

Feeling like My Self: Emotion Profiles and Identity

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This research examines the connections between emotion and social identity. Specifically, this project theorizes that identities are associated with discrete emotions, and that these associations give rise to *emotion profiles* that describe appropriate emotional experiences for individuals with that active identity. The results establish that social identities have associations to specific emotions and that these associations differ between identities. Experiencing emotions consistent with the identity's emotion profile enhances persuasion, as well as performance on an effortful task. Further experiments investigate whether individuals engage in emotion regulation to reduce (enhance) their experience of emotions which are inconsistent (consistent) with the identity's emotion profile. Finally, consequences for the framing and positioning of identity-relevant products are drawn.

“A man who is master of himself can end a sorrow as easily as he can invent a pleasure. I don’t want to be at the mercy of my emotions. I want to use them, to enjoy them, and to dominate them.” Oscar Wilde (1992, 88)

When do people want to change their emotional experience? While the consumer behavior literature has typically treated consumers as passive experiencers of emotion—emotion is induced in the individual, from which a series of downstream events occur—there is substantial evidence that people can and do manage their ongoing emotional experiences (Andrade and Cohen 2007; Gross and Thompson 2007). Known as *emotion regulation*, this is the self-management process where individuals manipulate either the emotion antecedents or the subjective, physiological, and behavioral elements of the emotional response (Gross 1998). Generally, people try to change their emotions when they feel bad, as when a person eats a chocolate bar after reading a sad story (cf. Study 4: Labroo and Mukhopadhyay 2009).

However, there may be other reasons to experience emotions aside from simply “feeling good.” Emotions do have hedonic components: pleasure, fantasy and fun (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Higgins 1997), but emotions are more than just valence—the appraisal dimensions and action readiness tendencies may be leveraged in assistance of other goals. Using emotions to aid performance on another task (e.g., making oneself angry prior to a negotiation in order to get a better outcome) is the idea that emotions also have *instrumental* value (Tamir 2005), and perhaps individuals will regulate their emotions in order to achieve instrumental benefits—even at the expense of positive feelings (Cohen and Andrade 2004).

Using emotions instrumentally can thus motivate consumers to regulate their emotions. But when, and for what purpose, are emotions used instrumentally? The current work posits that there are associations between discrete emotions and specific social identities, and that

individuals will choose to experience or regulate emotion in order to maintain consistency between the active identity and the emotion experience. In this framework, emotions are integral to manifesting a given social identity, and thus can be used instrumentally to achieve an identity-consistent experience.

The research proposed here describes a model of emotion experience and regulation whereby consumers seek out and manage their emotional experience in order to achieve consistency with the *emotion profiles* of specific identities. Each component of the theory will be discussed in turn. The core proposition is that social identities have associations to specific emotion states (e.g., athletes are angry), and these emotion profiles prescribe both the consumption and regulation of emotional experiences. The contributions of this paper are threefold: first, a unique motivation for the choice and management of emotional experiences is provided (emotion profiles based upon social identity); second, a gap in the literature on social identity is addressed by implicating emotions in the enactment of the self-concept; finally, implications for the framing and positioning of identity-relevant products are drawn.

EMOTION REGULATION

Emotion regulation has been defined as the self-management process by which individuals manipulate either the emotion antecedents or the subjective, physiological and behavioral elements of the emotional response (Gross 1998; Gross and Levenson 1993). Examples of different kinds of emotion regulation may include: shopping for a new outfit after a hard day at work, changing the television channel when a show becomes too graphic, enhancing the expression of one's sadness when a friend is hurt, and so on. Emotion regulation is such a

common and everyday experience that most undergraduates report doing it at least once a day, and can easily recall an example of such behavior (Gross, Richards, and John 2006). Indeed, we often only take note of emotion regulation when it fails—such as when a child throws a temper tantrum or a friend is not as excited for our good fortune as we had expected. Psychology has become interested in emotion regulation through research on emotion dysregulation: many clinical disorders involve a form of emotion dysregulation (Thoits 1985). As greater insight into emotion regulation failures has emerged, theories about the healthy emotion regulation system have developed, as well as deeper understanding of the psychological processes involved in such self-regulatory practices.

Theorists have described five distinct emotion regulation strategies, distinguished by the points at which they intervene in the emotion generation process. *Situation selection* is the most forward-looking type of emotion regulation, whereby an individual approaches (avoids) circumstances that would lead to desired (undesired) emotional experiences. Marketing has touched upon this strategy when discussing the consumption of emotion and individuals' desire to have affect-laden encounters (Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). Once a given situation has been entered, an individual can then engage in *situation modification* where he alters aspects of the emotionally loaded external environment, such as a dieter avoiding the cookie aisle and its accompanying guilt. Within a situation, individuals may shift their attention toward and away from emotional targets, a process of selective *attention deployment*, as when people change the channel when shows become too graphic. Individuals may also alter their internal appraisal of the conditions, such as mentally distancing themselves from upsetting content (Gross 1998). Frequently called *reappraisal*, some forms of this strategy may enhance consumers' processing of otherwise disturbing material (e.g., protective framing: Andrade and Cohen 2007). Finally, if

emotion regulation did not happen at other points along the elicitation process, an individual may act directly upon the components of an emotional response: physiological, subjective and expressive reactions. Often, *response modulation* involves hiding or enhancing a facial expression, but may also include self-medicating or other behaviorally-focused actions. This response modulation strategy is typically deemed the least effective type of emotion management, as it seldom changes the experience of emotion (Gross and Levenson 1993) but rather merely hides the internal emotion states from the outside world.

Regardless of the efficacy of each strategy, these are a variety of ways in which an individual may alter the course of an emotional experience. Thus, emotion regulation theories provide a useful framework for understanding how a person may manage their emotions in order to achieve either hedonic or instrumental outcomes. While this perspective describes a variety of strategies about *how* individuals change emotions, it does not provide an answer to the opening question of *when* individuals would be motivated to do so. To answer that question, social identity theory, and its rich explanation of behavior change, is needed.

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

Social identity theory proposes that individuals possess a sense of self (identity) that arises from their awareness of themselves as an individual (personal identity) and from their membership in various social groups (social identity: Tajfel 1982). Individuals rely on their social identity to provide social categorization, self-definition, and behavioral guidance (Markus and Wulf 1987). There are two essential characteristics of social identity that impact its influence on an individual's behavior: malleability and self-importance. The malleability of social identity

refers to the fact that context can influence which specific identities are actively guiding behavior (Markus and Kunda 1986). An individual has a variety of identities which may be salient at any given time (e.g., sister, student, volunteer, tennis player), but elements in the person's surroundings may make her more likely to view herself in terms of one social membership over another (e.g. feeling like an athlete in a Nike store, but a student in Barnes & Noble), and this heightened level of identity activation will guide her behavior in identity-congruent manners (Markus and Kunda 1986; Tajfel 1982). In addition to identities varying in salience due to contextual factors, identities can also vary in self-importance or the degree to which an individual associates that identity as part of him- or herself (Reed 2004). Critically, those identities that are more self-important are more likely to guide behavior and define the self than those that are less important (Aquino and Reed 2002).

Social identities are thus mental representations that individuals use to define themselves and, further, to guide behavior (Reed 2004; White and Dahl 2007). It is this component of social identity theory—active identities guide behavior—which makes it particularly relevant and useful in consumer behavior. Recent work has emphasized that individuals can use products to define their identities, and thus consumption acts become one form of self-definition (Escalas and Bettman 2005; Laverie, Kleine, and Kleine 2002). Additionally, consumers not only select products that match their self-image, but also avoid those products that are inconsistent with their self-image (Berger and Heath 2007; White and Dahl 2007).

Research in marketing has highlighted the effect of identity on advertising effectiveness (Forehand and Deshpandé 2001), preference formation (White and Dahl 2007), and consumption (Berger and Heath 2007). These streams emphasize that when an identity is salient, it activates associated attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs—which then influence consumers' response to

marketing activities. But this area has overlooked whether particular emotions are associated with specific identities, and whether the pursuit of these specific emotions can influence consumption. The next section introduces a new construct to consumer behavior, *emotion profiles*, and describes why social identities may have associations to specific emotions which then guide behavior and consumption.

