Limore DeKalo Final Paper December 4, 1996 Preface: This paper intends to investigate in detail, from different theoretical perspectives, the reasons that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq ordered the invasion of Kuwait and the reasons why President Bush decided to intervene in support of Kuwait against Iraq in the Gulf War. Misperception was the burden on which the Gulf War, and more specifically the initial invasion, centered around. Iraq is classified as a rogue state, or nuclear outlaw, which is defined as states that "are mavericks equipped with modern weapons and hegemonic ambitions. They are third world powers seeking to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical armaments" (Klare, 1995, 472Not22.txt.). There are two policies that Klare differentiates between: deliberate overestimation and rogue state marginilization. Overestimation is when the threat of a rogue state is overestimated by the defender for its own purposes, an example of a motivated bias where leaders see what they want to see. Rogue state marginilization is when the rogue states are no longer deemed as important and they are denied the ability to be role models for other defective states. It is interesting to question whether "rogue" states have inherent rogueness or whether these states come to be labeled as rogues because of their external environment. It is conveniently understood that rogue actors are low on the rheostat of rationality. When two or more actors are engaged in an escalating dispute, if one actor is in a different position on the rheostat of rationality than another, escalation is caused by misperception. Classical deterrence theorists argue that leaders leap through windows of opportunity in order to maximize gain. In this case deterrence fails because someone is trying to gain things, and the defending state did not issue a credible deterrent threat. Windows signify freedom of choice for a unified actor to pursue expected gains. The Gulf War, and Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait, can be analyzed from a classical deterrence perspective because Saddam is a unitary actor in pursuit of expected gains. On the other hand, other theorists believe that leaders are in basements of felt needs (i.e. fear), where windows are illusions (472Not12.Doc, 1996). In the basement of fear, leaders are faced with restricted choices and they seek to minimize expected losses. Analyzing the Gulf War from this perspective we would believe that Saddam faced threats from his military opposition, leaving him with no choice but to invade Kuwait. We may also state that Saddam feared the debt his country was suffering from and had no choice but to proceed with the Kuwaiti invasion. From these two perspectives we can dissect the Gulf War into a process of decision making. Decision making is the foundation of the Gulf War which can be divided into information and value. The more information one has, the less uncertainty there is. Leaders need more information as to the consequences of their choices: stakes, costs, benefits, likelihood of success and failure. Value is defined as a simplification of the complexity 472Not1.Doc, 1996). All the incremental steps of the Gulf War followed a rational, decision-making process where each side, the US and Iraq, assumed different stakes and held different perspectives. Chronology of Events: Spring (May) 1990- Arab Summit including Iraq and Kuwait; Saddam protests low Kuwaiti oil prices July 10- OPEC agreement; decrease in oil production; increase in price of oil; Kuwaitis said they would only adhere until fall of 1990 July 16- Iraq and Kuwait negotiate; Iraq presents demands: 1.) Kuwait will provide $24 billion in revenue for disputed oil field along border; 2.) Kuwait will provide $12 billion to compensate depressed oil price on world market; 3.) Kuwait will cancel $10 billion debt that Iraq owes it from Iran-Iraq war; 4.) Kuwait will lease disputed island to Iraq Mid-July- Iraq builds up forces along Kuwaiti border; Kuwait threatened by Iraq to adhere to demands July 19-24- US government releases statements about US policy and interests July 25- Saddam meets with US ambassador to Iraq August 2- Iraq invades Kuwait November 8- US announces sending of 150,000 troops to Saudi Arabia in addition to those already sent into Gulf region November- Early January- increase in diplomatic activity as third parties mediate the dispute (i.e. France, UN, Soviet Union, Arab states) Late December- UN Security Council Resolution calling for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by mid-January of 1991; if Iraq does not withdraw, UN will use whatever means necessary to restore international peace and security January 16, 1991- US air attacks against Iraq February 24- US and coalition launch ground offensives and Iraq is compelled to accept cease-fire agreements and withdraw from Kuwait within 72 hours (Freedman and Karsh, 1993) Historical Setting: In 1930 the territorial dispute between Iraq and Kuwait began. A territorial dispute is defined as a "disagreement between states over where their common homeland or colonial borders should be fixed; one country contests rights of another country to exercise sovereignty over some or all of its homeland or colonial territory" (Huth, 1996, p.19). In 1932, Iraq gained its independence and Kuwait gained its freedom in 1961. Before Kuwait gained its independence, the dispute was between Iraq and Britain. Iraq's initial "excuses" for claims over Kuwait hinged on historical claims and sometimes the dispute was limited and centered around islands and land borders. Iraq agreed to give up the issue of where to draw the land border if Kuwait agreed to lease or give up islands to Iraq. But Kuwait only agreed to give up its islands only after the land border issue was settled. This deadlock of issues continued