The Mughal Siege of Jodhpur, 1565

A Forgotten Imperial Episode

In his book, *The Formation of the Mughal Empire*, Douglas Streusand remarked that “although Jodhpur is certainly a great fort, Abū al-Faẓl’s notice of its fall is so brief that the Mughals probably did not have to mount siege operations in order to take it.” Streusand also pointed out that “[Abū al- Faẓl’s] entire presentation [the Akbar Nāmā] serves to glorify, justify, and explain the status of Akbar in accord with his view of himself.” An inglorious siege with mixed results may not have fulfilled Abū al-Faẓl’s purpose. It is indisputable that a siege took place, but its history is relatively unknown. Most historians of Akbar’s reign have relied solely on Persian chronicles to reconstruct events, while neglecting the Rājasthānī sources which best describe what happened.


3 Even V. S. Bhargava, who was at least aware of these sources, favored Abū al-Faẓl’s dates for the siege. He remarks that “according to the Khyāṭs of Marwar Jodhpur was relinquished by Chandrasen [to the Mughals] in Dec. 1565…. But Abu Fazl specifically mentions [the] conquest of the fort of Jodhpur in the 8th regnal year (1563-64) of Akbar’s reign…. Hence, the date given by Abul Fazl has been accepted as accurate as generally dates in the Khyāṭs are ‘demonstrably inaccurate.’” V. S. Bhargava, *Marwar and the Mughal Emperors, A.D. 1526-1748* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1966), p. 46, n. 1. Needless to say, this sort of logic—that because some dates in a source are inaccurate, all are inaccurate—does little to advance historical knowledge. Better accounts of the siege can be found in Hindi histories. In particular, see Māṅgīlāl Vyās, *Jodhpur Rāyā kā Itihās, Saṃvat 1496 se 1637 Vi. San. 1439 se 1580 Ī* (Jaypur: Paṅcśil Prakāśan, 1975), pp. 190-192, and Hukamśinh Bhāṭī, “Husainkulīkhaṃ kī Jodhpur par Cāṛhāī Sambandhī Navīn Tathya” (in *Svatantrya Vīr Rāv Candrasen: Jodhpur kā Śāsak, 1562-1581 Ī*, ed. by idem. Jodhpur: Rājasthānī Śodh Saṃśthān, 2001), pp. 47-52. Of these two accounts, Bhāṭī’s is the better but occasionally married by his tendency to make statements unsupported by the original sources he uses. Vyās did not have access to the Udaibhāṅ Cāṁpūvat rī Khyāṭ. Two older Hindi histories of Mārvār, G.H. Ojhā’s *Jodhpur Rāyā kā Itihās* (2 vols. 2nd ed. Jodhpur: Rājasthānī Granthāgār, 1999 [1936]) and B.N. Reū’s *Mārvār kā Itihās* (2 vols.
In the following pages I have attempted to correct this imbalance. In addition to the relevant Persian sources, available in English translation, I have used seventeenth-century Rājasthānī chronicles\(^4\) to reconstruct both the series of events leading up to the siege and the siege itself. It is my hope that whatever inadequacies one finds in these pages will be overwhelmed by the reader’s discovery of what the Rājasthānī sources might add to the political history of the Mughals in the time of their greatest ruler, Akbar.

Part I

A Succession Dispute

The siege of Jodhpur cannot be separated from the dispute that began between three of the sons of Rāv Mālde, ruler of Jodhpur 1532-62, following his death. The eldest son, Rām, had been the pāṭvī, or heir-apparent, to the throne until 1547-48, when Rāv Mālde became incapacitated from guinea worms and had to spend four months confined to bed.\(^5\) Although Rām was only about seventeen years old at this time,\(^6\) partly because of his father’s illness and partly because of his jealousy of Udaisiṅgh and Candrasen, the young sons of Rāv Mālde’s favorite rāṇī, Jhālī Sarūpde,\(^7\) he decided to imprison his father and sit himself on the throne of Jodhpur. Rāv Mālde’s senāpati (army commander), Prithūrāj Jaitāvat,\(^8\) refused to involve himself in Rām’s coup. Neither would the Rāv’s chief advisor (pradhān), Jeso Bhairavdāsot.\(^9\) Without their support, Rām had no chance of success. Within a short time he was deposed, disinherit, and banished to Gūndoc, a town fifty miles south-southeast of Jodhpur. One of Rāv Mālde’s

\(^4\) These sources are discussed in Appendix A.

\(^5\) JRKK, p. 10.

\(^6\) Rām was born either on February 12, 1530, or during the Vikrama Saṅvat year 1588 (1531-32). He was the son of Rāṇī Kachvāhī Lāchapde, daughter of the Sekhāvat Kachvāhā Rajpūt Ratansī Sekhāvat of Amarsar. MRMR, 2:32.

\(^7\) Rāṇī Jhālī Sarūpde was the daughter of Jhālo Rajpūt Jaitāv, one of Rāv Mālde’s military servants (cākar), who had had been granted the important town of Khairvo in Mārvār. She had two sons: Udaisiṅgh, the eldest, born January 13, 1538, and Candrasen, born July 30, 1541. Ibid., 2:29-30.

\(^8\) Prithūrāj Jaitāvat (d. 1554) was a Rāṭhoro Rajpūt and the son of Jaitāv Jaitāv, the founder of the Jaitāvat branch of Mārvār Rāṭhor. Ibid., 2:234-239.

\(^9\) Cāmpāvat Rāṭhor Jeso Bhairovadāsot. Ibid., 2:203-208.
wives, Rāṇī Ūmade Bhāṭiyāṇī, who had adopted Rām, accompanied him to Gūndoc. After a few days there, they went on to Mevār, where Rām was welcomed by Rāṇo Udaiśingh Sāngāvat (reigned ca. 1537-72), whose daughter he had married, and given Kelvo town with many villages. Rām remained in the service of Rāṇo Udaiśingh for the remainder of Rāv Mālde’s life.

Rām’s flight with Ūmade allowed Rāṇī Jhālī Sarūpde and her two sons, Udaiśingh and Candrasēn, to increase their influence in Jodhpur. But Udaiśingh, the elder of the two, was a difficult child. He did not get along with his mother and often refused to meet with her. Their relationship worsened after a quarrel over their new living quarters being built at the Jodhpur Fort. Udaiśingh’s residence was finished first, so Jhālī Sarūpde suggested that she move into it while Udaiśingh might move into hers upon its completion. Udaiśingh’s rude response to her proposal caused her to petition Rāv Mālde and have him designate Candrasēn his successor to the throne of Jodhpur. Mālde gave Udaiśingh Phalodhī and sent him there to keep him away from his brother and mother. Phalodhī was the headquarters of one of the smallest districts of Mārvār. Its revenues were meager. It was not the sort of place to satisfy a man with ambition.

Rāv Mālde began entrusting Candrasēn with important tasks while keeping him under the guidance of more experienced military commanders. Candrasēn accompanied Rāṭhōr Devīdās Jaitāvat and Rāṭhōr Pato Nagāvat to Jālor in 1559, when they took the fort there from the local

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10 Rāṇī Ūmade Bhāṭiyāṇī was the daughter of Bhāṭi Rajpūt Lūnkaraṇ Jaitēyot, ruler of Jaisalmer, 1528-51. *Ibid.*, 2:27.

11 In addition, Rāv Mālde forced Rām’s mother, Rāṇī Kachvāhī Lāchapde, to leave Jodhpur, but she may not have initially gone with him to Gūndoc. JRKK, p. 1010.


13 JRKK, p. 97, 102; AB, pp. 41-42; *Murārdān*, p. 591; UCRK, 1:316, 2:72.

14 She had wanted Rāv Mālde to expel Udaiśingh from the kingdom as he had Rām, but Mālde refused to do so. MRK, p. 44.

15 Phalodhī is seventy-two miles north-northwest of Jodhpur.

16 AB, p. 92; JRKK, p. 102; MRK, p. 44. Naipāti has written that Sarūpde gave Udaiśingh Phalodhī after Rāv Mālde died, but he probably meant that she confirmed his possession of it. *Vigat*, 1:66, 83, 2:5.

17 Devīdās Jaitāvat was Prithirāj Jaitāvat’s brother and the son of Jaito Pāṇcāṇoṭ. After Prithirāj died in 1554, Devīdās became Rāv Mālde’s senior military commander. MRMR, 2:240-245.

18 Bāḷāvat Rāṭhōr Pato Nagāvat, son of Nago Bhārmalot. UCRK, 1:405-406.
Bihārī Afgān ruler, Mālik Burhān. Candrasen assumed formal possession of the fort on October 1, 1559. Probably around the same time he received Sīvāṇo as part of his share of his father’s domain. Sīvāṇo, with its great fort, was a strategic outpost of considerable value. In the hills surrounding the town were many other smaller forts, which would be immensely useful if there were a succession dispute of any duration. Candrasen remained stationed there until 1562, when he went to northeastern Mārvār to engage the Mughals, who were besieging the fort in the town of Mērto. After the fort fell on March 20, 1562, he returned to Sīvāṇo.

Candrasen was in Sīvāṇo when Rāv Malde died on November 7, 1562. The news reached Candrasen during the night. He left for Jodhpur the next morning at daybreak and reached there the same day. Meanwhile, his half-brother Rām in Mevāṛ had to wait until November 10 to find out about their father’s death. Rām departed almost immediately for the court of his father-in-law Rāpo Udaisingh, while his infuriated adoptive mother, Ümade Bhūtiyāṇī, cursed him for leaving without even saying farewell before she became a satī. Rāv Malde’s other son and all the powerful ṭhākurs from the various branches of the Rāthor clan had previously gathered in Jodhpur, where they discovered that Candrasen was holding his mother, Jhāli Sarūpde, a prisoner to keep her from becoming a satī before she explained to the assembly of brothers and Rajpūts that he was indeed designated to succeed his father. After she did so, he released her, whereupon she went to the old Rāthor capitol, Maṇḍovar, and burned to death on November 13. Before she died, she confirmed Udaisingh’s possession of Phalodhī. A half-brother, Rāymal, received Candrasen’s former appanage, Sīvāṇo. Candrasen himself ascended the throne of Jodhpur on December 31, 1562."

19 The Bihāris were Pāhāṇs of the Lohanī tribe. They had been ruling Jālor for over 150 years. For an account of their history, see Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. 5, Cutch, Pālanpur, and Mahi Kāntha (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1908, pp. 318-320.

20 Vigat, 1:64. AB, p. 41, gives May 21, 1562 (Āśadh, Vad 3, V.S. 1618) as the date of Jālor’s conquest, which is after Devidās was supposedly killed at Mevāṛ. Bānkidās, Bānkidās ri Khyāti, ed. By Narottamdājī Svānī (Jodhpur: Rājasthān Purattvānvesaṇ Mandir, 1956), p. 15, indicates that Jālor was captured during the period August 25-September 8, 1561, and that Candrasen took possession of the fort on September 14, 1561 (Āsoj, Sud 5, V.S. 1618). These dates are unlikely, as Devidās had been stationed at the fort in Mērto after its completion in the V.S. year 1617 (date 1 date 2).

