In 1962 the House and Senate passed a joint resolution that declared: The United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leininist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;... and to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination. 1 In order to accomplish this, the Congress amended the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act, and the 1949 Export Administration Act. The formal economic embargo was finally enacted on February 6, 1962. 1 The purpose of the embargo was to isolate Cuba and apply enough economic pressure to topple Fidel Castro and his communist regime. Since this time, the United States foreign policy with respect to Cuba has changed little. However, since the establishment of the embargo over thirty-four years ago significant change has occurred in the international environment. In that time the Soviet Union has collapsed, the Cold War has ended, the European Union has formed, the Cuban economy is in disarray, and eight different U.S. presidents have been in office. This raises the question, of why the United States continues to view Cuba as a threat in the post cold war era and why does it continue to impose sanctions despite a weak Cuban economy and against world wide objections. To answer these questions the U.S. policy towards Cuba will be thoroughly examined. First, the formation of U.S. foreign policy will be explored from a theoretical perspective. Next, the history of the Cuban policy will be reviewed. Finally, the policy will be evaluated by discussing it in terms of theoretical models and conclussions about its effectiveness will be made. Theoretical Orientation Based on its position toward Cuba, it does appear that the U.S. considers Cuba a threat. Many U.S. presidents have referred to this threat. President Bush repeatedly declared, our policy must remain a constant one until such time as Cuba begins to act as a responsible member of the international community instead of a threat to the peace and security of its neighbors. 2 President Clinton has described the Cuban government as "repressive, violent'' and "scornful of international law.'' 3 Despite this appearance, it is unclear what real or perceived threat Cuba poses to the U.S. Several aspects of threats and threat perceptions exist and examination of the different types of threats can serve as an important part of examining foreign policy. First, threats can be divided into two categories: strategic and intrinsic. In general, a strategic threat is one which is perceived as potentially damaging to nonvital interests. The possibility of the loss of international reputation or credibility is considered a strategic threat. On the other hand, an intrinsic threat is one which is perceived as encroaching on vital interests. The land of a country is considered a vital interest and, thus, the potential loss of land is considered an intrinsic threat. Since both of these threats are based on perception and are perceived by people, the definition of vital and nonvital interests is not always readily apparent. In order to determine what is considered vital and nonvital it is necessary to know the values of the threat perceiver and these are not always readily accessible. Values vary among different people and different governments. Nonetheless, the mainland of a nation will always be considered an intrinsic threat and reputation will always be considered a strategic threat in this paper. Therefore, acts which threaten these two entities will be classified as either strategic or intrinsic by considering which element, homeland or reputation, they most threaten. Thus, it is possible to examine whether or not Cuba can be considered either an intrinsic or strategic threat to the U.S. and to isolate the factors that may classify it as one type of threat or the other. In order to be considered an intrinsic threat, Cuba must pose a plausible threat to the mainland U.S. of either occupation or mass destruction. Cuba is not known to possess nuclear weapons. The once formidable military has been greatly reduced since the end of Soviet support and it is less than ten percent of the size of the U.S. military; also the export of terrorism has been greatly reduced in the 1990s. 1 In addition to destruction or occupation of a country, the political system and freedom of a country can also be considered an intrinsic threat. Castro has expressed that it is not his goal to spread socialism into the United States. In 1994 he stated, We do not want to change the U.S. social system; we do not seek to establish socialism in the United States. 4 Based on this, it is difficult to consider Cuba as an intrinsic threat to the United States. While Cuba does not appear to impose an intrinsic threat to the United States some could perceive that it does impose a strategic threat to the United States. Cuba has a history of human rights violations and since human rights are considered important to the U.S. then the Cuban violations could pose a strategic threat to the United States. Additionally, Fidel Castro could be considered a strategic threat to the US. If he were to outlast economic sanctions, then he could be considered by some to have triumphed over the US. This could be perceived as a threat to the U.S. international reputation which would constitute a strategic threat. Since, ultimately threats are determined by people, a number of factors can affect threat perception. Not all leaders and governments act rationally and different assumptions about the actors rationality can affect threat perception. Rational decision makers seek to maximize gains and minimize losses. However, people are often constrained by cognitive structures that limit their ability to make rational choices. 