as rogue states and magnifies their threat to both American and Israeli interests in order to maintain current levels of U.S. foreign assistance flowing to Israel. Finally, Presidential ideology also promotes the rogue threat to the United States. In Rogue Regimes, Raymond Tanter demonstrates that there are both rehabilitative and retributive goals of an embargo policy. 48 He states that Presidents have always believed that they have the responsibility of rehabilitating foreign leaders (changing their behavior), and the moral obligation of punishing them (retribution) for wrong doing. Tanter also clarifies the efficacy of rehabilitation and retribution with respect to the unitary nature of the actor, and the implications to them of actions taken through windows of opportunity or basements of fear. For rehabilitation to be successful, the actor must be unitary because it is impossible to coerce a country with no structure for decision making. As an example, he shows Americas failure to coerce Iran in 1979 because it was in the middle of a revolution and therefore had no governing structure. Furthermore, rehabilitation only works if a country is acting from a window of opportunity. For example, if Iran or Iraq tries to maximize its gains through behavior unacceptable to the United States, then sanctions to coerce them to stop is possible. In other words, if the suffering caused by the sanctions is more costly than partaking in the opportunistic behavior, then they will change their behavior. This is an example of rational decision making. However, if the actor is acting out of a basement of fear, attempts of rehabilitation by coercion will only increase their fear. For instance, if Iran or Iraq engage in behavior because they are frightened of the United States, then trying to change their behavior by inflicting pain on them will only increase their fear of the United States. Therefore, only retribution can work if a country is acting out of a basement of fear. Iraq is a unitary actor with Saddam at the helm. The sanctions on Iraq have done very little to hurt the dictator directly. Saddam continues to live in palaces and has access to Western luxury goods smuggled in through Iran and Turkey. Furthermore, he directs the few funds he is able to receive through black market transactions and the illegal sale of oil through Iran to fund the military. Military officers have a better quality of life than the average citizen in Iraq so therefore rarely desert. Saddam also continuously purges his military of suspected rebels, and shifts officers around so that they do not develop troop loyalties which could lead to a coup detat. 49 The is also evidence that Saddam is acting out of windows of opportunity. Saddam constantly challenges the commitment and resolve of the West to defend the Kurds in the North, and Kuwait in the South. He has already maneuvered his troops towards the Kuwaiti border sparking instant anti-Hussein rhetoric from President Clinton, and costing the U.S. millions of dollars every time it has to reinforce its position in the Gulf. Finally, he managed to invade Northern Iraq by aligning himself with a U.S. supported Kurdish faction, against its domestic opposition, sparking only limited retributive response by the United States in the form of missile attacks on southern Iraqi military installations. It is evident that the U.S. government along with the U.N. intended to punish Saddam Hussein for his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. One prime example of retribution is the reparations clause in Resolution 687 which requires Iraq to pay for reparations to the victims of the war. 50 The extreme nature of this retributive policy is well demonstrated by its linkage to the one-time oil sales Saddam is allowed to make for the purchase of humanitarian goods. Revenue from the oil sales is not entirely for the benefit of the Iraqi people, but in part intended to pay back victims of Iraqi aggression in the Gulf War. Another example of retribution is President Clintons bombing of the Iraqi Mukhabarat headquarters in Baghdad after the discovery of the Iraqi attempt on President Bushs life in 1992. In his speech after the bombing President Clinton made the retributive nature of the bombing absolutely clear; It was (the assassination attempt) an elaborate plan devised by the Iraqi Government and directed against a former President of the United States because of actions he took as President. As such, the Iraqi attack against President Bush was an attack against our country and against all Americans. We could not let such action against our nation go unansweredThere should be no mistake about the message we want to send. 51 Iran is also a unitary actor acting out of windows of opportunity. First, Iran has a centralized government dominated by the radical Islamic mullahs. Furthermore, it seeks to increase its military strength, not out of fear from the United States, but out of hegemonic ambitions such as being the most powerful state in the Middle East. Furthermore, it continues to support radical Islamic groups such as the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, and the Kurdish P.U.K. party in northern Iraq to further its interests in the Middle East. The Presidents support for the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act demonstrates both the rehabilitative and retributive nature of the President towards Iran. The bill is directed at Irans support of terrorist groups and their