Political Science 472
Dr. Raymond Tanter
GSI John Post
"Others have argued that the world's future fault lines will fall not between the major states or civilizations but between the growing nexus of democratic, market-oriented societies and those "holdout" states that have eschewed democracy or defied the world community in other ways. Such 'pariah' states or 'rogue' powers are said to harbor aggressive inclinations to support terrorism, and to seek the production of nuclear or chemical weapons."1 In the article from which this quotation, was taken Anthony Lake, Clinton's foreign policy advisor, was quoted as saying "(We) must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family (of nations) but also to assault it basic values," Lake then proceeded to place several nations in this category including Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. This list is interesting due to its exclusion of Syria. Throughout its recent history, Syria has partaken in the roguish activities of: sponsorship of international terrorism and participation in international drug trafficking. Its record in these events is clear.
As a sponsor of terrorism "Syria provides safehaven and support for several groups that engage in international terrrorism." according to Patterns of Global Terrorism.2 Furthermore, "Several radical terrorist groups maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory and in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon..."3 Additionally "Syria has also allowed Iran to resupply Hizballah via Damascus."4 Finally, Syria has given either financial or military aid to a veritable alphabet soup of terrorist organizations including the DFLP, JIP, PFLP-GC, PFLP-SC, PSF.
Syrian occupied Lebanon has been noted as the source for between twenty and thirty five percent of all heroin imported into the US.5 According to independent estimates, the total value of SyriaUs Drug trade in 1992 was over four billion dollars.
Why has the USG engaged in negotiations with Syria and thus seemingly overlooked SyriaUs participation in rogue activities? The answer can be found through an understanding of prospect theory, motivated bias and bureaucratic politics.
Prospect theory states that often actors pay more attention to losses than they do to gains. This means that contrary to a rational choice of selecting the greatest gain or minimizing losses actors according to prospect theory will risk more to avoid losses than to would to achieve a gain.
Using prospect theory we can see that once the US set is reference point as bringing about peace in the Middle East it feared losing Syria's participation in the Middle East more than it valued having Syria stop its rogue activities.
"After the Gulf War cease fire, the Bush administration set in motion an effort to create a New World Order which constituted its policy reaction to the changed strategic circumstances of the world and the Middle East. Washington sought to implement a political strategy in search of a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict..."6. The belief that the USG could bring about a solution to conflict in the Middle East was soon transferred from the Bush administration to the incoming Clinton administration. As Warren Christopher stated " The day after his election...President Clinton reaffirmed America's enduring interest in the Middle East. He vowed to make the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace one of his top priorities."7
Thus the reference point had been set: the USG was committed to bringing about peace between Israel and Syria. A reference point is a critical component to prospect theory since it "is an anchoring mechanism...the reference point is a person's goal which anchors him/her in light of other events and decisions."8
Reference points also serve another purpose in prospect theory "Given rising expectations, whether based on the extrapolation of past trends or on conceptions of justice, people define their reference point at some future and higher level of satisfaction, frame any point short of that as a loss (regardless of recent accomplishments) and are willing to take excessively risky actions to reach that aspiration level."9
As we review the speeches of Warren Christopher we can see that the reference point towards Syria had shifted from "working to condemn and isolate state sponsors of terrorism"10 to seeing her as a partner for peace. Suddenly Christopher can be heard speaking of Syria not so much as a rogue state but as "the key to completing the circle of peace."11
As prospect theory states actors are often willing to take substantial risks in order to reach the reference point. Thus in the fall of 1994, Clinton personally met Assad violating AmericaUs stance of not meeting with states who sponsor terrorism. This is just what the Washington Post feared when it wrote that the Clinton administration might soon regret "the precedent of visiting a country officially listed as a sponsor of terrorism."12
Next let us examine how motivated bias distort America's perception of Syria's rogue activities. Motivated Bias is a psychological concept that states that actors see what they want to see.