5 Rationality is often thought of in terms of degrees and actors can be placed on a rheostat of rationality. Actors who use analytical processes, that is, those that use comprehensive search, optimal revision, complete evaluation, and seek to maximize gains are placed near the top of the rheostat. Those that succumb to the cognitive structures in decision making by failing to consider all possibilities due to lack of effort or personal biases are placed lower on the scale of rationality. In order to conclude that the U.S. has acted as a ratioally toward Cuba, evidence would have to exist that the government has carefully evaluated all possibilities by searching for information and that it has sought to maximize gains. If evidence exists that the U.S. has been subjected to biases, has not sought information, or has not sought to maximize gain, then the U.S. will be placed at a lower level on the rheostat of rationality. Evaluating the degree of rationality of the U.S. is an important step in uncovering the reason for the U.S. policy towards Cuba. To best evaluate U.S. position towards Cuba it is helpful to understand what strategy the United States has taken when dealing with the Caribbean nation. Deterrence and coercion are the main strategic options available in the international arena. Deterrence seeks to have an actor maintain a certain (desirable) behavior or prevent an actor from changing his current behavior. Two types of deterrence exist: deterrence by threat and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by threat works on an actors intentions by using rewards or punishments to elicit the desired behavior. Deterrence by denial operates by destroying capabilities. Since deterrence is interested in maintaining the status quo, it has not been the policy favored by the US. The U.S. has repeatedly advocated change in Cuba. From the Bay of Pigs disaster to the latest economic sanctions the goal of the United States has been the same; change the current political system of Cuba. Peter Tarnoff, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs mentioned the goal of changing Cuba when discussing the trade embargo. He declared, I strongly believe that the embargo is the best leverage the U.S. has to promote change in Cuba... 6 Because the goal is change, the strategy of coercion has been the one favored by the US. Coercion attempts to get an actor to change unacceptable behavior or force an actor to undo an action already taken. Even though the United States has chosen the strategy of coercion when dealing with Cuba, success of this policy is far from certain. In order for coercion to be successful, the actor being coerced must be rational. Many different theories abound which explain the factors that can cause coercion failure. The perceived credibility of threat, calculation of risk, and personal biases can all greatly affect the success of coercion. Evidence Across Time and Space In order to best evaluate the reason for the current U.S. policy towards Cuba it is necessary to examine the history of Cuban-American relations. These relations have been in nearly permanent conflict since the rise of Castro in 1959. In the late 1950s, political and social unrest in Cuba was reaching a fever pitch. The leader at the time was Fulgencio Batista who had a military background and eventually siezed power in 1952. Batista clearly expressed his desire to follow U.S. guidelines, and in return, the U.S. supported him. However, as turmoil mounted in Cuba and Batista responded with increasing violence, the U.S. found a need to end its ties with the dictator. This helped to create an unstable political environment and it was from this environment that Fidel Castro emerged as a powerful figure. Shortly after Batista fled the country in late 1958 Castro marched into Havana and siezed power. 1 Initially, the U.S. was unsure of how to respond to Castros success. Yet, it did not take long for the U.S. to develop a negative attitude towards Castro. Richard Nixon was the chief early advocate of programs designed to unseat Castro. Nixon became confident in April of 1959 that Castro was a menace, either Communist or Communist-dominated, and from that time forward he favored nearly every means of ousting the Cuban leader, including invasion. Nixon became a key proponent of the initial Bay of Pigs plans. 7 After beating Nixon in the election of 1960, Kennedy readily supported the Bay of Pigs invasion and on April 15, 1961 the American-sponsored invasion of Cuba began. The goal of the invasion was to over-throw Fidel Castro and his government. The failure to do so destroyed any hopes of normal relations with Fidel Castro and Castro turned permanently to the USSR for aid. In addition to economic assistance, the USSR also provided military power. Cuba was motivated to request nuclear missiles because it had believed the United States was preparing for another invasion and the U.S. covert war itself was taking a mounting toll; the Soviet Union readily complied with the request and the stage was set for the Cuban Missile Crisis. After the crisis was resolved by President Kennedys ultimatum to the Soviets, the U.S. policy that still stands against Cuba was developed. The plan called for an economic embargo of Cuba which sought to isolate it in order to, cripple and topple the government and partly to contain Cubas influence on other countries where social and economic conditions made them candidates for revolution. 7 This policy was maintained nearly unchanged through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. During the Nixon administration, some softening of the stance towards Cuba was seen. Cuba curtailed its practice of supporting armed revolution in the western hemisphere and began to develop state-to-state relations with several Latin American countries. 1 The unrest in the United States during and after the Vietnam War helped to promote a reconsideration of the hard-line towards Cuba that had been in place for over ten years. The biggest change in U.S. policy towards Cuba was the acceptance of Castro as the leader of that nation. Through the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the predominant view was that Castro was temporary. The Nixon administration, thus, focused on the trade embargo of Cuba and no longer harbored intentions of overthrowing the Castro regime. 7 The Ford administration initially attempted to reduce Cuban-American tensions, but Cuba became involved in a war in Angola and its efforts there were seen as contrary to the goals of the U.S. Therefore, by 1976 reports circulated through Washington of renewed Defense Department contingency plans for a military blockade of Cuba. 1 Carter inherited poor relations between the U.S. and Cuba and attempted to improve them. He held talks with Cuban officials and tourism and immigration rules were relaxed. Nevertheless, by 1979 U.S. and Cuban paths crossed once more in Africa and relations between the two countries unraveled. On top of the African strains, the Mariel boatlift of April-May 1980 helped to raise US-Cuban relations to the heights of tension they had been in earlier years. Approximately 120,000 Cubans emigrated to the U.S. from Cuba and the United States welcomed them. 1 However, the administration later charged that the Cuban government forced some prisoners and patients in mental institutions to emigrate at that time. 1 The failed policies of Ford and Carter, thus, left a sense among policymakers that the U.S. policy toward Cuba had failed to achieve U.S. objectives because it had been insufficiently harsh. 