Salman H. Elmi 12/4/96--Prof. Tanter PS 472--Term Paper The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996: Explanations and Outcomes The Global Environment: Current State of Affairs: Since the fall of the Soviet Empire and the consequent end to the Cold War, new problems have begun to emerge on the doorsteps of U.S. foreign policy makers. An irony in the success of arms reduction initiatives has been the new availability of weapons-grade fissile materials in the F.S.U. In addition, as a result of a drastic economic slowdown in the Republics, the fissile materials are not presently under badly needed security and inventory systems, and the incentives to keep them off of the black market are not enough. (Graham) and (Rosenthal) Alluding to a black market, inevitably brings up the issue of rogue states. Currently there is an enormous demand for the aforementioned materials, and the scientists with the know-how to use them in a destructive manner. Additionally, many of the states demanding them are also the states who are involved in state-sponsored terrorism. One state in particular, the Islamic Republic of Iran, has proven itself to be an increasing threat to the strategic and intrinsic interests of the United States since their revolution of 78 and 79. (Tanter) Although some argue that this rogue threat has been invented by the State Department, Pentagon, and those whose jobs depend on having an enemy of moment (Klare et. al), I believe that it has been empirically proven that the threat is real, particularly in regards to Iran. If anything, the abovementioned actors simply exaggerate and/or prod along situations when they deem them necessary for their own benefit, or the benefit of national security. USG and Iran, History of Relations: A brief history, leading up to the legislation upon which this paper focuses on, is called for. Reasons for Irans state of affairs when dealing with the U.S. range back to the late 1800s. In this time period, both Britain and Russia had empires spanning much of globe. Iran, while not a formal colony of either, had its northern third under a Russian sphere of influence, and its southern third under a British sphere (with the center designated as a neutral zone). Along with the influence, came physical occupation, which in turn made Iran a battlefield in WWI. Again in WWII, the Allies had used Iran as a battlefield and wreaked havoc on much of its fertile soils. Upon reaching the end of the second world war, Soviet and British/American withdrawal became a source of tension, and was among the beginnings of the cold war. It is in this relative time period in which the CIA, along with British cooperation, instigated the 1953 coup which deposed the then Prime Minister of Iran, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh (who had nationalized oil to the detriment of Western Oil Companies), and replaced him with the exiled Shah of Iran. Continuing along the time-line of USG and Iranian relations, one can see that the anti-imperialistic resentment in which the Iranian peoples held as a result of the U.S. was only going to get worse. After nearly twenty more years of the Shahs despotic rule (with much U.S. financing) 1, the Islamic Revolution of 1978 and 79 occurred in which the leash of the West was symbolically thrown off. From this point on, anti-U.S feelings in Iran were only solidified by the U.Ss engagement in a flip-flopping BOP strategy towards Iran and Iraq during their devastating war lasting from 80-88. (Tanter) American feelings towards Iran have been more or less a reaction to Irans reaction towards imperialism. With the revolution, also came the seizing of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979, along with the taking of seventy American hostages. In addition, President Carters rescue missions for the hostages failed, resulting in more loss for the USG, in terms of life, moneys, and strategic interests such as reputation. Samuel Huntington has also commented on the culture clash between the West (and prominently Northern Tier nations) and Islamic nations (prominently LDCs), and has attributed many of the anti-Iranian feelings held by Americans to this Clash of the Civilizations. History of Sanctions Towards Iran, and U.S. Legal Authority Drawn Upon: More recently however, Irans pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, and its continued support for terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, has fueled the political fire that has lead to a series of executive orders and legislative decrees (i.e. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act) starting twenty some odd years ago. Since 1979, The Carter, Reagan, Bush, and now the Clinton administrations have placed a wide variety of constraints on Iran, beginning with those mostly of a military nature (i.e. dual-use technology exports to Iran have been banned), leading to the more recent economically centered ones. 2 In 1979 itself, the U.S. began maintenance of a continuous state of national emergency with respect to Iran (Executive Order 12170), and consequently has drawn authority for much of its maneuvers towards the rogue from this state. Section 2656f (a), of Title 22 of the United States Code requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria for terrorists. (Wilcox) In 1984, Iran was placed on this list, and has not been removed since. With the exception of very few items, all imports from Iran have been banned since 1987. (Executive Order 12613). The Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, included a series of prohibitions on: commercial arms sales, the transfer of restricted