21 Sīvāṇo is fifty-eight miles southwest of Jodhpur.


23 AB, p. 56; JRKK, pp. 102-104; Vigat, 1:66.
Rāv Candrasęņ’s first significant action as ruler was to cede the fort of Jāḷor to the Mughals on January 3, 1563, a conciliatory gesture which very likely kept them from immediately invading his domain.²⁴ His position in Jodhpur was too insecure to permit a major confrontation with the Mughals. His disinherited half-brother, Rām, who had not come to Jodhpur upon Rāv Mālde’s death, had the backing of the Sīsodīyos of Mevār and was plotting against him. His older brother, Udaisingh, seated in Phālodhi, had the support of a number of Bhāṭī Rajpūts with connections to the Jaisāḷmer, Vairsalpur, and Vikumpur ruling families.²⁵ Udaisingh’s intentions were uncertain. In the northeast, the Mughals had captured Meṣto and had forced the Udāvat Rāḥoṛs, the rulers of Jaitāraṇ,²⁶ out of their lands and into the Arāvali Mountains.²⁷

It was the wrong moment to alienate members of several of the most powerful Rāḥoṛ lineages of Mārvaṛ, but this is precisely what Rāv Candrasęņ did with an inexplicable display of impetuous cruelty. At some time in 1563 (or possibly at the beginning of 1564), he became enraged over an unspecified infraction committed by one of his grooms (pāṇḍav). The groom, fearing for his life, fled to the encampment of Jaitmāl Jēsāvat, one of the leading men of the Cāmpanṭat Rāḥoṛ lineage,²⁸ for protection. Rāv Candrasęņ had him apprehended and then demanded his release from Jaitmāl’s camp. Jaitmāl pleaded with Rāv Candrasęņ to forgive him for giving asylum to the groom. He implored the Rāv not to kill the man. Rāv Candrasęņ appeared to agree, but later sent an assassin and had the groom strangled. Jaitmāl, upset, went and wept before Prithīraj²⁹ and Mahēs,³⁰ two prominent members of the Kūmpāvat Rāḥoṛ lineage:

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²⁴ Ibid., 1:67; AB, p. 78. Bāṅkidās states that Candrasęņ entrusted the fort to Akbar’s officer, “Khānjarām,” on December 15, 1561, an unlikely date, as Rāv Mālde was still ruling Jodhpur at that time. Bāṅkidās, Bāṅkidās rī Ḋhūṭi, p. 21.

²⁵ In addition, six of Udaisingh’s wives were Bhāṭṭiyāṇīs, but the exact dates of his marriages to them are unknown. Udaisingh’s daughter Rambhāvatī Bāṛ was married to Bhāṭī Khetsī Māldevot, son of Bhāṭī Rāvaḷ Mālde Lūṅkarāṇot of Jaisāḷmer (1551-61). See MRMR, 2:41-42, 44-45, 47-48. Perhaps the most important of Udaisingh’s Bhāṭī supporters in Phālodhi was Māṅo Nimbāvat, the father of Goyandḍās Māṅāvatt, who grew up in Udaisingh’s household and later became pradhān of Jodhpur from approximately 1596 to 1615. NK, 2:154-155.

²⁶ Jaitāraṇ is fifty-five miles east of Jodhpur. The town is the headquarters of a district with the same name.

²⁷ See below, p. 8-10.

²⁸ Cāmpanṭat Rāḥoṛ Jaitmāl Jēsāvat. Jaitmāl, born on January 10, 1489, would have been seventy-four years old in 1563; Rāv Candrasęņ was only twenty-two or twenty-three in that year. See MRMR, 2:209-210, for a short biography of Jaitmāl.

²⁹ Kūmpāvat Rāḥoṛ Prithīraj Kūmpāvat. Ibid., 2:308-312.
Then Rāṭhōṛ Prithūṛāj Kūmpāvat said to Jaitmāl Jesāvat, “You must not weep. If God has [so] arranged, then [it is] I, of the belly of Kūmpo, who shall make Candrasēṇ weep like this. You should not be sad about anything.”

After meeting with other Rāṭhōṛs and deciding on a plan, they informed Rām, Rāymal, and Udaisīṅgh of their discontent with Rāv Candrasēṇ. They encouraged the three brothers to take action against the Rāv. With the support of the Rāṇo of Mevāṛ, Rām raided Sojhat Pargano in the east while Rāymal moved north from Sīvāṇo with a small contingent and attacked Dūnāro. Shortly afterward Udaisīṅgh and his retainers sacked Lāgar and Gāṅghāṇī villages in western Māravāṛ. Rāv Candrasēṇ dispatched an army from Jodhpur. His soldiers managed to drive Rām back across the Arāvalīs into Mevāṛ and forced Rāymal to return to Sīvāṇo. Then Rāv Candrasēṇ received word about Udaisīṅgh’s raids in the west. He rode after Udaisīṅgh and caught up to him going into Lohīyāvaṭ village. A brief battle occurred. Without doubt it was serious, as men from both sides died. Somehow, despite the presence of many retainers, both brothers were wounded. Udaisīṅgh himself managed to strike Candrasēṇ a blow. Then Rāvāḷ Meghrāj, a Maheco Rāṭhōṛ, stuck Udaisīṅgh in the shoulder with a lance (barchī) and knocked

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30 Ibid.

31 AB, p. 78. See also JRKK, p. 105.

32 Sojhat town, the headquarters of Sojhat Pargano, is forty-three miles southeast of Jodhpur.

33 Dūnāro village is thirty-two miles southwest of Jodhpur along the Lāṇī River. At the time Rāymal attacked, it was held by Rāv Candrasēṇ’s loyal retainer, Pato Nagāvat. UCRK, 1:405-406.

34 AB, p. 79; JRKK, p. 105; MRK, p. 47; UCRK, 2:76; Vigat, 2:6.


36 Lohīyāvaṭ or Lohāvaṭ village is situated twenty-one miles southwest of the town of Bhāloḍhī in western Māravāṛ.

37 Maheco Rāṭhōṛ Rāvāḷ Meghrāj Hāpāvat, the ruler of Mahevo (modern Mallāṇī, the name of an area of western Māravāṛ and also a village located sixty-six miles southwest of Jodhpur and five miles south of Kher village. Five inscriptions mentioning Meghrāj have been found, dating from 1547 to 1581. See MRMR, 2:333-334; Hukamśīṅh Bhāḷī, Maheco Rāṭhōṛōṇ kā Māl Ithās (Jodhpur: Ratan Prakāśan, 2001), pp. 55-56.
him off his horse. He was saved from further damage by his retainer, Hado Khicci, one of a
dozens of his men who were killed at Lohiyav.38 Candrasen won the battle, then quickly left for
Jodhpur, while Udaisingh returned to Phalodhi and prepared the fort there for a siege. Candrasen
soon rode out again from Jodhpur to attack Phalodhi, but several of the important thakurs
accompanying him talked him out of further action and brought him back.39

The inconclusive results of all the hostile actions against Candrasen caused Prithiraj
Kumpavat, Akshara Devidasot,40 and other discontented Rathors to resume plotting against him.
Once again they sent word to Ram in Kelvo, along with 20,000 pirojis41 in cash. They
encouraged him to go to the Mughal Emperor, Akbar, for support, saying “Why do you sit? Go
and bring the Imperial armies [here]!”42

Part II

The Enemy at the Gate: The Mughals and Mavr, 1558-64

The first two Mughal emperors, Babur and Humayun, had paid very little attention to
Mavr. They were much more worried about their Afghan opponents and the Sisodiyo Rajput
of Mevar. As a result, Rav Malde had been able greatly to expand his domain during
Humayun’s first period of rule (1530-40). After Humayun died from a fall and Akbar, a minor,

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38 Udaisingh lost the following men in this battle: 1) Mandanot Rathor Jogo Sadavat, 2) Mandlot Rathor Isaradas
Amravat, 3) Patavat Rathor Hingol Netavat, 4) Karamsot Rathor Kalyandas Mahesot, 5) Jaso Bhathi Kelhan
Sanjarot, 6) Joso Bhathi Jamal Tilokstiyot, 7) Kelhan Bhathi Sankar Dujansalot, Udaisingh’s wife’s brother, 8-10)
Gagaryio Rathors Mokal Gangavat, Khimraj Apexalot, and Pancain Tohavat, 11) Khicci Cauvun Hado Kelhapat,
and 12) Sahnji Karmo Jaisiighet. Rav Candrasen lost two, Araokamalot Rathor Lakhman Bhimot and Hamirot
Bhathi Raypal Shihavat. AB, p. 79; JRKK, p. 105; MRK, p. 48; NK, 2:128, 145, 162, 181, UCRK, 1:91, 93, 160, 441,
476, 514, 2:77, Vigat, 1:80, 83-84.

39 JRKK, p. 106; UCRK, 2:77. The important thakurs were Udavat Rathor Javant Dungasiyot of Jaitaraun,
Campavat Rathor Jaitmal Jesavat of Auuvo, Balaavat Rathor Pat Nagavat, Sonagar Cauvun Mansingh Akhairajot
of Pall, and Kumpavat Rathors Prithiraj and Tiloksi. Two of these men, Jaitmaul and Prithiraj, had previously urged
Udaisingh to attack Rav Candrasen’s territory.

40 Jaitavat Rathor Askara Devidasot, son of Devidas Jaitavat. AB, p. 79. UCRK, 1:269, indicates that Askara
was born on April 19, 1559. If this date is correct, he would have been only four years old when he was supposed
to have been plotting with Prithiraj Kumpavat against Rav Candrasen. Perhaps another member of the Jaitavat family
of Rathors was actually involved with Prithiraj, or possibly someone was acting on behalf of Askara.

41 Piroji = Firozshahi, a small coin issued in the reign of Firoz Shah Tughluq, Sultans of Delhi, 1351-88.

42 AB, p. 79.
succeeded to the Mughal throne in 1556, the situation changed. Hājī Khān, one of the Afghan nobles in the service of the Sūr rulers, had retained independent authority over the Alwar region of Rājasthān after the Sūr dynasty was deposed. The Mughal leadership dispatched an army under the command of Nāšir al-Mulk to take Alwar. Hājī Khān decided to abandon his territories and flee. He went toward Ajmer with 5,000 horse and 150 elephants. Near Ajmer he found his way blocked by 40,000 troops led by the Rāṇo of Mevār, Udaisiṅgh Sāṅgāvat, who demanded an enormous sum in gold, a prize elephant, and a beautiful dancing girl in exchange for safe passage. Hājī Khān’s refusal to comply resulted in a great battle at Harmāro, a town near Ajmer, on January 24, 1557. He won the battle, partly because he received outstanding military support from Devidās Jaitāvat, whom Rāv Mālde had sent along with 1,500 picked troops from Jodhpur, and partly because the Rāṇo’s somewhat incompetent army included many contingents that had never fought together before.43 After winning, Hājī Khān’s army occupied Ajmer and Nāgaūr.44

Why would Rāv Mālde come to the aid of an Afghan noble fleeing from the Mughals? One might think that, after Sher Shāh Sūr invaded Mārvār in 1543-44 and destroyed Mālde’s army, he (Mālde) would not particularly care what happened to any of Sher Shāh’s former retainers. Rāv Mālde may have reckoned that the Mughals were not destined to remain in control of Hindūstān (they had been driven out in 1540), particularly considering Akbar’s minority, and so he decided to help a powerful Afghan commander. His fear of the Rāṇo of Mevār winning at Harmāro was certainly an important reason as well. He knew that Jaimal Viṃādevot, a Mēṭīyo Rāḥoṛ and his bitter enemy,45 was supporting the Rāṇo. If he did nothing, the Sīsōdiyos would seize Ajmer and Jaimal would be even more securely on the throne of Mēṭo in northeastern Mārvār.46 Alternatively, if he helped Hājī Khān win, Mēṭo would be easy to capture. In the event, Rāv Mālde moved from Jodhpur to Jaitāraṇ during the battle and was able to occupy Mēṭo three days after the Rāṇo and Jaimal lost.47

Mughal Conquest of Jaitāraṇ, March 13, 1558


44 NK, 1:61, and UCRK, 2:308 indicate that Hājī Khān was already in possession of Ajmer when the battle Harmāro occurred, but AN, 2:72 indicates that he obtained Ajmer and Nāgaūr after the battle.

45 See MRMR, 1:

46 According to UCRK, 2:308, Rāv Mālde feared that if the Rāṇo won the battle, the Rāḥoṛs of both Mēṭo and Bīkāner (enemies of the Jodhpur ruler and allies of the Rāṇo) would benefit.