EMOTION PROFILES

Research has demonstrated that emotions can be represented within memory as nodes interconnected with broader associative networks (Bower 1981). Additionally, social identities have been conceptualized as associative networks, with interconnections between the social group and attitudes, behaviors and beliefs (Kleine, Kleine, and Kernan 1993). Bringing these two ideas together, the current research posits that certain emotions are connected to specific social identities. Why might emotions be connected to identities? There are two possible reasons: one, there may be identity “prototypes” which are affiliated with specific discrete emotions (e.g., Ray Lewis is an athlete and is always angry), secondly, certain discrete emotions may have action tendencies (Frijda 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989) which correspond to the goals of that identity (e.g., anger leads to the desire to overcome obstacles and punish others—qualities which may aid athletes during competition). These two ways that emotions are affiliated with identities are not mutually exclusive, and both suggest that specific emotions may be seen as instrumental to the expression of a particular identity, leading to a set of emotional prescriptions or *emotion profiles* associated with that social identity.

For instance, a mother should be warm and caring, but that same woman in the boardroom is expected to be coolly professional and possibly even aggressive (Simpson and Stroh 2004). Notably, conforming to the salient emotion profile enhances enactment of the current identity—a woman who is warm and caring is more “motherly” than one which is aggressive (Smith-Lovin 1990). Being warm enhances a woman’s match with the mother identity both because it is part of the prototypical mother identity (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2001) and because warm emotions may augment feelings of affiliation and care (Smith-Lovin 1990)—key goals for a mother. In this way, conforming to the salient emotion profile is a way in which emotions can be used instrumentally to enhance identity-consistency. Two separate research domains support the associations between identities and emotions and the existence of emotion profiles, whereby an active identity ordains what emotions can or cannot be expressed, and at what intensity (cf. “feeling rules” in Hochschild 1979).

There is evidence supporting identity-emotion associations from social psychology, as cross-cultural research has found differences in the perception (Matsumoto 1993), expression (Markus and Kitayama 1991) and desirability (Triandis 1989; Tsai 2007) of different discrete emotions based on cultural differences in the self-concept. These researchers have theorized and found evidence that the self-concepts associated with various cultures value distinctly different types of affect (Tsai 2007), and that these divergences seem to stem from a desire to conform to specific norms (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Cultural identification is not necessarily a social identity, though it may be so when individuals consider their membership in a national, ethnic, or religious group a component of their self-concept. Importantly, these research streams suggest that emotions are tied to the self, and that these associations create a motivation to conform to or preference for these cultural norms.

For instance, Tsai's work (2007; Tsai, Knutson, and Fung 2006) has demonstrated that individuals with interdependent self-concepts (emphasis on the self as a member of the community; East Asian cultures) tend to value emotional calm (low arousal positivity) as ideal. In contrast, independent participants' (emphasis on the self as an autonomous individual; Western cultures) ideal emotional state is one of elation and excitement—high arousal positivity. This research has emphasized that discrepancies between ideal and actual affect are correlated with depression and anxiety (Tsai et al. 2006), as well as lowered general life satisfaction (Suh et al. 1998). In consumer behavior, culturally-based emotion preferences have been connected to message persuasion (Aaker and Lee 2001; Aaker and Williams 1998).

Along with social psychology, organizational behavior and sociology have examined the ability to conform to the emotion norms of a job as a component of workplace success. Hochschild's seminal work (1983) led the way in understanding that emotion is often central to a worker's job, particularly in service industries (e.g., flight attendants, salespeople). This area of study has been termed "emotional labor," as appropriate emotion expression becomes a component of an individual's job description and execution. Within the emotion labor realm, emotion expression is explicitly seen as instrumental: conforming to an organization's emotion profile (known as a "feeling rule" in this literature) is essential to job execution. While occupations are not necessarily social identities—though they can be—they do involve constellations of attitudes, beliefs, and actions associated with the occupation. In this way, it may be reasonable to conclude that a parallel exists between the organizationally enforced feeling rules associated with different jobs and emotion profiles associated with specific identities.

Indeed, research in organizational behavior has begun to emphasize the role of "gender identities" in the enactment of emotional labor. For instance, when studying human resource

managers, Simpson and Stroh (2004) suggest that the female gender has an emotion profile promoting the suppression of negative affect and the enhancement of positive affect. In contrast, male emotion profiles suggest suppression of all affect, with the possible exception of negative affect. When individuals are forced to adopt an emotion profile that is inconsistent with their gender (e.g., a woman who must conform to male emotion profiles) a state called *emotional dissonance* results (Jansz and Timmers 2002). Emotional dissonance is similar to cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957) in that it is a feeling of psychological tension and discomfort, and has motivational characteristics, as the experience of negative tension impels an individual to reduce the discomfort. Because emotional dissonance results from experiencing an emotion that is in violation of an emotion profile, individuals will be motivated to either change the emotion profile or change the emotion. As emotion profiles are associated with identities, and presumably formed through learned norms (Hochschild 1983), changing the profile may be difficult. In contrast, individuals are quite familiar with and adept at changing their emotions: the psychological process known as emotion regulation, described above.

Insert Figure 1 about here

Summary. Emotion regulation provides a theoretical framework that outlines a variety of strategies consumers may use to select and manage their ongoing emotional experiences. Some emotion regulation strategies are forward-looking, where an individual chooses to enter a situation because it provides the opportunity to experience a desirable emotion. Other strategies

influence the current emotional state, allowing an individual to reduce unwanted emotions, or enhance desirable ones. Finally, some strategies simply mask the internal emotional state, providing the external appearance of another emotion—despite a different subjective experience. While all of these strategies provide tools for a consumer to select and alter their emotions, the emotion regulation literature has little to say about *when* a person may want to use these self-regulatory procedures.

The framework proposed in the present research suggests that an individual's identity activates a specific emotion profile: these profiles constrain the set of desirable emotions consistent with that identity. Research from cross-cultural psychology and organizational behavior suggests that emotion profiles are acquired through learned norms (Hochschild 1983), and that conforming to these profiles can enhance the enactment of key roles (Simpson and Strohm 2004). Thus, emotions can be used instrumentally, as inducing or amplifying emotions that conform to an identity's emotion profile enhances identity consistency. In contrast, if a person experiences an emotion that is inconsistent with the active emotion profile, emotional dissonance results—characterized by negative feelings of discomfort and tension (Jansz and Timmers 2002). This dissonant state motivates the individual to engage in emotion regulation processes to change or reduce the violating emotion, thereby diminishing emotional dissonance. In this way, identities provide a motivating force to engage in emotion regulation.

EMOTION PROFILES AND SOCIAL IDENTITY: STUDIES

In order to test the proposed framework, two pretests and four studies are described. Specifically, the following hypotheses are investigated: first, that there are associations between

specific social identities and discrete emotions. Once these emotion profiles have been identified, the current framework predicts that there will be differences in outcomes if an individual experiences an emotion which is consistent or inconsistent with their active identity's emotion profile. In particular, experiencing an emotion profile-consistent emotion will enhance outcomes, such as attitude toward an advertisement, effortful performance, and attitudes toward products which enhance emotion profile-consistency. When experiencing an emotion profile-inconsistent emotion, these outcomes will be diminished, leading to lowered persuasion, performance and product attitudes. Thus, the prediction is an interaction between social identity and emotion experience. In addition to the effect of emotion profiles on consumer outcomes, the theory also predicts that individuals will be motivated to engage in emotion regulation based on their identity's emotion profile. If an individual experiences an emotion profile-consistent emotion, he or she will try to up-regulate or enhance that emotion experience, and would have higher attitudes toward products positioned as enhancing that emotion. In contrast, if an individual experiences an emotion profile-inconsistent emotion, he or she would engage in down-regulation to try and reduce that emotional experience, and would thus have higher attitudes toward products positioned as reducing the emotion.

Over the course of two pretests and four studies, these hypotheses are tested. Pretest 1 uncovers the associations between specific social identities and discrete emotions, identifying a set of emotion profiles. Pretest 2 then looks at how individuals understand these emotion profiles, and whether emotion profile-consistency or inconsistency influences judgments of other people. Studies 1 and 2 look at the effect of emotion profiles on persuasion and effortful performance. Study 3 then measures the degree to which individuals engage in emotion regulation to reduce emotion profile-inconsistent emotions, or enhance emotion profile-

consistent ones. Finally, study 4 examines the effect of emotion profiles on preferences for products that are positioned as enhancing or reducing emotions. Throughout these empirical tests, the prediction is an interaction between the active social identity and the emotion experience: when individuals experience an emotion which is consistent with the active identity's emotion profile outcomes will be enhanced, but if they experience emotions which are inconsistent with the active emotion profile outcomes will be reduced. Ultimately, this work addresses whether emotions are implicated within the self-concept and how that influences consumer outcomes.

