Javier Diaz North Korea: Rogue Regime prospectus INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS PS 472-prof. Raymond Tanter 18 NOV 96 PREFACE-THEORETICAL ORIENTATION North Korea presents one of the most perplexing security crises to the US of any of the rogue regimes we have discussed thus far in this term. Their dedication to isolation and their own national security agenda has closed their doors from the rest of the world. Their attainment of nuclear capabilities has made them a prime candidate for hegemonic power in the near future. Nuclear capability coupled with a vast military gives them a virtually unlimited potential for power growth in the international arena. For these reasons the US has sought to limit their nuclear capabilities and to bring them out of their isolation by opening their markets to the western world. For the Koreans there is much to gain from an open market and relations with the US. They have much to gain because of the many resource problems they face that the US may be able to resolve. My main question in light of my opening is; Why does US continue a policy of containment and North Korea continue to isolate themselves despite the fact that cooperation would be in both partiesÕ best interests? Other questions that arose as pertaining to my main question include-How unitary an actor is Kim Jong Il and how will he handle US/ North Korean government relations in the near future? Is the North Korean government at the point of desperation because of their lack of available resources? Is the latest ÒSubmarine IncidentÓ a sign of brinkmanship? If so, what are the motivations for such actions? Also, how will the North Korean people handle a western invasion after so many years of isolation and anti-American sentiments being fed to them by the North Korean government. The US governmentÕs prospective will be the principal interest I will address in this paper. This is because information on the North Korean government is scarce and often speculative because of the isolationist policy of the North Koreans. This policy prevents the release of information to the outside world. The majority of information on North Korea will come from recent military action, press releases on statements made by the North Korean government on their actions, and Department of Defense releases on North Korean positions. The information for the US perspective will come from a much wider base of information including statements by prominent US leaders and from various DOD resources. We will begin with the rationality of action of North Korean military and leaders. The North Korean government has a long history of isolation from the outside world. Their policy of Juche(self-reliance) has been in effect for over 50 years.1 The people of North Korea are in a position where they see the outside world as an antagonistic entity trying to implore the horrors of capitalism upon them. This Stalinist policy has thus created a bias which the North Korean government continues to propagate. This isolation has recently led to what many view to be a desperate situation for the North Koreans. Their very survival may now depend on how they will act in relation to the outside world. The North Korean government is basically left with a forked road as their choice. They can either attack the South Koreans in an effort to take resources by means of their huge military potential or they can open the door for good relations with the outside world. Regardless of the decision they make, when the North Korean government does decide what to do they will most likely be acting on motivated biases. They will see what they want to see from the situation rather than rationally assessing their actions.2 The reason being they will be acting out of a many pronged set of fears. These fears include a fear of famine, a fear of revolt, a fear of destruction of their way of life, or a fear of invasion by agitators. These fears may all be taken into account when making the decision of whether or not to cooperate with the outside world, primarily with the US an South Korea. As we have discussed in class, when an actor Òdwells in a basement of fearÓ he lowers his position on the rheostat of rationality.3 Kim Jong Il has been declared the Supreme leader of North Korea, for this reason it may seem that he is the supreme unitary actor when we examine the rationality of North Korea. However, looking closely, I see a flaw in this line of thinking. With the death of his father Kim Il-Song many thought that Kim Jong Il did not make a concerted effort to consolidate his power.4 I was one of them. I believed he took too long to declare himself the leader of a country that I viewed to be very unstable. However, looking once again at the situation I realized that there were many indications that Kim Jong IlÕ s power base had been established and solidified. First, there was the coup that occurred just days after he took office. This coup was handily quelched by the government with the use of some inside sources. Several factions in the Korean PeopleÕs Army(KPA) attempted a coup dÕetat in April of 1995,5 . Secondly, we see the solidification of the leadership embodied by the ÒSupreme leaderÓ of North Korea. Kim Jong-Il is the Supreme Commander of the KPA, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Secretary General of the Korean WorkersÕ Party(KWP), and