until the final invasion. Iraq viewed its island control as important in getting better access and security in the Persian Gulf region; Iraq only had one access to the Persian Gulf because of its prior dispute with Iran. There is long standing tension in Iraq since the Iran-Iraq war which left Iraq with an outstanding $80 billion debt. Saddam rallied Arabs behind his regime to build pressure on Kuwait because he wanted to get large sums of money to restructure Iraq's economy. Iraq needed to decrease expenditure and increase revenue since Saddam's domestic vulnerability would increase if the state had to be declared bankrupt. Through historical ties, Iraq said it annexed Kuwait in order to eliminate the trace of Western colonialism left in the Middle East. Kuwait was of high value to Iraq because it possessed wealth, a natural harbor, and 120 miles of the Gulf coastline. Iraq proceeded to threaten Kuwait, but Kuwait decided that surrendering to extortionist methods would only lead to unlimited demands by Iraq in the future. Kuwait ultimately decided not to decrease its oil production, not to forgive its wartime loans to Iraq, and not extend Baghdad additional grants. The violation of oil quotas by the Arab states was interpreted by Iraq as a "declaration of war on Iraq" (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, p. 46). The oil prices from 1980-1990 were low, thus compounding Iraq's debt since Iraqi oil exports make up a large percentage of its economy. In addition, OPEC members, specifically Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, drove the price of oil down even further by overproducing oil. When Iraq requested that OPEC members cut back on oil production, they refused to adhere so Iraq deemed their actions as an economic warfare on Iraq. This economic turmoil led to political instability in Iraq and to the discontent of the people in all job sectors because it made it even harder to find jobs. The domestic situation is a strong determinant in the shaping of foreign policy decisions. Due to the domestic turmoil in Iraq, Saddam released foreign hostages in Iraq and Kuwait in the hope that he would divert attention away from Kuwait and towards the Palestinian problem. Saddam was also intently observing Bush's tendency to "buckle under pressure" (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, p. 239) hoping that it would help his invasion. Baker said he would not make concessions with Iraq; he made this ultimatum: Saddam would get assurance that if he complied with the UN resolution he would be rewarded with an American promise not to attack; US would maintain military presence in Kuwait; Iraqi sanctions would be held intact until they gave up their chemical weapons and showed to abide by Non-Proliferation Treaty (Freedman and Karsh, 1993). The US was not willing to stand for anything less than complete withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. Saddam tried to manipulate the terms of the complete withdrawal ultimatum, and Bush worried that Saddam was trying to use the question of dates to impose further strains on the coalition, in turn, using diplomacy to weaken the coalition. Once Iraq saw that it had no other choice, Iraqi forces moved into Kuwait immediately. The US initially saw Iraqi troops move into Kuwait assuming it was for the purpose of intimidation. The US's stance was that it would support the sovereignty and integrity of Gulf States, but took no position on the Iraq-Kuwait dispute (Freedman and Karsh, 1993). Saddam was confident of American neutrality therefore allowing Iraq to pursue more brutal policies against Kuwait, with diminished concerns of the United States' potential intervention. The Geneva meeting was held in order to let Saddam know that force would be used if necessary, and that it was up to him if to avert war or not. The US relinquished all its options and therefore backed Saddam into a corner, forcing him to determine the next step and ultimately determine the path that the "questionable" war would take. Baker was adamant about Iraq's understanding that the war, if that was the chosen path, will be fought for a quick and decisive end and not for breathing space and negotiations. The objective would be the complete liberation of Kuwait and the toppling of the present Iraqi regime. Saddam undermined the cohesion of the coalition, and with Saddam's defensive frame of mind, he hoped to deter and inflict enough discomfort so that the coalition would want a cease-fire on terms other than full implementation of UN resolutions. Due to the depressing memory of Vietnam, Iraq wondered about the US's ability to sustain a commitment. Saddam hoped that US public opinion would resent deaths and decide that they could not cope with the demands of a long war, hoping that the "Vietnam-syndrome" would resurface. On the other hand, the US wanted to avoid casualties and devised a plan to avoid ground war, and engage instead in an intensive air campaign. The US eventually fully implemented an air campaign which resulted in the complete liberation of Kuwait. Saddam also believed that a large number of defenders would have a deterrent effect against the US's contemplation of intervention. Theoretical Orientation: Both Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait and the US's decisions to intervene in the dispute on behalf of Kuwait followed the rationality model of policy makers. Rational choice is composed of three basic components: unitary actor, transitive preferences, and maximizing expected utility among choices. Unitary actors are individuals (i.e. President, Prime Minister, King) that make the ultimate decisions, but they are not isolated from other political figures. Both Saddam Hussein and President Bush are unitary actors. The only difference between the two is that Bush was less isolated in his decision