To the USG, the Gulf War had brought about a vast political realignment of the Middle East. The USG thought that Syria's participation in the Gulf War signaled a new direction for this once radical Soviet client state. "Syria's participation in the U.S.-led multinational coalition aligned against Saddam Hussein marked a dramatic watershed in Syria's relations both with other Arab states and with the West."13
However, other sources suggest that the USG was seeing what it wanted to see--engaging in a motivated bias towards Syria's actions, and that perhaps there were other reasons for Syria's participation other than a new political alignment. "Even though Washington appeared to believe otherwise, not all of the Arab participants in the coalition against Iraq entered the coalition out of a sense of moral indignation or visions of a new Arab consensus. In the coalition against Iraq, Arab interests conveniently converged in joint action, but these evaporated soon after the war."14
Perhaps the US could have discerned three reasons for Syria's participation. First it gained financial aid of 2.5 billion from the Gulf coalition. Second, its participation ended years of diplomatic isolation from other Arab states as a result of its support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War. Third, the Gulf War gave Syria the opportunity to attack and subsequently lessen the influence of Iraq, its traditional rival in the Middle East. The money Syria received from the Gulf coalition was used to purchase new weapons systems.15 Finally, Syria's participation in the Gulf War allowed it to advance one of its major foreign policy goals: to be a major power in the region.16
Another example of this motivated bias is illustrated in a interview of Warren Christopher broadcast on Nightline "Ms. Roberts: You keep saying that everybody wants a cease-fire , but can you give us some sense of the evidence that Syria wants a cease-fire? Have they done anything to stop arming the Hizbollah? Secretary Christopher: I think they want a cease-fire, Cokie, because they would like to get back to the bargaining table. they would like to get back to the peace process.... I do think that they would like to bring this fighting to an end so they can get back to the peace process."16 Christopher's response is nonsensical. It flies in the face of the facts: How eager could Syria have been to get to the peace table if it was allowing Hizballah to fire rockets into Israel?17
Besides psychological motivations and biases such as prospect theory, the very complex nature of US foreign policy making contributes to what seems like a schizophrenic foreign policy towards Syria. The USG is not a unitary actor. Unlike Assad's Syria, in the USG more than one man or institution is calling the shots. The State Department and Congress have different viewpoints about what our policy towards Syria should be. This can lead to misperception of American foreign policy and intentions. A foreign leader will often choose to pay attention to the viewpoint that best suits their agenda.
In the USG there seems to be significant disagreement between the State Department and Congress over US policy towards Syria. This is perhaps best evidenced by the struggle between several congressman and the State Department over the issue of whether Syria should have been taken off the list of nations that do not cooperate with anti-drug efforts. An article by the Washington Post summarizes the political infighting over this issue. "According to several officials the State Department called for waiving Syria's inclusion on the list even though drug experts in the Administration say Syria continues to do little to stop the Opium trade..."18
The reason for this was as a reward for Syrian participation in the Middle East peace process.19 However, Democratic members of Congress disagreed with this action and were " set to denounce the Clinton administration for rewarding Syria..."20
Bob Dole best sums up CongressUs dislike of the administration and State DepartmentUs policy towards Syria "...the administration refused to speak out strongly enough on Syrian support for terrorism and has opposed congressional efforts to draw attention to SyriaUs role in a aiding and harboring terrorists."21 As a result of Congressional political pressure, the administration decided against the waiver for Syria. And thus, foreign policy was dictated by Congress not the State Department.
As Steven Hessler states " By their imposition of sanctions, the USG seeks to coerce the SG into complying with its demands."22 In order for Syria to have the sanctions against it lifted it must stop its participation in both international terrorism and drug trafficking.(For a complete listing of US laws and sanctions that cover Syria's rogue actions refer to Appendix A)
Professor Tanter defines strategy as "Strategy as manipulation of predictability of one's own actions so that an adversary's chooses in one's favor."23 The USG employs strategy in its policy of sanctions because according to the Export Administration Act of 1979 any state that appears on the "terrorism list" is automatically banned from the export of goods or technology. This leaves Syria with the choice of sanctions or choosing in the USG's favor and stopping its sponsorship of terrorism and drug trafficking.
Because the USG employs strategy in its policy towards Syria it effectively rules out the use of either search or persuasion. The USG in addressing the problem of Syrian sponsorship of terrorism neither sought our alternate alternate solutions to the problem. Nor did the USG engage in persuasion, which is a manipulation of the situation so as to persuade the other party that it is in their best interests to do (or not) a certain action.