47 Vigat, 2:60 (translated in MRMR, 1:127).
The Mughals reacted quickly to Hājī Khān’s victory. Muḥammad Qāsim Khān, Sayyīd Maḥmūd Bārhā, Shāh Quli Khān Māḥrām, and Ṭahir Khān Kharram Suṭān were sent against him. Hājī Khān fled into Mārvār before the advancing Mughal army, while Muḥammad Qāsim Khān seized Ajmer. Hājī Khān spent some time in the Jaitāraṇ region of Mārvār before going on to Gujarāt. A village near Jaitāraṇ town, Hājīvās (“Hājī’s residence”) bears his name. One of Rāv Mālde’s military servants, Üdāvat Rāthor Rāv Ratansī Khīṃvāvat, was ruling Jaitāraṇ at this time. It is not completely clear whether initially Ratansī himself permitted Hājī Khān to stay for awhile near Jaitāraṇ or was previously ordered to do so by Rāv Mālde, but in either case the Mughals were in no mood to tolerate anyone offering Hājī Khān assistance. Shāh Quli Māḥrām was sent to take the fort of Jaitāraṇ in early 1558.

Abū al-Fażīl has a short but vivid account of the conquest of Jaitāraṇ on March 13, 1558:

Shāh [Qulī] Khān [Māḥrām] and a number of others were sent to take Jitāran .... (The victorious heroes by the strength of their swords and the might of their courage conducted many of the stiff-necked Rajputs to the abyss of annihilation and took possession of the fort.) The surface of that country was cleared from the rubbish of stubborn rebels.

48 AN, 2:72.

49 Ibid., 2:103.


51 For a biography of Ratansī Khīṃvāvat, see MRMR, 2:403-406.

52 NK, 1:62 indicates that Rāv Mālde had permitted Hājī Khān to come into Mārvār after the Mughal army advanced against him. Then Akbar ordered his men to “kill whoever protected [Hājī Khān].” But UCRK, 2:287, states that Rāv Mālde “signaled the Mughals” and had Ratansī killed, suggesting that perhaps Ratansī did not have the Rāv’s permission to allow Hājī Khān into Mārvār.

53 Shāh Quli Māḥrām Bahārlū, a Mughal commander of 3,500. He received his nickname “Māḥrām” (one who is admitted to the harem) because he had been allowed to enter Akbar’s harem, after which he was castrated. AA, 1:387. Several Rājasthānī sources say that Muḥammad Qāsim Khān was in command of the expedition against Jaitāraṇ, but it is more likely that he ordered his subordinate, Shāh Quli Khān, to undertake this task. AB, p. 99; N. S. Bhāṛī, Rājasthān ke Aṭṭhāṣīk Granthoṃ kī Sarvekṣāṇ, 3 vols. (Jodhpur: Rājasthānī Granthāgār, 1989), 1:38, 83.

54 AN, 1:103. A long poem about the siege of Jaitāraṇ, the Rāḥaṃr Ratansīṅgh rī Velī, commemorating Ratansī’s courage in facing the Imperial army, was composed shortly after the battle by Düdo Vīsrāl. Tessitori has written
The “rubbish of stubborn rebels” included Rāv Ratansī and several members of his family, who was killed along with many others. Rāv Mālde did nothing to help Ratansī, possibly because he did not wish to offend the Mughals, but more likely because he questioned Ratansī’s loyalty. A few years earlier, during the unsuccessful attack on Meṛto in 1554 by Rāv Mālde’s army, Ratansī had allowed Jaimal, the ruler of Meṛto, to escape death on the battlefield, an act of mercy that Rāv Mālde never forgave. Ironically Jaimal, who had sought Mughal aid after losing Meṛto in 1557, accompanied the Mughal army to Jaitāraṇ in 1558.

Mughal Conquest of Meṛto, March 20, 1562

The Mughals did not immediately follow up their conquest. They were preoccupied with suppressing a rebellion in Jaunpur and subduing the Bhadauriyah Rajpūts near Agra in the years 1558-59. Rāv Mālde was able to reassert his authority over Jaitāraṇ. He gave it to Rām, one of Ratansī’s younger sons. After a short time the Rāv replaced Rām with Jāsvant Duṅgarsiyot, a member of another branch of the Üdāvat Rāḥor family, who came to Jaitāraṇ from Mevār. In that “the author [of the poem] has developed the simile of the hero who like the bridegroom goes to spouse the enemy army, a simile common in bardic poetry.” L. P. Tessitori, A Descriptive Catalogue of Bardic and Historical Manuscripts, Section II: Bardic Poetry, Part 1: Bikaner State (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1918), p. 70. See also “Aithāsik Veli Saṅgrah,” in Paramparā, pts. 51-52, ed. by N. S. Bhāṭī (Caupasṛi, Jodhpur: Rājasthānī Śodh Saṃstāṭhān, 1979), pp. 23-40.

55 Thirty-four men died, including Kisansā, Goyandās, and Kānh, three sons of Jaitiśī Üdāvat (Ratansī’s father’s brother), and Bhānīsā Khimvāvat, Ratansī’s brother. JRKK, pp. 91-92; Kisansingh Üdāvat, Üdāvat Rāhaur Itīhās (Jaitāraṇ: Vīr Rāv Śrī Rattansīṃh Smṛti Bhavan Niyās, 1982-83), pp. 75-71; UCRK, 2:301, 316; Vidar, 2:432-433.

56 AB, p. 49 (translated in MRMR, 1:172). UCRK, 2:287, states that Rāv Mālde also was angered because he thought Ratansī had addressed Jaimal as “Rāj” (i.e., as his superior) during this battle; Ratansī argued that he had addressed only his own kinsman, Duṅgarsī Üdāvat, as “Rāj” (Duṅgarsī, a former ruler of Jaitāraṇ, was one of Jaimal’s retainers at the time).

57 JRKK, pp. 91-92; Kisansingh Üdāvat, Üdāvat Rāhaur Itīhās, pp. 70-71. A short anonymous poem (git) praising Ratansī has been published in Prācīn Rājāsthānī Gīt, part 2, edited by Giridharilāl Ārmanā (Udaipur: Rājasthān Viśva Vidyāpiṭh, 1956), pp. 45-46. The poet notes that Ratansī shut the door of dharm (the supposed door through which one exits with a promise of safe passage when defeated in a siege; see below, p. 18) and opened the actual doors of the fort in order to die fighting against the Mughals. Jaimal, in contrast, had abandoned Meṛto to Rāv Mālde without a fight in 1557.

58 Srivastava, Akbar the Great, 1:36-38.

59 UCRK, 2:287.
1560 the Mughals once again began to pressure Jaitāraṇ from their base in Ajmer, and Jasvant was forced to abandon the town. He went to Borār, a village in the Arāvali Mountains on the Mārvār-Mevār border, where he built a small fort.60

Jaimal, the Meṛṭyo Rāṭhōṛ who had accompanied the Mughals against Jaitāraṇ in 1558, returned to the Mughal court in early 1562 seeking assistance in his struggle with Rāv Mālde.61 This time Akbar granted him Merṭo and sent the new jāgīrdār of Ajmer and Nāgaur, Mīrzhā Sharafū’-d-Dīn Ḫusayn, along with 7,000 horse, to help him retake it.62 Rāv Mālde received word of the Mughal advance. He dispatched his son, Candrasen, along with several senior Rajpūts and 2,000 troopers, to Merṭo, where Rāṭhōṛ Devidās Jaitāvat was the garrison commander inside the fort.63

The fort in Merṭo, known as the Mālkoṭ or Mālgāḍh, was of recent origin. Rāv Mālde had it built between March, 1558 and 1560 at a cost of around rs. 180,000.64 An important facet of Rāv Mālde’s reign was his policy of building new forts, renovating older ones such as Jodhpur, and tearing down certain others that either were inadequate or too closely identified with the independence of their former occupiers. Prior to Rāv Mālde, most of the forts built in Mārvār were the productions of local thākurs, often the sons of rulers, who used these fortified sites to sustain their regional power. For example, the fort of Jaitāraṇ, built around 1484 by Ūdo Sūjāvat, son of Rāv Süjo of Jodhpur (ca. 1492-1515), became the center from which the Ūdāvat Rāṭhōṛs, Ūdo’s descendants, maintained their control over the villages surrounding Jaitāraṇ.65

The koṭṭrī (small fort) built in Merṭo town in 1462 by Rāv Varsīṅgh Jodhāvat and his brother Dūdo (sons of Rāv Jodho Riṇmalot of Maṇḍor and Jodhpur, ca. 1453-1489) fulfilled a similar

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60 Ibid., 2:306-307; AB, p. 71, JRKK, p. 92; Vigat, 1:537.

61 UCRK, 2:193 indicates that Jaimal came from Citoṛ in Mevār to meet Akbar at Dīdvāṇo, which is sixty-two miles north of Ajmer. It is more likely they met in Ajmer itself. Akbar had come to Ajmer from Agra sometime after January 14, 1562, and Jaimal reached Merṭo with the Mughal army on January 27, 1562. AN, 2:240; JRKK, p. 92; Vigat, 1:60, 2:63-64.

62 Mīrzhā Sharafū’-d-Dīn Ḫusayn had been engaged in military operations against the Kachvāḥo Rājā of Amber, Bihāri Mal. He had forced the Rājā to pay an indemnity and held the Rājā’s son and nephews as hostages. Akbar took pity on Bihāri Mal, whose daughter he married, enrolled him in Mughal service, and ordered the Mīrzhā to return the hostages. While on his return journey to Agra, Akbar dispatched the Mīrzhā from Sāmbhār to Merṭo. AN, 2:241-243.

63 Vigat, 2:63.

64 AB, p. 52; UCRK, 2:69, 194; Vigat, 2:61.

purpose for the Merīyo Rāḥoṛs. But under Mālde, the forts of Mārvār were usually taken over by his appointees, who often were men of lower tank owing their careers to him, and not by his sons. These forts required permanent small garrisons of Mālde’s troops. They served as storage facilities for weapons, men, and horses, strong points for enforcing local dominance and tax collection, and defensive bases in case of invasion.

Rāv Mālde built or renovated at least seventeen forts in Rājasthān, most of which were in Mārvār:66

**Newly constructed:** Mālgāḍh Fort (Meṛto), Pokaraṇ Fort, Sojhat Fort, Kūṇḍal Fort, Cāṭṣū Fort, Mālgāḍh Fort (Rāypur), Mālkoṭ Fort (Pīploḍ), kotṛī (Reyāṁ), kotṛī (Gūndoč), kotṛī (Pīmpāṛ), kotṛī (Dunāṛo).

**Renovated:** Jodhpur (fort completely renovated; wall built around city; walls built around Rānīsār Tank and Cokeḷāv Tank; wall around the Rāmpoḷ made; iron gate made); Sīvāṇo (fort renovated; wall built around town); Phāṭodhī (fort renovated and gate made); Ajmer (towers built above the fort); Jāḷor (fort renovated); Nāgaur (fort renovated).