President of North Korea.6 These two factors are important because they solidify his power base which gives him the unitarity he so desires. Finally there is the question of coercive diplomacy, it has become obvious to me that the U.S. has taken a stance of complete deterrence toward the North Koreans. My reasoning is that the posture of the U.S. has been that of the defender, the U.S. has offered a reasonable amount of raw materials and food stuffs to North Korea. In exchange the North Koreans have the position of a potential initiator, they have the decision of whether or not to continue their policy of Juche isolation. If they continue, then the U.S. will not offer the goods and the North Koreans will remain in dire straits. If the North Koreans do accept the offer then they will be breaking a long-term commitment to their isolationist policies and will open the way for other relations.7 As of the last three years the North Koreans have been forced to accept aid from long-time enemies including South Korea and Japan to cover about 50% of their overall subsistence.8 They have however not left the realm of the Orient for their supplies. However, with the signing of the Agreed Framework, and with the new trade talks occurring in the Far East, their acceptance of aid and the opening of their markets to the western world does not seem that far off. By using an assurance/deterrence policy, the US has opened the way for good relations, the rewards they are offering for good behavior9 may be too tempting for the North Koreans to refuse. LOGICAL STRUCTURE The position of the US in the matter is to continue to contain the North Koreans. Why is this policy continued is part of the main question. There are several key factors in determining why the US continues to contain the North Koreans. Primarily at concern for the US are the unitarity of North Korea and how it relates to the rationality of Kim Jong-Il, the intrinsic necessities of North Korea, and the strategic interests at stake for both the North Koreans and the US. Finally, I will discuss the legality of the precedence by which the actors validate their actions. Exactly how unitary an actor is North Korea. This question probably plagues the mind of several foreign policy officials in Washington constantly. I have concluded that Kim Jong-il has the final word in the decisions made by the government. Since 1989 he has been bred to be the leader of the country and to replace his father who was notorious for his control over his country. Kim Jong-il was given several positions of great power in government prior to his fatherÕs death. The authority and strength of the positions he was given increased as he learned how to better run the government. Some of these positions include being appointed Supreme Commander of the KPA in 1991 and Chairman of the National Defense Commission in 1993.11 This unitarity I believe limits the ability of the country to evolve and progress. The reason being that in this case the actor has been bred to lead in the same way as his predecessor. This closed-mindedness leads to misperceptions and both motivated and unmotivated biases. The reason being that the actor sees only what he has been trained to see and maintains these long-standing policies regardless of what is going on in the world around him11 . He acts like a horse going into a burning barn. Regardless of the fire the horse will go into his stall because that is where he feels safe, that is where he has been trained to go. Kim Jong-il has been bred to believe that isolation is safe12 and that is where he should stay despite the fact that the world around him is crumbling. In North Korea, we see a classic example of the cognitive decision making process where the actor is inherently less rational because of past experience, misperceptions, and biases. The past experience is the Korean War and the stereotyping of the Western world as an inherently evil Capitalist entity out to crush the Communist party. The misperception is the same as the past experience ideal of the US as out to get the North Koreans. The biases have come from a long-standing hatred of the western world and an enemy mentality that cannot escape the North Koreans. These have all led to a paranoia in the leaders of the North Korean Government(NKG) that has led to a massive buildup of static military forces which maintain huge numbers of active servers and a vast network of reserves as well as a montage of various logistics personnel.13 With this much military potential how could the country be in need. Well, in order to maintain the 1.2 million man standing army and the strong defensive, coastal, air and navy the NKG must devote a huge portion of its Gross National Product to the production of goods to support it. In 1995, North Korea had to sacrifice its long standing policy of self reliance and accept aid from Japan and South Korea to fill nearly half of its food shortfall of more than 2 million tons.14 Secondly North Korea also devotes millions to its aggressive nuclear research program. This program is the point where the US and North Korea have found both failure and success in relating. There have been signs of promise in this topic, yet there have been several disappointments as well. Here is where there have been examples of search and the use of some aspects of deterrence. With the long-standing friction we have