1 President Reagan was determined to increase pressure on Cuba. Reagan did not trust Castro because of his actions in Africa during the Ford and Carter years. Because of this, President Reagan refused to talk with Castro. He also viewed Cuba as a pawn of the Soviet Union and because of his strong anti-communism stance, he was unwilling to negotiate with the Cuban government. 1 As Wayne Smith, former head of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, observed in 1982: The Reagan Administration began by excluding normalization of relations even as a distant objective. 1 No one in the Reagan administration actually believed that the embargo of Cuba would actually crush Cuba, but some did believe that it could influence political and social dynamics within Cuba to U.S. advantage. 1 In May of 1985 the United States started broadcasts over Radio Marti, a medium-wave station aimed at creating dissension within Cuba. 1 This further destabilized relations between the two countries. Under Reagan, the U.S. increased restrictions on imports of Cuban newspapers in addition to restricting the visas for Cuban scholars to come to the US. Also, U.S. tourists were denied the right to travel to Cuba and this reduced further the information available to the general public about Cuba. Reduced contact between the citizens of both countries made it easier for the administration to depict Cuba with diabolical images. 1 President Bush continued many of the policies that were in place during the Reagan administration. Radio Marti continued to be broadcast across Cuba and the general policy of economic sanctions continued. However, it was during the Bush era that the end of the Cold War finally came about. Amazingly, this collapse was not foreseen and the effect it would have on Cuban-Soviet relations was not known. As late as August of 1989, Michael Kozak, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs made the following statement: ...we do not believe cuts (by the Soviet Union) would be so severe as to endanger their (the Soviet Union) special relationship with Cuba. The relationship will remain intact for the foreseeable future. 2 This declaration illustrates the lack of readiness that the U.S. had in regards to policy revision in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the collapse, the U.S. did not seek to relinquish economic barriers with Cuba. Instead, it reaffirmed its position with the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act which increased sanctions on Cuba on the condition that sanctions would be lessened if some reform was made. The act was unspecific as to what Castro and Cuba would have to do in order to have sanctions reduced. This act was strongly supported by President Bush and challenger Bill Clinton. From the start of his administration, President Clinton has taken a hard-line stance against Cuba. He strongly supported the Cuban Democracy Act and now stands in support of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. However, Clintons policies and positions have shifted slightly throughout his first four years as president. Clinton is the first president to be dealing with Cuba through his whole term without the added dimension of the Cold War. So, it is with Clinton and not his predecessors that careful examination is needed to help understand the U.S. policy towards Cuba in this post Cold War era. To do this, it will be useful to explore how Clintons biases may affect his rationality, which, in turn affects his position on Cuba. First, however, it is necessary to examine how Cuba and the United States can be judged as unitary actors. When dealing with Cuba over the last thirty-five years, the United States has really only needed to speak with one man, Fidel Castro. Castro bears the title of President, First Vice President, and President of the council of Ministers. The message out of Havana has been Castros message. He has always denounced the U.S. embargo against Cuba as unjust, and continued to do so recently. Throughout the course of the last thirty-five years, Castro has shown unwavering resolve. He has refused to give into the economic sanctions by the U.S. This has been a consistent message during his time as leader of Cuba. He recently reaffirmed his commitment to stand firm in spite of the economic hardship which his country faces. He said, The disappearance of the socialist bloc has been a hard blow to us. Against the U.S. blockade we had been able to benefit from trade with socialist countries, which served as the basis for the development of our economy. The blockade is still in effect today but the basis has vanished, and we are being put to one of the toughest tests ever known in the modern era. However, our decision to keep our ideals has not weakened. 8 In another statement, Castro said that he is not willing to accept U.S. conditions for lifting of the embargo. Our position is that we do not accept any types of conditioning that may affect the country's sovereignty and independence to solve economic problems between the United States and Cuba or political problems between the United States and Cuba. This is an old position. I can assure you categorically that we would not accept political conditioning. 