acquisition of weapons of mass destruction from countries such as Russia, China, and North Korea. The sanctions are therefore an attempt to try and change the behavior of Iran by promising to lift the pain which the sanctions are intend to impose on Iran if they comply with U.S. demands. The retributive nature of the sanctions are the signal they send not only to Iran, but to other U.S. designated rogues that engaging in outlaw behavior is wrong and will be punished. Legal Issues This section will discuss the legal implications of extraterritorial American laws. Specifically, it will focus on the Helms-Burton Act, and Iran-Libya Sanctions Act which have recently been passed to stop attempt to stop foreign businesses from undermining Americas unilateral attempts of containing rogue states. U.S. frustration with its allies over compliance with its containment policy of rogue states has culminated in two recent extraterritorial laws. The first one, The Helms-Burton Act of February 1996, does not directly relate to this case but must be mentioned as a precedent to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Similar to the case with Iran, many foreign countries today have economic relations with Cuba. In the post Cold War world, the United States is unilaterally trying to contain Cuba, only to have its policy undermined by foreign business relations with Castro. Frustrated by its failed attempts to convince its allies to participate in a multilateral containment of Cuba, the United States passed into law the Helms-Burton Act in early 1996 which punishes foreigners who do so. The act bans foreigners from entering the United States whose businesses are now operating in facilities seized from American firms by the Castro regimes nearly forty years ago. It also allows Cuban Americans to sue foreign businesses in U.S. courts which currently have business relations with Cuba. It is clearly an extraterritorial act, and has resulted in a complaint filed by the European Union, Canada, and Mexico in the new court of world trade which has been created under the auspices of the World Trade Organization to promote fair trading practices among it members. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is thus the second of two American extraterritorial acts. Similar to the Helms-Burton Act, it was passed in reaction to Americas futile attempts to persuade its allies to multilaterally contain Iran and Libya. With respect to Iran, the law gives the President a choice of five different forms of sanctions against companies, both domestic and foreign, who invest over $40 million annually in Iran. 52 As stated by Senator Alfonse DAmato, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, companies will either trade with Iranor trade with us they cant have it both ways. 53 It has like the Helms-Burton Act caused a negative reaction by Americas allies. Both the Helms-Burton and Iran-Libya Sanctions Act were passed based on the precedent of many previous acts which attempt to punish foreigners for violating U.S. policies. For example, under the Arms Export Control Act of 1967, the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994 foreign persons or companies can be penalized if they aid and abet in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1993, and the Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 also prohibit the Defense Department and State Department, respectively, from doing business with any foreign entity which complies with the Arab Leagues anti-Israel boycott. There were also two executive orders by President Clinton in March and May of 1995 which lay the groundwork for the containment of Iran. Executive Orders #12957 and #12959 both limit the extent to which U.S. entities can conduct business with Iran. 54 Implications for Theory and Policy It is evident that a combination of bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and presidential ideology forms the basis for Americas aggregate perception of Iran and Iraq. With regard to bureaucratic and domestic politics, we have seen that both the Pentagon and A.I.P.A.C. have motivated biases to promote the rogue state threat. Presidential ideology stems from the traditional belief by U.S. presidents that they have the obligation to pursue retributive and rehabilitative policies with respect to outlaw foreign nations. The combination of the three competing interests of bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and presidential ideology have in this case converged to produce laws which punish our allies. While all three interests all promote the same policy of dual containment, they do so against the best interest of the United States. By punishing our allies for not complying with our own laws, we turn them against us, as seen in their complaints filed with the WTO. If at first, we were frustrated because our ability to contain rogues was being undermined by our allies, our credibility of threat to rogues is now even less than it was before because our allies have explicitly voiced their opposition to the containment policy. With respect to Iraq, we continue to promote its isolation in the U.N Security Council., and hope that our allies will comply. However, as demonstrated, the coalition which was at first united against Saddam is now slowly coming undone. As countries such as France, Russia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia begin to undermine our policy towards Iraq, it is likely we will see increased tension