to intervene in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. The US political system's structure allows for Congress, the Senate, the House of Representatives, and public opinion to influence and help steer the President's ultimate decision. The political structure of Iraq allows Saddam to make a completely isolated and individual decision in terms of domestic and foreign policy, but this does not free Saddam from domestic political turmoil once his decision is publicized. Transitive preferences is defined as the consistent and stable ordering among alternatives. If A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A has to be preferred to C. Lastly, maximizing expected utility among the possible choices involves choosing an option that maximizes your benefits and minimizes your losses (Aronson, Wilson, and Akert, 1994). Expected utility is the value associated with a policy/option. It is most important to compare the expected utility of using force to the expected utility of not using force. Both Saddam and President Bush ranked their alternatives, engaged in a cost-benefit analysis, and picked the option with the highest anticipated expected utility. Rationality is not always consistent with making the right choice. In retrospect, a unitary actor may see that they did not maximize their utility, though at the time the leader made the decision they thought they were. Rationality does not refer to goals being pursued by the decision maker, rather it refers to how you choose among your options before you can be labeled as rational or irrational. Goals themselves cannot be rational, rather it is the process of weighing evidence that maximizes outcomes in the long-run which can be labeled. Rational choice model assumes that others seek rewards and avoid punishment, but it does not look at the actor's characteristics. If we did consider the actor's characteristics, as bounded rationality does, we would notice that those leaders whom we believe, we fear the most. Those leaders who appear to be irrational are the ones abiding by the most rational strategy in order to gain credibility. Bounded rationality considers perceived controllability and calculability of risk, also noticing the internal attributes of actors that may bias the perception of threat and opportunity. This theory contends that leaders are swayed by cognitive beliefs about events which may result in misperception (472Not1.Doc, 1996). Another assumption is the credibility of threats. Credibility of threats is composed of three basic components: resolve to use force, military capabilities to impose costs, and noticing how the credibility relates to expected utility (Schelling, 1966). Credibility is defined as the assessment of how willing an actor is to carry out their threats, and the assessment of what capabilities the actor has to impose costs and damage on their adversary. High credibility is when others think that you have the resolve and can inflict a lot of damage because of your capabilities. There is always the possibility of miscalculation as in the case of the Gulf War. Credibility tells you nothing about the expected utility of not using force which is an important factor to consider. A credible threat does not ensure successful deterrence. Another inference is that domestic politics affect the expected utility of international conflict. Domestic politics can affect foreign policy through the expected utility of using force versus the expected utility of not using force. In terms of the expected utility of not using force, accepting the status quo may be politically risky because it may be seen as a sign of weakness. Counter-elites may say that the leadership has failed and this may lead to a foreign policy defeat for the existing leadership. There is not the same amount of domestic opposition for all foreign policy decision makers. The way in which elites resolve domestic conflicts affects how they handle international disputes. In a democratic country, such as the US, unitary decision-makers are socialized with norms of negotiation: compromise, trade-offs, bargaining, and concession-making. Democratic leaders disregard coercion and violence, and at the international level they usually have a higher expected utility for not using force. Democratic leaders are also less likely to escalate territorial disputes into military conflicts. But sometimes democratic leaders do not abide by these norms because it may be in their best interest to mirror their adversary's stances. On the other hand, authoritarian states are socialized in a manner to believe that violence and compellence are successful means to successful ends. Iraq's behavior left the US with no choice but to adopt a stronger stance, and the US mirrored Iraq's escalatory moves. The expected utility of using force analyzes what gains can be achieved from using force. There are usually always costs incurred when using force (economic casualties, fatalities), but sometimes these disincentives to the use of force are minimal. Lastly, the assumptions of bureaucratic politics is differentiated between Iraq and the US. Bureaucratic politics is a fifth wave theory that brings in differences within a unit to explain why the unit has a hard time deterring and coercing. Saddam has complete control over Iraq, therefore there is no role for bureaucratic politics in Iraq. However, Saddam still has to please his armed forces so he may be engaged in what is known as bureaucratic warfare (472Not8.Doc, 1996). In contrast, there is much division in the unit of the US' government and therefore bureaucratic politics plays a large role. There is a split between those civilians that remained in the White House and wanted to bring Iraq into the family of nations, while the Department of Defense was planning for future war. The state was interested in peace planning with