9 Cuba, through Castro has indeed acted as a unitary actor. One factor that increases Cubas ability to act as a unitary actor is the strict control which Castro has imposed over the government and communications. News is censored and government propaganda is spread throughout the country. Therefore, even if factions in Cuba exist that would threaten to undermine the appearance of Castro as a unitary actor they are difficult to see. This tight control which Castro has established furthers the perception of Castro as a unitary actor in Cuba. While Castros longevity has allowed Cuba to behave as an exceptional example of a unitary actor, the United States has seen eight different presidents during the time of the Castro regime. Still, for the most part, the U.S. has acted more or less as a unitary actor. The U.S. Constitution allows for the president to be the major actor in foreign affairs. The power to sign treaties, command the armed forces, and appoint foreign representatives is given to the president in article 2, section 2 of the United States Constitution. In the specific case of Cuban policy, the president has been the main spokesman for the United States since Castro took over. Kennedy was the spokesman who initially established the confrontational policies with Castro. Later, Reagans rhetoric was the main message sent to Castro. However, while the United States has typically presented its final message to the world through a single unitary actor, the president, along with many people and groups are responsible for the formulation of U.S. policy. Furthermore, it is possible for Castro to see the different factions within the United States. This offers a potential alternative to the view of the United States as a single, unitary actor with regard to Cuba. In a bureaucratic politics approach, players see different faces of issues, propose competing ways to resolve value conflicts, and have varying time horizons for action success. 10 Current U.S. policy toward Cuba has been shaped by bureaucratic politics. The president is not the sole orchestrator of the policy. Congress also has a powerful voice in the formulation of policy. In fact, Congress has been the driving force in U.S. policy toward Cuba in the last year. The initiation of the Helms-Burton Act by Congress applied pressure to the President to maintain a tough stand toward Cuba. However, some dissention did exist between Congress and the President with respect toward Helms-Burton. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff, raised questions about the Helms-Burton legislation on behalf of the President in May of 1995. He said, As currently drafted, some of the bills provisions would not effectively advance our ability to further a peaceful, rapid transition to democracy in Cuba. 6 He further added, One concern is to ensure that legislation not infringe upon the Presidents authority under the Constitution to conduct foreign policy, nor his flexibility to respond appropriately to evolving situations. This statement shows a lack of unity between the Congress and the Executive branch and can be considered one sign of the existence of bureaucratic politics. Less than a year later, though, President Clinton did sign the Helms-Burton legislation into law. Because the United States is for the most part a free and open society, such differences are relatively easy to detect. This contrasts to Castros Cuba where potential disagreements from within the government are very difficult to detect. The relative openness of the United States government makes it difficult to give the perception in the international arena of a unitary actor. Even within the Congress, there is not one unified approach. While the majority of Congress supported the Helms-Burton Legislation there was some opposition. In fact, an alternative bill was submitted that sought to lift all economic sanctions against Cuba. The bill introduced into the House of Representatives by Representative Rangel seeks to lift the embargo against Cuba. The bill finds that with the end of the Cold War, sanctions against Cuba are no longer needed, that the sanctions are hurting the Cuban people and not the government, and that the United States trades freely with other communist regimes. 11 Yet, a majority of Congress voted to approve legislation that would accomplish the polar opposite of the Rangel proposal. This division among actors in Congress over the correct action to take is further evidence of bureaucratic politics. Reasons for the support of the Helms-Burton Act and for the general hard-line stance towards Cuba by the United States can be examined based on a number of possible explanations. Foreign policy can be influenced by many different factors. One such factor is domestic pressure from special interest groups. Evidence exists that the U.S. policy towards Cuba has been substantially affected by Cuban-American groups. A well-organized and well financed Cuban-American lobby has helped ensure that neither Democrats nor Republicans, in the White House or in Congress, ever went soft on communist Cuba. 12 The Cuban American National Foundation and its millionaire head, Jorge Mas Canosa, have consistently pressured Congress and the White House to tighten U.S. embargos of Cuba. 12 CANF wields considerable power in Washington. In 1992, Mas was the chairman of the advisory board that oversees Radio and TV Marti. The sponsor of the 1992 Cuba Democracy Act, Rep. Robert Torricelli, received $7,050 from CANF officials in 1991. 12 Between 1989 and 1990 Dante Fascell, the former Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of Florida got nearly $6,000 from the CANF. Many other legislators received significant contributions from CANF as well. 12 This influence helps to support a view that the U.S. policy towards Cuba is being strongly influenced by domestic political pressures. From a theoretical perspective, this could be considered an example of bureaucratic politics and motivated bias. Because politicians are being supported by a special interest group, they may develop a motivated bias to see what they want to see by ignoring facts that do not support their position. Motivated biases can lead to faulty assessment of adversary resolve and overconfidence in ones position. 13 Actors that use motivated biases when formulating policy do not behave in an entirely rational way. The motivated bias of some Congressmen can lead to bureaucratic politics because the end result is that different Congressmen see different faces of issues and propose different solutions to the problems. This is the trademark of bureaucratic politics. Congress may not be the only actor which is allowing motivated biases to interfere with rational thought with respect to Cuba. President Clinton also appears to incorporate motivated and unmotivated biases into his positions. As a teenager, President Kennedy was somewhat of an idol to President Clinton. When Castro embarrassed Kennedy at the Bay of Pigs it influenced Clintons perception of Castro. Clinton aids say, that his, thirty-year-old feelings toward Castro go a long way toward explaining the Presidents hardheaded attitude toward Cuba today. 