goods and technology, and firms and governments (foreign or otherwise), and assisting Iran or Iraq in acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Pursuant to section 204 (b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), the Clinton administration also exercised its authority to declare a national emergency to respond to the actions and policies of the Government of Iran and issued an Executive Order prohibiting United States persons from entering into contracts for the financing or the overall management or supervision of the development of petroleum resources located in Iran or over which Iran claims jurisdiction. (Clinton). However, seeing that sanctions were not working, and that Iran still topped the State Departments terrorist list, Clinton, (in lieu of the upcoming elections), took economic sanctions a step further by signing a final version of Senator Alfonse DAmatos H.R. 3107 into law: An Act: To impose sanctions on persons making certain investments directly and significantly contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Iran or Libya to develop its petroleum resources. . . This Act may be cited as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Section 2: The Congress makes the following findings: 1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them and its support of acts of international terrorism endanger the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and those countries with which the United States shares common strategic and foreign policy objectives. 2)The objective of preventing the proliferation of weapons . . . and acts of terrorism . . .requires additional efforts to deny Iran the financial means to sustain. . . Sec. 3: The Congress declares. . . limiting the development of Irans ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources of Iran. In the case of this legislation, an extraterritorial type reading of the law can be easily construed as a result of Section 5: Imposition of Sanctions: Sanctions with Respect to Iran.--Except as provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 2 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President determines that a person has, with actual knowledge, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, made an investment of $40,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of at least $10,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals of exceeds $40,000,000 in any 12-month period), that directly and significantly contributed to the enhancement of Irans ability to develop petroleum resources of Iran. In this one paragraph, the USG is effectively saying that those who do not jump on its bandwagon, (allies or not), will be subject to a secondary boycott and punishments by the USG. In addition, it is the President of the United States, and only he (or she), who may deem exceptions to this law legal or not. This leads me to my question: Why did President Clinton sign the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act on August 5, 1996, despite the fact that U.S. strategic interests (including continuing alliances with its friends) were put in danger; and what were the main factors, foreign and domestic, that lead him to such a decision? Theoretical Orientation: To assist in the task of answering the aforementioned question, I will now lay out the theoretical groundwork from which I will base my assumptions. I will first deal with the rationality of the actor(s) involved. In creating foreign policy, decision makers diagnose a problem, draw inferences, examine alternative means of resolution, and make choices through mechanisms that bear little resemblance to comprehensive rationality. It is imperative, however, for international decision makers to strive to act in a manner which is as rational as possible because rationality is a prerequisite for responsibility. (472 not1.doc, and 472 not21.doc) The Rational Choice Model has some basic components that I will touch on now. Foreign policy makers who abide by this model are said to follow a unitary actor mode of decision-making. By this, it is meant that although the leader of the nation might have many cabinet members and advisors, in the final analysis, it is the leader him/herself who has the final say on the outcome of events. A second component of this model is that of transitive preference. In basic terms, the unitary actor is seen as making decisions by using the transitive preference law of mathematics: if I prefer A to B and B to C, then I must prefer A to C. A third component to the Rational Choice model is that of maximizing expected utility. Maximizing utility basically entails the unitary actor choosing the policy option which derives the most gain, and the least loss for him/herself. When calculating this utility, the unitary actor assigns a value with a policy option, and gives a probability of achieving the desired policy option. By multiplying (probability x value), the actor can derive his/her expected utility for each policy option. A final component of the Rational Choice model, is the focus on how choices are made. By this it is meant that the unitary actor does not call the rationality or morality of the goals into question, but just focuses on the most efficient means to the end. 3 Looking upon the rheostat of rationality, to determine the USGs level of rationality is a more complex task than to determine Bill Clintons. With any democratic government, (and most other governments as well), bureaucratic politics always plays a role. With a nation as large as the U.S., bureaucratic politics introduces different interests with different