Much of the construction had occurred after Sher Shāh’s invasion of Mārvār in 1543-44, beginning with the small forts at Kūṇḍal and Pīploḍ near Sīvāṇo, where Rāv Mālde lived when he was forced to abandon Jodhpur. He and his men stayed in these forts for nearly two years. Probably it was his appreciation of their value in a time of trouble that encouraged him to accelerate his building program after he recaptured Jodhpur in 1546. Properly manned, the forts of Mārvār would confront an invader with a defense in depth that would be difficult to surmount.67

Rāv Mālde had a large fort built in Pokaraṇ between September-October, 1550 and 1552, which has been well-described by Naiṅṣī in his Vigat:

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Rāv Mālde had the great fort built. The wall that the Rāvji had made is 15 gaj (45 ft.) high. Above it Rāvāl Bhīṃī [ruler of Jaisāłmer, 1577-1613] and Rāvāl Kalyāṃmal [ruler of Jaisāłmer, ca. 1613-27] made additions, in some places 5 gaj and in others 8 gaj (15-24 ft.) high. The base of the wall is 5 gaj (15 ft.) in width. The wall is 21 gaj (63 ft.) high facing the gate. On the rear side it is 17 gaj (51 ft) high including the parapet (jeh). There is a tower above it. Inside the fort there are 21 towers. Caukādārs (sentinels) should be kept there. Inside that tower [and] 16 [of the other] towers they pitch large tents, of the sort that caukādārs stay [in]. One fort gate is a very large gate for which there are iron doors. There is a large room (mālīyo) above the gate. There is another gate, constructed after Mahārājāji [Jasvantsīṅgh of Jodhpur, 1638-78] acquired [Pokaraṇ in 1649]. He had a curtain wall (parkoṭo) built.

Inside the fort it is 200 gaj (600 ft.) long, 200 gaj across, an equal-sided square. [There is] one ordinary well inside the fort, near the gate [and] the hall of audience (dīvāṃkāno), facing the stable (pāygā). [There is] fairly good water [in it at a depth of] 6 to 7 puras (30 to forty feet). One step-well [is] behind the home of Bhāṭī Bhopat; [another] step-well [is] near the tower of the Goddess (Devi). The water [is] fairly good, [but] it has fallen into disuse.

There are always homes of members of the garrison (rāvlā ghar) inside the fort.... There is one Jain temple, one Śrī Ādesur [temple, and] one temple of the Goddess. There is an icon of the Goddess on the Cāṃvad Tower.... There is a ditch around the fort, a fine one, 4 gaj (12 ft.) deep and 5 gaj (15 ft.) wide.⁶⁸

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⁶⁸ *Vigat*, 2:308.
The fort of Pokaran, with its thick walls, wells, and deep external protective ditch, which was probably designed to make mining more difficult, was likely a prototype of the fort built at Merto a decade later.\textsuperscript{69}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{main_gate_pokaran_fort}
\caption{Main Gate, Pokaran Fort.}
\end{figure}

When Rāv Mālde initiated the construction of the Mālgadh in 1558, his most experienced military advisor, Devādas Jaitāvat, had cautioned him not to do so. He observed that Merto was a town in a flat plain; there were no natural defenses to help protect the fort. The men required to garrison the fort would have to flee if there were a serious invasion, otherwise they would be

\textsuperscript{69} The fort of Pokaran has been preserved and is now a small hotel (See http://www.fortpokaran.com/). The Mālkot in Merto is today mostly in ruins. Both forts have similar crenellations, towers, high walls, and a square or rectangular shape. See Census of India, 1971: Series 18, Rajasthan: Part IX-A, Administrative Atlas (Jaipur: U. B. Mathur, 1976), Map no. 14.17, “Merta Town,” which indicates that the Mālkot or Mālgadh is located to the southwest of the town of Merto and is in the shape of a rectangle.
killed when the fort was besieged. Despite the warning, Rāv Mālde had the construction of the fort completed, and in 1560-61 he ordered Devidās to remain inside as the commander of the garrison. Devidās at first objected, saying that he was not the sort of Rajpūt who would be able to abandon the fort if ordered to do so during a siege, but Rāv Mālde was obstinate. He pointed out that Mērto was in the face of an impending attack by the Mughals, whom he expected Jaimal, the head of the Mērtīyo Rāthor lineage, to bring from Ajmer and Nāgaur in the near future. And so it was, as the Mughal army approached Mērto early in 1562, that Devidās awaited them inside the Mālgadh, along with Mērtīyo Rāthor Jagmāl Vīramdevot and 500 men.

Candrasēn and his men had already reached Mērto. Rāv Mālde had told them to do battle with the Mughals if they found an opportunity, but, if not, to bring Devidās back to Jodhpur. Candrasēn decided to avoid battle. He withdrew his contingent to the villages Sātālyās and Indāva (four and eight miles, respectively, to the southwest of Mērto) before the superior Mughal force arrived. Devidās, as he had promised, refused to leave. The Mughal army reached the town and immediately went to the fort. Four expert horsemen began the siege by firing arrows against the gate of the fort, whereupon the Rajpūts within discharged bricks, stones, arrows, boiling pitch, and bullets. Two of the horsemen were killed; the other two wounded. The Mughal commander, Mīrza Shaīrafū’d-Dīn Ḥusayn, prudently decided to exercise caution. His army took up safer positions within the town, and, after deliberation with his subordinates, the Mīrza commenced formal siege operations. Batteries were erected and mines were driven on

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70 AB, p. 52 (translated in MRMR, 1:179).

71 I.e., he was the sort of Rajpūt who would fight to the death defending the fort.

72 AB, p. 52 (translated in MRMR, 1:179).

73 Mērtīyo Rāthor Jagmāl Vīramdevot was Jaimal Vīramdevot’s brother (or, more likely, half-brother). After the battle of Hamārā in 1557, Rāv Mālde had reward Jagmāl with a grant of half of the villages of Mērto Pargano. MRMR, 2:365-367.

74 AN, 2:248.

75 AB, p. 53 (translated in MRMR, 1:180); Vigat, 2:64 (translated in MRMR, 1:132).
various sides of the fort. The Mughals were vigorously opposed by the garrison, whose members fought daily skirmishes with the besiegers.

Plate 2. Mālgadh (Mālkot) Fort, Merto.

Meanwhile Candrasena assembled his Rajput commanders, encamped at Sātalvās and Indāvār, and again pondered what to do. An acrimonious discussion began. A Varsiṇghot Meṛṭyo Rālhoṛ, Sāṃvaldāś Udaiṇghot, remarked that Devādās was a Rajput equal to many

76 The sources do not mention any artillery being used in the siege, a deficiency which may have prolonged it considerably.

77 AN, 2:248-249.

78 For a biography of Sāṃvaldās, see MRMR, 2:427-429.
Rajpūts, unlike Candrasen’s two leading commanders, Prithirāj Kūmpāvat and Mānsingh Akhairājot, whom Sāṃvaldās called a “Baniyā” and a “little one-eyed man,” respectively. Then Prithirāj and Mānsingh brought up Sāṃvaldās’s disgraceful conduct in a previous affair involving Prithirāj’s brother, Māṇḍan Kūmpāvat. After more bitter words, Sāṃvaldās apologized. He offered to lead a night attack against the entrenched Mughals surrounding the Mālgaṭh. Candrasen himself decided to return to Jodhpur, but Sāṃvaldās remained and spent a few days gathering more retainers for the night attack.

Sāṃvaldās sent word to Devīdās informing him of his intentions to strike at the Mughals and afterward join Devīdās inside the fort. Then he and his men proceeded to Meṛto, where in a fierce nighttime engagement they completely destroyed one of the Mughal camps, killing in the process fourteen Mughal commanders and around one hundred soldiers. Sāṃvaldās himself was severely wounded, as were many of his retainers. Finally his surviving soldiers brought him away from the battlefield. They withdrew in the direction of Reyān village, about fifteen or sixteen miles southeast of Meṛto. Jaimal, conferring with Mīrzā Sharafu’d-Dīn Ḥusayn, warned that more attacks were to be expected unless something was done about Sāṃvaldās. He and the Mīrzā led a Mughal contingent toward Reyān. They caught up to Sāṃvaldās and killed him after a brief skirmish.

Back in Meṛto the siege continued. The position of the garrison deteriorated, as there no longer was an army threatening the Mughals from the rear. Devīdās continually received letters from Rāv Mālde ordering him to abandon Meṛto and proceed to Jodhpur, but he did not obey. He had Mālde informed:

> When you had the fort built, I objected to you many times, [saying], “You should not keep me [here]; you should not have the fort built.” Now I shall not abandon the fort and come [to you in Jodhpur]. I will not give up the fort until I die."

Rāv Mālde wrote back. He remarked that Devīdās was making a name for himself,

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79 Sonagaro Cahuvaṇ Mānsingh Akhairājot. For a biography, see *ibid.*, 2:109-111.

80 Kūmpāvat Rāhor Māṇḍan Kūmpāvat. For a biography, see *ibid.*, 2:312-320. In the middle of an attack on Sāṃvaldās’s household by Māṇḍan, Sāṃvaldās had fled, leaving his wife and mother defenseless.

81 AB, pp. 53-54 (translated in MRMR, 1:180-183).


83 UCRK, 1:264.
but pointed out that the prolonged, probably futile resistance to the Mughals was seriously weakening his domain.  

Finally the Mughals successfully exploded a mine and blew a tower to pieces. The Rajputs inside managed to repair the breach to some extent, but the fort’s defenses were impaired. Fairly soon afterward Devīdās began negotiations with the besiegers. After much deliberation, an agreement was reached: the garrison would leave their military supplies behind inside the fort. They would then be allowed to leave freely and to keep possession of their horses. Jagmāl came out first with a few retainers and departed without incident. Both Persian and Rājasthānī sources indicate that Devīdās violated the agreement and burned the stores in the fort before leaving. Then, just as he was evacuating his men through the main gate, a Mughal laid his hands on a gun belonging to Rāv Mālde that was being carried by a foot-soldier. Devīdās bashed the Mughal in the head with his iron-ringed stick, whereupon the Mughal’s brains “gushed out and ran down toward [his] nose.”

Jaimal and Mīrza Sharafu’d-Dīn Ḥusayn were observing the evacuation from an advantage point on the walls. Jaimal noted that Devīdās was leaving the fort through the “door of dharma,” i.e., with a guarantee of safety upon surrender, and remarked that Devīdās was not the kind of Rajput who would readily abandon a fort and depart. He was going unwillingly, ordered to do so by Rāv Mālde. Normally the dharma of a Rajput involved fighting and dying in battle before the face of one’s master. In particular forts were not to be surrendered to enemy, and those holding fortresses were enjoined to give them up only after fighting to the death in their defense. The “siege epics” of medieval Rājasthān praise the fallen heroes of the past who did just that, at Gāgrūḍ, Jālur, and Rīṇṭambhor, among other places.