The United States policy of imposing economic sanctions on Syria is a rational one because it minimizes losses while it maximizes gains. Economic sanctions cause the USG minimal economic hardship because "...US bilateral trade with Syria is insignificant."24. Yet sanctions have brought gains for the USG in that Syria has not directly supported terrorism; "we (the State Department) have no evidence of direct Syrian involvement in terrorist acts since 1986..."25 Gains are also evident in the area of drug trafficking as according to the International Narcotics Control Strategy report of 1996 "Illicit opium and cannabis cultivation in Lebanon remains significantly diminished due to strict enforcement and highly effective continued eradication efforts by joint Lebanese-Syrian authorities."26 Furthermore, these sanctions are rehabilitative because their goal is to stop Syrian rogue activities and therefore bring Syria into the family of nations.
Because of sanctions, the State Department and the Clinton administration protect themselves from attacks that they are being too lenient with Syria when they engage in bilateral talks or when President Clinton visits Syria. Warren Christopher illustrates this, in the following interview:
"Ms. Cokie Roberts: Mr. Secretary, some of your critics, however, say youUve been a little to reasonable with Syria...
Secretary Christopher: We've hardly been too reasonable with Syria. They're on our drug list. They're on our terrorism list. They understand the dissatisfaction we have with them..."27.
The Syrian government is also a rational actor because it has shown repeatedly that it undertakes these rogue actions in order to maximize gains and minimize loses. One of the main goals of Syrian foreign policy is to increase its influence in the region. Hizballah attacks against Israel have created significant disturbances within northern Israel and on several occasions have provoked Israeli retaliation.
Because Syria "allows" Hizballah to operate the message sent to Israel and the USG is clear: in order for Israel to have a secure northern border it must make peace with Syria. Thus Syria continues to be placed on the US terrorist list and face economic sanctions but in return receives an extra bargaining chip in peace negotiations. Finally, through drug trafficking Syria is able to recoup the cost of USG sanctions.28
Conclusion and Analysis:
The USG overlooks Syrian participation in rogue activities because of prospect theory, motivated biases, and the importance to the USG of closing the circle of peace between Israel and her immediate neighbors. Because bringing about peace between Israel and Syria has been a high priority of American Foreign policy the USG has increasingly been willing to take risky actions in courting Syria despite its rogue activities. Furthermore, because of motivated bias the USG has misperceived Syria's nature and motives in both the Gulf War and its role in the tensions between Hizballah and Israel in southern Lebanon.
We must now ask the question how effective has this policy been? Although this policy was born out of a rational consideration of options it has clearly not reached its goals of bringing about a true peace between Israel and Syria. America's policy of coercive diplomacy, though rational, has been ineffective because Assad has been able to circumvent the punishment that these sanctions provide. In the case of terrorism he has simply subcontracted the job to Hizballah and yet has still retained the bargaining chip of threatening Israel's borders.
I would argue that the USG policy towards Syria needs to be retooled. However, two points must be taken into consideration. The US cannot create a lasting peace in the Middle East without Syria, and only Assad can bring Syria to the table of peace. Another point that must be held in consideration is the fact that the sanctions cannot be removed (before peace is made with Israel) because of the high political cost of appearing to grant concessions to a brutal dictator.
One possible avenue to explore in search of a more effective policy towards Syria would be for the USG to use more sticks than carrots. For example, the USG should impress upon Assad that if peace can not be reached than perhaps Syria's neighbors both Israel, Jordan and Turkey must be strengthened with significant arms deals. Give Assad the choice of either making peace and end his rogue activities or be forced into insignificance as a player in the Middle East.
In the past, Assad has been willing to realign the country's foreign policy in order to maintain its power in the region. This is evidenced by Syria's participation in the US coalition in the Gulf War and Syria's reestablishing of relations with Egypt in 1989. In future efforts to coerce Assad, the USG should pay attention to this powerful motivating force behind his decisions.
Appendix A
State Sponsorship of Terrorism
In 1979 the US State department as mandated by Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act created the "terrorism list" of countries that provided state support for international terrorism. Syria has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since the list's creation.
Being placed on the terrorism lists subjects these sponsorers (such as Syria) to trade and export restrictions by the USG. In 1986 the sanctions were expanded to include aircraft, aircraft parts and computers of US origin.29 Due to the 1986 sanctions Syria is ineligible for Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Both the EXIM Bank and OPIC have suspended their programs in Syria 30. And in 1989 the Anti-terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 prohibited the export of both military equipment or munitions to any state listed on the State DepartmentUs terrorism list.30 Finally, in 1994 Congress enacted section 73(f) of the Arms Export Control Act which targets the transfer of ballistic missile technology to terrorist nations(Hr3540). In the 1995 edition of Patterns of Global Terrorism, Syria was listed as a state supporter of Terrorism. in the 1995.