14 Also, a more personal reason for Clintons hard line toward Castro exists. Castro played a role in the most traumatic event of Clintons political life: his 1980 defeat for reelection as Arkansas governor. After Castro flooded the U.S. with Cuban refugees in 1980 during the Mariel boatlift, Clinton accepted thousands of the migrants at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. When they rioted and some escaped into the surrounding community many voters blamed Clinton and, thus, he was not reelected as governor. 14 When Clinton was told in 1994 that Castro was about to unleash another wave of disaffected Cubans, the presidents first reaction was, We will not have another Mariel boatlift. 14 Later he said, Let me be clear: The Cuban Government will not succeed in any attempt to dictate American immigration policy. I have ordered that illegal refugees from Cuba will not be allowed to enter the United States. 15 This evidence indicates that like Congress, President Clinton may be allowing motivated and unmotivated biases to affect his policy toward Cuba. His decision in 1994 not to allow refugees into the United States is an example of an unmotivated bias because he probably perceived the situation as similar to the 1980 exodus because that was what he expected to see. However, if he refuses to view Castro as someone to negotiate with because he harbors an over thirty year old grudge against him then Clinton would be allowing a motivated bias to interfere with rational decision making. Also, like Congress he may be attempting to please Cuban-American groups in an effort to gain their support. During the 1996 elections both Florida and New Jersey, two states with large Cuban-American populations, were seen as key states by both candidates. Clinton may have felt pressure to take a hard line stance toward Cuba in order to win reelection. Even Castro recognized that Clinton may be allowing motivated biases to influence policy. He said, U.S. presidents are slaves to many things, among them, electoral campaigns. During the course of their campaigns they make statements and commitments, and Clinton, unfortunately, had a hostile attitude toward Cuba. But they are also totally different during the first term when they are very careful about everything to be re-elected, and in the second term they seem to have their hands less tied. 16 If Clinton is allowing political concerns to impact policy then this would be yet another example of a motivated bias affecting Clintons policy decisions. While domestic motivated and unmotivated biases and bureaucratic politics offer one way to explain the current U.S. policy toward Cuba, another explanation is that the United States actually perceives Cuba as a threat to national security. Even with this approach to examining U.S. policy, motivated and unmotivated bias can be found. Evidence exists that the actors within the government do, at least superficially, believe that Cuba is a threat. The Helms-Burton Act explicitly mentions this as one main reason to impose sanctions. Section II of the Act states that the Congress finds, The Cuban Government engages in the illegal international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice in the United States. The Castro government threatens international peace and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups dedicated to international violence. For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and continues to pose a national security threat to the United States.17 The State Department, however, while continuing to include Cuba on the list it submits to Congress of terrorist sponsoring nations, admits that Cuba does not pose much of a terrorist threat. In, Patterns of Global Terrorism, the State Department finds that, there was no direct evidence of its sponsorship of terrorist acts in 1995. Further, the State Department acknowledges that, Cuba no longer is able to actively support armed struggle in Latin America or other parts of the world because of severe ongoing economic problems. Also it states, Havanas focus now is to forestall an economic collapse 18 This information from the State Department suggests that perhaps Congress did not adequately revise its perception of Cuba based on new information. If this is the case, then it would be considered another obstacle in the way of rational decision making. Members of Congress could be so accustomed to the view of Cuba which was established during the Cold-War that they are unwilling to revise their opinions based on recent findings. Since the end of the Cold War, the Cuban armed forces have shrunk by seven thousand men. 19 This further indicates that viewing Cuba as a national security threat, an intrinsic threat, may be outdated. Therefore, it does appear that many policy makers do use motivated and unmotivated biases in viewing Cuba. While the Cold War view of Cuba as a threat should change, it may have been reinforced earlier this year when Cuban planes shot down two American civilian aircraft which had been flying over international waters. The downing of the aircraft allows for the U.S. response to the incident as well as U.S. policy towards Cuba in general to be considered in yet another manner. Rather than using rational thought to weigh expected concrete gains and losses, the United States may be using a retributive policy to gain intangible benefits. Retribution results in positive feelings derived from punishment to right a perceived wrong. Statements from the President after the downing of the aircraft suggest that he believed Cuba needed to be punished for its actions. Clinton denounced the Cuban government as, Repressive, violent, and scornful of international law. 3 He then ordered a tightening of economic sanctions and announced that he would sign the Helms-Burton Act to which he had been previously opposed. U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Florida Republican, said of the incident: It was an act of aggression, an act of terrorism, an act of war ... We need an energetic and dramatic response from President Clinton.'' 3 Statements like these from government officials suggest a retributive goal rather than a rehabilitative one. However, officials are not likely to admit such motives behind sanctions. Instead, they seek to portray sanctions as rehabilitative measures. 20 Accordingly, President Clinton justified the increased sanctions on Cuba not by discussing retribution, but rather by explaining that they were needed to bring about change. He said, I took immediate steps to demonstrate my determination to foster change in Cuba -- including the signing into law of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, which strengthens the embargo, advances the cause of freedom in Cuba, and protects the interests of American citizens whose property was expropriated by the Cuban regime. 