Iraq, while the military personnel were interested in war planning. Because of the bureaucratic politics operating in US foreign policy decisions, Saddam interpreted mixed signals. He found it in his best interest to engage in a motivated bias and give the state's wish for peace planning more weight than the military personnel's position. Saddam's motivated bias resulted in him underestimating the threat perception of US intervention. Some Congress members, the business sector, and diplomats were motivated to converge to bring Iraq into the family of nations and follow an accommodationist policy with it, while others wanted to continue labeling Iraq with a rogue status. Saddam's perception of mixed signals caused him to only want to see the accommodationist part and ignore the Pentagon's concern that still considered Iraq a rogue state. This lack of consensus among US bureaucrats on the national security interests at hand are illustrative of a bureaucratic approach. Although once the Gulf War began, consensus was reached among the bureaucrats about Iraq's threat, leading the US government to pursue a unitary actor approach. Deterrence and Compellence: In the case of the Gulf War, deterrence and compellence were pursued. Extended deterrence is present when one country tries to protect another country from being attacked. "In extended deterrence, the defender threatens military retaliation against another state [potential attacker] in an attempt to prevent that state from using military force against an ally of the defender" (Huth, 1988, p. 16). The United States tried to protect Kuwait from being invaded by Iraq, and the US immediately threatened to use their own force in the face of a military attack by Iraq. Generally deterrence is when you stop a course of action before its pursuit is attempted. "Deterrence persuades an adversary, through threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh the benefits" (Huth, 1988, p. 15). Compellence, also known as coercion, is when one country threatens or uses military force in order to make another country stop what it has already begun, and compels the aggressor to stop its military aggression. Pursuing compellence is harder to achieve success with because decision makers are pursuing a policy in which they have already invested resources. Compellence involves aggressors that already think it is in their best interest to use force. Deterrence is a plan of action that is being considered, but since no action is taken, it is easier to change plans. It is always easier to reinforce actions rather than modify actions. Deterrence is successful when force is not used and the defender's interests are protected in the dispute. Deterrence failure is when an armed conflict is carried out, or even when no attack is carried out but the potential attacker achieves his primary directives. Compellence success is when the compellent threat is made and the attacker stops using his force. Compellence failure is when the defender makes a threat and then pulls back and the attacker gains all its demands. If the defender has to go to war to stop an attacker from engaging in its aggressive acts, only limited force should be used. If a defender has to go to war in order to stop a war, it is classified as a compellence failure. When concessions are made and both the defender and aggressor reach a stalemate, it is between a success and failure. In terms of conventional deterrence and compellence, success is likely when you have the military capability and resolve to deny your potential attacker's objectives quickly (Huth, 1988). After the US' initial attempt at extended-immediate deterrence failed and Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US had no choice but to compel the Iraqi attacker to de-escalate its armed conflict and to terminate the war. Since the Gulf War was estimated to be a quick and decisive victory, long-term potential military strength is not important. Mearsheimer states that in order for deterrence to succeed and for the defender to deny a military blitzkrieg victory of the attacker, the defender needs strong immediate and short-term balance of forces to make deterrence effective. Other perspectives contend that, nuclear weapons have the strongest deterrent effect when the defender is weakest in conventional forces and vice versa. In the Gulf War, the defender fought with strong conventional forces, so nuclear weapons were insignificant. Deterrence and coercion are factors of the chicken game, a game of cooperation where both sides would benefit from cooperating. The first choice of each actor is to stand firm because each actor prefers to avoid mutually disastrous confrontation. Both disputants try to prevail by making the other believe that they are standing firm. Instilling fear in the adversary is one way to increase the defender's credibility. Since resolve, demonstrated through relinquishing all options, and threat are at issue, then the dispute is illustrative of a chicken game. The Chicken game, rather than Prisoner's Dilemma, is more relevant in international security decisions. Some people believe Saddam to be an irrational person who therefore shows much resolve. But irrational people cannot play the game of chicken because it takes resolve. Thus, Saddam cannot be labeled as irrational because he demonstrates much resolve as the stages of the invasion advanced. Lastly, communication, as between Iraq and the US, is a feature of chicken. Even though no "effective" and/or deterrent communication was relayed, both sides still communicated therefore characterizing the dispute as an example of the chicken game (Snyder, 1971). Iraqi Perspective: Many issues were at stake for Iraq when it decided to invade Kuwait. Iraq's dispute with Kuwait hinged on territorial claims, the debt incurred from Iran-Iraq war, and OPEC prices and