Pretest 1: Associations Between Specific Emotions and Social Identities

In order to discern whether individuals believe that specific emotions are associated with certain social identities, a pretest was run. In this pretest, participants were asked to assess the usefulness of a specific emotion for a set of social identities. Usefulness was chosen as the construct of interest, as it captures the essence of emotions being used instrumentally—in the service of other goals (Tamir 2005). Eighty-seven undergraduates participated in the pretest, which was part of an hour-long behavioral lab session, along with other studies. For their participation, individuals were paid \$10.

In the pretest, participants were randomly assigned to a condition, where they were presented with one specific emotion from a set of fourteen emotions (anger, disgust, fear, guilt, happiness, pride, sadness, boredom, challenge, disappointment, fascination, hope, relaxation and worry). They were asked to rate the usefulness of their assigned emotion for ten different identities (athlete, student, artist, volunteer, party host, business person, environmentalist,

romantic partner, politician, and friend) on a scale from 1 = not at all helpful to 7 = extremely helpful.

Insert Table 1 about here

The purpose of the pretest was to establish that individuals see connections between an identity and specific emotions, as well as discover the emotional profile associated with a variety of identities relevant to our student participants. In all, fourteen emotions were evaluated with regards to ten distinct social identities. While some emotions were undifferentiated across identities (e.g., happiness was useful for all identities), many were seen as benefitting one identity more than others. For instance, anger was seen as quite useful for an athlete ($M_{athlete} = 5.25$), but not so for other identities ($M_{all\ others} = 2.52$, all $p < .05$). Indeed, anger was not rated above the midpoint of the usefulness scale for any other identity. Similarly, sadness appears to be associated with the artist ($M = 5.09$) and volunteer ($M = 3.81$) identities, but not with any others ($M = 2.49$) all $p < .05$. This data supports the contention that social identities include more than behaviors, cognitions, and beliefs, but implicate specific emotional states as well.

The pretest data provides two important pieces of evidence. First, it represents preliminary support for the current theory, in that some specific emotions are seen as particularly useful for certain social identities but not others. While the data do not state why these associations exist, or how they come to be learned, many of the associations follow from emotion theory. For instance, anger may be useful for athletes because its external locus of control (Frijda 1986) focuses attention on the obstacles impeding goal pursuit, and thus may

inspire competition and motivation to overcome barriers to progress. In contrast, sadness may be useful for volunteers because it involves a sense of loss and the motivation to change circumstances (Frijda 1986)—indeed, recent work has shown that the expression of sadness on victims' faces in charity advertisements promotes sympathy and helping behavior (Small and Verrochi 2009). Interestingly, some of the emotions were undifferentiated across identities: happiness was seen as useful for all identities, while boredom and relaxation were seen as relatively useless. It is noteworthy that these three emotions (happiness, boredom and relaxation) all lack specific action tendencies (Frijda 1986) and are characterized by more diffuse affective states. Their lack of identity-specific associations may be due to these characteristics, or the restricted set of identities provided to participants. At the very least, however, these results provide a set of emotion profiles that can be leveraged to test the theory described here.

Specifically, the pretest data afford two emotion profiles that are of particular interest: athlete-anger, volunteer-sadness. These social identities had strong associations to each of these emotions and, importantly, had contrasting profiles. In other words, anger was seen as useful for the athlete, but not so for volunteers, while sadness is useful for volunteers but not for athletes. These contrasting profiles allow a more parsimonious test of the theory, as individuals with a salient athlete (volunteer) identity should prefer to experience anger (sadness), and should regulate their emotions to avoid sadness (anger). Pretest one thus provides a useful starting point for understanding the associations between emotions and social identities. However, the design of this pretest focused solely on the usefulness of these emotions toward specific identities—no other assessments were made. So while anger may be useful for athletes, it is unclear whether angry athletes are perceived well or poorly. Specifically, is there more to the association besides just usefulness? Pretest two attempts to assess (for the athlete-anger and volunteer-sadness

profiles) whether other concepts are influenced by the emotion profile, or whether usefulness alone captures these associations.

Pretest 2: Meaning Behind Emotion Profiles

In order to further understand the concepts implicated in the emotion profiles identified in pretest one, a second pretest was run. In this pretest, participants read a vignette about an unknown individual and were then asked to judge that person and his behavior along a variety of dimensions, including: appropriateness, authenticity, performance, and likeability. These measures were meant to capture the types of person-judgments that might be influenced by emotion profiles: how correct is that person's behavior (appropriateness), how deeply held is his identity (authenticity), how likeable is he, and how good is his performance. All of these characteristics are social judgments that may be used in forming an impression of another individual—will they be influenced by emotion profile-consistency? One hundred eight individuals participated in the pretest, which was part of an hour-long behavioral lab session, along with other studies. For their participation, individuals were paid \$10.

The pretest used a 2 (identity: athlete, volunteer) by 2 (emotion: anger, sadness) between-subjects design. Participants read one of four vignettes:

Athlete: Andy and his teammates are getting ready for a big game against their rival school. Just before they go out onto the field, their coach gives a speech to prepare them for the game. When the coach finishes his talk, they all feel *angry (sad)* as they take the field.

Volunteer: Two days a week Sam volunteers at a local soup kitchen. On his way to the charity, he always listens to a CD which makes him feel *sad (angry)*. That CD is the soundtrack to his volunteer work.

After reading the vignette, participants were asked to rate Andy (Sam) on a variety of dimensions: appropriateness (single-item), authenticity (five items), performance (single-item), and likeability (three items). After completing the measures, participants were thanked, debriefed, paid and dismissed.

Results. Participants were first asked to rate how *appropriate* Andy (Sam)'s behavior was on a sliding scale from 0=extremely inappropriate to 100=extremely appropriate. These ratings were subjected to a two-way ANOVA with identity (athlete, volunteer) and emotion (anger, sadness) as predictors. There were no significant main effects of either identity or emotion. However, there was a significant interaction between emotion and identity, ($F(1, 104) = 12.201, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .105$). Follow-up contrasts showed that participants who evaluated Andy the athlete thought his behavior was more appropriate when he was angry than when he was sad (56.719 vs. 39.333), ($F(1, 104) = 5.402, p < .05$). Participants who evaluated Sam the volunteer, on the other hand, thought his behavior was more appropriate when he was sad than angry (50.957 vs. 30.759), ($F(1, 104) = 6.820, p < .01$).

After providing the appropriateness ratings, participants were asked to evaluate the person's behavior on a five-item scale meant to assess how *authentic* Andy's (Sam's) behavior was. Participants indicated their agreement with a 1=disagree completely to 9=agree completely scale, where the prompts asked: Andy's behavior is characteristic of an athlete, Andy is an authentic athlete, Andy genuinely cares about being an athlete, Andy is good at being an athlete, Andy is a model athlete. For Sam, the questions reflected the volunteer vignette. Factor analysis revealed that these five items all loaded onto one factor, thus an authenticity index was created by averaging all items ($\alpha = .793$). This authenticity index was subjected to a two-way ANOVA

with identity (athlete, volunteer) and emotion (anger, sadness) as predictors. There was a significant main effect of identity, ($F(1, 104) = 10.328, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .09$), where the athlete ($M = 4.813$) was seen as more authentic than the volunteer ($M = 3.996$). This main effect is qualified by a significant interaction between emotion and identity, ($F(1, 104) = 38.098, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .268$). Follow-up contrasts showed that participants who evaluated Andy the athlete thought his behavior was more authentic when he was angry than when he was sad (5.667 vs. 3.958), ($F(1, 104) = 23.381, p < .001$). Participants who evaluated Sam the volunteer, on the other hand, thought his behavior was more authentic when he was sad than angry (4.710 vs. 3.282), ($F(1, 104) = 15.291, p < .001$).