21 Thus, while earlier statements indicated that retribution may be a motive behind the increased sanctions, official statements and explanations by the President attempt to justify the sanctions by exalting their rehabilitative properties. One of the most frequently offered justifications for the continuance of economic sanctions against Cuba is that it continues to violate human rights. Michael Kozak, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs declared that, The Cuban Government is one of the worst violators of human rights in this hemisphere. 2 In 1995, The Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs stated, Only Cuba was excluded (form the Summit of the Americas) because its government continues to shun those (values of human rights and democracy) principles. 6 On December 28, of 1994, the UN General Assembly passed a U.S. drafted resolution condemning systematic human rights abuses in Cuba. 22 Based on this information, Cuba does appear to be a serious violator of human rights. The U.S. places value on human life and on human rights. Protection of these rights are incorporated into the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, it could be argued that the United States has a strategic interest in maintaining the embargo of Cuba in order to protect human rights. However, many other countries world wide including China have been cited by the UN as human rites violators. Even so, the United States continues to grant Most Favored Nation trading status to many of these countries. Thus, human rights violations alone cannot account for the hard-line continuation of sanctions against Cuba. Regardless of the reasons, the overall United States policy does remain one of economic isolation of Cuba. This policy has been widely criticized by the international community. President Clinton has recognized that widespread disapproval of the policy does exist. In signing the Helms-Burton Act he said, Often, the United States has stood alone in that struggle, because our allies and friends believed that pressuring Cuba to change was the wrong way to go. 23 The Helms-Burton Act does considerably more than just pressure Cuba to change. Contained within the Act are provisions that declare it forbidden that any nation will be allowed to trade with Cuba. The claims provisions would allow foreign companies to be sued in U.S. courts if they have investments or ongoing business with property in Cuba expropriated by the Cuban government and claimed by a U.S. national. 24 The temporary entry restrictions would bar travel to the United States by corporate officers and controlling shareholders of companies that have investments or ongoing businesses in Cuba involving expropriated Cuban property claimed by a U.S. national. The restrictions will also extend to immediate families, i.e. spouses and minor children. 24 The legality of these measures in terms of international and United States law should be examined. Section two of Article VI of the Constitution of the United States declares, This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the land 25 This obligates the United States to comply with all treaties that it has made. The United States is part of many organizations and has signed many treaties. The creation of the Helms-Burton Act threatens to violate some of the international treaties into which the United States has entered. The European Community has argued that Helms-Burton violates agreements under the WTO, NAFTA, OAS statutes, UN resolutions, and FCN treaties. 26 In a statement released by the EU, it was explained that the EU did not want to be involved in a dispute between the U.S. and Cuba, but that the extraterritoriality of the Helms-Burton Act was unfair and in violation of international law. 26 The effect of the claims provisions of Helms-Burton would run directly contrary to widely accepted international legal practices. Expropriation claims are normally to be settled through local legal remedies in the first instance, bilateral negotiations on a government to government basis in the second, or if these fail, arbitration in the International Court of Justice or a special claims commission set up by mutual agreement. 24 In its criticism of Helms-Burton the EU cites UN resolution 49 which condemned the United States embargo of Cuba as proof that Helms-Burton is in violation of UN agreements. Violation of a UN resolution gives the UN the mandate to take whatever action it deems necessary to get the rebel nation to comply. Article ninety-four of the UN Charter states that each member nation agrees to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party. 27 In addition to violating UN resolutions, the EU claims that Helms-Burton violates NAFTA and the World Trade Organization. Canada has threatened to bring the matter to NAFTA under Chapter twenty which establishes an organization for the settlement of disputes and arguments. 28 The EU promises to pursue similar measures with the WTO under Article twenty-three. Because Helms-Burton seeks to apply United States law to other countries it does appear to be in violation of the treaties into which it has entered. Even before the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act was signed, the administration recognized that it could be illegal. A high-ranking member of the Clinton Administration proclaimed, We are concerned that a number of the bills provisions could conflict with other important U.S. interests including our compliance with major international trade and investment agreements, including GATT, NAFTA, and Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. 6 This acknowledgment indicates that the United States was aware of the legal difficulties associated with Helms-Burton even before it was signed into law. Even in light of nearly unanimous international criticism, the United States continues to favor its position in Cuba. In a recent statement, President Clinton said, "We will work with our allies when we can," but he added that the United States was prepared to take unilateral action if necessary. "This is in the best interests of our country," he noted, "and in the best interests of the Cuban people." 