utility functions. While AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) might have one specific stance on the topic in question, John Lichtblau, the Chairman of the New York-based Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, might have another. (IRNA web site) Even within interest groups, opinions may differ. Lichtblau warns of retaliatory legislation and boycotts on U.S. firms, while other leaders within the U.S. petroleum and gas fields, see this legislation as beneficial. An AIPAC report on this legislation answered to the question, Will this [legislation], hurt American companies?: No. It will level the playing field for U.S. companies: American firms are already banned by the Presidents Executive Order of May 6, 1995 [see History of Legislation section above] from engaging in trade and investment with Iran. This bill will deter foreign competitors from gaining an advantage by investing where U.S. companies cannot go. Seeing the effect that bureaucratic politics can have on an official U.S. stance on this legislation, it can be easily seen that no real unitary actor exists on the part of the United States as a whole entity. Recalling the four basic components of the Rational Choice Model above, the assumption of a unitary actor was the first and foremost of the components, and the components following mostly depended upon its existence. As a result, the USG as a whole cannot be seen as a rational actor if the events leading up to the signing of this legislation are to be taken into account. It is in my opinion however, that Bill Clinton did act as more or less a unitary actor while signing this legislation (as much as checks and balances allows), and as a result of meeting the subsequent components of the Rational Choice Model, acted upon a relatively rational level. At the most fundamental level, we must remember that this legislation was exactly that--legislation. It came in front of the President, and it was his decision whether to sign it into law, or veto it. . . he chose the latter. As Tanter stated in Whos at the Helm?, The heads of democratic states are accountable for both the process of decision making and the policies of the government. (quoted from Busman) At the signing of the legislation into law President Clinton was noted as saying, It will limit the flow of resources necessary to obtain weapons of mass destruction. . . With this legislation we strike hard where it counts, against those who target innocent lives and our very way of life. It shows we are fully prepared to act to restrict the funds to Iran and Libya that fuel terrorist attacks. When presented with the statement France says the Europeans will retaliate if this measure is implemented, the President replied, Well, of course, thats their decision to make. but every advanced country is going to have to make up its mind whether it can do business with people by day who turn around and fuel attacks on their innocent civilians by night. Thats a decision that every countrys going to have to make. . . (White House Virtual Library) Taking B in the transitive preference ladder to be Iran, we can see that Clinton met the second component of Rational Choice with ease. If his Executive order on May 6, 1995 was A, and it produced a negative outcome on B . . . then C (Iran and Libya Sanctions Act) had an even more profound negative impact upon B. Therefore, since these negative impacts are good in Clintons point of view, and A hurts (>)B, then C should hurt (>) B even more because it is stronger than A, and as a result is better than A. (C>A). Now I arrive to Clintons derivation of the utility of this legislation in particular, and his focus on ends over morality. As will be shown through evidence, he meets both remaining criteria in text-book fashion. A report put out on October 13, 1995 commented on Clintons May 1995 Executive Order noting that the CIA has admitted to the American Congress that President Clintons unilateral [emphasis added] trade ban against Iran was failing and would not succeed in removing the Islamic government from power in Tehran. . . CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, John Gannon, was reported by the London Times as saying that the sanctions would have not long-term impact. (IRNA web site) Through reading such commentary, it has become clear to me that Clinton was definitely cognizant and unhappy about his perceived lack of action especially in regards to Iran. This, was compounded with the fact that the Iran and Libya Bill was set before the President for signing in the midst of an election year. As was discussed in Tanters Chapter on Iran in Rogue Regimes, it is at such times in which leaders place ideological issues at the forefront. This is especially significant when one considers that Clinton perceived dwindling support from such enormously influential interest groups as AIPAC for ideological reasons, and the business sector as well. (because U.S. companies were banned under the 1995 Executive Order, putting them at an unfair disadvantage to their competitors.) In the previously cited AIPAC report the question was asked, Wouldnt a multilateral response be better to stop Iran? To which AIPAC replies, Of course. Thats why the United States has done everything possible over the past several years to coordinated a multilateral response to Iran. . . Unfortunately, our allies have not cooperated, preferring to maintain economic relations with Iran . . . Some matters are so vital to our national security interests that the United States must act. Such is the case in dealing with Iran. The U.S. must lead by example to demonstrate