After providing the authenticity ratings, participants were asked to evaluate whether Andy (Sam) would *perform well*, along a 9-point scale. This question was meant to replicate the results from the first pretest. The performance question was subjected to a two-way ANOVA with identity (athlete, volunteer) and emotion (anger, sadness) as predictors. There was a significant main effect of emotion, ($F(1, 104) = 6.236, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .057$), where the athlete ($M = 4.89$) was seen as performing better, in general, than the volunteer ($M = 4.10$). This main effect is qualified by a significant interaction between emotion and identity, ($F(1, 104) = 64.825, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .384$). Follow-up contrasts showed that participants who evaluated Andy the athlete thought he would perform better when he was angry than when he was sad (6.66 vs. 2.54), ($F(1, 104) = 57.561, p < .001$). Participants who evaluated Sam the volunteer, on the other hand, thought would perform better when he was sad ($M = 5.30$) than angry (5.30 vs. 3.14), ($F(1, 104) = 14.925, p < .001$).

Finally, participants were asked to indicate how *likeable* Andy (Sam) was on three items, which were 9-point scales anchored by: bad/good, unfavorable/favorable, and dislike/like. Factor

analysis showed that all three items loaded onto one factor, so the scores were averaged to create a likeability scale ($\alpha = .839$). Andy's (Sam's) likeability was subjected to a two-way ANOVA with identity (athlete, volunteer) and emotion (anger, sadness) as predictors. There was a significant main effect of identity, ($F(1, 104) = 11.460, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .099$), where the athlete ($M = 4.650$) was liked more, in general, than the volunteer ($M = 3.769$). This main effect is qualified by a significant interaction between emotion and identity, ($F(1, 104) = 36.106, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .258$). Follow-up contrasts showed that participants who evaluated Andy the athlete liked him better when he was angry than when he was sad (5.271 vs. 4.028), ($F(1, 104) = 11.817, p < .001$). Participants who evaluated Sam the volunteer, on the other hand, preferred him when he was sad than angry (4.710 vs. 2.828), ($F(1, 104) = 25.349, p < .001$).

Insert Table 2 about here

Discussion. The first pretest assessed whether participants believed that certain emotions are *useful* to specific social identities, and found that there are indeed associations between identities and emotions: revealing emotion profiles for each identity. Building upon the findings from the first pretest, the second attempted to understand what the identity-emotion association means. In this pretest, two identities were used (athlete and volunteer) along with two emotions (anger and sadness). Across a variety of judgments, participants evaluated the individual who expressed an identity-consistent emotion (e.g. athlete-anger, volunteer-sadness) as better than the individual expressing an identity-inconsistent emotion. Specifically, angry athletes and sad volunteers were seen as more likable, more authentic, more appropriate, and performing better

than sad athletes or angry volunteers. These results provide further support for the existence of identity-specific emotion profiles, and suggest that experiencing identity-consistent emotions has implications for a variety of social judgments.

While the first two pretests present evidence for associations between identities and emotions, and suggest that these emotion profiles influence judgments, neither pretest examined actual emotion experience. Therefore, the studies which follow assess the influence of identity-specific emotions (emotion profiles) on consumer outcomes. Study one assesses the impact of emotion profiles on persuasion, study two examines performance differences, study three investigates emotion regulation, based on emotion profile-consistency and inconsistency, and study four connects the theory to consumer preferences.

Study 1: Emotion Profiles and Persuasion

The first pretest suggested that there are connections between specific emotions and individual social identities, while the second demonstrated that these emotion profiles impact judgments of other individuals. In particular, in the second pretest, individuals who expressed an emotion profile-consistent emotion were judged as acting more appropriately and more effectively. The first study thus builds on these results, investigating whether emotional advertisements that are consistent with an identity's emotion profile will be more effective than ads which are inconsistent with that profile.

This study builds upon research within consumer behavior that looks at the impact of specific emotions on advertising effectiveness (e.g., Edell and Burke 1987). Recent work on emotions and persuasion has emphasized that compatibility between the persuasion target and

the specific emotion enhances persuasion (Agrawal, Menon, and Aaker 2007). For instance, Agrawal and colleagues (2007) looked at whether an advertisement was self- or other-focused (e.g., about “me” or about “my family”), and how discrete emotions with self- or other-focused appraisal dimensions influenced the match between the target and persuasion. The authors found that indeed, advertisements which were self-focused and contained a self-focused emotion (e.g., pride) enhanced the relevance and importance of the advertisement, versus ads which were self-focused but contained an other-focused emotion (e.g., empathy). Following this theory of enhanced compatibility, study 1 seeks to test whether advertisements which match the emotion profile of the active identity are seen as more persuasive.

The study used a 3 (identity: athlete, volunteer, control) by 2 (emotion: anger, sadness) between subjects design. The prediction is that participants primed with an athlete identity will have more positive attitudes and higher behavioral intentions towards an angry advertisement, but participants primed with a volunteer identity should have higher attitudes when presented with a sad advertisement. The control participants should not differ in their responses to the two advertisements.

Participants and Procedure. Eighty-three participants completed this study, where the average age was 20 years (age range 19-32), and 52% of the participants were female. Individuals were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions (athlete-anger, athlete-sadness, volunteer-anger, volunteer-sadness, control-anger, control-sadness). Participants were paid \$10 for their involvement in an hour-long lab session, in which this study was one of multiple experiments.

Participants first engaged in a “writing task” which included the identity prime. They were instructed to write about a time when they performed as an athlete (volunteer), and were asked to describe it in such detail that someone reading the story would experience it as if it were happening to them. This type of writing task is common in the social identity and consumer behavior literatures (e.g., Reed 2004), and has been shown to reliably increase the salience of the target identity. Individuals in the control conditions were simply asked to write about their day yesterday.

Immediately following the writing task, participants were then presented with an ostensibly unrelated “advertising evaluation” study. In this study, participants were told that they would be reading a print advertisement, and then evaluating it on a variety of dimensions. The ad (see figure 2) was promoting STD testing, a relevant topic for undergraduate lab participants. To manipulate the emotion of the advertisement, two copy changes were made. In the angry ad, the headline read “How could you do this to me!” and in the sad ad, it read “How could you do this to me?” In addition to the headline, the picture in the angry ad was of a woman expressing anger, while the sad ad was the same woman expressing sadness. The pictures were taken from a validated set of facial expressions (Beaupré and Hess 2005).

Insert Figure 2 about here

After viewing the advertisement, participants were then asked to evaluate the ad on a set of scales: attitude toward the advertisement, relevance, and behavioral intentions. Once they had completed these measures, participants were debriefed, thanked, paid and dismissed.

Results. Participants were first asked to rate their attitude toward the advertisement on a 10 item scale (good, pleasant, nice, irritating, interesting, annoying, positive, favorable, believable, effective: Williams and Drolet 2005). Each item was a 100-point sliding scale from 1= not at all to 100= extremely. The ten items were subjected to a factor analysis, and one factor emerged, thus the items were averaged to create one index of aAd ($\alpha = .82$). A two-way ANOVA was then run on the aAd ratings, with identity and emotion as predictors. A significant main effect of identity emerged ($F(2, 77) = 6.631, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .147$), such that the ratings from the volunteer participants were significantly lower ($M = 30.96$) than either the athlete ($M = 44.91$) or control conditions ($M = 40.66$), both $p < .05$. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between emotion and identity ($F(2, 77) = 8.895, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .188$). As predicted, for those participants with an active athlete identity, attitude toward the advertisement was higher when the ad was angry than when it was sad (51.89 vs. 37.94), ($F(1, 77) = 7.974, p < .01$). In contrast, participants with an active volunteer identity rated the sad advertisement as higher than the angry ad (40.17 vs. 23.71), ($F(1, 77) = 9.757, p < .01$). In the control condition, there was no difference between the angry ($M = 41.29$) and the sad advertisements ($M = 40.03$), $p > .75$, supporting the hypothesized effect of emotion profile-consistency on advertising effectiveness.

In addition to attitude toward the advertisement, participants also completed a two-item 7-point measure of ad relevance (meaningful, relevant: Williams and Drolet 2005). These two items loaded onto one factor, and were averaged to create a relevance index. This measure was subjected to a two-way ANOVA with emotion and identity as predictors. There were no significant main effects of either identity or emotion, but the hypothesized interaction emerged:

($F(2, 77) = 4.063, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .095$). Follow-up contrasts showed that for participants with an active volunteer identity, the sad advertisement was seen as significantly more relevant than the angry advertisement (3.14 vs. 1.86), ($F(1, 77) = 4.149, p < .05$). In the athlete condition, the angry advertisement was marginally more relevant than the sad advertisement (3.79 vs. 2.68), ($F(1, 77) = 3.531, p = .064$). Again, in the control condition there was no difference between the angry ($M = 3.53$) and sad advertisements ($M = 3.07$), $p > .40$.

