Since the United States' inception, foreign policy has been based upon the notion of American hegemony and idealism. Leaders formulated foreign aggression and activity with the belief that American idealism and democracy is the world's most effective means of governing and should be shared with the rest of civilization. The desire for ultimate control of immediate surroundings--the Western Hemisphere-- was thwarted following the 1959 Cuban revolution. "By 1962 the Soviet Union had established a military outpost in Cuba and later that year began to emplace strategic missiles on the island" (Country Studies, section 5). The Castro revolution and the Soviet presence created a unique dilemma for American hegemony in the West. For a Communist state highly supported by the powerful Soviet Union lie situated in such close proximity to the American state of Florida. As exemplified following the intense Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, a Soviet supported nation so close to the American mainland sparked fear within the populous and challenges for the Pentagon. "The Castro government maintains a military-dominated economy that has decreased the well being of the Cuban people in order to enable the government to engage in military interventions and subversive activities throughout the world" (US Code). For a classic motivated bias developed. Whether or not Soviet weapons ever would be deployed from Cuba in aggression against the United States, an American fear of communism led to that notion as a constant concern. Americans saw what they wanted to see; a communist threat that at any time would employ its capabilities to attack the US. One must recognize, however, that as of 1991, the Soviet Union no longer exists. Communism and the Eastern Bloc collapsed. The Berlin Wall no longer stands as a symbol of European communism. With this drama and the upheaval that followed, numerous changes occurred, including tremendous drops in funding from the Soviet Union, which no longer existed as the world's second superpower; the United States' antithesis. "The Castro regime has so far survived the acute economic crisis that followed the demise of the Soviet Union" (Gonzalez). One must question then, why the United States still remains as concerned and fearful of Cuba. For if their military potential has been diminished as a result of the Soviet collapse, then why has not the United States began to treat Cuba as simply another Caribbean state? Surely American democracy holds communism and human rights violators in disregard, but Cuba appeared to be treated differently. Perhaps it results from proximity, perhaps it is history, but regardless, the United States government (USG) holds a specific disdain for Cuba and this paper aims to determine the historical and political reasons for America's continued containment of Cuba despite the Cold War's end. The first question to be addressed is whether current US policy is rational. Now that the Soviet Union no longer exists, should the USG continue to treat Cuba as it did while it was so heavily supported politically and militarily by the Soviets? "Events is the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have dramatically reduced Cuba's external support and threaten Cuba's food and oil supplies" (US Code). Previously, with the economic and military resources provided by the USSR, the Castro regime may have posed a threat due to location and capabilities. However, is current policy irrational? A rational actor follows a course in his best interests after consulting with others. One possibility is that a motivated bias prohibits the Pentagon's rationality. Following the collapse of communism and the Cold War, various elements of the population and Congress began to call for increasing military cutbacks. To forestall this, the Pentagon may have had to elevate various threats in the Middle East and attempt to maintain current threats, including Cuba. In a motivated bias, an actor sees what he wants to see, he has a motivation behind his perceptions. This may be a classic case, since without Soviet support, does Cuba really posses an inherent threat to the United States? "Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggles in Latin America and other parts of the world. Havana's focus is now to forestall an economic collapse" (1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism). Regardless of Cuba's present economic state, the American electorate and Congress appear willing to maintain the status quo, in terms of attitudes toward Cuba and the Castro regime. The Helms-Burton bill passed Congress after lengthy debates and delays only following the downing of an American civilian aircraft over Cuban airspace. Certainly, the USG is quick to react in all acts of aggression against Americans, however such strong sanctions tend not to be the general course of action. Cuba is a special case; it is a communist state nearly bordering the United States. This proximity, along with long-held Cold War fears, lead Americans and USG to treat Cuba differently than other Communist or rouge states. "While the US government trades with human rights violators like China and Indonesia, and has sought closer relations with states like Vietnam and North Korea, it has reinvigorated the campaign of fear, hate and misperception against innocent Cuban victims" (Wiley). Employing an unmotivated bias, Americans and their government expect aggression and difficulties regarding Cuban relations. In such a bias, an actor sees what he expects to see and such notions tend to be based upon prior events. For history will determine what will happen in the future and Americans point to two events that have shaped relations with and attitudes toward Cuba: the Bay of Bigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bay of Pigs invasion which intended to topple the Castro regime in 1961 and remove this Western communist threat, instead claims the title of one of America's most famed military disasters. "The story of the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs is one of mismanagement, overconfidence, and lack of security" (The Bay of Pigs). The long-term effects of the failed invasion and subsequent policy may be simply discussed as the USG reacting to its own embarrassment and anger. For the United States throughout its history conquered lands that held both intrinsic and strategic interests. The United States took the Philippines and Hawaii for intrinsic interests because of their locations relating to military strategy and a need for American presence in the Pacific. World War II and the American retaliation against Japan and aggression towards Germany in aid of allies displayed American resolve and capabilities and expressed to the world the American spirit. Such actions represent strategic interests. The Bay of Pigs invasion dealt with strategic interests; the desire to dismantle the only communist threat in the West. For Communist fears were pervasive throughout the US, however, these fears tended to pertain to a distant USSR, not a nearby Soviet supported Cuba. Thus the United States desired a removal of the Castro regime and its ties to Moscow. However, the invasion turned into a military disaster with longstanding effects. "The ultimate indication of the invasion's failure is that thirty-five years later Castro is still in power. This not only indicates the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, but American policy towards Cuba in general. As with many wars, even a cold one, the leader is able to rally his people around him against an aggressor" (Bay of Pigs). One notion is that due to the embarrassment the USG felt regarding its failure, policy results as punishment to the Castro regime for not falling to the American attack. If one event were to be employed as the symbol of Cold War relations, it likely would be the Cuban Missile Crisis. The crisis was a classic example of the Chicken game: who would flinch first. For as it became apparent to Americans that the Soviets had placed missiles in Cuba and pointed them at the United States, the chicken game began. Who had more resolve? Would the USSR attack the United States as American Cold War ideology had feared for years, or would the Americans hold the stronger resolve and attack first with a moral defensive posture? Decisions in such circumstances depend upon threat credibility and critical risk. Did the US believe the Soviets had enough resolve to really attack the United States? In determining its actions, the USG had to establish how credible the Soviets were. Such a conclusion often is based upon motivated and unmotivated biases--what the US expected or wanted to see. A 1989 conference expressed an unmotivated bias the Cubans held, based upon previous American international aggressions. "The Cubans expected the United States to invade and predicted up to 800,000 casualties" (The Cuban Missile Crisis). Furthermore, the US had high critical risk, based upon a motivated bias. The USG, hoping to avert a military conflict, did not want to see a Soviet threat, thus didn't see one. Such an assumption allowed the Pentagon to believe it could withstand any military actions perpetrated by the Soviets and Cubans; the USG held little regard as to the credibility of the threat being amassed in Cuba. "US intelligence estimates of ten thousand to twelve thousand Soviet troops in Cuba during the crisis were far off, according to the Soviets. The real figure was over forty thousand" (The Cuban Missile Crisis). Thus while playing the chicken game, both nations showed tremendous resolve based upon various biases which were colored by their respective notions of the other side's willingness to take action. History and ideology have previously been discussed in this essay as reasons for the maintenance of current US policy towards Cuba. The next section of the paper shall delve into the specific elements of said policy, discussing its rationality and purposes, including coercion and deterrence. The centerpiece of the United States containment policy of Cuba has been an economic embargo prohibiting any business interests and trade with Cuba. "The term 'economic embargo of Cuba' refers to the economic embargo imposed against Cuba pursuant to section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act" (Helms). The act then serves as a means of punishing an enemy and employing coercion to gain an acceptable outcome. For coercion is defined as "Action taken to force a party to change unacceptable behavior or undo an unacceptable action already taken." So the USG in drafting such legislation is attempting through economic measures to force the Castro regime to relinquish its communist control and alter its poor human rights record. Through economic pressure and lack of aid the USG aims to coerce Castro to change his ways. "The embargo is an enduring symbol of this country's firm stance against totalitarianism and a clear message to those who would rule by the force of violence and repression rather than the will of reason and public consent" (FAQs). However, the embargo has been in place since 1961 and no appreciable progress has been made. One then begins to question the purpose of maintaining an embargo that appears not to hold a purpose. Is it rational for the US to maintain this legislation or should various changes be made? "No other nation observes the US embargo on Cuba. Canadian, Mexican and French companies, among others, have sizable investments there. Canada is expected to challenge the policy under (NAFTA)" (Gray). This begs the question, is ideology rational? Perhaps not, for if the United States refuses to trade with a nation out of ideological concerns that neighbors and allies ignore, than what purpose does an embargo hold? If the Cubans have access to materials via other nations, then one would expect the US trade embargo to yield little success in pressuring Castro. Maybe so, but it also must be recognized that as the world's only remaining superpower, the US does possess access to more funds than other nation. Thus, Castro is robbing his people of tremendous amounts