to other countries the perils of their short-sighted approach. With such streams of thought floating around in interest group literature, coupled with accusations by the President that the European nations will have to decide whether they can make deals with people during the day who wreak terror at night, one can surmise that the President Clinton was very honestly (or at least was brought to be) worried about the nuclear weapons programs and terrorist incidents connected with Iran. The annual Department of State report on terrorism notes, Iran continued in 1995 to be the worlds most active supporter of international terrorism. . . [Iran supports Hizbollah, who was credited with the 1994 bombing of the Jewish Center in Buenos Aires], Iran also supports other radical organizations that commit terrorism in opposition to the peace process, including HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General command. It also provides safehaven to the Kurdistan Workers Party, a terrorist group fighting for an independent Kurdish state that carried out numerous terrorist acts in 1995 against Turkish interests. In addition, the report noted that international terrorist attacks against U.S. interests rose from 66 to 99 in from 1994-95, and that the number of U.S. citizens killed rose from four to twelve, while the total number of fatalities from international terrorism worldwide declined from 314 to 165. (Wilcox et. al) Speaking on the number one state sponsor of terrorism, Clintons own Secretary of State Warren Christopher noted, Iran is in a class by itself in its pursuit of two of the worlds chief dangers: international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While on one side the State Department and National Security Council were concurring that Iran was indeed a threat, on the other the director of the CIA and the Pentagon were agreeing as well. (AIPAC report, Klare) I believe that Clinton took the perception of his lack of action, the unhappiness of interest groups and business interests (with the previous Executive Order), reports from several channels within the USG framework that Iran was a true menace, the fact that it was an election year etc., and decided to take action by signing the legislation in question into law. While the reasoning for Clintons appeasement of groups such as AIPAC and the State Department and Pentagon might be easily deduced, the question of U.S. business and U.S. allies is now at hand. The AIPAC report notes that Australian giant BHP announced Australias biggest project in Iran in January 1996, a multibillion dollar pipeline deal from Iran to Pakistan but canceled the project a month later, specifically because of the prospect of this bill [Iran and Libya. . . ] becoming law. . . Japans construction giant JGC announced interest in February 1996 in three onshore gas projects in Iran, at a time when other contracting firms told the press they were reluctant to invest in Iran because of concerns over the US legislation. Soon thereafter, JGCs Chairman responded to a letter from Senator Al DAmato, lead sponsor of the senates version of the bill saying that JGC would not, in fact, participate in new projects in Iran. In addition to these two projects, AIPAC noted that Shell was dissuaded in investing, and that the French company, Total agreed not to pursue any further projects in Iran. As a result, the report notes, U.S. firms working on competing projects outside Iran (such as BHPs pipeline), and pipelines from Pakistan to Turkmenistan and Qatar, are now at an advantageous position. Through the aforementioned analysis, it becomes clear how Clinton believed he would appease his business interests inside his own borders. The final question he had to deal with (and at the crux of controversy behind this legislation), was Will this Legislation Provoke a Trade War involving retaliatory sanctions against American companies? Although many have predicted this would be so (see above), the AIPAC report notes, It shouldnt. Iran is only a minor market for our major trading partners: Irans total imports were $10 billion in 1995, 1/3 of 1% of global imports. . . this [legislation] does not try to block purchases of Iranian oil, the major interest our allies have in Iran. With this having been said, it was probably this same line of analysis that Clinton followed when rationalizing his decision to sign the legislation into law. AIPAC was a leading advocate in his re-election bid, and constitutes the ideological reasoning of a large percentage of American voters, most of whom are interested in such issues during election years. With the evidence now presented, I believe that President Clinton was as close to a unitary actor as he could be, and he followed the transitive preference component of the Rational Choice Model. In addition, I believe that he showed that he placed more emphasis on the ends of his action, irregardless of the morality of his actions, by cutting off the Iranian civilian population (currently Iran derives more than 90 percent of its hard currency from its petroleum industry), by alienating his allies, and consequently isolating the U.S. Finally, I believe that by weighing all the factors mentioned above, (in lieu of the fact that he was in the midst of an election year), Clinton saw his gain to be maximized and loss minimized by signing the legislation and therefore he followed the rule of rational expected utility. Now that the theoretical orientation of the actors involved has been established, it is an opportune time to observe under which theories and to what extent they are acting. Of the three methods of