production levels. Additional benefits that would be derived from the invasion were: access to Kuwaiti oil fields, access to the Persian Gulf, compelling Kuwait to cancel debts, lowering Kuwaiti oil production, and possibly pressure Saudi Arabia to change its oil production levels, stabilize political dissent within Iraq's military, and most importantly solidify Saddam's political position. Since there was a highly attractive expected utility of using force, Saddam precipitated in the invasion of Kuwait. Ultimately, it was not relatively costly to invade Kuwait and there was a high probability of success because of Iraq's military advantage. There are some consequences of the invasion that made it worthwhile to consider the expected utility of not using force. There was the possibility that the political situation may get worse if the economic situation worsened. There was also the chance of loosing potential revenue generated from the increase in oil prices. Surprisingly, it would have been economically costly for Saddam not to use force in the developing dispute. The expected utility of not using force is very low from Iraq's perspective. Saddam's military did not want to surrender and/or abide by the guidelines set by the UN resolution. There were high political costs domestically within Iraq and in order to increase Saddam's leadership role in the Arab community he thought he could attain it through military success in Kuwait. There were very high domestic costs of retreat, Saddam feared suffering from domestic political opposition, and there was a big difference between retreating with an army intact versus surrendering. The theory of effort justification states that the more effort someone puts into something, the more value they add to it (Aronson et. al, 1994). After Iraq invested resources into its advancement of the invasion into Kuwait and a takeover became much more realistic, Iraq was determined not to give up. Compellence, which is a reversal in a course of action, may lead to domestic criticism and be considered a sign of failure. Iraqi's perceptions of US credibility in December 1990 was a determinant in Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait. Credibility is defined as the capability of the forces and the willingness of the country to use those forces (Schelling, 1966). The US hinted at its willingness to negotiate and its reluctance to use force so Saddam questioned whether the US could afford to use their forces at all. Saddam also assumed that the US would not be able to bear heavy casualties because strong pressure would be put on Bush to pull out or negotiate. This is referred to as the "Vietnam-syndrome", and Saddam underestimated the extent to which the US public opinion supported the use of military force in the Gulf region. Also, US foreign policy has many objectives and Iraq assumed that its attack on Kuwait may not have been of highest priority. Iran was the country that posed the greatest threat to US security interests at this time and Iraq thought that attention may be diverted from its conquest to Iran. Since balance of power was the operant principle at the time, Iraq thought the US would view it as a powerful tool, serving US interests by being in opposition to Iran. Iraq thought it should be viewed as a useful "ally" to pursue cooperative policies with. Iraq gave more thought to the chance of an opportunity cost if the US supported Kuwait, which would result in the alienation Iraq. If the US alienated Iraq it would in turn eliminate the chance of engaging in cooperative policies with Iraq against Iran. Iraq held some misconceptions about its own capabilities and about the outside support it would receive. Saddam miscalculated the response of the Arab states; instead they formed a coalition in support of the US and its policies. Saddam also overestimated Iraqi capabilities and overestimated the number of casualties that Iraq could inflict on the US. In the eyes of the Iraqi regime the perceived US threat was underestimated. These "misperceptions" are motivated biases-- when people see what they want to see. Saddam may have had a motivated bias to believe that the resolve to forcibly remove his forces was extremely low. Saddam was also motivated to be overconfident in his perception of Iraq's capabilities and underestimation of the US resolve, therefore deterrence posed by the US was defeated. The White House and State Department also have an unmotivated bias to perceive Iraq as a potential ally. On the other hand, the Pentagon has a motivated bias to perceive Iraq as an enemy. Motivated biases, in eyes of both Iraq and the United States, serve to over and under-estimate the perceived threat of their adversary. Iraq's military strategy was to convince the US that the use of force to initiate war would result in a protracted and costly armed conflict. Iraq threatened to inflict substantial damage to the US so even US victory would be costly and the US would have to step back and engage in diplomacy. Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait was very rational and plausible according to the expected utility of using force in comparison to not using force. United States' Perspective: For many reasons the United States opposed Iraq actively after its invasion of Kuwait. The US thought that Saddam gained too much control over the oil market. With this new control Iraq could gain too much control over oil production. The brutality of Iraq's invasion infringed upon the human rights act in the US. US intervention also intended to support territorial sovereignty of states. Weakening Iraq's military capabilities (i.e. chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities) and weakening its long-term threat in the region was also a determining factor in US intervention. The Munich analogy is also important in explaining the US's decision because if the international community did not respond to Saddam's aggression then other leaders may find using force to be effective and desirable when they are in a dispute themselves. The Munich analogy is a good example of an unmotivated bias where leaders pay too little attention to base rates. Threats are overestimated because leaders over-rely on the Munich lesson, and leaders and the general public expect the future to resemble the past. Therefore, Munich is a representative heuristic because it has similarities to the situation at hand, causing the leaders to think that the two situations are the same and they act accordingly. Another example of an unmotivated bias is the underestimation of American resolve in regards to the "Vietnam-syndrome". Too much attention is given to the clearness of some case in the past, resulting in an over- or underestimation of a perceived threat. A threat is seen because the leader may have expected to see the threat in the first place indicating a short-cut to rationality (472Not12. Doc, 1996). The US wanted to show the international community that it could take forceful action and in doing so, promote regional stability. There were many reasons why the United States decided to get involved in a clear and direct way. The main response of the US after the invasion was to use non-military means (i.e. economic sanctions) to get Iraq out of Kuwait. The US employed oil embargoes, cut off imports into Iraq, and froze Iraqi assets in banks worldwide. The US military position increased as there were a large number of conventional troops deployed onto Saudi territory and the US prepared to use force if necessary to compel Iraq out of Kuwait. The US started issuing credible threats of military action and made clearer policy statements to those ends. It is questionable if the US attempt at extended deterrence in support of Kuwait worked. In the beginning stages of the arising dispute, the US did not directly issue a threat to Iraq that if they invaded, the US would retaliate with military force. The US made a weak attempt at deterrence by saying that the US had interests in the Persian Gulf regions and that it would protect the sovereignty of the states in that region, and stated that it would take whatever measures necessary in order to ensure US interests. The US did not attempt direct deterrent military action prior to the invasion. The US only conducted air exercises with the United Arab Emirate (UAE) forces, but did not classify this as a build-up action. Initially, the threat of US military intervention was unlikely and the US was in no position to offer effective military aid to Kuwait to alter the immediate balance of forces (Freedman and Karsh, 1993). Iraq still had a high expected utility of force. In the end, the US' attempted deterrence policy failed. The US was not clear as to the path of action the Iraqis would choose. The US discounted the likelihood that Iraq would use their forces in a large-scale attack. Iraq, on the other hand, overestimated the affect that the "Vietnam-syndrome" (in terms of casualties) would have on the American public's support for military intervention in Kuwait. Iraq "black boxed" the US by taking all of its assumptions about the US and assuming it will seek to decrease pain and increase gains (Schelling, 1966). Assuming that the US would act to avoid pain, Iraq thought they held the pain control, while in the end, it is evident that Iraq overestimated its "power of pain" towards the US. These two misperceptions by both sides downplays the credibility of threats and the perceived resolve of both the unitary actors and their nations. The US, at best, thought that Iraq would engage in a limited attack in order to take only two islands along the land border in the area of the disputed oil fields. Importantly, the US also underestimated how resolved Saddam was to use military force. The perception of the imminence of both side's threats were in question. US Intervention Plans: The United States employed different tactics in trying to oust Iraq from Kuwaiti territory. Both Instant Thunder and the denial strategy employed compellence and coercion. Coercion is defined as persuading an opponent to stop an ongoing action or start a new course of action by changing its costs and benefits and forcing a state to accept a change of the status quo (Pape, 1996). Instant Thunder, a decapitation strategy, is an operation that tried to decapitate Saddam's regime. This operation functioned on the premise that if the head (of Saddam) was removed, the rest of the body will die. Iraqi military leaders were the targets of Instant Thunder. Using a strategic bombing technique, the US tried to kill or isolate the military from the field in order to show the Iraqi population how vulnerable their country is. The operation aimed to overthrow the government or isolate its leadership to provoke a revolt against Saddam and/or induce a change in his regime; i.e. to get Iraq out of Kuwait without fighting a ground war. The second operation that took place against Iraq was the policy that had more of an impact, and was a factor in the successful coercion by the US. The denial operation targeted troops on the line, equipment and supplies that supported the Iraqi troops, and was directed at the fighting capabilities of Iraq in Kuwait. A denial strategy is aimed at decreasing the probability that resistance will yield benefits. After attacking industrial, transportation, and military targets, through theater bombing, the odds of retaliation from the adversary lessen. By decreasing an adversary's capabilities and demolishing their military's infrastructure, the defender also decreases the adversary's credibility and perceived resolve. Denial punishment inflicts enough pain to overwhelm the adversary's interests in the dispute, therefore causing the