Finally, participants were also asked to indicate the likelihood that seeing this ad would change their behavior (1= not at all likely, 7= extremely likely). This single-item measure of behavioral intentions was subjected to a two-way ANOVA with emotion and identity as predictors. There were no significant main effects of either emotion or identity. However, a significant interaction between emotion and identity emerged ($F(2, 77) = 4.021, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .095$). As with both aAd and relevance, participants with an active volunteer identity indicated a greater likelihood to change their behavior after viewing a sad advertisement than after viewing an angry ad (3.91 vs. 1.86), ($F(1, 77) = 5.628, p < .05$). Those participants with an active athlete identity were marginally more likely to change their behavior after viewing an angry ad than after a sad ad (4.21 vs. 2.93), ($F(1, 77) = 2.511, p = .11$). Again, in the control condition there were no differences between angry ($M = 3.40$) and sad ($M = 3.33$) advertisements, $p > .90$.

Insert Table 3 about here

Discussion. Study 1 finds support for the hypothesized influence of emotion profiles on persuasion. As predicted, participants with an active athlete identity showed more favorable

attitudes, higher relevance, and increased likelihood of behavior change when they were presented with the advertisement that was angry: consistent with the athlete identity's emotion profile. In contrast, participants with an active volunteer identity showed more favorable outcomes (aAd, relevance, and behavioral intentions) when presented with a sad advertisement, which is consistent with the volunteer emotion profile. Control participants were equally affected by the angry and sad advertisements. Taken together, the ads which were consistent with the active identity's emotional profile had more persuasive impact than those ads which were inconsistent with the active profile.

Interestingly, this study demonstrates an effect of identity salience on advertisements which contained no reference to the active identity. Traditional research on identity in consumer behavior demonstrates identity-consistency effects for brands, products and advertisements which overtly match the active identity (e.g., "Olympic athletes use Brand X!"). In the case of study 1, the advertisements made no mention of either athlete or volunteer identities, but rather capitalized on the current framework: when an identity is active so too is its emotion profile. By incorporating an emotion which is consistent with the emotion profile, identity relevance was achieved, and greater persuasion resulted.

While study 1 demonstrates the effect of emotion profiles on persuasion, it did not capture the functionality of these emotion profiles, where the emotion is seen as particularly *useful* for the active identity. Returning to the idea that emotions can be used instrumentally, assisting the pursuit of other goals, the next study examines whether experiencing an emotion profile-consistent emotion will enhance performance on an effortful task.

Study 2: Emotion Profiles and Instrumental Performance

Given the evidence that social identities incorporate emotions, the question remains whether experiencing a emotion profile-consistent emotion will enhance performance, as suggested in the organizational behavior literature (Simpson and Stroh 2004; Tamir 2005). To assess performance, participants engaged in a real-effort task: clicking a mouse button for three minutes. This task has been used in prior literature (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009) to measure the amount of effort an individual is motivated to exert. As described above, experiencing emotion profile-consistent emotions enhances an individual's motivation both by increasing his alignment with the salient identity and by freeing up resources that would otherwise be devoted to regulating inconsistent emotions. Thus, the prediction is that participants will exert more effort (click more) when they experience emotion profile-consistent emotions.

The study used a 3 (identity: athlete, volunteer, control) by 2 (emotion: anger, sadness) between subjects design. According to the theory, participants primed with an athlete identity will exert more effort when they experience anger, while participants primed with volunteer identity will exert more effort when they experience sadness. Therefore, the prediction is an interaction between identity and emotion condition.

Participants and Procedure. Ninety-eight individuals participated in this study, where the average age was 21 years (age range 18-31) and 51% were female. Study participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions (athlete-anger, athlete-sadness, volunteer-anger, volunteer-sadness, control-anger, control-sadness). Participants were paid \$10 for their involvement in a one-hour lab session containing multiple studies, of which this was one.

As in study one, participants first completed a “writing task” where they wrote about a time that they performed as an athlete (volunteer) (Reed 2004). Again, those participants in the control condition simply wrote about their day yesterday.

After writing about the focal identity, participants proceeded to the ostensibly unrelated second task. In the “doing work” task, participants were told that they would be clicking a button for three minutes. While they performed that task, they would be listening to music. The music was one of two soundtracks, which had been pretested to reliably elicit either anger or sadness. The two soundtracks were pretested by 47 participants and rated for the emotions that they made the listener experience (7-point scale, 1=not at all to 7=extremely). The angry soundtrack was rated as more angry ($M = 4.83$) than the sad songs ($M = 2.61$), $p < .01$, and the sad soundtrack was seen as sadder ($M = 3.86$) than the angry songs ($M = 2.37$), $p < .01$. The two sets of songs were equally unfamiliar to participants (0-100 scale: $M_{angry} = 8.79$, $M_{sad} = 2.37$), $p > .40$.

Thus, the music that played during the click task represents the emotion induction. After completing the clicking task, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.

Results. A two-way ANOVA with identity and emotion conditions as predictors tested the click data. There was a significant main effect of emotion, ($F(1, 92) = 4.132$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .043$), whereby participants who listened to angry songs clicked more ($M = 983.35$) than individuals who heard sad songs ($M = 906.92$). However this main effect is qualified by a significant interaction between emotion and identity, ($F(2, 92) = 8.052$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .149$). Follow-up contrasts showed that participants with a salient athlete identity exerted more effort when they heard the angry soundtrack than the sad soundtrack (1013.47 vs. 864.81), ($F(1, 92) = 5.315$, $p < .05$). In contrast, those with an active volunteer identity exerted greater effort when

listening to the sad soundtrack than the angry one (1002.06 vs. 864.77), ($F(1, 92) = 4.051, p < .05$). In the control condition, participants exerted more effort when listening to angry songs than sad songs (1071.82 vs. 853.83), ($F(1, 92) = 12.123, p < .01$). The difference between the athlete and control conditions, when listening to the angry music, was not significant, $p > .3$.

Insert Figure 3 about here

Discussion. Study two finds preliminary support for the proposed link between social identity, emotion and performance. As expected, participants with an active athlete identity exerted more effort while listening to angry music than did those participants with an active volunteer identity. In contrast, individuals with salient volunteer identities performed better while listening to sad music than those with athlete identities. In the control condition, performance was greater in the angry condition than the sad condition—as it was for participants with an active athlete identity. In the volunteer condition there appears to be increases in performance when experiencing an emotion profile-consistent emotion, as the volunteers exerted more effort in the sad condition than both the athletes or control participants (both $p < .05$). However, there does not appear to be the same type of increased performance above control for athletes experiencing anger. One possible reason for the lack of an increase is that participants may have been reaching a ceiling on performance: in the athlete-anger, control-anger and volunteer-sad conditions participants were clicking over 1,000 times in 3 minutes—more than 5 times a second.

In order to assess whether a physical limit was indeed being reached, an additional condition was run at a later date. In this version, participants were given a monetary incentive to click as much as physically possible: for every click they would be paid \$0.01, in addition to their standard \$10 participation payment (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009). While clicking, participants again heard either a sad or angry soundtrack to control for any emotion effects.

Thirty-five participants completed the click task with monetary incentives. When these participants' data are included in the two-way ANOVA, the main effect of identity is reduced to non-significance. However, the interaction between identity and emotion remains significant ($F(3, 125) = 7.593, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .154$). Follow-up contrasts show that within the anger condition, there are no significant differences between the effort exerted by athletes ($M = 1013.47$), controls ($M = 1071.82$), and monetary incentives ($M = 980.99$), all $p > .2$. In the sad condition, there is no difference between the effort exerted by volunteers ($M = 1002.06$) and participants paid by the click ($M = 1068.88$), $p > .25$. These results suggest that in the emotion profile-consistent conditions participants are reaching a physical limit, which may explain why there are no differences between the athlete and control conditions. While the design of study two unfortunately contained a physical constraint, it still supports the connection between identities and specific emotions, and demonstrates that experiencing emotion profile-consistent emotions aids performance on instrumental tasks.