Drug Trafficking
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires both that the US State Department publish annually the International Narcotics Control Strategy report and that the President is required to identify a list of the major drug-producing and transit countries as defined in the law. Additionally the President may certify whether or a country is meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 U.N. Convention.31 "Section 2346(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the termination of United States Foreign Aid."32 Syria has been included in the list since its presence in Lebanon in the 1980's. Syria was included in the 1995 list of major drug producing and transit countries.
Works Cited
1 Michael T. Klare, "Global Security: The Human Dimension: Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms"
http://www.enews.com/magazines/chistory/961101-001.html.
2 U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995, http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/press/state/archive/april/sd3_5-1.htm.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Michael Widlanski, "Assad Case" The New Republic February 3, 1992.
6 United States Army Foreign Military Studies Office, The United States
and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration after the Gulf War 1992, http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/geo/pubs/rusi2v8/htm.
7 United State Department of State Dispatch, Maintaining the Momentum for Peace in the Middle East, 24 Oct 1994: 5:709-11.
8 Raymond Tanter, Prospect Theory: Choosing to Cooperate, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not11.txt.
9 Levy, Jack, Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical
Applications and Analytical Problems, Political Psychology, 1992, Vol. 13, No. 2 page 289.
10 Christopher Says U.S. To Stress, Peace, Security, Remarks at Harvard
University, http://www.usia.gov/abtusia/posts/FR1/wwwharve.html
11 Charles Lane, "A Man Of Good Intentions: St. Chris On The Road To Damascus" The New Republic July 29 1996.
http://www.enews.com/magazines/tnr/archive/07/lane0729986.htm
12 "Clinton Takes Policy Gamble with Syria Visit", Los Angeles Times, 23 October 1994.
13 U.S. State Department, Background Notes, Syria, 1995.
14 United States Army Foreign Military Studies Office, The United States and the Persian Gulf in the Bush Administration after the Gulf War 1992, http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/geo/pubs/rusi2v8/htm.
15 U.S. State Department, Background Notes, Syria, 1995.
16 Stephen Hessler, "An Examination of United States Policy
Towards Syria From 1979 to the Present" PS472, University of Michigan
17 Interview of Warren Christopher, This Week with David Brinkley, 21
April 1996.http://www.state.gov//www.state.gov/www/current/middle_east/
apr96_mideast_update.html
18 Thomas Lipman, 1994 "State Department Back on Effort to Court Syria", Washington Post, 31 March 1994:A1.
19 Ibid.
20 Steve Greenhouse, "State Depart. Steps Back on Effort to Court Syria", New York Times, 1 April 1994.
21 Bob Dole's Remarks To Conference of Veterans of Foreign Wars, Http://www/fas.org/spp/starwars/elect96/bd960820.htm
22 Stephen Hessler, "An Examination of United States Policy
Towards Syria From 1979 to the Present" PS472, University of Michigan
23 Raymond Tanter, Game Theory.
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/F96PS472Notes/472not5.txt
24 Department of State Bulletin, "Counterterrorism: US Policy and Proposed Legislation", 1988 88:44-7
25 Syrian Support for Terrorism Testimony by Ambassador Philip C Wilcox Coordinator for Counterterrorism gopher ://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/07-1%
26 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report", March 1996.
27 Interview of Warren Christopher on Nightline on ABC-TV's "This week with David Brinkley"
http://www.state.gov/www/current/middle_east/apr96_mideast_update.html
28 Raymond, Tanter, Prospectus for Publication: ROGUE REGIMES. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/rogue/prospectus.html
29 Stephen Hessler, "An Examination of United States Policy
Towards Syria From 1979 to the Present" PS472, University of Michigan
30 David A.Charters, ed., The Deadly Sin of Terrorism (Greenwood Press: London, 1994) pg.196-199.
31 Department of State, "International Narcotics Strategy Report", gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0f-1%3aa211342%3a5.696/03/01%20Daily%20briefing
32 Stephen Hessler, "An Examination of United States Policy
Towards Syria From 1979 to the Present", PS472, University of Michigan