opposing government to concede or take the chance of having its population revolt (Pape, 1996). Pape is a strong advocate of the value of theater bombing and force, while in contrast, Thomas Schelling prefers threats and threat escalation to the use of force. Eventually the air power succeeded in coercing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and it also undermined Iraq's ability to defend against the Coalition's ground threat. Iraq's movements stopped because of uncertainty of the nature of the Coalition's advance, and because of the air power's ability to destroy their forces. After the US utilized all its options in its coercive attempts, Iraq was given one last chance and was therefore compelled to make a decision. The US left its opponent, but not itself, a way out so that the Iraqi adversary can see the US's resolve and know that the choice to either escape or fight is left in their hands because the US will not back down. Iraq decided to engage in hostilities with the US, so the American military was forced to implement the two operations. Instant Thunder was carried out but it was not effective because Saddam kept on the move and a coup probably would not rise up against him because he was entrenched in his power. Instant Thunder hit many of its intended targets, but Saddam and the major leaders were still alive. There was no uprising or revolt in Baghdad and the communication between the regime's leaders and the military was still maintained, thus indicating a failed attempt. The denial campaign of air power was successful because Iraq's front troops suffered from major shortages. Iraqi capabilities were reduced and the morale of the Iraqi forces in the field was shattered and they were no longer willing to fight. Reduced mobility of Iraqi forces also immobilized them from regrouping after substantial US breakthroughs made by US forces (Pape, 1996). Iraq ultimately did not agree to everything before the ground campaigns began because the cost of fighting with the US was less then withdrawing from Kuwait and leaving behind all fighting capabilities. Saddam did not want to loose face by agreeing to US terms and decided to stay and fight because even defeated, it might not loose all its fighting capability. Similarly, the US preferred to fight and defeat Iraq than to get a favorable, but not complete, diplomatic victory/agreement. The US was eager to launch a ground campaign because they were confident in carrying out the plans at a low cost. The US wanted to decrease the long-term military threat that Iraq could pose to the Gulf states and a strong military position led the US to be uninterested in a diplomatic settlement. In his book Pape concludes that the denial strategy is best achieved by theater air power, and that when coercion succeeds, the denial strategy is what was pursued. Legal Authority: Unitary actors employ different legal authorities in order to attempt to deter, coerce, or launch military action. Congress and the Executive Branch have had, and will continue to have, disagreements as to what is in each's power and authority, and what specifically is the assigned duty of one or the other. Congress has the power to declare war, the power to fund armed forces, and the power to ratify treaties. The power of the President, as Commander-In-Chief of US armed forces, is able to direct the forces once the operation is authorized by Congress. A few exceptions such as an attack in an emergency situation against US military forces or territory does not require the President to get advanced authorization from Congress, but after the President immediately employs and directs the forces, he must go back to Congress and inform them of the troops involvement. There have been many disputes between Congress and the President, because the President oversteps his legal line of authority and neglects the terms set by the War Powers Resolution (Fisher, 1995). The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is very significant in the formal declaration of war against a country abroad. This resolution was passed as a direct consequence of US involvement in the Vietnam war. There was much dissatisfaction with the President's involvement and direction in Vietnam and Congress thought that the President was too powerful and independent in his decision to use military force. Fear of the imperial presidency led to the implementation of this resolution, even in the face of much expressed dissent by the President himself. The War Powers Resolution includes three terms that the President is "required" to abide by. First, the President must engage in advanced consultation with Congress. The President, in advance of sending US forces into a threatening situation, should consult with Congress on the decision. It is important for the President to realize that reporting to Congress is not equivalent to the required consultation. Second, the President is also required to report to Congress within 48 hours of action taken. After the President has stipulated that forces were sent into a situation, he is required to submit a formalized report to Congress. Lastly, there is a 60 day period without any Congressional authorization, and when it is over, authorization is required to continue the operation. These 60 days allow the President to maintain his forces in military action without explicit Congressional authorization, but if the action is going to continue past 60 days, explicit and formal approval and support is needed by Congress for continued operation. The 60 day period can sometimes be extended to 90 days under special circumstances (Fisher, 1995). The impact of the War Powers Resolution has been minimal. There has been little impact overall because the President engages in ineffective consultation if he engages in it at all. The President usually fails to submit the formal