affecting adversary behavior (Search, Persuasion, and Strategy), the U.S. only used the latter in dealing with Iran via this legislation. In my estimation, the use of coercion within the context of Prospect Theory is the best way of explaining the U.S.s exact approach. Deterrence is commonly defined as an action (threat) taken to force a party to maintain a certain behavior, or prevent them from changing their behavior. Coercion is commonly defined as an action taken to get a party to change unacceptable behavior, or to undo an acceptable action already taken. Compellance, is generally defined as coercion, but with a harsher connotation. Often military force is used in compellance. While the aforementioned definitions apply to different aspects of strategy (using rewards/punishments to get an actor to take a certain action), search and persuasion are different. Search involves pursuit of another possibility. Finally, persuasion involves convincing another actor to take an action without force by showing that (the persuador) is not in control of the outcome, but just making the other actor aware of the costs and benefits of action/inaction. 4 Through the aforementioned definitions, it becomes clear that the U.S.s policy of economic sanctions, particularly in lieu of the legislation at hand, is one of a coercive nature. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was noted as stating, Our policy toward Iran has been consistent from the start; that is, to use our diplomatic and economic measures and our military deterrent to contain Iran and to pressure it to cease its unacceptable actions. (quoted in Busman, 5/1/95). Although this statement was made the week of Clintons previous Executive Order, the ideas involved still apply to the Iran and Libya legislation of this year. Until this date, (as we are aware), no major military conflicts have broken out between the U.S. and Iran, and therefore we must assume that the U.S. is following a coercive path of strategy, just short of actual compellance. In regards to Prospect Theory 5, the basic underlying tenant is that losses are more salient than gains to a policy maker and thus he/she will follow the policy of loss aversion, as opposed to gain maximization. If a person pays more attention to gain than losses, which is most likely, (it hurts more to lose $20, than elated to find $20. This leads to loss aversion, a cornerstone of Prospect theory). People become risk acceptant. they will risk more to avoid this loss than they would to gain. They are so preoccupied with the possible loss, that may go all out in order to avoid losing or getting too far from their reference point. With these definitions in mind, it becomes clear why I believe President Clinton acted within the confines of Prospect Theory by using coercive strategies. As a unitary actor, he decided that economic sanctions were the best method available to coerce the Iranian government into stopping its terrorist actions and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. When weighing the possible backlash by U.S. allies, (as discussed above) it is my contention that Clinton went all out in order to avoid losing the election, more U.S. lives, etc. and decided to take the risk-acceptant posture of alienating his allies. Legal Authority: At this point in the discussion, I move to analyze the legal authority that Clinton took under domestic law, and how it might contradict with international norms and regulations. As was discussed above, Clinton cited Executive Order 12170 (state of national emergency with respect to Iran--Carter administration), and the subsequent Executive Order 12613, which banned most imports from Iran in 1987. (Reagan administration). The previous E.O. cited Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. sec. 1701 et seq., [and] the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. sec. 1601 et seq., and 3 U.S.C. sec. 301, while the latter states, By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (22 U.S.C. 2349aa-9), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code. In addition to the two E.O.s, when President Clinton signed the Executive Order calling for the unilateral boycott of Iran in May of 1995, he also called upon the powers designated to him Pursuant to section 204 (b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. More specific to the legislation at hand , under Section 6 Description of Sanctions, it is noted, (2) Export Sanction--The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to a sanctioned person under--(i) The Export Administration Act of 1979; (ii) The Arms Export Control Act; (iii) The Atomic Energy Act of 1954; and (iv) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the Unites States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services. Summing up the domestic justification for such legislation, Tanter notes that [according to] the Paquette Habana Case, International law is a part of our law. But it can be disregarded by treaty, Executive Order, or judicial decision. See Article 1, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution [of the U.S.] (472law2.doc) Extraterritoriality: As far as international norms and regulations are concerned, it has been argued that the extraterritorial intent of this legislation lends it to becoming a blatant violation of international law. (Tehran Times 8/31/96). I will now proceed to look into these accusations. GATT (the general agreement on tariffs and trade) appears that it would have the most to note on this topic. Although under GATT norms, a move (such as sanctions) with the intent of gaining commercial advantage