21 These statements by the President allow for U.S. policy to be a examined from a prospect theory perspective. Prospect theory holds that the threat of loss is weighed more in decision making than is the possibility of gain. Actors who conform to prospect theory type actions anchor their values with reference points. These reference points are often tied to the status quo; if a leader is so worried about avoiding loss that he fails to adequately weigh prospective gains, then he is operating according to prospect theory. 29 In some ways, President Clinton and the U.S. policy towards Cuba exemplifies prospect theory. The President and other leaders appear so worried about winning reelection that they are willing to endure international criticism and forgo the gains of international cooperation and free trade in order to maintain the status quo. Their perceptions of the current situation regarding Cuba appear to be anchored in the Cold War era. The possible gains that could be attained by relaxing economic sanctions against Cuba in the form of improved international relations and increased business influence in Cuba are outweighed by the possible loss of domestic support, international perception of resolve, and American dominance of Cuba. America may not be the only actor in the situation that displays aspects of prospect theory. Fidel Castro does not appear to be a leader who is seeking to jump through windows of opportunity. The United States has repeatedly communicated that sanctions will be lifted if Castro cooperates. Secretary of State Christopher said, if he moves in a tangible, significant way, well respond in a carefully calibrated way. 30 However, Castro has repeatedly stated that he will not change because of U.S. pressure. He expresses that the United States is the aggressor in the relationship. He proclaimed, We are therefore not trying to rule the United States, nor diminish its independence one iota. It is not that we have a problem with the United States. It is the United States that has a problem with us.'' 31 By continuing its trade sanctions against Cuba, the United States has backed Castro into a corner of fear. The only window of opportunity open to him would be to comply with U.S. demands, a position that Castro has repeatedly refused. Castro is entrenched and is acting out of a basement of fear. He values holding power and maintaining the socialist system. The prospect of losing both of these objectives causes Castro to avoid seeking the potential economic gain that Cuba would experience if he were to give into U.S. demands by opening the economy to capitalism and by improving treatment of human rights. This means, that like the US, Castro may be operating according to prospect theory. He is anchoring his values in maintaining control of the government and in continuing socialism. Because he seeks to avoid loss rather than maximize gain, Castro does not approximate a rational actor. Therefore, coercion attempts against him are likely to fail. Implications for Theory and Policy Based on the information examined thus far, an analysis of the United States as a rational actor is possible. Rational actors seek to maximize gain or minimize loss. They thoroughly examine all information available and seek out new alternatives to old thoughts by continuously revising their views. Using this criteria, the United States does not currently approximate a rational actor. Biases, both motivate and unmotivated, bureaucratic politics, and fear of loss all act to interfere with rational thought and decision making in U.S. policy formation with respect to Cuba. Therefore, the Unite States would place fairly low on the rheostat of rationality. The lack of evidence of thorough search and revision on the part of the U.S. indicates that it displays more of a cognitive form and less of an analytic form of rationality; this makes it less of a rational actor. The United States could best be described with respect to Cuba as an actor that uses motivated and unmotivated biases in the context of bureaucratic politics. In order for the United States to better approximate a rational actor, it is necessary for it to be aware of the biases to which its policy toward Cuba is currently subjected. The U.S. should carefully weigh the costs and benefits possible by considering the effects of sanctions and no sanctions against the island nation. Before declaring the policies a failure, though, consideration of the goals must be reviewed. Michael Kozak attempted to explain the objectives of the Cuban embargo. He stated, Some say that our embargo policy has failed given the survival of Fidel Castros communist regime. Such criticism misses the point. Given Castros ideological commitment to his vision of revolution, it is unlikely that economic sanctions alone will ever induce him to abandon his goals. What the embargo does is to deny Cuba opportunities to earn hard currency and acquire goods, thus limiting the resources available to the government to carry out policies inimical to U.S. interests. To put it in starker terms, every dollar that the embargo prevents Cuba from earning from an American tourist is a dollar that Cuba cannot spend to provide a rifle to overthrow a democratically elected government in our hemisphere. 2 Kozak in his statement seems to advocate maintaining sanctions in order to deter Cuba from spreading socialism. He discusses the sanctions in terms of limiting Cubas capabilities. If this was the intended purpose of the sanctions on Cuba then the U.S. would be using deterrence by denial as its strategy toward Cuba. However, most U.S. officials have said that sanctions are designed to pressure Castro to change his behavior. This demonstates a coercive intent. If this is truly the goal of the sanctions, then they are ill advised. The United States has forced Castro into a corner and has caused him to act out of a basement of fear rather than windows of opportunity. Because of this, Castro cannot be considered a rational actor. Therefore, coercion is destined to fail. Tough economic sanctions against Cuba have failed to coerce Castro into compliance thus far, and because he is not a rational actor they are unlikely to succeed. So, while the sanctions can be considered a failure if rehabilitation is the goal, their success needs to be reconsidered if retribution is the purpose behind the sanctions. Retribution is an ideologically based policy. Therefore, if imposing sanctions is retributive in nature, then the policy is a success. Finding evidence of retributive intentions, though, is difficult because officials do not typically list punishment as a goal in foreign policy. Yet the U.S. reaction to the downing of the Brothers planes