already established, we can see that a nuclear standoff could be a probable end to the matter. But, can the North Koreans establish a nuclear capability? As far as many are concerned the answer is yes. In 1980, the North Koreans kicked off the program by building the Yongbyon reactor, 100 km north of Pyongyang(the capital of North Korea). Since then they have begun construction on three more reactors in Yonbyon and Taechon.15 Nothing to suspect, right...wrong! In the early 80Õs the North Koreans built a secret facility used to separate plutonium which is the essential step to making a nuclear weapon. The Central Intelligence Agency discovered the existence of the plant in 1989. The reactors were officially to power the capital city and neighboring cities but could obviously be used for both purposes.16 The reason that the plant was hidden is that in 1985, under pressure from the Soviet Union, the NKG agreed to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty(NPT). They disclosed most of the information on their nuclear holdings and their facilities. The CIA estimates that there was enough plutonium to construct one or two bombs produced by the Yongbyon facility.17 After the initial inspections by the IAEA, the inspectors were not satisfied and requested that more inspections be done. The NKG refused and threatened to resign from the NPT. Since then the US has used a policy of assurance by rewarding the North Koreans for not actually withdrawing from the NPT. ÒIn the fall of 1994 North Korea agreed to suspend its nuclear program in exchange for a $4 billion dollar assistance program to build safeguarded light water power reactors...This agreement required that all reactor and reprocessing plant work be halted, that all irradiated fuel remain under safeguards and that North KoreaÕs domestic reactors be eventually dismantled.Ó 18 This was an unprecedented breakthrough in relations, however once again the North Koreans threatened to withdraw from this agreement, named the Agreed Framework. The NKG has been debating the issue from April of 1995 until June of 1996 and no progress has been made. There is no more updated information to draw from. Each time it appears that the US has successfully employed a search by looking for alternatives that resolve the conflict, the North Koreans threaten to destroy relations or withdraw. This has led to a lack of convincing persuasion in the region. Persuasion can flow directly from a search and can be optimized in this situation.19 The North Koreans have control of the situation, however the US has combined the ideas of persuasion and deterrence because they have incorporated a set of rewards and punishments to the equation.20 If the North Koreans cooperate then the US will give aid. If the North Koreans do not then Òdeterrence by denialÓ will be employed and they will get no aid for their starving people. Deterrence by denial is an idea that the US will deny the NKG the raw materials they need from the US if they do not cooperate with said treaties.21 Aside from intrinsic needs there are also strategic interests at risk for both sides. These interests have a serious influence on the decision making process as well. Although not as clear as the intrinsic interests the strategic interests play a role in perceptions of opponents, one to another. Strategic interests seem to be much less clear than intrinsic interests in most cases, however, in the realm of North Korea they seem pretty cut and dry. As far as the US is concerned they are looking to open up the markets of the Eastern world(intrinsic) and to retain their hegemonic control of the world(strategic). These two key goals have a great amount of overlap. The US by opening the North Korean market to the world will set the stage for a more open East Asian market and a new market for distribution of goods. 22 The US will maintain their role in opening up the East to trade and keep their reputation for leadership and control in the Orient. 23 This role of a controller of the situation has been played by America ever since the Vietnam War and has been expanded since the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and Asia. The goals of the North Koreans are just as clear despite this Òveil of secrecyÓ they keep over their affairs. The North Koreans have been suffering from severe overpopulation and famine in many parts of their country. 24 This development has led to a dire need for raw materials and foodstuffs, however they do not want to sacrifice their military potential to get it. Here, the North Koreans have demonstrated a bit of Prospect Theory in my opinion. My reasoning is that although this is not a classic example of prospect theory where a leader pays more attention to his losses in war than his gains. 25 Here we see North Korea paying more attention to what they would lose, one of the largest militaries in the world and a blossoming nuclear program, than to what is really important which is to feed their people. This loss aversion strategy has put North Korea in the position of having to accept food from traditional enemies. 