for the acting party would be illegal, the U.S. officially denies that this would be the intent. The AIPAC report notes, This [legislation] does not violate the GATT. With respect to the right of the U.S. to take unilateral action, GATT Article XXI [states] that the United States has a very clear and legitimate interest to prevent nuclear weapons development and terrorism by Iran. While I do agree with AIPAC that the U.S. does have this right, and that Article XXI of GATT allows this: Nothing in this agreement shall be construed. . .to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, I also believe (as discussed in the theoretical section above) that the U.S. (and President Clinton in particular), had more than just its security interests in mind when signing this legislation into law. This is irrespective of the argument that the threat to U.S. security is over-inflated in the first place. (Klare). Additionally, I believe that the U.S. could feasibly think of ways of achieving the same goals, without having to alienate its allies, and consequently putting its own industries at an advantage over foreign competitors. In fact, the European Commission has noted, [we] fail to see why the United States needs to hit out at its friends while targeting its adversaries. (Tanter) When speaking of this legislation, understanding of the extraterritoriality factor can be facilitated by viewing it in a larger class of rules and regulations, which includes the Helms-Burton Act. This law had similar purposes, but with the island-nation of Cuba as its target, as opposed to Iran and Libya. Also signed into law within the midst of this past election year, President Clinton has been receiving more criticism on account of world organizations in regards to this legislation, than the Iran and Libya Act. (Tampa Tribune, 1996). However, it is within the context of these criticisms, in which the worlds organizations have been leashing out against extraterritorial terms in all legislation as a whole. (particularly against U.S. legislation). On the 12th of November, 1996, The United Nations General Assembly called for an end to the United States-imposed embargo against Cuba by a 137-3-25 vote, with the three votes against belonging to Israel, the United States, and Uzbekistan. A U.N. press release relating to the vote stated, The General Assembly this morning again urged States to repeal all laws and measures, the extraterritorial effects of which influence the sovereignty or freedom of trade and navigation of other States, such as the United States legislation known as the Helms-Burton Act. . . By adopting [the] resolution, the Assembly called on States to refrain from promulgating and applying such measures, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter and international law. Besides the U.N., the E.U., O.A.S., and W.T.O. have been making statements on or investigating extraterritorial legislation. The E.U. notes on its Europa web site that, the extraterritorial intent of this legislation has also been made clear by Senator DAmato himself, while introducing [it] on the floor of the Senate when he stated that Simply put, a foreign corporation or person will have to choose between trade with the United States or trade with Iran. . . While the European Union shares some of the US concerns vis-a-vis Iran . . . The EU has made clear that it considers that the US has no basis in international law to claim the right to regulate in any way transactions taking place outside the US with Iran undertaken by subsidiaries of US companies incorporated outside the US or to impose export of procurement sanctions on any foreign person or foreign-owned company who trades with Iran. In a statement made the day of the signing of the act in Brussels, the European Commission stated, We in the European Union fully support the determination of the United States to combat terrorism in all its forms and whatever its source. . . We do not believe, however, that the dAmato law goes in the right direction. It establishes the unwelcome principle that one country can dictate the foreign policy of others, and disturbs the unity of purpose between allies that is so necessary if we are to stamp out terrorism successfully together. The EU has already said it will act to defend its rights and interests if they are jeopardised by this legislation. (Europa web site) Our neighbors to the North made the following similar statement in regards to the Helms-Burton Act: Canada shares the U.S. objectives of improving human rights standards and moving to more representative government in Cuba . . . But we are concerned that the Helms-Burton Act takes the wrong approach. That is why we have been working with other countries to uphold the principles of international law. (Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade-Canada) The Canadian report continues to say that the NAFTA bureaucracy has been consulted and that Mexico shares its concerns. In addition, Canadas objections to the Helms-Burton Act have been raised at the highest levels. Canada is working to oppose [it] in such international bodies as the WTO, OECD, and the OAS. As a result of such actions, the OAS has issued a 32 member signatory resolution condemning extraterritorial acts such as Helms-Burton, and the WTO is now involved in a lengthy investigation of the legalities of such legislation. In law4.doc, although the Paquette Habana case is mentioned, international norms are also explicitly stated: The United States does not have jurisdiction to enforce its laws, i.e., to take measures directed towards compliance, on another nations sovereign