of American financial and other aid by not caving in to American pressures. "The embargo today serves as the major obstacle to the finding of substitute markets, credit and assistance at a critical time when the Eastern Bloc, Castro's former political and economic base of support, has collapsed" (FAQs). Therefore, since the US wields such immense economic power throughout the globe, its coercive power is great. The US possesses the ability to hold the potential for trade and tourism in front of Castro, which could lead to an economic boom in his nation. Yet, he remains content maintaining the communist stance, rather than reforming and accepting American aid. That communist stance is not the only worry for the USG. For Americans tend to remain rather paranoid regarding Cuba and Castro, never knowing what to expect. Realization of such concern occurred in early 1996 when the Cuban Air Force shot down a civilian American aircraft flying a humanitarian mission. What resulted was popular American disgust among the electorate and government. Following such intense public opinion, stronger sanctions were imposed by President Bill Clinton, and a major piece of legislation that had commonly been opposed was rapidly and decisively passed by both houses of Congress. "This act is a justified response to the Cuban government's unjustified, unlawful attack on two unarmed US civilian aircraft that left three US citizens and one US resident dead" (Clinton). The bill, titled the "Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1995" was signed by Clinton March 12, 1996, one week following the Cuban downing of the American plane. According to the legislation's language, commonly referred to as the Helms-Burton Bill, the law aims to increase sanctions. "A Bill: To strengthen international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to develop a plan to support a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba, and for other purposes" (Helms). Measures within the Bill call for additional decreases in foreign investment and further containment of Cuba. "The bill urges the president to seek an international embargo against Cuba and commits the United States to keeping Cuba out of international financial institutions" (Webber). Certainly these are strong coercive measures intended to force Castro to change unacceptable behavior, including unprovoked terrorism such as the plane incident. To be effectively coercive, options and abilities must be relinquished. Since the US is the only nation with such disregard towards Cuba, how effective can even the new measures be? Castro likely will not cave to US appeals, but still the recently passed Helms-Burton Bill is the most intense stance yet that the USG is intolerant of the Castro regime and demands change. "The purposes of the Act are to increase economic pressure on the Cuban government and to discourage foreign investment in expropriated properties in Cuba, the claims to which are owned by US nationals" (Background). Previously enacted trade barriers are coercive in nature since they are actions taken in order to force an actor to undo an action taken--the formation of a communist regime. Furthermore, such sanctions also possess elements of the concept deter, within the heading of deterrence. Such sanctions, preventing trade with the world's only superpower, assuredly were a "threat of punishment to prevent unacceptable behavior." However, they also may be interpreted as simply persuasive. Since other nations freely trade with Cuba, and the US has remained the world's sole holdout, perhaps the sanctions were not strong enough and did not coerce, instead only attempted to persuade Castro to alter his method of rule. Measures within the new Helms-Burton law, however, are purely coercive since various provisions allow for direct action. "In addition to stricter sanctions, the Helms-Burton Act gives Cuban exiles the right to sue over property they lost during Fidel Castro's 37-year communist rule" (USA Today). By providing for direct action by individuals against the Cuban government and Castro regime, more vehement pressure shall be exerted upon the rogue government and the potential for such coercive measures finally making progress becomes more likely. As previously discussed, regardless of the symbolic importance of the US embargo and Helms-Burton's roles in coercing Castro to alter his government and strive for democracy, the United States remains the only nation with such attitudes and policies towards Cuba. Recently, because of the Helms-Burton passage, international criticism has fallen upon the United States for its Cuban sanctions. The US embargo towards Cuba is based on a complex system of laws and regulations that prohibit virtually all commercial and financial transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals by US companies, US owned or controlled companies and US nationals. The threat of sanctions on companies incorporated outside the US, even if owned or controlled by US nationals, is clearly extraterritorial as these companies should only have to conform with the laws of the country in which they are incorporated (Foreign and Security Policy). Hence, another means of discussing the embargo's rationality develops. For US policy appears so distant from the wishes of its allies that one must question why in three decades an alteration in policy has not developed. Furthermore, why have the sanctions been strengthened through Helms-Burton, or LIBERTAD? Since being imposed in 1961 to create an economic downfall and bring democracy to Cuba, the embargo has created no tangible effect. A likely explanation is that there has been no international cooperation, however, this is one provision in the new law--for the USG to encourage international participation in US-Cuban policy. Such participation is not likely to occur since there is such apparent global opposition to the previous and new American policy. "The EU has conveyed to the US administration and Congress its opposition to the bill and its determination to defend the