26 Their strategic interests are to save face in the Orient and to achieve a foothold in the international diplomatic arena as well as preserve their isolationist integrity. Their loss aversion tactics are already preventing their opportunity to achieve those strategic interests. The loss of the support of longtime allies in China and the Soviet Union has ensured that the North Koreans have no chance at preserving their isolationist integrity. The reason being that with every other country involved in international trade, and North Korea left out they will never have the raw materials necessary to endure. 27 They are destined to become another Cuba, left out in the cold of the International Trade market. So why is North Korea continuing this isolationist policy I have asked and why do the starved people not rise and revolt and what is the government planning to do? These following key questions are at the core of the argument. Why does North Korea continue the isolationist policy. The answer is simple, pride. Their long-standing tradition of Juche embodies everything that North Korea is. Their identity id defined by this concept. Just as Switzerland is defined by their ideals of permanent neutrality, North Korea is defined by Juche. In several speeches Kim Jong-il has urged the North to make the country a ÒfortressÓ protected from the horrors of Capitalism and Democracy.28 How does Kim intend to achieve these goals. His idea is to maintain the same policies that have gone on for the last 50 years. The North Korean people will not be informed of anything that is not censored by the NKG. This way the ideas of revolution and revolt will not gain a seed in their heads. By feeding the people anti-West propaganda the NKG helps its own cause. The people instead of blaming the NKG for not supplying them with food, blame the Capitalist, democratic countries for Òtaking the food out of their childrenÕs mouths.Ó 29 The North Korean government has censored every bit of information about the outside world. Even when the Olympics came to North Korea, the athletes were given limited contact for fear of dissenters. Finally, what is the North Korean government planning to do? This question is the key to the debate. We must not only look into the recent events to answer this question, we must also look inside the Òblack boxÓ of Kim Jong-il. In his Òblack boxÓ 30, Kim Jong-il retains a sense of hatred toward the western world. He believes he should be able to run the country with no outside interference and that the US should not get involved in Òmatters that do not concern them.Ó 31 So how will he combat this outside influence and this famine at the same time. I believe that Kim Jong-il will test his limits of power by employing a policy of brinkmanship before an all out attack on South Korea. There are several reasons that this strategy seems plausible. First of all, their threatened withdrawal from the Agreed Framework and their refusal to be inspected by the IAEA seems to be a ploy to buy time, possibly to build one or two nuclear weapons. 32 With a nuclear threat the North will have doubled its threat credibility because they will have both the reputation of irrationality that goes with Kim Jong-ilÕs refusal to be in the international trade arena and they will have the means with which to threaten. 33 Second, the NKG is slowly becoming more and more desperate. The famine and widespread poverty are taking a toll on the people and they will soon be calling for some action. They are in an obvious basement of fear and needs and we all know that irrationality is the common result of this type of posture 34. Fearing loss of power and prestige the NKG may decide to strike in order to preserve their way of life. They have already demonstrated some signs of brinkmanship where they appear to be stretching their bounds on military action. In 1994 they deployed several long range artillery rockets to the demilitarized zone and subsequently have also deployed several combat aircraft to that area. 35 However, most significantly, In September of 1996, the South Korean military discovered a North Korean mini-submarine off their coast. The passengers inside escaped but were later discovered to be North Korean undercover operatives on a mission. This sign of war was denied by the North, who said those men were on a routine training mission and suffered engine trouble. 36 One of the spies captured said that this type of mission happened fairly often and that the numbers have been increasing. 37 To me, this is an obvious sign of brinkmanship, where the North is testing the waters to see how much it can get away with, without a response from the US. How does North Korea justify these actions legally and how does the US justify their stance legally. Well the North Koreans have a simple answer for the justification of their actions. They have never officially signed a treaty that ended the Korean War, so technically the two countries are still at war. If North Korea reduced its army, or released information about its nuclear program, then that would jeopardize their chances of winning the war. This justification leaves the door open for them to do just about anything in the realm of military action that is not limited by the armistice they did sign. 38 So, how do the Americans combat this? The US cites the several treaties that the NKG has agreed to over the years as a rallying point to influence the NKG to cooperate. The specific goals of the NPT and the Agreed Framework will never be met however, because of the loose writing form in which they state the restrictions. Too many loopholes have been left for the North Koreans to leap through. 