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84 AB, p. 54 (translated in MRMR, 1:183); Vigat, 2:64 (translated in MRMR, 1:132-133).
86 AB, p. 55 (translated in MRMR, 1:184); Vigat, 2:64 (translated in MRMR, 1:134).
88 For example, at the siege of Sivāṇo Fort in 1539, Āmo, the wife of Rāthor Mado Merāvat, told her husband not to hand over the fort until he died (gadh mar nai dai). He then died fighting and she became a satī. Vigat, 2:219.
Mīrzā Sharafu’d-Dīn was not of a mind to tolerate any sort of violation of the pact agreed upon, particularly just after one of his soldiers had been murdered. In addition, Jaimal suggested that if Devīdās were allowed to reach Jodhpur, he would bring Rāv Mālde back with him and carry out a night attack against them. They went after Devīdās, caught up to him and his contingent near Śāṭālvās, and killed him along with many of his men. This battle occurred on March 20, 1562, and marked the end of Mughal military operations against Merto. It had taken nearly two months for a large Mughal force to capture a small fort with a modest Rajpūt garrison.\footnote{Persian chronicles indicate that between 200 and 250 men died with Devīdās at Śāṭālvās. Fereshtah, \textit{History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India, till the Year A.D. 1612}, 2:209; MT, 2:46; TA 2:260. MRK, p. 42, states that 165 of Devīdās’s men died with him; Mīrzā Sharafu’d-Dīn Ḫusayn lost 135. Other Rājasthānī sources list only the more important companions of Devīdās who were killed. For a composite list of forty-two men, see MRMR, 1:234-235.}

Things fall Apart, 1562-64

Once again, as in 1558, the Mughals did not immediately follow up their victory. Jaimal received Merto as a \textit{jāgīr} from Akbar, and one of Jaimal’s sons, Viṭṭālādās, began performing military service at the Mughal court in Āgrā. Mīrzā Sharafu’d-Dīn returned to the court where he looked after Viṭṭālādās as a favor to Jaimal, whom he had grown to like during the siege of Merto.\footnote{\textit{Vīgāt}, 2:67 (translated in MRMR, 1:139).} Mīrzā Sharafu’d-Dīn was received in Āgrā with great honor by Akbar, but soon afterward, in October of 1562, he became suspicious of Akbar’s interventions toward him and fled to his \textit{jāgīr} of Nāgaūr and Ajmer. Leaving court without being granted leave by the Emperor was a serious offense, and so Akbar, after an investigation, gave Ḫusayn Quṭl Khān\footnote{Ḥusayn Quṭl Khān was Bayrām Khān’s sister’s son. His father, Wālī Beg Zū’l-Qadr, had joined Bayrām’s rebellion. As a punishment, Akbar ordered his head cut off and had Ḫusayn Quṭl Khān imprisoned. When released, he attached himself to Akbar. His first major command came against Mīrzā Sharafu’d-Dīn. He rose to a rank of 5,000 in Mughal service. AA, 1:348-351.}
Mîrzâ Sharaﬁ’u’d-Dîn’s jâgîr and sent him to Nâgaur along with several other Mughal officers with orders to bring the Mîrzâ back to Áigrâ.93

According to Nâîsî, Mîrzâ Sharaﬁ’u’d-Dîn brought Jaimal’s son Vîthaldâs with him from Áigrâ. They went directly to Mêrto. The Mîrzâ camped at the Đângolâ Tank while Vîthaldâs went to visit his father. As soon as Jaimal saw Vîthaldâs he sensed something was amiss. Vîthaldâs told him what had happened. Jaimal then went to meet with Mîrzâ Sharaﬁ’u’d-Dîn at the Đângolâ. The Mîrzâ asked Jaimal to send for his men in Nâgaur, whereupon Jaimal dispatched another of his sons, Sâdûl, along with some of his retainers and Mîrzâ Sharaﬁ’u’d-Dîn’s soldiers, to Nâgaur. They succeeded in bringing the Mîrzâ’s men out of Nâgaur, but Imperial aḥadîs, reaching the town just after they left, followed them and managed to kill Sâdûl with forty of his retainers while Mîrzâ Sharaﬁ’u’d-Dîn escaped to Mêrto.94 Shortly afterward he departed for Jâlîor, which, as will be recalled, Râv Candrasen had handed over to the Mughals in January of 1563 just after he ascended the throne of Jodhpur. After a brief stay in Jâlîor, Mîrzâ Sharaﬁ’u’d-Dîn went to Gujarât. Meanwhile Ḩusayn Quli Khân took control of both Nâgaur and Ajmer, which Mîrzâ Sharaﬁ’u’d-Dîn had left in the hands of one of his officers, Târkhân Dîwâna.95

Jaimal realized it was time to flee Mêrto himself. He was too closely involved with Mîrzâ Sharaﬁ’u’d-Dîn to escape Imperial wrath, and so he went to Mevâr, where Râño Udaisîngh gave him the important grant of Vadhnor.96 He remained a loyal military servant of Râño Udaisîngh’s until 1568, when he died during the siege of Cîtro. After Jaimal abandoned Mêrto, Ḩusayn Quli Khân’s men occupied the town. Upon Akbar’s orders, they turned it over to Jâgmâl, Jaimal’s brother. Thus by early 1563 the political situation in Mêrto had completely reversed: now it was Jaimal fleeing the Mughals while Jâgmâl, who had defended the fort during the siege of 1562, became a Mughal jâgîrdâr.97

The Mughal Invasion of Central Mârvâr, 1564

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93 AN, 2:303-304.

94 Vîgat, 2:67 (translated in MRMR, 1:139-141).

95 AN, 2:304.


97 AN, 2:305. Jâgmâl had married a daughter to Akbar. See UCRK, 2:217.
At some point in Akbar’s eighth regnal year he decided to order an invasion of central Mārvār and an attack on Rāv Candrasen in Jodhpur. This much is known from the *Akbar Nāmā*, the only Persian chronicle to mention the decision. V. S. Bhargava, A. L. Srivastava, and, following them, Douglas Streusand have all assumed from Abū al-Fazl’s account that the invasion took place in 1563 and was soon over with, ending with the conquest of the Jodhpur fort. Rājasthānī sources, however, reveal that the initial invasion occurred in 1564 and that the decisive siege of Jodhpur in 1565. So one has to ask: first, is it possible for the invasion to have begun both in the eighth regnal year and in 1564, not 1563; and second, if so, why did it take place at that time and not earlier? Why was it that the Mughals, who seized Merto on March 20, 1562, waited almost two years to advance further into Mārvār?

In answer to the first question, Akbar’s eighth regnal year began on March 10, 1563, and ended on March 10, 1564. There is no reason, therefore, to assume, as V. S. Bhargava has done,98 that the invasion must have occurred in 1563 and that accounts given in Rājasthānī sources stating that it took place in 1564 are wrong. The *Akbar Nāmā* does not contradict the Rājasthānī accounts; it simply does not contain all the information they do about events in Mārvār.

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The second question is more difficult. The Mughals, after conquering Merto, may have felt that there was no need to confront Rāv Mālde in Jodhpur, who during the entire siege of Merto had been encouraging his commander, Devidās Jaitāvat, to hand over the fort and leave. Rāv Mālde’s successor, Rāv Candrasen (1562-81), also seemed anxious to avoid provoking the Mughals: he had given up possession of the important fort of Jāłor in southeastern Mārvār to them in January, 1563. In addition, it appears that Akbar was primarily concerned during much of 1563 with the rebellion of Mīrzā Sharafu’d-dīn Ḥusayn, especially after another rebel, Shāh Abu-al M’aaīlit, joined him in Jāłor.99 And so there was no overriding reason to invade central Mārvār and attack Jodhpur in that year. Other matters were more pressing.

Very likely it was the slowly deteriorating political situation within Mārvār, and not any direct provocation by Rāv Candrasen, that persuaded Akbar to order the invasion which took place in 1564. One will recall that a serious succession dispute between the sons of Rāv Mālde had begun not long after Rāv Candrasen’s accession to the Jodhpur throne on December 31, 1562. Discontented Rāthor Rajpūts had urged Rām, Rāv Mālde’s eldest son, to approach the Mughals for assistance against Candrasen.100 Just as Jaimal Vīramdevot’s arrival at the Mughal court in 1562 requesting aid in recovering Mēto had won Akbar’s approval, so too did Rām’s similar appeal in late 1563 or early 1564101 regarding Jodhpur. It offered Akbar an opportunity to replace a potentially hostile independent Rajpūt ruler in a major kingdom with one who owed his position to Akbar alone. In addition, Akbar must have known that several powerful Rajpūt families within Mārvār were backing Rām and would be supportive of an attack on Candrasen.

Ḥusayn Quṭṭ Khān and Rām led a Mughal army into Mārvār and reached Jodhpur on May 22, 1564. They encamped at the Rām Vāvṛī.102 The city remained encircled by the army for eighteen days, during which the residents were provided with grain from Bālī, a town about seventy-five miles south of Jodhpur. Fighting appears to have been minimal, although Mughal

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99 AN, 2:309.

100 See above, pp.

101 According to Naiṣi, discontented Rāṭhors encouraged Rām to appeal to the Mughals in the month of Jeth, V.S. 1620 (April-May, 1564). It would appear Naiṣi has run the events of several months into one. The month Jeth is unlikely as it would place both the appeal and the subsequent attack on Jodhpur within the same month, but the year, V.S. 1620 (July 6, 1563 to June 25, 1564) is probably correct. As has been noted, Akbar decided to order an invasion of central Mārvār during his eighth regnal year (March 11, 1563 to March 10, 1564). So, unless one assumes that Rām’s appeal to the Mughals postdated Akbar’s decision to attack and had little or no influence on it, the appeal must have come after July 6, 1663, before March 10, 1564, and not in April-May, 1564. Vigat, 1:67.

102 The Rām Vāvṛī (step-well) was located outside the Cánd Poḷ (gate) on the northwest side of Jodhpur. Mūṭhāto Rāmo had it constructed in 1538. “Nīvānāṁ rī Vigat,” in Vigat, 1:587.
troops sacked and burned a nearby village. Then, on June 10, 1564, an agreement was reached through the mediation of important Rāhōr ṭhākur, according to which Rām was to receive Sojhat, a large town and administrative center of the Mārvār district with the same name. On June 11 the Mughals departed Jodhpur along with Rām. They stayed two days in Maṇḍor, then one in Bohrāvās before heading for Vīsalpur, where they remained for either two or seven days, depending upon which source one follows. Then they went to Sojhat, which was turned over to Rāv Rām. Subsequently Ḫusayn Quṭb Khān and the Mughal army moved on.

So ended the invasion of 1564. The Mughals had extended their authority over another district of Mārvār. Akbar’s appointees now held Merto, Sojhat, and most of Jaitāraṇ. But Rāv Candraseṇ remained independent in Jodhpur. His willingness to compromise over Sojhat had given him some more time to prepare his defenses.

Part III

The Mughal Invasion of Central Mārvār

And

The Siege of Jodhpur, 1565

After the invasion of 1564, Ḫusayn Quṭb Khān returned to Nāgaur. From July to December, 1564 his activities are unknown, but it may presumed from subsequent events that he was gathering men and military supplies. Then, in January of 1565, he once again came to Jodhpur with an Imperial army. This time Rāv Candraseṇ temporarily diverted an attack by agreeing to a tribute of 400,000 pīrojīs and sending Paṇcolī Bhāṇo Adhāvat and several others to

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103 MRK, p. 48, notes that when Rām was offered Sojhat, the Mughals had been advised previously by these Rāhōrs that he should not obtain Jodhpur because he had no valid claim (ḥak) to the throne after Rāv Mālde banished him.

104 Maṇḍor is five miles north of Jodhpur.

105 Bohrāvās is twelve miles northeast of Jodhpur.

106 Vīsalpur is twenty miles east of Jodhpur and fifteen miles southeast of Bohrāvās.

107 Rām received the title of “Rāv” when he formally received Sojhat from Akbar.

Nāgaur with the Khān as hostages. Bhāpo managed to escape from the fort of Nāgaur, but the remaining men died while imprisoned there.  

A month or so afterward Ḫusayn Quṭb Khān and his troops proceeded toward Jodhpur for the third time. As the army drew near the town of Sojhat, where they evidently expected to be joined by Rāv Rām, they were attacked at Pācnero village by a Muslim Cauhūṇa Rajpūt, Dāūd Nāyak, and his 1,500 gunmen, sent there by Rāv Candrasen. A fierce battle occurred, in which Dāūd Nāyak died along with forty men of his brotherhood, but not before they killed three hundred of Ḫusayn Quṭb Khān’s “quiver-bearers” (tarkas bandh). This episode suggests that Rāv Candrasen was prepared to resist the Mughals much more forcefully than on previous occasions. It also reveals the increasing role of gunpowder weapons in warfare in Mārvār.

In the middle of the fifteenth century the Muslim sultanates of Gujarāt and Mālwā along with the Hindu kingdom of Mevār had begun to employ cannons, particularly in sieges. Firearms (arquebuses) also made their first appearance in India in this century. In the sixteenth century gunpowder weapons became more common in Rājasthān. A painting from Mevār dated

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109 JRKK, p. 106. Vyāś has not accepted this khyār’s account of these events, since, as he says, “no other source refers to [them].” But he does not apply this overly-exacting criterion to much of the remainder of his analysis, and I see no reason to follow him in this instance. Vyāś, Jodhpur Rājya kā Ithās, p. 190.