Although study two provides evidence that emotion profiles have implications for actual behavior, it leaves two research questions still unanswered. First, it does not address whether individuals would attempt to use emotion regulation to change their emotions to achieve consistency with the identity's emotion profile. In both study one and two, participants were put into an emotion condition, and then behavior was observed. They had no opportunity to try and

manage their emotions; for instance, if a person with an active athlete identity was in the sad music condition, he or she simply had no choice but to listen to the music. Study three thus employs a paradigm that both allows participants to modulate their emotional responses and measures the degree of emotion regulation a participant is employing when presented with emotional stimuli. Secondly, studies one and two do not investigate the impact of emotion profile-consistency on consumer decisions, such as product attitude. Study four will therefore provide participants with an emotion regulating product, and assess preference and willingness to pay.

Study 3: Emotion Regulation and Emotion Profile-Inconsistency

The third study is designed to demonstrate that individuals engage in emotion down-regulation when they are presented with stimuli that would violate the identity's emotion profile, but that when an individual encounters consistent emotional stimuli, emotion regulation is used to enhance or maintain the emotion. In order to assess these differences in emotion regulation, a novel paradigm is developed, which measures whether an individual is using attention deployment upon presentation of a target stimulus. Specifically, the task that participants engage in permits measurement of attention—thus, if attention shifts away from the target when the emotional stimulus is inconsistent with the emotion profile, it is evidence of emotion down-regulation, supporting the proposed theory.

The study has three parts: identity activation, attention task, and follow-up measures. The study began by informing participants that they would be completing two tasks, a writing task and then a perceptual task. The overt purpose of the study was to assess whether individuals

could remember the details of their essays after engaging in a mentally demanding task. In fact, the writing task was the identity activation prime and the “perceptual” task is the emotion regulation measurement portion.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two identity conditions: athlete or volunteer. As in study 1 and 2, they were instructed to write about a time that they performed as an athlete (volunteer) (Reed 2004).

Once participants had completed the identity activation task, they progressed to the attention task. Instructions told participants that their goal during this task was to quickly and accurately identify whether the letter T was right-side up or up-side down. The task is difficult as the letter is small (3/4 inch tall), presented briefly (115 milliseconds), and at a low contrast (80% black letter presented on a 40% black background). Thus, for participants to correctly identify the letter’s orientation, they must be directing their attention to the letter’s location. The computer recorded the participants’ responses (accuracy), which can be used to assess how much attention they are devoting to the target location. Therefore, participants’ ongoing responses to the letter are the key dependent variable, as they capture the degree of attention an individual is directing to the stimulus presentation. Systematic decreases in the accuracy data would indicate that participants are shifting attention away from the target’s location.

In order to create situations where participants may shift their attention in order to control their emotional experience, participants were informed that during the task, they would see some photographs. All pictures were taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS: Lang, Bradley, and Cuthbert 2005) and have been validated for their ability to induce emotions. Two types of pictures were presented to participants: positive pictures (e.g., flowers, bunnies) and sad pictures (e.g., crying child, funeral procession). Thus, the pictures provide emotional

stimuli—which may prompt participants to shift their attention away from the target location to reduce unwanted emotions.

In addition to the pictures, participants were warned before a picture appeared: a red light would tell them that the upcoming picture was likely to be unpleasant; a green light suggests that the upcoming picture will be pleasant, while a yellow light says it could be either pleasant or unpleasant. These warning lights are meant to provide participants with the opportunity to prepare for the upcoming picture. Thus, if participants do not want to experience the unpleasant (sad) emotions, they may strategically shift attention away from the target location when they see a red light, as they anticipate an undesirable emotional event.

Insert Figure 4 about here

An important component of this design, however, is that the “unpleasant” pictures were all sad photographs: consistent with the volunteer identity’s emotion profile but inconsistent with that of the athlete identity (see figure 4). This means that there should be an interaction between the identity prime and both the warning lights and the pictures. For athlete identities, sad emotions violate the active emotion profile, and these participants should engage in emotion regulation: avoiding the sad pictures. Participants with an active athlete identity should thus shift attention away from the target both when they expect an unpleasant picture (red light) and when they actually see a sad photograph. These attention shifts will be manifested as lowered accuracy following red lights and sad pictures, relative to green or yellow lights and positive pictures. In

contrast, for participants whose volunteer identity is active attention should *not* shift away from sad pictures, and thus accuracy should remain high for Ts following red lights and sad pictures.

Taken together, the study is a mixed design with one between-subjects factor 2 (identity: athlete, volunteer) and two within-subjects factors: 3 (warning: red, green, yellow) x 2 (picture: positive, sad). The prediction is a three-way interaction, such that those participants with an active athlete identity will shift attention away from red lights and sad pictures, while participants with active volunteer identities will not show a drop in accuracy following red lights and sad pictures. Accuracy will not differ amongst identities for positive pictures, or for green and yellow lights.

Participants and Procedure. Study three had 52 participants who are students and staff at a large northeastern university, with an average age of 22 years (age range 18-63), and 55% were females. Participants were paid \$10 for their participation in an hour of studies, of which this was one.

Participants completed a total of 16 trials within the attention task, where one trial consisted of a set of T identifications, a warning (red, yellow or green circle), more T identifications, a picture (positive or sad) and a final set of T identifications. Once participants finished the 16 trials, they were asked some follow-up questions, debriefed, thanked and paid.

Results. A three-way mixed repeated measure ANOVA was run on the accuracy of identifying the T that immediately followed the picture. Because this is a repeated measures test, a test for sphericity must be run in order to assess whether the variances across the repeated measures factor are equivalent. If sphericity is violated, the conclusions from a repeated measure

ANOVA can be invalidated. Mauchly's sphericity test (1940) was run and the test was not significant $\chi^2(2) = .195, p > .90$: sphericity was not violated, thus uncorrected degrees of freedom will be reported.

A main effect of identity was significant ($F(1, 50) = 5.676, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .102$), such that participants with an active volunteer identity were more accurate ($M = 86.3\%$) than those with an active athlete identity ($M = 74.3\%$). No other main effects were significant. This main effect is qualified by a significant interaction between identity and the warning, ($F(2, 100) = 3.278, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .062$). As predicted, follow-up contrasts show that following a red light participants with active athlete identities performed significantly worse than those with active volunteer identities (64.6% vs. 88.9%), ($F(1, 50) = 8.579, p < .01$). Performance was not significantly different for the two identity conditions following either the green or yellow lights, both $p > .30$.

Insert Figure 5 about here

In addition to the significant interaction between identity and warning, there was also a marginally significant interaction between identity and picture type ($F(1, 50) = 3.633, p = .062, \eta_p^2 = .068$). Follow-up contrasts show that upon seeing a sad picture, participants with active athlete identities performed significantly worse than those with active volunteer identities (70.9% vs. 89.1%), ($F(1, 50) = 9.333, p < .01$). There were no significant differences between the two identities when they saw a positive picture, $p > .30$.

These two two-way interactions are qualified by the predicted three-way interaction between identity, warning, and picture type ($F(2, 100) = 2.960, p = .056, \eta_p^2 = .056$). Follow-up

contrasts show that within the athlete identity condition, when participants saw a positive picture that had been preceded by a red light, performance declined ($M = 66.7\%$) compared to positive pictures preceded by green lights ($M = 84.8\%$), ($F(2, 49) = 3.407, p < .05$), and marginally so compared to yellow lights ($M = 81.8\%$), ($F(2, 49) = 2.671, p = .079$). For athlete identities, performance was not significantly different between the green and yellow lights preceding positive pictures, $p > .60$. Similarly, when participants with active athlete identities saw a sad picture which had been preceded by a red light, performance declined ($M = 62.5\%$) relative to sad pictures preceded by either green ($M = 75.7\%$) or yellow ($M = 74.2\%$) lights, ($F(2, 49) = 3.315, p < .05$). These results suggest that participants with active athlete identities realized that a red light signaled an upcoming sad emotional event (inconsistent with the athlete's emotion profile), and thus shifted attention away from the target location, decreasing their accuracy. Evidence for this strategic attention shift was found even when participants actually saw a positive picture.