39 For example, nowhere in the Agreed Framework does it specifically address dual-use of resources, whereas it should say that all resources given must be used for civilian power supplies 40.The NPT and the Agreed Framework as well as a new more specific treaty must slowly be fed to the NKG in order for them to cooperate. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry said that the North Koreans must be weaned from their own history to join the rest of the world. 41 CONCLUSIONS The conclusion is that the US needs to continue to try to deter the North Koreans by any means necessary. It appears, however, that a more hard-line stance is necessary. The rewarding of actions before they occur has led the North Koreans to take advantage of the US. They have continually refuted IAEA inspectors and have knitpicked or outright denied the treaties they have signed.42 The solution is to continue a deterrence policy until they are at their breaking point and must cooperate. Why not persuasion rather than deterrence? The reason is that persuasion will lead to a showdown with a very formidable military whose full potential is still unknown. This may cause another Vietnam. So how does the US take a more hard-line stance without employing persuasion. Deterrence by denial, the US must intensify the deterrence by denial. Event though this may cause a more intense basement of fear I believe that this is the key to getting them to cooperate. Without food, soldiers cannot fight, without fuel tanks canÕt roll and planes canÕt fly. Intensify deterrence by denial and the NKG will learn quickly that cooperation would be in their best interests. Once this occurs, the US must present the NKG with an out that will allow them to cooperate with us as well as save face in the Orient and allow them to maintain their countryÕs solidarity. The more hard-line stance could also include an increased military presence in South Korea to prevent a retaliatory strike, deadlines for IAEA inspections and a policy where the US will not trade with countries that will trade with North Korea. These three things will assure the cooperation and safe dismantling of the North Korean regime without an increased threat of a strike on North Korea. However, we must be careful on how fast we push the North Koreans for we may end up with a war that is not ours on our hands if we try to do too much, too fast Defense Intelligence Agency ÒNorth Korea:Foundations for Military Strength.Ó. Defense Intelligence Agency .via the Internet Tanter, Raymond. PS472 Class Notes. Fall 1996 Ibid. Defense Intelligence Agency ÒNorth Korea:Foundations for Military Strength.Ó Defense Intelligence Agency. via the Internet Bermudez, Joseph. ÒFailed Military Coup in North Korea RevealedÓ. 1996.via the Internet Defense Intelligence Agency ÒNorth Korea:Foundations for Military Strength.Ó Defense Intelligence Agency. via the Internet Ibid. M...., John. ÒWorldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Commitee by the Director of Central Intelligence.Ó DCI speech. 2/22/96 Ibid. Defense Intelligence Agency ÒNorth Korea:Foundations for Military Strength.Ó Defense Intelligence Agency. via the Internet Tanter, Raymond. PS472 Class Notes. Fall 1996 Defense Intelligence Agency ÒNorth Korea:Foundations for Military Strength.Ó Defense Intelligence Agency. via the Internet Ibid. M...., John. ÒWorldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Commitee by the Director of Central Intelligence.Ó DCI speech. 2/22/96 Sublette, Carey. ÒNuclear Danger ZoneÓ. RAND Corp., Apr 1995 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid Tanter, Raymond. PS472 Class Notes. Fall 1996 Ibid. Bailey, Russell. ÒNorth Korea: Development though CoercionÓ. Glossary. Winter 1996 Bodansky, Yosseff. ÒThe Rise of the Trans-Asian Axis: Is it The Basis Of New Confrontation?Ó. Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy. Sept. 1994 Ibid. CNN. ÒFood shortage not hurting North Korean GovernmentÓ. Sept 16, 1996 Tanter, Raymond. PS472 Class Notes. Fall 1996 Ibid. Defense Intelligence Agency ÒNorth Korea:Foundations for Military Strength.Ó Defense Intelligence Agency. via the Internet Jong-il, Kim. On the Speeding Up the building of Socialism. Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1993 Defense Intelligence Agency ÒNorth Korea:Foundations for Military Strength.Ó Defense Intelligence Agency. via the Internet Tanter, Raymond. PS472 Class Notes. Fall 1996 Jong-il, Kim. On the Speeding Up the building of Socialism. Foreign Languages Publishing House. 1993 Sublette, Carey. ÒNuclear Danger ZoneÓ. RAND Corp., Apr 1995 Tanter, Raymond. Class discussion. ÒThreat Credibility and Critical RiskÓ Bailey, Russell. ÒNorth Korea: Development though CoercionÓ. Winter 1996 M...., John. ÒWorldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Commitee by the Director of Central Intelligence.Ó DCI speech. 2/22/96 Reuters. ÒPerry rejects North Korean Sub explanationÓ. Reuters 1996 Ibid Defense Intelligence AgencyÓ North Korea:Foundations for Military Strength. ÒDefense Intelligence Agency. via the Internet Wendt, James C. ÒThe North Korean Nuclear Program: What is to be DoneÓ RAND Corp. 1994 Ibid. Perry, William. ÒEver Vigilant in the Asia-Pacific RegionÓ. US Department of Defense Publications. Vol. 10, No. 87, Sept. 12, 1995 Wendt, James C. ÒThe North Korean Nuclear Program: What is to be DoneÓ RAND Corp. 1994