110 Although the sources do not explicitly state that Ḫusayn Quṭb Khān went to Sojhat, UCRK (2:77) and the “Rāv Rām ro Vākō” (in Vigat, 2:433) both note that Rāv Rām brought the Mughals back to Jodhpur in March of 1565, and Bāṅkīdās, Bāṅkīdās rī Khyaṭ (p. 21) states that Rām just previously had led the Imperial army from Sojhat to Pālī, which was taken on February 19, 1565 (see below, p. 25). One may therefore assume that Ḫusayn Quṭb Khān was passing through Pācnero village on his way to join Rāv Rām in Sojhat. If he had been joined by Rāv Rām before the army reached Pācnero, there have been little reason for them to go on to Sojhat.

111 Pācnero village is four miles east of Sojhat.

112 The Nāyaks of Mārvār were mostly Muslim soldiers claiming descent from Rajpūts. They maintained their ancestors came with the Rāthors from Kanauj in the thirteenth century, but I have not been able to find any reference to Nāyaks in Mārvār before the reign of Rāv Candrasen. In the nineteenth century they performed special functions at the Jodhpur Fort, including opening and closing its various gates and guarding their keys. The Mārvār census report of 1891 notes that the Muslim Cauhūṇa Nāyaks were called Phulānī and descended from Ālā Phul Nāyak, who according to JRKK (p. 106) was the son of Ajābkas and brother of Dāūd Nāyak. Ripoṛt Mardūsumārī Rājmārvār san 1891 Īsvī (Jodhpur: Śrī Jagḍīśśāṁ Gahlot Šodh Sarṣṭhān, 1997 [1896]), p. 78.

113 JRKK, p. 106.

1521 indicates soldiers carrying a form of arquebus or musket in a battle.\textsuperscript{115} The \textit{Chanda Rau Jetā Sī ro}, a poem written about 1535 in Bikaner, mentions two-barreled guns (\textit{donaṭi}) being employed in a night attack by the Rāṭhors on the Mughal troops of Kāmrān, Hūmāyūn’s brother, who had invaded Bikaner from the north.\textsuperscript{116} The Rāṭhors of Jodhpur had at least a few firearms of some sort at the battle of Samel in 1544, as they used them to shoot an elephant just before the fighting began.\textsuperscript{117} In 1554 Rajpūts in Rāv Mālde’s army test-fired arquebuses or perhaps muskets (\textit{bandāq}) in military exercises prior to the battle of Merto.\textsuperscript{118} In 1562 the soldiers under Devīdās Jaitāvat’s command during the two-month siege of the fort at Merto used firearms against the Mughals.\textsuperscript{119} The trend toward increasing use of firearms, which began under Rāv Mālde and accelerated after the great battle of 1544 at Samel, continued apace under Rāv Candrasen and reached its high point in the fighting of 1565. Artillery, however, seems to have been of little importance in Mārvār in the sixteenth century, although not completely absent, as Ziegler has asserted,\textsuperscript{120} since Rāv Mālde is said to have had cannon at the siege of Pokaraṇ in 1550.\textsuperscript{121}

After the attack at Pācnero village, Ḥusayn Quṭb Khān picked up Rāv Rām and his men at Sojhat and then marched toward Pāli, which they reached on February 19, 1565.\textsuperscript{122} The Rajpūt chief ruling Pāli, the Sonagaro Cahuveṇ Mānisēgh Akhairājot, had fled the town ahead of the advancing army and gone to Mēvār. After securing Pāli, the army proceeded to Jodhpur. As they were approaching, the Mughals would have been able to see the great Jodhpur fort, now known as the Mehrāngārh, from a considerable distance, as it sits on an isolated rock, the Cirīyā


\textsuperscript{117} AB, p. 43 (translated in MRMR, 1:166).

\textsuperscript{118} NK, 3:117 (translated in MRMR, 1:212).

\textsuperscript{119} See above, p. 15.


\textsuperscript{121} “Rāv Mālde’s cannons discharged” (\textit{Rāv Mālde rī nālāṇ chaṭī}). \textit{Vigat}, 2:294.

\textsuperscript{122} Bāṅkīdās, \textit{Bāṅkīdās rī Khyāṭ}. p. 21.
Ţüńk, about four hundred feet above the surrounding plain.\textsuperscript{123} Perhaps those men who had been at the siege of Merto in 1562, a difficult endeavor requiring two months of effort, would have been discouraged observing the walls of the Jodhpur fort, which vary from twenty to one hundred twenty feet high and from twelve to seventy feet thick, enclosing an area 1,500 feet long and, at the widest, 750 feet.\textsuperscript{124} Others may have been bolstered by the knowledge that Sher Shāh Sūr had taken this same fort in 1544 after only a brief siege in which all the defenders were killed and few of the attackers harmed.\textsuperscript{125}

Plate 4. Mehrāngarh Fort, Jodhpur.

But 1565 was different than 1544. In the prior year, Rāv Mālde, along with most of his army, had abandoned Jodhpur before Sher Shāh reached the city. The garrison remaining in the fort was small and poorly armed. By contrast, in 1565 Rāv Candrasena had spent considerable

\textsuperscript{123} It is said that on a clear day the fort can be seen from Jālor, sixty-seven miles south-southwest of Jodhpur.


\textsuperscript{125} For a list of those killed at the Jodhpur fort in 1554, see MRMR, 1:232-233.
time making preparations before the arrival of the Mughals. He had with him at least six hundred gunnmen along with several important Rajpūt commanders and their contingents. Moreover, Rāv Mālde had made extensive efforts in the 1540s to renovate the Jodhpur fort as well as to fortify two of its principal water sources, the Rāṇīsar and the Cokelāv. And so, a well-supplied, well-protected garrison under Rāv Candraseṇa awaited Ḫusayn Quli Khān and the Mughal army when they reached the city on March 13, 1565 and began the siege.

Sieges in the pre-modern era were often terrible, long-drawn-out affairs that brought out the worst in defenders and attackers alike. Rājasthān has had its share of such episodes, in particular in the early fourteenth century, when the Khiljīs invaded. Jauhars, or ritual suicides of women en masse in fires followed by warriors emerging from doomed fortresses and fighting to the death against the besiegers, had occurred at Rīṇṭhambhor in 1301, Cītor in 1303, Sīvāṇo in 1308, Jālā in 1311, and Jaisālmer in 1315. More recently, there had been the jauhar at Cītor in 1535, following a long siege conducted by the Sultān of Gujarāt, Bahādur Shāh. Hundreds, sometimes thousands, of individuals died in these suicidal conclusions to bitter conflicts. If one wonders why such horrific events occurred, consider what happened to the survivors of Sher Shāh Sūr’s siege of Raisin in 1543:

According to the custom of the Hindus, everyone killed his family members (women and children) .... A few wounded women, children, three of the nephews (brothers’ sons) of Puram Mal along with his minor daughter were left alive. They were brought to [Sher Shah] who ordered: “The boys should be castrated so that their line (of descent) may be put to an end.” He gave their daughters to the dancers that they might make them dance in the streets and the bazaars; the wounded women were handed over to low-caste people.

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Husayn Qulī Khān probably had good knowledge of the Hindū custom of *jauhar*, and he certainly would have been aware of the fight to the death by the Rāṭhor garrison at Jaitāran in 1558. He would have remembered the stubbornness of the defeated Rāṭhor Devidās Jaitāvat at Meṛto, who died in combat along with all of his men shortly after the siege there ended in 1562. He would have been alert to the possibility of Rajpūt night attacks such as the one Sāṅvāḷdās Udaiśīṅghot had carried out at Meṛto in that same year against Mirzā Sharaftū’d-Dīn Husayn’s men. But at least Husayn Qulī Khān would not have to worry about a hostile army to his rear. Rāv Candrasen’s brothers, who were rebelling against him, would not take any action against the Mughals. Nor would the Khān have a problem with the various powerful Rāṭhor Rajpūt *ṭhākurs* of Mārvār who disliked Rāv Candrasen and refused to join him at Jodhpur.

Shortly after Husayn Qulī Khān arrived at Jodhpur on March 13, 1565 with the Mughal army, Rāv Candrasen and a few of the leading Rajpūt chiefs of Mārvār along with numerous retainers engaged them in battle at the Engravers’ Gate (Kasāṛām rī Pol). The location of this gate is uncertain. The city of Jodhpur in 1565 was surrounded by a wall built by Rāv Mālde, but the entrances to the city through the wall were named after the towns they faced (e.g., Jāḷorī, Nāgaurī) and usually were referred to in local sources as “doorways” (darvājo) and not “gates” (pol). Probably the Engravers’ Gate was somewhere on the north side of the city, as the fort was completely inaccessible on its south side, where the hill it sits on was cut away to make an ascent impossible.

Rāv Candrasen and his commanders took note of the size of the Mughal army and decided to fall back to the safety of the fort’s interior. Here they remained for the next few days. Then, on March 18, the Mughals attacked the Rāmü Pol, which evidently was the main gate of

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130 Hukamṣīṃh Bhaṛī maintains that Rāv Candrasen’s men shot arrows at the Mughals in this engagement, but contemporary sources do not support his statement (“Husainkulikhaṅ kī Jodhpur par Ḍāḥī Sambandḥī Navīn Tathya,” p. 48).

131 JRKK, p. 106, states that Sonagaro Cāhuvaṅ Māṃsīṅh Akhaīrājot, Rāṭhor Prithīrāj Kūmpāvat, Bāḷāvat Rāṭhor Pato Nagāvat, Čāṃpāvat Rāṭhor Jaitmāl Jaisāvat, and Meṛṭīyo Rāṭhor Čāndo Viramdevot took part in this battle with the Mughals. It is highly unlikely that Jaitmāl Jesāvat, who detested Rāv Candrasen, would have been in Jodhpur at this time, although he may have later reconciled with the Rāv. Čāndo Viramdevot may have been there, but UCRK, 2:219 says that Ḥusayn Qulī Khān had him killed in Nāgaur sometime during the V.S. year 1621 (June 24, 1564 to July 13, 1565). This same *kyāt* (1:309) indicates that Prithīrāj Kūmpāvat, after urging Rāv Rām to bring the Mughals to Jodhpur in 1564, switched his allegiance back to Rāv Candrasen in 1565 and participated in the defense of the fort.

132 Vigat, 1:186-189.

the fort at that time. They broke a portion of the wall around this gate. Rāv Candrasen’s men managed to kill fifty or so Mughal soldiers, while Rāthor Dāso Pātalot, one of his troop commanders, was wounded. Rāv Candrasen and all the other Rajpūt ṭhākurs then abandoned the town to the Mughals and returned to the fort. Around midnight on that same date they reemerged to carry out a night attack, then withdrew once more. On either March 27 or March 29, 1565 the Rāv’s retainers briefly came outside the fort one last time to fight. They killed several Mughal soldiers. A Jeso Bhāṭī Rajpūt, Rīṃmal Nīmbāvat, and a Nāyak, Khetsi, died fighting.

After March 29, Rāv Candrasen and his men, including all the senior Rajpūts, remained inside the walls of the fort until the end of the siege. H. S. Bhāṭī states, without corroboration, that the Mughals took advantage and thoroughly looted the town below. Naiṣī notes that Rāv Candrasen, who was “exceptionally intense” (gāḍhō nipat), fought many skirmishes with the aid of his personal contingent of about 600 Bhīmlādevat gunmen. These Bhīmlādevats were Khīcī

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134 The Mehrāngarh Fort has seven gates at present, none of which is named Rām Poḷ. A ramp on the north side passes through these seven gates and ascends to the fort. There is no other point of access. See Antonio Martinelli & George Michell with Aman Nath, Palace of Rajasthan (Mumbai: India Books House in Association with Mehrangarh Publishers, Jodhpur, 2004), p. [186-187] for an excellent photograph of the ascent through the gates.