In contrast to the results for the athlete identity condition, participants with active volunteer identities had a markedly different pattern of data. On trials where these participants saw a positive picture that had been preceded by a red light, performance *increased* relative to pictures which had been preceded by a green light (94.7% vs. 76.8%), ($F(2, 49) = 4.175, p < .05$). There were no significant differences between the red and yellow lights or yellow and green, both $p > .15$. When participants with an active volunteer identity saw a negative picture, however, there were no significant differences between the three types of lights, all $p > .20$. These results suggest that, unlike participants with active athlete identities, those with salient volunteer identities did not see the red lights and sad pictures as emotional events to be avoided. Because sadness *is consistent with* a volunteer's emotion profile, there was no need for

individuals in the volunteer identity condition to shift their attention away from the target location—emotion regulation was unnecessary, and unused, as evidenced by the accuracy results.

Discussion. Study three finds support for the proposition that individuals engage in emotion regulation to enhance emotions that are consistent with the active identity's emotion profile or to decrease emotions that are inconsistent with the emotion profile. Participants who had an active volunteer identity did not shift attention away from the sad pictures, implying that these participants were directing their attention onto the picture in order to maintain or enhance their experience of sadness. In contrast, participants with an active athlete identity showed significant performance decrements following sad pictures and red lights, as they shifted their attention away from these stimuli in order to reduce the inconsistent feelings of sadness. Not only does this study support the theory that emotion regulation is employed to enhance emotion profile consistency, but it shows that individuals can strategically regulate their emotions in service of identity consistency goals. This emotion regulation was *strategic* because the warnings had an effect on participants' attention shifts: they formed an expectation of the upcoming picture (consistent or inconsistent with emotion profile) and shifted their attention accordingly. The largest drops in accuracy—the largest attempts to reduce emotional experience—were observed in participants with active athlete identities, who saw a sad picture, after a red warning. That red warning prepared athlete participants for the sad picture, and they allocated their attention accordingly: in a strategic manner to support the athlete emotion profile.

By utilizing a novel paradigm that measures emotion regulation, study three demonstrates that the emotion profile associated with an active identity can dictate the strategic use of emotion

regulation. Participants actively managed their emotional state in order to conform to the identity's emotion profile. This highlights a unique contribution of the current theory: emotion regulation can be used strategically to enhance identity consistency.

While study three provides further support for the proposed theory, it has not connected these processes to consumer decision making. Thus, study four employs an experimental design demonstrating that the motivation to be consistent with salient emotion profiles can be leveraged in product positioning, enhancing the identity-relevance of products and thereby increasing brand attitude.

Study 4: Emotion Regulation and Product Evaluations

The final study is designed to show that products which are positioned as enhancing emotion profile consistency will be preferred. Study four has a 3 (identity: athlete, volunteer, control) x 2 (emotion: anger, sadness) x 2 (product positioning: enhance, reduce emotions) between-subjects design, where the emotion is induced incidentally, and a product is positioned as either increasing or decreasing emotions within an advertisement (Williams and Drolet 2005).

The proposed theory predicts that the athletes will prefer the products that reduce emotion if they are experiencing sadness, but not anger, and volunteers will prefer that which decreases anger, but not sadness. Other theories, such as mood repair (Labroo and Mukhopadhyay 2009) and emotion regulation (Gross 1998), would predict that preferences for the emotion regulating product should not differ based on either the salient identity or the specific emotion: all participants are in negative states, thus all should want to decrease their emotions. This unique prediction highlights the core contribution of the current work,

emphasizing consistency with identity-specific emotion profiles as a driver of emotion regulation.

This study also demonstrates that products can be framed as emotion regulators (Williams and Drolet 2005), and that consumers prefer those products that regulate emotions in an identity-consistent manner. Importantly, this study reveals that the benefits of identity targeted advertisements and products (Reed 2004) can be attained without ever mentioning the identity. By simply capitalizing upon the emotion profile associated with the specific identity, product preferences can be altered.

Participants and Procedure. Two hundred twenty-four individuals participated in this study, where the average age was 24 years (age range 18-59) and 59% were female. Participants were paid \$10 for their involvement in a one-hour lab session containing multiple studies, of which this was one.

Participants were told that they would be participating in two unrelated studies: a writing task, and a “divided attention” study. The procedure is as follows: first, participants were primed with either the athlete, volunteer, or neutral identity, as in studies 1-3. Next, participants were told that they would be participating in a “divided attention” study, where they would be asked to do two things simultaneously. This study contained both the emotion manipulation and the product evaluation.

To induce the target emotion in participants, a facial and bodily feedback procedure was used. Following the procedure described by Flack and colleagues (Flack, Laird, and Cavallaro 1999), participants were instructed to position their face and body into specific orientations that correspond to either anger or sadness. These types of expressive emotion manipulations have

been shown to not only induce mild to moderate levels of emotion, but also are specific to the target emotion (e.g., anger position induces anger only, not general negativity: Duclos et al.

1989). Participants received the following instructions, taken from Flack and colleagues' (1999) validated manipulations:

Anger: Push your eyebrows together and down. Clench your teeth tightly and press your lips together. Put your feet flat on the floor directly below your knees, and put your forearms and elbows on the table. Now clench your fists tightly, and lean your upper body slightly forward.

Sadness: Lower your eyebrows down toward your cheeks. With your mouth closed, push up lightly with your upper lip. Sit back in your chair, resting your back against the back of the chair, and draw your feet loosely under your chair. You should feel no tension in your legs or feet. Drop your head, letting your rib cage fall, and letting the rest of your body go limp. You should feel just a slight tension up the back of your neck and across your shoulder blades.

Participants were given 15 seconds to arrange their body in the correct position, and were asked to maintain the position until told to stop.

At this point, participants were presented with a product that they would get to test and evaluate. Individuals were shown a short video about a fictional product, AudioClear White Noise Headphones. While the video played, white noise was generated in participants' headphones, as a sample of what using the AudioClear product would be like. Importantly, participants received one of two infomercials: enhance or reduce emotions. In the enhance emotions condition, participants read that the AudioClear product would intensify their emotional experiences, "tightening the connection between their mind and body." In the reduce emotions clip, participants read that the product would reduce their emotions, "making their minds calm and rational." Thus, the product was positioned as either up-regulating (enhancing) or down-regulating (reducing) emotions.

After viewing the advertisement, participants evaluated the product on a set of measures, including attitude toward the brand, purchase likelihood, and willingness to pay. Additionally, participants rated their current emotional state, in order to assess the impact of product positioning and trial.

Results. The two measures of attitude toward the product (1=dislike intensely to 9=like intensely) and purchase intention (1=definitely would not buy to 9=definitely would buy), were combined to form a single index of brand attitude ($\alpha = .878$). A three-way ANOVA with identity, emotion and product positioning as between-subjects factors was run on the brand attitude measures. A main effect of identity was found ($F(2, 212) = 4.867, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .044$), such that participants with an active volunteer identity had significantly higher attitudes toward the headphones ($M = 4.69$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 3.72$). No other contrasts were significant.

However, this main effect was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction between identity, emotion, and product positioning ($F(2, 212) = 8.432, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .074$). Follow-up contrasts show that those participants with an active athlete identity experiencing anger have no preference for the reducing headphones versus the enhancing ones (4.03 vs. 4.63), ($F(1, 212) = .907, p > .30$). In contrast, participants with an active athlete identity who are experiencing sadness significantly prefer the reducing headphones to the enhancing ones (5.21 vs. 3.25), ($F(1, 212) = 7.757, p < .01$). Thus, for participants with active athlete identities, when they are experiencing an inconsistent emotion (sadness), they prefer a product that promises to reduce the inconsistent emotions.

For those participants with active volunteer identities, however, the pattern is different. When these participants experience the emotion profile inconsistent emotion of anger, they have significantly higher attitudes toward the product positioned as reducing emotions versus the enhancing headphones (5.04 vs. 3.71), ($F(1, 212) = 4.343, p < .05$). When participants with an active volunteer identity are experiencing the emotion profile-consistent emotion of sadness, however, they have significantly higher attitudes toward the product positioned as *enhancing* their experience of sadness versus reducing it (5.74 vs. 4.30), ($F(1, 212) = 5.416, p < .05$). Thus, these participants are attempting to increase their experience of sadness—further boosting their emotion profile-consistency. Those participants in the control condition merely show no preference differences for either product, regardless of the emotion they are experiencing, all $p > .50$.