report, and deliberately omits and avoids stating that a threatening situation exists, so that the 60 day clock will not be started. In addition, and most consequential, the President rejects the War Powers Resolution's legality and constitutionality. Most presidents believe that this resolution infringes on their rights as Commander-in-Chief. The president believes that he has the authority to engage into the hostilities at his discretion, and contends that he needs to enforce his authority with much leeway. Importantly, Congress has not compelled the President to implement the terms of the resolution. Congress defers the actions taken to the Presidential initiative, and if things fail, that is when Congress states its opposition publicly. If the President's directed actions succeed, then there is no opposition by Congress and they may even support the President publicly, so that the adversary perceives bi-partisan support and a unified position against it. Congress wants to avoid all issues of accountability, but they are glad to share in the success of operations. The War Powers Resolution is also very relevant in terms of the Gulf War and President Bush's decisions. President Bush did not think that he had to seek Congressional support, but he ultimately got Congressional support to send troops into the Gulf region the day before the deadline (US Resolution 660). During a press conference the President stated, "We have used military force 200 times in history. I think there have been five declarations of war" (Franck and Glennon, 1993, p. 648). President Bush argued that he had the authority to carry out military action because he was Commander-in-Chief and that he had the authority because the UN Security Council authorized the use of military force in the region (UN Resolution 678). Bush allowed Congress to debate over giving him authorization when he was confident that the outcome would be in favor of supporting US military action. Bush staged the opportunity for Congress' leaders to take a position, and in the end, the majority of them stood behind the President. The debate was held on January 12, and the deadline for authorization was on January 15, 1991. Congress may not have wanted to be portrayed as undermining the US position so late, so therefore they may have supported Bush's request. Ultimately, Congress approved military operations to be pursued in the Gulf region because of the failed US attempt to oust Iraq from Kuwait under the stipulations of US' Resolution 660, and under the stipulations of UN Resolution 678. When both of these attempts failed, a Joint Resolution was issued, "To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678...to uphold and implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area" (Franck and Glennon, 1993, p. 646-647). Conclusion and Policy Proposals: Both President Bush's policies and Saddam's pursued policies both followed the rational choice model. Both unitary leaders ranked their transitive preferences, and picked the option that they thought would yield the most benefits. In addition, these two leaders engaged in cost-benefit analysis for each possible option, and they also considered the expected utility of either using force or not using force. Strategy consists of deterrence and coercion. Deterrence is further broken down into deterrence by denial, threat, or punishment. Pape concludes that deterrence by denial is the most effective way to stop an adversary from enacting a plan, while Schelling concludes that deterrence by threat is most beneficial. In the Gulf War the threats and resolve of both participants, Iraq and the US, were consistently misperceived, and/or influenced by motivated and unmotivated biases. These biases decreased the susceptibility to persuasion of both countries. Iraq and the US "may have arranged to miss the point so as to foreclose the possibility of being persuaded..." (472Not5. 1996). Both the US and Iraq searched for new alternatives, but no alternative was satisfactory to both the opponent and self. Although each side endured a cost-benefit analysis for all the proposed options, the option with the highest expected utility was for Iraq to invade Kuwait, and for the US to intervene on behalf of Kuwait. At first extended-immediate deterrence was the chosen policy path. With the underestimation of each side's threats, deterrence failed. Coercion was the second attempt to try and remove Iraq from Kuwait. The denial strategy was the successful operation that led to the complete liberation of Kuwait. These policies were "shaky" in their perception of leading to a successful end because of the low credibility of threats. If the US and Iraq both issued credible, believable, and resolved threats, then maybe deterrence would have initially been effective, thus deterring Iraq from invading Kuwait. "Misperception is deeply rooted and yet only one among multiple causes of deterrence failure, the remedies are far from obvious...[assuming] that leaders can accurately evaluate an adversary's intentions and military capabilities and that they can predict the impact of their statements and actions on the perceptions of a challenger...[these] are both highly problematic assumptions" (Jervis, Lebow and Stein, 1985, p. 61). Both of these actors are rational, therefore allowing them to make accurate calculations and be deterred or coerced, but the misperception and biases influencing threat perception stood in their way of at least being deterred. Works Cited Aronson, E., Wilson, T.D., and Akert, R.M. (1994). Social Psychology: The Heart and the Mind. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers. Fisher, L. (1995). Presidential War Power. Kansas: University Press of Kansas. Franck, T.M., and Glennon, M.J. (1993). Foreign Relations and National Security Law. 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