135 Dāso Pātalot was a Jaismālot Rāthor. UCRK, 1:102. No doubt others were killed, but Rājasthani chronicles almost always list only important men who died.

136 Hukamsinh Bhāṭī maintains that “Rajpūt warriors” (Rājpūt yoddhāon) killed the Mughals with bullets, but his sources do not support him, mentioning neither Rajpūts nor bullets. “Husainkulikhāṃ kī Jodhpur par Cāṛhāī Sambandhī Tathya,” p. 49.

137 NK, 2:161.

138 The chronology of these events is not completely certain. The sources state that the Mughals’ assault on the Rām Poḷ occurred after the attack in which Jeso Bhāṭī Rīṃmal Nīmbāvat and Nāyak Khetsi were killed, but the date they give for this assault, Vaisākh, Vadi 2, V.S. 1621 (March 18, 1565), comes before the attack, which the sources maintain happened on March 27 (Vaisākh, Vadi 10, V.S. 1621) or March 29 (Vaisākh, Vadi 12, V.S. 1621). See JRKK, p. 106; UCRK, 2:77-78. One other source (“Rāv Rām ro Vāko,” in Vigat, 2:433) gives Vaisākh, Sudī 15, V.S. 1621 = April 15, 1565, which is not likely. Possibly the correct date for the assault on the Rām Poḷ was Vaisākh, Sudī 2, V.S. 1621 (April 2, 1565) and not Vaisākh, Vadi 2. Confusion between Vadi and Sudī in Rājasthani chronicles is fairly common.

139 Hukamsinh Bhāṭī, “Husainkulikhāṃ kī Jodhpur par Cāṛhāī Sambandhī Tathya,’’ p. 49.

140 Vigat, 1:68. MRK, p. 49, puts the number of gunmen at 700.
Rajpūts, perhaps from Kāylāṇo village. Their deployment at Jodhpur during the siege of 1565 is another example of the greatly increased use of firearms in Mārvār in the second half of the sixteenth century.

On April 4, 1565 the Mughals made a particularly fierce assault with cannon. Two horses inside the fort were killed. Then, on April 23, 1565, the Mughals’ cannon balls struck the Cokeḷāv, a tank within the fort. Fifty men died. The water supply ran out. On May 2, 1565, they broke the wall of the Rāṇīsar tank, the other principal source of water for the defenders. Kīsandās Dūjaṇsalot, a Karaṇot Rāṭhor, and Muṇhato Jogo died at this time. Rāv Candrasen’s men were forced to move back. On May 14, 1565 the defenders managed to obtain water from the Māl Vāvṛī step-well at a depth of about 125 feet. The water lasted for about seventeen days; then the Mughals somehow poisoned the well with hūng (asafetida).

The Rājastham chronicles are silent about events at Jodhpur between May 14 and the end of the siege on December 2, 1565. Possibly the defenders were able to survive for awhile by collecting rain water after the monsoon began. But food and other supplies (perhaps

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141 *Ibid.* which comments that they were “great fighters” (bhaṛa laṛaṛtā) from the house of “Bhīvaṇṭo Devt ot Khēcī.” AB, p. 86, says that they lived in Kāylāṇo village during Rāv Candrasen’s stay in the mountains around Sīvāṇo in the 1570s. Kāylāṇo (modern Kalyāṇpur) is twenty-five miles southwest of Jodhpur. In the mid-seventeenth century it was the largest village in Sīvāṇo Pargano. *Vigat*, 2:233-234 (listed as Kānāṇo).

142 Rāṭhorān ri Khâyā: Murāridānī ri Khâyā ro Hindi Tarjumā. MS no. 15672 (Rājastham Pracyavidyā Pratishthān, Jodhpur), p. 160; UCRK, 2:78. Both these sources give *Jeth, Vadi* 8, V.S. 1621 = April 23, 1565 as the date for the attack on the Cokeḷāv, but B.S. Pātāvat, who edited a version of the Hindi translation of the relevant passage in MS 15672, has altered the date without comment to *Jeth, Sudi* 8, V.S. 1565 = May 7, 1565. See Bhāvanīṣṭhī Pātāvat, “Rajastham Gadya Sāhitya mēṃ Rāv Candrasen,” in *Svatantrya Vir Rāv Candrasen: Jodhpur kā Śāsak, 1562-1581 Ṭ.*, ed. by Hukamsinh Bhāṭī (Jodhpur: Rājastham Śodh Sāṃśthān, 2001), p. 99.

143 *Vigat*, 1:68 incorrectly identifies this Rāṭhor as Kīsandās Gāṅgāvat.

144 AB, p. 85; JRKK, p. 106; “Rāv Rāṃ ro Vāko, 2:434; UCRK, 2:78.

145 UCRK, 2:78. “Rāv Rāṃ ro Vāko,” 2:434 says that water was reached at about sixty-five feet.

146 UCRK, 2:78. H. S. Bhāṭī alleges that the Baniyās of Jodhpur sold the Mughals the hūng, but, as is often the case with his assertions, the original sources he uses do not support him. Hukamsinh Bhāṭī, “Husainkulikhāṃ kī Jodhpur par Caḥhāṛi Sambandhī Navin Tathya,” p. 50.

147 Most of the monsoon rain in the Jodhpur area falls in the months of July and August. But MRK, p. 49, states that not a drop of rain fell in the vicinity of Jodhpur during the last six months of the siege. One should note also that the heat in Jodhpur reaches its peak in the months of May and June, when the average daily high temperature is around 105 degrees Fahrenheit.
gunpowder) grew scarce.\textsuperscript{148} Ḫusayn Qulī Khān may have taken advantage of a lull in activities to return to Nāgaur for a short time. He also may have sent his men against the Ūdāvat Rāṭhōr Jassvánt Ḯūṅgārsīyōt in this period. Jassvánt had taken up residence in a fort at Borār village in the Arāvālī mountains and was maintaining an independent existence there as a “third force” (ṛīṛ ṭāṛ) between Rāv Candraseṇḍ Rāv Rām. One sources says Jassvánt was killed by Ḫusayn Qulī Khān (i.e., by Ḫusayn Qulī Khān’s men) on July 15, 1566;\textsuperscript{149} another says the Mughals killed him on October 28, 1566.\textsuperscript{150}

In December Ṛv Candraseṇḍ, perceiving that his position was deteriorating,\textsuperscript{151} came to terms with Ḫusayn Qulī Khān. The Ṛv realized that the Mughal army was numerous and still intent on battle, and so he agreed to abandon the fort on the night of December 2, 1565, accompanied by Sonagarō Cahuvaṛ Mānsīṛīn Akhairājōt, Rāṭhōr Tilokśī Kūmpāvaṛ, and Rāṭhōr Pato Nagāvaṛ.\textsuperscript{152} Ḫusayn Qulī Khān’s mother took pity on the young Ṛv and provided him with horses for his men to ride and camels to carry their goods.\textsuperscript{154} They left the fort without interference about nine in the evening. After having the auspicious moment determined, Ḫusayn Qulī Khān and Ṛv Rām climbed up to the fort. Eleven Rajpūṭs still inside then put their hand prints on the fort’s wall, emerged, and died fighting in a token final gesture of defiance.\textsuperscript{155} Ṛv

\textsuperscript{148} AB, p. 80; JRKK, p. 106; UCRK, 2:78.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.}, 2:306-307.

\textsuperscript{150} AB, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{151} According to MRK, p. 49, disease had broken out inside the fort.

\textsuperscript{152} Kūmpāvaṛ Rāṭhōr Tilokśī Kūmpāvaṛ, another of Kūmpo Mahirājōt’s many sons. UCRK, 1:324.

\textsuperscript{153} AB, p. 80; JRKK, p. 107; “Ṛv Rām ro Vāko,” 2:434; UCRK, 2:78; \textit{Vigat}, 1:68. H. S. Bhāṭi says that Meṛṭīṛ Rāṭhōr Cândo Viraṇdevot and Rāṭhōr Pṛthirāj Kūmpāvaṛ also left Jodhpur with Candraseṇḍ on the night of December 2, 1565. See Hukamsīṛ Bhāṭi, “Husainkūlikkhāṇ kī Jodhpur par Cāṛāvī Sambandhī Navīṇ Tathya,” p. 50. Cândo was probably dead by December 2. Shortly after leaving, Pṛthirāj Kūmpāvaṛ approached Akbar and became an Imperial military servant. MRK, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{154} “Ṛv Rām ro Vāko,” 2:434; UCRK, 2:78. His mother is supposed to have said that Candraseṇḍ was “[l]ike a son of hers.” MRK, p. 49, relates that Husayn Qulī Khān had said to his mother, “You must see Ṛv Candraseṇḍi descending from the fort; the Ṛv is worth looking at.” And so she stood by the gate and watched Candraseṇḍ come down from the fort. Perhaps she made her remark then.

\textsuperscript{155} The eleven who died included four Jeso Bhāṭīs: Āśo Jodhāvāt and his two sons, Jaimal and Jogo, and Gāṅgo Nimbāvāt; four Rāṭhōrs: Jaimalōt Rāṭhōr Vairāl Pāṭalōt, Bhāṭvāsīyō Ṣudāvāt Rāṭhōr Ṭāṅo Viraṇdevot, Pāṭalōt Rāṭhōr Śūro Gāṅgāvāt, and Viṛ Viraṛjōt; and three Īṇō Parīhārs: Rāso Jōgāvāt, Raṇḍhīṛ Mehekāvāt, and Śūjo Vairāṅgōt. JRKK, p. 107; NK, 2:154, 161, 164, 175, 176; “Ṛv Rām ro Vāko,” 2:434; UCRK, 1:60, 105, 478; \textit{Vigat}, 1:68.
Rām remained in the fort for about a week and then returned to Sojhat. Ḥusayn Quṭb Khān stayed at the fort.

**Epilogue**

When the minds of the Imperial servants were at rest about the business of M. Sharafu-d-dīn Ḥusain, they addressed themselves to the taking of the fort of Jodhpur, which was the strongest fort in that country. Let it not be concealed that this fort was the capital of Rai Māldeo, who was one of the great Rajahs of India, both in rank and position, and for the number of his servants, and the extent of his territories. When he departed from the fortress of life, his younger son Candar Sen succeeded him and held this fort. The officers went to besiege it, and Rām Rai, the elder son of Rai Māldeo, came and joined the army of fortune, and after that he was exalted by saluting the sublime threshold, which is the kissing-spot of the exalted ones of the horizons. Mūnu-d-dīn Ahmad Khān Farankhudā and Mozaffar Moghul and a number of others were sent to assist Ḥusain Quṭb Khān. By the Divine aid the fort was soon conquered. 

So wrote Abū al-Fazl. His account is not so much wrong as it is brief, although one would question his use of the adverb “soon” with regard to the amount of time (eighteen months) it took the Mughals to conquer the Jodhpur fort. He devoted much more of his Akbar Nāmā to the sieges of Merto and Cotor, which ended with decisive Mughal victories and the slaughter of many defenders. The longer, considerably less bloody siege of Jodhpur gave the Mughals control of the fort and the surrounding countryside, but Rāv Candraseṇ had not given up his independence. He rode away a free man to Bhādrājan, a town forty-eight miles south-southwest of Jodhpur. Such an undramatic end to nearly two years of hostilities may have left Perisan and Rājāsthānī chroniclers uninspired, but it raises some questions.

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156 Rāv Rām had said to Ḥusayn Quṭb Khān, “You have Jodhpur given to me.” But the Khān told him, “Handing over the fort and giving the kingdom of Jodhpur to you are not my option. This matter is in the hands of the Emperor himself,” whereupon Rāv Rām turned pale and went back to Sojhat. MRK, p. 49.