did appear to have retributive undertones. While the original purpose of the act when it was created in Congress may not have been retributive, the timing of Clintons signing of it makes it appear so. If the United States was dealing with a rational actor, then coercion would be expected to force Castro to maximize gain, or in this case, minimize the negative effects of the economic sanctions and, thus, comply with the U.S. demands. However, because Castro does not seek to leap through windows of opportunity, the U.S. policy of coercion will not work. The United States has employed for the last thirty-five years policies that assume that it is dealing with a rational leader. Castro has clearly demonstrated that he does not fit this description. With the threat from the Soviet Union gone, instead of continuing with economic sanctions, the United States should lift all embargos and allow democracy a chance to invade Cuba. By lifting sanctions the United States could achieve several objectives that are forgone by maintaining the current policy. Through trade, commerce, and increased communications, democracy will slowly spread into Cuba. Also, by lifting the embargo Cuban people who have been condemned to poverty may gain access to food, medicine, and other essentials. The United States claims that it is the condition of the Cuban people that is one of its biggest concerns and has led it to maintain the embargo. By lifting the embargo the U.S. would have an opportunity to help raise the standard of living of the Cubans. Finally, by lifting the embargo of Cuba, the United States stands to benefit from increased favor by the international community. Ending the sanctions against Cuba and repealing the Helms-Burton act would also bring the United States in line with international and domestic law. These benefits far surpass the potential damage of a perceived lost resolve that lifting the embargo could cause. Therefore, the United States should overcome the obstacles of psychological barriers that appear in the form of biases and fear of loss. Leaders should intelligently consider all of the information available, review alternative policies, and develop a new Cuban policy that relies on rational thought and decision making. End Notes 1 Brenner, Phillip. From Confrontation to Negotiation: U.S. Relations with Cuba. Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1988. 2 Kozak, Michael. Cuba: A Threat to Peace and Security in Our Hemisphere. 2 August 1989 Statement before Subcommittee on Western Hemispohere Affairs of House Forein Affaris Committee: Department of State Bulletin. 3 U.S. to Tighten Sanctions in Shoot Down Aftermath, The Boston Globe on-line Available at: http://www.latinolink.com/news/cubc0227.html 4 Castro, Fidel. May, 7 1994 Speech in Havanah Available online at: gopher.//lanic.utexas.edu:70/00/la/Cuba/Castro/1994/19940507 5 Tanter, Raymond. 472NOT1.DOC. [Online] University of Michigan, Political Science 472. Sept.8, 1996. Available: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not1.txt. 6 Tarnoff, Peter. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. Statement Before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 22 May 1995 in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. 7 Mazarr, Michael J. Semper Fidel: America and Cuba 1776-1988. Baltimore, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, Inc., 1988. 8 Castro, Fidel. January 5, 1994 speech in Buenos Aires. Available: gopher.//lanic.utexas.edu:70/00/la/Cuba/Castro/1994/19940105 9 Castro, Fidel. October 23, 1995 interview with Bernard Shaw of CNN. Available: gopher.//lanic.utexas.edu:70/00/la/Cuba/Castro/1995/19951023 10 Tanter, Raymond. 472NOT8.DOC. [Online] University of Michigan, Political Science 472. Sept.8, 1996. Available: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not8.txt. 11 House Resolution 883 Sponsored by Rep. Rangel. Available on-line at: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/hot-bill.html 12 After Castro Moves Out, U.S. News and World Report, 4 May 1992, 44. 13 Tanter, Raymond. 472NOT14.DOC. [Online] University of Michigan, Political Science 472. Sept.8, 1996. Available: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not14.txt. 14 Following in Kennedys Footsteps, U.S. News and World Report, 12 September 1994, 38. 15 Clinton, William J. at press confererence. 19 August, 1994 in U.S. Department of State Dispatch Vol. 5, No 35. 16 Castro, Fidel. 2 January 1994 speech in Buenos Aires. Available: gopher.//lanic.utexas.edu:70/00/la/Cuba/Castro/1994/19940102 17 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (online) available: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/L?d104:./list/d104sh.lst:160[160- 160](Cuban_Liberty_and_Democratic_Solidarity_(LIBERTAD)_Act_of_1996) 18 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism. U.S. Department of State [Online] Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. April 1996. Available: http://www.usis.usemb.se/terror/TERSST.HTM#Cuba. 19 Klare, Michael. Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1995. 20 Tanter, Raymond. Rehabilitation vs. Retribution; Windows vs. Basements. (online) in University of Michigan conferU group ps472, item 89, 2 December, 1996. 21 Clinton, William. 12 March 1996 White House Press Release (online) available: http://www.democrats.org/hot/wh/9603/w960312a.html 22 United Nations Resolution 49 available: http://ourworld-compuserve.com/homepages/agamemnon/united.html 23 Clinton, William. 16 July 1996 White House Press Release (online) available: http://www.democrats.org/hot/wh/9607/w960716.html 24 Background on the Helms-Burton Bill (online) 9 May 96 available: http://www:usis-canada.usia.gov/helms.htm 25 Constitution of the United States, article vi, section. 2. (online) available: http://www.elections.eb.com/elec/pri/Q00000.html 26 EU Criticism of Helms-Burton. (online) available: http://europa.eu.itn/en/agenda/eu-us/pub/pr/index.html 27 United Nations Charter, article 94. (online) available: http://www.undcp.org/charter.html 28 North American Free Trade Agreement available: http://the-tech.mit.edu/Bulletins/nafta.html 29 Tanter, Raymond. 472NOT21.DOC. [Online] University of Michigan, Political Science 472. Sept.8, 1996. Available: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not21.txt. 30 Robinson, Linda. U.S. News and World Report. 12 September 1994 p 38. 31 Castro, Fidel. 8 May 1994 speech in Havanah. available: gopher.//lanic.utexas.edu:70/00/la/Cuba/Castro/1994/19940508