territory, absent consent by the other nation. Chapter 2, Section 2 of United States Statute in conflict with International law. Tanter notes that Franck and Glennon do cite the Cunningham v. Neagle case (as a result of the case, it becomes precedent that the USG has the power to command obedience to its laws), however I do not see that as justification for U.S. actions internationally, just domestically. As a result of the case, it becomes precedent that the USG has the power to command obedience to its laws. As far as the body of international law cases involved with extraterritoriality are concerned, cases on the Supreme Court docket exist that can be construed either way. (In support of Clintons actions, or against). In the case Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, (1977); the plaintiffs alleged that there had been a direct and substantial effect on United States Foreign Commerce, and that defendants intended the results of the conspiracy, including the impact on United States commerce. In this case, because of such damages, Timberlane was allowed to collect moneys. Clinton was able to use such cases by saying that when Cuba seized property formerly belonging to Americans, this had been shown to be compensated in judicial hearings. (Lexis) However, other Supreme Court cases including Underhill v. Hernandez and American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (1897 and 1909 respectively) 6 showed that Clintons actions are not justified. This is particularly important, considering that these decisions were made by the Supreme Court of the United States, and not an international body: Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. In fact, in the American Banana case, the Americans were complaining of a Costa Rican seizure of their lands. To this the Supreme Court said our courts could not challenge. (Lexis search) A doctrine by the name of the act of State doctrine has emerged from the body of international court cases dealing with this subject. A Lexis search of extraterritoriality mentions, The leading modern statement of the act of state doctrine appears in Banco nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino (1964). . . The court concluded that the doctrine was not compelled by the nature of sovereignty, by international law, or by the text of the Constitution. Rather, it derives from the judiciarys concern for its possible interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by the political branches of the government: The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this countrys pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere. (Lexis) After sifting through what has seemed like a mountain of evidence, it has become clear to me that while the United States actions might be fully justified within the context of domestic law (especially in lieu of Cuban and Iranian seizures of American property and embassies). However, the emerging body of international norms and laws do not deem Clintons actions legal. In fact, when one ponders on the origin of international law, it must be seen that the law is simply the conglomeration of brain-storming efforts between sovereign nations, on bi-lateral bases, or within the context of international organizations and the like. The U.N., O.A.S., E.U., W.T.O., and O.E.C.D. are all such international organizations which have shown criticism of Clintons extraterritorial maneuvers, be them towards Iran, or any other nation. What is even more significant, is that the U.S. is a member and supposed leader of many of these organizations, and that if the U.S. keeps along its current path, it will eventually fit the definition of rogue (diplomatically speaking) just as well if not better than the nations in which such legislation is intended to keep in check. Conclusions and Policy Implications: In a time in which the dangers of nuclear proliferation and terrorism run rampant among the ruins of the cold war, I believe it to be an enormous mistake for the U.S. to jeopardize its relations with its allies, while further exacerbating its relations with its adversaries. It struck me the other day as I picked up my issue of the New York Times dated November 20, 1996. On the front page, a huge picture of Fidel Castro and Pope John Paul II is shown in which they are conversing in a pleasant manner. On the same page, is an equally large picture of the (soon to be deposed) U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The article is entitled Boutros-Ghali vs. Goliath: His Account. In the article, the Secretary General describes in detail the near impossibility which is found in trying to stand off against the U.S., and the sheer ridiculousness of it is, considering that The U.S. Stands Alone (the title of a front page NYT article from the day before). Even in more mainstream journals such as Time magazine, the most recent issue dated December 2, 1996 includes a two-page story on the Secretary v. U.S. struggle entitled The Unforgiven. Perhaps policy-makers could justify such maneuvers by the U.S. if the legislation was an astounding success, (thereby overshadowing the U.S.s increasingly isolationist stance in world politics) . . . but it simply is not. On October 7th of this year it was reported Irans trade with leading Western countries has shown further signs of recovery this year, boosted by continuing rises in oil exports and a reversal in the decline of imports over the past few years. The trend indicates that Irans trade surplus with the European Union is expected to soar past dlrs 3 billion in 1996, with firm oil prices adding to the extra trade gained from the