EU's legitimate rights under WTO. The US administration has taken on board these objections and has offered to help Congress make the Helms Bill more compatible with US international obligations" (Foreign and security Policy). Similar objections have been noted by Canada, the UK, Mexico and Japan. "As it stands, LIBERTAD violates several general principles of customary and conventional international law--WTO, NAFTA, OAS statutes, UN conventions and resolutions, FCN treaties" (Foreign and security Policy). With such numerous and prevalent objections to American law, one must not expect the new Bill to hold much coercive ability, since it will be so mightily challenged by so many nations. Thus again the rationality of the US policy of coercing Cuba comes into question. Is serving American ideological interests, while ignoring the rights of allies an acceptable foreign policy? Is the US acting as singly as the nations it so despises and wishes to contain? "Though US trade and travel with Cuba is already severely restricted, Congress never tires of adding a new slap against the island nation's revolutionary regime. The (Helms) Bill applied new pressures on the country, such as preventing the US president from easing sanctions on Cuba without an act of Congress" (Sanctions from the Hill). Both the population and USG have held motivated and unmotivated biases towards Cuba for decades, yet now all must question the productivity of polices resulting from said biases. Are increased sanctions necessary in a climate of international disagreement which has led to an ineffectiveness of US policy? The USG, in shaping policy may be somewhat of an international unitary actor. As defined, a unitary actor, regardless of his rationality will individually make decisions. Furthermore, the quality of those decisions will be based upon the unitary actor's level on the rheostat of rationality. Previous discussion related to the notion that perhaps US policy in Cuba is somewhat irrational since USG alienates allies by acting counter to the policies of global partners. Furthermore, since the US is acting alone and potentially violating international agreements, the USG constitutes a unitary actor with its economic embargo and now LIBERTAD act. "US allies, including Canada, have objected that the measure would violate open trade agreements" (Black). However, the US likely is acting rationally, since a rational actor follows his interests and the best course to reach those goals, regardless of the external appearance. So, American policy and USG believe that the three-decade-old embargo and its strengthening through LIBERTAD comprises the most effective means of bringing democracy to Cuba. "Our current efforts are beginning to yield results: they are depriving the Cuban regime of the hard currency it needs to maintain its grip on power" (Clinton). Whether or not this appears irrational to outsiders is irrelevant since the unitary actor, the USG, believes this is the wisest action to take. Such rationality is based on American ideology which holds communism in disregard. "It should be the policy of the United States to maintain sanctions on the Castro regime so long as it continues to refuse to move toward democratization" (US Code). A motivated bias relating to what USG and American citizens expect from communist states creates a setting where the rational course appears to be maintaining the status quo. For it does not matter which actions are taken by American allies; the USG detests communism and is unwilling to trade with such a regime. Hence, the American government must remain an international unitary actor since it is in its best ideological interest to not support communist Cuba in any way. The United States has maintained the same policy towards Cuba Since first imposing an economic embargo in 1961. Said sanction was strengthened earlier this year (1996) when the LIBERTAD or Helms-Burton act became law and added to the economic pressures. This US policy appears rather ineffective. Among the stated purposes of LIBERTAD, which also has been at the center of the United States Cuba policy for years is, "to develop a plan to support a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba" (Helms). Yet thirty-five years following the inception of the US sanctions, Castro remains in power, heading a communist regime. There have been various explanations for the inability of the embargo to topple Castro. First, until the Soviet collapse and the end of the Eastern Bloc in 1991, Cuba was heavily supported both economically and politically by Moscow. Secondly, the United States is the only nation enforcing the embargo, with many other powerful governments freely trading with the Cubans. Thus, the ability for the US policy of economic depravation is difficult to maneuver since the Cubans have always had substantial financial resources via the Soviet Union and its democratic trading partners. Another hindrance to effective operation of US policy is that it is impossible to coerce an irrational actor. "The very reason Castro refuses to contemplate the slightest reform is his inability to tolerate any dissolution of his absolute power" (FAQs). Castro may believe it is in his best interest to retain his absolute rule, yet recent global history has been a tale of the fall of communism and of the inherent desire for democracy. For if Castro desires to remain in power and avoid the revolutions that swept through Europe, cooperation with the USG and a transition to democracy may prove the surest method of retaining power. However, such a determination would require a certain level of rationality that Castro has yet to effectively display. Until such a move towards democratization occurs, all US sanctions and embargos must remain in place. Though the US embargo on Cuba may not have damaged the island nation to the extent the USG would prefer, the policy must continue. For it must prevail as a symbol to Havana and the world of the United States' disdain for communist governments and for the American ideal of spreading democracy.