between the U.S. and our allies. With respect to Iran, our containment policy has always been unilateral and has culminated in an extraterritorial law which has angered our allies. If we adhere to the staunch containment policy of Iran, we will continue to experience vocal opposition from our allies. Without support from our allies, the containment of Iran and Iraq will be difficult. If other countries wish to promote their interests in these two countries, U.S. containment will be undermined, and as a result ineffective. The only nation which will be hurt is the United States in the form of lost revenue from lost business with the region, and from the cost of maintaining a heavy troop presence in the Gulf. Unlike the Cold War when the United States and its allies multilaterally contained the Soviet Union, the post Cold War era has no threat perceived as dangerous enough by our allies for them to justify a multilateral containment approach. Therefore, the United States should abandon this flawed policy in favor of the balance of power approach it has used in the past. As long as the balance of power within the Middle East is maintained, the United States should not attempt to interfere in regional affairs. Endnotes 1. Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 26. 2. Ibid. 3. Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994), 15. 4. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 43. 5. Notes on rational decision making can be found on Professor Raymond Tanters Political Science 472 world-wide-web home page at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96Ps472Notes/472not1.txt 6. Ibid. 7. For more information on motivated and unmotivated biases as they relate to threat perception see Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 8. Gregory F. Gause, The Illogic of Dual Containment, Foreign Affairs 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994): 57. 9. Anthony Lake, Confronting Backlash States, Foreign Affairs 73, No. 2 (March/April 1994): 45-46. 10. See Appendix B 11. For more information on Saddam and the Kurds see Jentleson, With Friends Like These, 68-93. 12. Iraq: down but not out, Economist, 8 April 1995, 23. 13. Iraq: down but not out, 22 and Alan Cooperman, Rolling up in Iraq,U.S. News & World Report, 23 September 1996, 59-60. 14. Iraq: down but not out, Economist, 8 April 1995, 23. 15. Iraq: down but not out, Economist, 8 April 1995, 23. and Cooperman, Rolling up in Iraq, 59-60. 16. Cooperman, Rolling up in Iraq, 60. 17. Ibid. 18. Russell Watson, A New Kind of Containment, Newsweek, 12 July 1993, 30. 19. Text of President Clintons address to the nation June 26, 1993 on the U.S. attack on Baghdad Clinton Describes Retaliation Against Iraqi Complex, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 51 (July 1993): 1765. 20. Carla Anne Robbins, Containing Saddam Remains a Challenge, New York Times, 20 September 1996, A11. 21. Ibid. 22. Tim Zimmerman, Gun Barrel Diplomacy, U.S. News & World Report, 24 October 1994, 44. 23. Ibid., 43. 24. Ibid., 43. 25. Ibid., 43. 26. Douglas Harbrecht, Embargo? What Embargo? Business Week, 20 March 1995, 30. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Howard Fineman and Tara Sonenshine, Standing Tall, For Now, Newsweek, 16 September 1996, 40-41. 30. Ibid. 31. Douglas Harbrect, Embargo? What Embargo? 30. 32. Ibid. 33. Comprehensive U.S. Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action, AIPAC Report, 2 April 1995, 7; available from http://www.aipac.org/hot/MiddleEast/iranpr.htm; Internet; accessed 29 November 1996. 34. Ibid., 4-5. 35. Ibid., 4-5. 36. Remarks by President Clinton at signing ceremony, Washington, D.C, August 5, 1996 in U.S. Department of State Dispatch 7, no. 3 (August 1996): 402. 37. Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws, 13. 38. Ibid., 30. 39. Ibid., 40. 40. Ibid., 14. 41. Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes, 8-10 [chapter two: Iran: Balance of Power vs. Dual Containment of book on-line] available from http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/iran.chapter.htm; Internet; accessed 2 December 1996. 42. Klare, Rogue Regimes and Nuclear Outlaws, 11. 43. House Passes Curbs on Trade With Iran and Libya, Congressional Quarterly 55 (June 1996): 1775. 44. See Appendix B 45. See Appendix B 46. Raphael Danziger and Bradley Gordon, End American Aid to Israel? No, It Remains Vital, p. 5 of 10. AIPAC; available from http://www.aipac.org/hot/rafiart.htm; Internet; accessed November 15, 1996. 47. Ibid., 5. 48. Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes, 8-9. 49. Down but not out, 22. 50. See Appendix A 51. Text of President Clintons address to the nation June 26, 1993 on the U.S. attack on Baghdad Clinton Describes Retaliation Against Iraqi Complex, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 51 (July 1993): 1765. 52. See Appendix C 53. Ibid. 54. See Appendix D Appendix A For the full text of United Nations Resolution 687 see the U.N. Security Council world-wide-web home page at http://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/sed/scouncil/s91/4. Appendix B For information on A.I.P.A.C see their world-wide-web pages http://www.aipac.org/whatis/aipacwar.htm and http://www.aipac.org/whatis/t1.htm Appendix C For the text of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act see http:// tad.micro.umn.edu:70/00 /bills/104/1/10431071/ dtitle Appendix D For the full text of recent executive orders see http://library.whitehouse.gov