extension of last years U.S. boycott. (IRNA web site). I believe that it will be in the U.S.s best interests not to shun the U.N. and its allies, and to continue its good terms of trade from years gone. Any visitor of foreign nations as close as Canada, to as far as the continents of Europe and Asia can attest to the fact that the U.S. is increasingly being seen as an arrogant state, concerned with only its own financial gain and power standing in the world. While I do believe that national security should always take precedence in decisions such as trade, perhaps more compromise (or at least hiding of our intentions) can and should be pursued. In regards to our allies, assumptions such as what the major interests our allies have in Iran (pg.12 of this paper), and that the legislation shouldnt provoke retaliatory actions should not be made. In the end, the media portraying the Pope of all people on friendly terms with U.S. enemies can not be beneficial for U.S. interests. In addition, I also assert that less of a coercive attitude within the context of Prospect Theory would serve U.S. interests. On December 9th of this year, a report entitled U.S. sanctions will only intensify Iranians anti-west attitude concurs with my feelings. (IRNA web site) As has been shown in past Iranian/U.S. relations, the more the U.S. affected Iran negatively, the worse the situation, (and hence the terrorism etc.) got. In my opinion, such legislation may fuel the fire of anti-U.S. attitudes which it was written to prevent in the first place. I believe that successful coercion/compellance is contingent upon more of a multi-lateral approach, which the U.S. simply has not secured. In addition, perhaps more search and persuasion should be employed with rogue nations such as Iran, which can (if employed successfully), increase the level of cooperation, and hence rule out the need for use of strategy. While using strategy, I also believe that the U.S. might be in a better position if it employs more rewards for good action, and less of the punishments for bad actions. I feel confident that the U.S.s current level of military preparedness can supply the military deterrent needed to stop unwanted actions by rogue nations. While my outlook is very optimistic and hopeful for the security and the future of the U.S., I do believe that such legislation would be better suited to the new world order if they would cease in alienating the U.S.s allies, and fanning the flames of adversity between the U.S. and its enemies. Works Cited AIPAC statement, Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act (H.R. 3107) Questions and Answers. Search of Iran and Sanctions, under Info-Seek search engine. Allison, Graham T. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996. Pgs. 1-38. Cole, Juan R. Assorted Lectures from History 542Modern Iran and the Gulf States. University of Michigan History Dept., Fall 96. Cottam, Richard. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979. (79-82, 320-363). Class Home Page. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/: 472not1.doc, 472not21.doc 472law2.doc, 472 Item 52 midterm review. Department of Foreign AffairsCanada. http://www.draft-maecl.gc.ca/english.news/pres Diba, Farhad. Mossadegh: A Political Biography. Dover, New Hampshire: Croom Helm Publishers, 1986. (152-153, 165, 195). Europa Web Site. http://europa.eu.int. Huntington, Samuel P. Clash of the Civilizations?. Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993, pgs. 22-49. IRNA web site. http://www.netiran.com/ Keddie, Nikkie. Roots of Revolution. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981. (79-82, 113-115, 132-141,288-289). Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. N.Y., New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. Pgs. 142-43. Lexis search: GenFed library, search of American Banana v. United Fruit, Timberlane Lumber v. Bank of America, Underhill v. Hernandez, and Cuba v. Sabbatino. New York Times. November, 20, 1996. A1. Boutros-Ghali v. Goliath and picture. Rosenthall, A.M. Only a Matter of Time. NYT, Nov. 21, 1996. A19. Song, Anna. Prospect Theory Analysis. Posted on confer ps472. State Department home page: http://www.state.gov/index.html Tampa Tribune. Search of Helms-Burton Act. Date unknown (1996). Tanter, Raymond. Rogue Regimes. (yet to be published). Text of Iran Chapter (Chap. 2) can be found on class home page. (see above). Texts of E.O.s 12170, 12613, Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, U.N. charter, and U.S. constitution, from library research and internet searches. Time magazine. The Unforgiven. Dec. 2, 1996. Pgs. 46-7. U.N. press release. U.N. home page: http://www.un.org White House Home Page: http://www.whitehouse.gov/ Wilcox, Philip C. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995. Department of State Home Page: (see above). April, 1996. 1 Information about the history of Iran derived from Keddies Roots of Revolution, Cottams Nationalism in Iran, Dibas Mossadegh: A Political Biography, and Professor Juan R. Coles History 542: Modern Iran and the Gulf States. 2 Much thanks to Philip Busman and Siti Othman, whose papers lead me to research the proper Executive Orders and legislation dealing with sanctions on Iran. 3 Review of the Rational Choice Model taken from Professor Huths guest lecture on 10/14/96. 4 Definitions taken from PS472 Item 52 midterm review. (posted on confer, and on Tanter web page) 5 Prospect Theory analysis taken from Anna Songs post on confer. 6 Much thanks to Professor Tanters former student who posted on confer these cases, making my search of Lexis/Nexis much more simple.