157 AN, 2:305.
1. Why was there no *jauhar*? Perhaps the youth of Rāv Candraseṇ, who was only twenty-four when he abandoned the fort, led him to seek a compromise with the Mughals. His two sons were small children, who would be incapable of ruling for some years. One of the concerns of Rajpūts in similar situations over the centuries was that the “seed” (*bīj*) be protected, i.e., that the younger sons of a Rajpūt family not die too soon to have male offspring and thus threaten the perpetuation of the lineage. At the siege of Jaisaḷmer ca. 1315, Rāvaḷ Mūḷrāj entrusted several young Bhāṭi princes to the care of Kamāluddīn Garg, the commander of the invading Sultanate army, before opening the gates of the fort and fighting to the death along with 120 men:

> He had Kamalādī informed: “You have become my brother [during this siege]. Today is the time for brothers [to aid one another]. You protect my seed (*mhāro bīj ubar rākho.*”

At the siege of Jaitāraṇ in 1558 Ratansi Khīṃvāvat’s sons evidently were elsewhere, as they all survived the Mughal assault. Similarly, Devīdās Jaitāvat’s young son Āskaraṇ was not present at the siege of Merto in 1562 which ended with the death of his father and the slaughter of most of the defeated garrison. But perhaps Rāv Candraseṇ’s young sons were with him in Jodhpur in 1565 and he feared for their safety if he committed himself to dying in battle. He had to think about their young mothers, Rāṇī Kalyāṇde and Rāṇī Suhāgde, and the other two

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158 Rāysiṅgh, the eldest, was seven or eight years old; Ugraseṇ was six. Rāv Candraseṇ had several daughters, but their dates of birth are not known.

159 NK, 2:51.

160 The late nineteenth-century *Uхаṛ Rāṭhaurāṇ ṛ Khyāt* includes a fanciful account of the siege of Jodhpur, according to which Rāv Candraseṇ, after sending his family (*rāj lokāṁ*) to Sirohī, gathered sixty thousand defenders in Jodhpur, appointed sixteen military commanders (senāpati), and made Prithrāj Kūmpāvat his chief advisor. All of these actions are unlikely; they represent the anonymous author’s attempt to portray what he thought might have happened. The account does indicate that in Rājasthān tradition sending one’s family away to safety before a siege was an event within the realm of possibility. *Uхаṛ Rāṭhaurāṇ ṛ Khyāt: Ṭhikāṇā Koṇṇā*, ed. by Hukamsīṅgh Bhāṭī (Jīlā Jodhpur: Ṭhikāṇā Koṇṇā: Caupāsni, Jodpur: Adhyahan Kendra Itiḥās Anusandhān Sansthi, 2004), p. 28.
wives he had at this time.\textsuperscript{161} In addition, he was responsible for at least two of Rāv Mālde’s young wives who did not become saṭīs when Mālde died in 1562.\textsuperscript{162}

No doubt it was desirable for a Rajpūt to die a “good death” (i.e., in battle), but it was necessary to pick an appropriate time in one’s life to do so. The Rājasthānī texts suggest that it was often older Rajpūts who chose to die in combat while younger men may have preferred living to fight another day. Naiṃśi has recorded the ages of some Rajpūt soldiers who died in a battle at Pokaraṇ in the seventeenth century:\textsuperscript{163}

\begin{center}

Bhāṭi Partāpsīṅgh Surtāṇot, seventy-five years.
Bhāṭi Venḍāś Kalāvat, sixty years.
Bhāṭi Gokalḍās Pātāvat, fifty years.
Gaur Rāmo Varsalot. Sixty-four years. [His wife] became a saṭī afterward.
Cahuvāṇ Lākho, fifty years.
Kachvāhā Jaimal, a Turk [i.e., a Muslim Rajpūt], eighty years.
Bhāṭi Rūpsī Jagāvat, sixty-five years.
Bhāṭi Sādo Amrāvat, a Kelhaṇ, sixty years.
Rāṭhor Kusalcand Sameco, seventy years.
Rāṭhor Sādūḷ Vairalot’s military servant, fifty years.
Bhāṭi Lālo, a Mūlpasāv, Partāpsīṅgh’s military servant, thirty-eight years.
Bhāṭi Jaso, Phataisingh’s military servant, fell badly wounded. They picked [him] up; he died on the second day. Forty years.

Average age: fifty-eight and one-half years.

\end{center}

Such advanced ages may indicate that these Rajpūts picked this moment to end their lives honorably. In the mid-fifteenth century, Rāv Cāco of Pūgāl (ca. 1430-48), old and sick, decided that he had lived long enough and, wishing to die a warrior’s death, arranged a staged battle with

\textsuperscript{161} There is some evidence in the sources that young Rajpūt widows did not become saṭīs with the consistency of older widowed Rajpūt women. For example, only one of Rāv Candrasen’s own wives became a saṭī after his death in 1581. Three of his wives, Rāṇī Ahaṅkārī, Rāṇī Harkhānde, and Rāṇī Premalde, who must have been very young in 1581, died twenty-one, fifty-nine, and forty-five years, respectively, after Candrasen’s death. See MRMR, 2:37-39 for a complete discussion of Candrasen’s marriages.

\textsuperscript{162} JRKK, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{163} Vigat, 2:305.
the Sultan of Multān in which he was killed fighting along with a few of his retainers. Rāv Candrasen, a healthy young man in 1565, probably had a much different outlook. And so, when Ḥusayn Quli Khān opened the “door of dharma” by allowing him to leave Jodhpur after surrendering the fort, he took advantage of the offer.

2. Why did the Mughals let Rāv Candrasen ride away from Jodhpur unimpeded? One might expect that Ḥusayn Quli Khān would have been in no mood to be lenient after a long, difficult siege during which he had lost a significant number of men. His mother felt pity for Candrasen and may have influenced his decision, but no doubt it was Akbar who ordered him to allow Candrasen to leave without hindrance. Akbar had more urgent concerns elsewhere (particularly in Mevār). He may have believed there was a possibility that Candrasen someday would accept his terms and become an Imperial retainer, just as other Rajpūts had been doing. In fact Candrasen did briefly agree to serve Akbar during a meeting in Nāgaūr in late 1570, only to repudiate his agreement shortly afterward. He then continued to fight against Mughal rule until his death in 1581. But Akbar initially must have hoped for some sort of accommodation with Candrasen.

3. Why didn’t Akbar grant Jodhpur to Rāv Rām? One reason probably was Akbar’s wish to entice Rāv Candrasen into Imperial service. Second, Rāv Mālde, Rām’s father, had disinherited and banished him in 1547. He therefore lacked legitimacy in the eyes of senior Rāthors. Finally, Rāv Rām was incompetent. He seldom displayed the slightest wisdom in his actions, nor did he ever succeed in anything without a powerful patron. Rāv Rām went back to Sojhat after the events of 1565, but after a few years Akbar gave this town to some Sayyids and granted Rāv Rām the rule of only a village, Siriyārī. A few months later Rāv Rām died not

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165 Akbar was much less lenient after the conclusion of subsequent sieges. He ordered the execution of 30,000 defenders when Cītor fell in 1568 and then forced Rāv Surjan Hāṇo and his sons to agree to military service after Surjan surrendered Rīṇṭhambhār in 1569. He may have believed his generous treatment of Rāv Candrasen was a mistake.

166 JRKK, p. 108.

167 See above, p. 23, n. 103.

168 AB, p. 81; Murārdān, p. 591. Siriyārī village is twenty miles southeast of Sojhat.
long after a Jogī whom he had offended, Lakhāṇāṭh, cursed him, a singularly inauspicious end for a Rajpūt prince.\footnote{AB, p. 81. See also JRKK, p. 103; \textit{Murārdān}, p. 591, \textit{Vigat}, 1:71. Different dates are given for Rāv Rām’s death: May 4, 1573 (the correct date), May 9, 1574, and May 23, 1574.}

4. Why did the Mughal advance into Mārvār proceed so slowly from 1558 to 1565? As has been suggested, one reason was that the Mughals had more critical concerns elsewhere. But there were other constraints. Ziegler has written that the forts of Mārvār built in the latter part of the reign of Rāv Mālde were not primarily for defensive purposes. Their design “appear[s] to have been based less on military considerations than on the Rāv’s desire to express his power, prestige, and wealth.”\footnote{Ziegler, “Evolution of the Rathor State of Marvar,” 2:204.} Ziegler ignored the difficulties the Mughals had in taking these forts,\footnote{Ziegler’s study of warfare in Mārvār almost completely disregarded sieges, particularly those occurring in the years after 1562.} and he did not appreciate that they and their garrisons formed part of a defense in depth.\footnote{See above, p. 12.} Such a defense imposes a choice on an invader: either the forts are reduced, one by one, or they are bypassed, leaving hostile, fortified bases to the rear of the invader. The latter choice was far too dangerous for the Mughals to consider. Thus they had to commit themselves to a series of increasingly difficult sieges: at Jaitāraṇ in 1558, Mērto in 1562, and Jodhpur in 1565.\footnote{The Mughal advance into Mārvār did not stop in 1565 but continued after Rāv Candraśen repudiated his service agreement to Akbar in 1570. The Mughals resumed military operations and carried out another difficult siege at Sīvāṇo from 1574-76 under the leadership of Shāḥbāz Khān Kambū. In late 1576, the Bhāṭis of Jaisālmer, allied with the Mughals, besieged the fort at Pokaraṇ and were held off effectively by a small but determined garrison equipped with firearms and still loyal to Candraśen. \textit{Vigat}, 2:296.}

One of the reasons for the length of the latter two sieges was the growing use of firearms by the Rajpūts and their contingents. They created real problems for the Mughals, for gunmen firing bullets from inside a fort did not expose themselves to counter fire in the same manner as bowmen did when they shot their arrows.\footnote{Cf. John Frances Guilmartin, \textit{Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century}, rev. ed. (London: Conway Martin Press, 2003), pp. 154-166, for an excellent comparison of the relative advantages of crossbows, composite bows, and firearms.} The great advantage of arquebuses or muskets in stationary warfare, as opposed to open field battles, has been overlooked by most military
Historians of India.\textsuperscript{175} It seems as well that the increased use of gunpowder weapons in Mārvār led to the emergence of new military groups skilled in their use, such as the Muslim Nāyaks and the Bhīmlādevats, who are not mentioned in accounts of battles occurring before Rāv Candraseṇ’s reign.\textsuperscript{176} These men apparently were paid in cash and not with grants of land (\textit{paṭos}) like the Rajpūts.

In 1544 the Rāthors serving Rāv Mālde had confronted the army of Sher Shāh Sūr at Samel and had suffered a terrible defeat. After Samel, Rāv Mālde constructed several new forts, renovated others, and began acquiring firearms in large numbers. As a result, the Mughal invasion of Mārvār, which began in 1558, took a much different course than the earlier invasion by the Afghāns. Instead of fighting a single, decisive, open-field battle, the Mughals were forced to undertake sieges of increasing difficulty. The siege of Jodhpur, lasting eight months and ending inconclusively, was emblematic of the new style of warfare in Mārvār.

\textsuperscript{175} Ziegler has written that “into the mid-17th century, firearms continued to play only a minor role in Rajpūt warfare (“Evolution of the Rathor State of Marvar,” 2:204). However, he neglected to examine their role in sieges.

\textsuperscript{176} One should note that gaining proficiency in the use of a musket or arquebus normally only required a few months, but becoming competent with a bow often took several years. Cf. Guilmartin, \textit{Gunpowder and Galleys}, p. 166.
Plate 5. Sīvānō Fort, taken by the Mughals in March-April, 1576.
Map 1. Dates of Mughal Conquests and Acquisitions in Mārvār, 1558-76.

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