Insert Figure 6 about here

A similar three-way ANOVA was run on the willingness to pay data, with identity, emotion, and product positioning as predictors. A significant main effect of identity emerged, ($F(2, 212) = 3.603, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .033$), such that participants in the control condition were willing to pay significantly less ($M = \$16.34$) for the product than either those individuals with active athlete ($M = \$24.97$) or volunteer ($M = \25.64) identities, both $p < .05$. No other contrasts were significant.

Along with the significant main effect of identity, there was also a marginally significant three-way interaction between emotion, identity, and product positioning, ($F(2, 212) = 2.852, p$

= .060, $\eta_p^2 = .026$). Follow-up contrasts show that participants with an active volunteer identity who are experiencing sadness are willing to pay significantly more for the product positioned as enhancing emotions ($M = \$37.05$) versus as reducing emotions ($M = \$18.35$), ($F(1, 212) = 6.204, p < .05$). This result follows from the attitude data, in that participants with an active volunteer identity place greater value on the product which enhances their experience of emotion profile-consistent emotions (sadness). No other contrasts were significant.

After collecting the attitude and willingness to pay measures, participants also filled out an emotion scale containing fourteen items. An index of participants' felt anger was created with two items, angry and annoyed ($\alpha = .708$). This index was subjected to a three-way ANOVA with identity, emotion, and product positioning as predictors. There was a significant main effect of emotion ($F(1, 212) = 13.433, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .060$), whereby participants in the anger condition experienced more anger ($M = 3.55$) than those in the sad condition ($M = 2.69$), replicating earlier findings on the effectiveness of these manipulations (Flack et al. 1999). Interestingly, a main effect of product positioning was also found ($F(1, 212) = 6.127, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .028$), such that participants who experienced the product positioned as enhancing emotions felt more anger ($M = 3.40$) than those who tried the product positioned as reducing emotions ($M = 2.87$).

Similarly, three items (sad, depressed, upset) were combined to create a sadness index ($\alpha = .857$), which was analyzed with a three-way ANOVA. While there was no main effect of emotion condition ($F(1, 212) = 1.598, p > .2$), there was again a main effect of product positioning ($F(1, 212) = 6.630, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .030$). As in the anger analysis, participants who tried a product positioned as enhancing emotions experienced higher levels of sadness ($M = 3.00$) than those who tried the reducing emotions product ($M = 2.48$). Together, these results suggest that the same product experience (listening to 35 seconds of white noise) can have

markedly different effects on a consumer's emotions, based on how the product is positioned. These are some of the first results showing that not only can products be positioned as emotion regulators (Williams and Drolet 2005), but that when positioned as such, these products impact consumers' actual emotional experience.

Discussion. Study four replicates the earlier studies in support of the proposed theory: individuals engage in emotion regulation to enhance emotions which are consistent with the identity's emotion profile or to decrease emotions that are inconsistent with the emotion profile. Using a different type of emotion manipulation, facial and bodily feedback, this study again showed that participants with active athlete identities attempt to eliminate sadness, while those with active volunteer identities try to reduce anger. Importantly, in this study participants regulated their emotions with a product trial, explicitly connecting the theorized process to consumer decision making.

In addition to these findings, study four provides another contribution: products positioned as emotion regulating can have actual impact on consumers' subjective experience of emotion. While other researchers have suggested that consumers may purchase products in order to change their emotional state (e.g., Labroo and Mukhopadhyay 2009), this is one of few studies to show that product trial actually regulates emotion experience. It is worth noting that this study positioned the product as either reducing or enhancing emotions. From the proposed theory, the prediction would be that participants with active athlete identities would prefer the product which enhanced anger, as was observed with participants in the active volunteer condition experiencing sadness. The data did not show this pattern of preference for emotion enhancement for athletes in the emotion profile-consistent conditions. One reason for this may be that the

elimination of negative emotions is a particularly salient goal (Gross et al. 2006; Tamir et al. 2008). In order for participants to express preference for the emotion enhancing product, they would need to overcome this goal entirely, and pursue a solely instrumental (versus hedonic: Higgins 1997) emotion experience. As participants did not need to execute the salient identity after product evaluations (e.g., they were not expecting to perform athletically), the instrumental component of the emotion may have been less valuable. Additional studies that make the identity goals more salient (e.g., participants anticipate a task that engages the specific identity) may increase the instrumental value of emotions and manifest higher preferences for emotion enhancing products in the emotion profile-consistent conditions. Despite the lack of preference for emotion enhancing products in the athlete condition, the fact that participants preferred the emotion reducing product in the emotion profile-inconsistent conditions represents a sharp departure from existing emotion regulation research, and presents a unique contribution of the current theory.

Summary

Taken together, the results from the pretests and four studies suggest three novel findings. First, social identities are not merely collections of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, but also include connections to specific emotional states. The pretest data support this contention, providing “emotion profiles” for a variety of social identities, and demonstrating a variety of social judgments where expressing consistent or inconsistent emotions changes personal evaluations. Study one went beyond the effect of emotion profiles on social judgments, but showed that advertisements with an emotion profile-consistent emotion are more persuasive. In

study two, participants' performance on an effortful task was enhanced when they had an emotion profile-consistent emotional experience, versus an emotion profile-inconsistent experience. Study three created a situation where individuals must shift their attention in order to maintain consistency with an active emotion profile. Changes in attention were measured, demonstrating that individuals use the attention deployment strategy to decrease emotions that are inconsistent with the emotion profile or maintain those that are consistent with it. In study four, participants were asked to express their preference for products framed as emotion regulators, avoiding inconsistent emotions. Across four different types of emotion manipulations, these studies demonstrate that individuals can use emotions instrumentally, to achieve identity consistency, and that they can strategically regulate their emotions in order to coincide with a salient emotion profile. Finally, study four also revealed that products framed as emotion regulators can have actual impact on consumers' emotional states. These three pieces—that identities have emotion profiles, that individuals regulate their emotions in order to maintain consistency with emotion profiles, and that emotion regulating products actually change emotion—tell of a new source for emotion regulation goals (social identity), and describe a process by which emotion regulation is employed to achieve identity-consistent outcomes.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The study of emotions has grown in prominence within the marketing literature. From how specific emotions influence the processing of messages (Raghunathan, Pham, and Corfman 2006), to the consumption decisions consumers make in order to experience certain affective responses (Andrade and Cohen 2007; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999), marketers are willing to

explore the influence of emotions on consumers in a variety of ways. Only recently however, have marketing researchers begun to ask how consumers influence their emotions—controlling, adapting, and molding the emotional experience as it unfolds. The study of emotion regulation is growing rapidly in psychology (see e.g., Clore and Robinson 2000), but only in a few instances does it appear within the consumer domain.

The current framework focuses not on *how* individuals manage their emotions, but rather *when* a person is motivated to do so. In particular, social identity and associated emotion profiles were proposed as a mechanism that could induce people to regulate their emotions. Not only is this research stream novel in that it ties together two previously unrelated concepts, identity and emotion regulation, but it also has deep ties to consumer behavior and implications for judgments and decisions (Escalas and Bettman 2005).

Social identity has a long and extensive tradition of research within the consumer behavior literature (e.g., Dolich 1969; Berger and Heath 2007), but it appears that this research perspective has overlooked the role of emotions in enacting a specific social identity. While emotions are often alluded to within the identity literature (see, e.g. jealousy and grief in Belk 1988), it has remained an open question whether specific emotions are connected to specific identities. Given that emotions can be characterized as part of associative networks (Bower 1981), it is reasonable to believe that some of these “emotion nodes” will be connected to social identity-specific networks. The current research product finds evidence for such associations between specific social identities and a set of emotions desirable for that particular identity. Importantly, those findings have consequences for a variety of outcomes: person judgments, performance, persuasion, and product attitudes. Building on findings that demonstrate individuals approach products and enact behaviors which are identity-consistent, while avoiding

those which are identity-inconsistent (White and Dahl 2007), this paper proposes that individuals will be motivated to regulate their emotions in identity-consistent ways. Specifically, people should enhance their experience of identity-consistent emotions, and reduce their experience of emotions that are inconsistent with the emotion profile of a particular identity.

This paper not only addresses a gap in the marketing literature by enriching our understanding of the concepts contained within an identity, but also provides an essential pre-condition to emotion regulation, furthering conceptualizations of the emotion management process. Beyond establishing that emotions are included within social identity structures, the current research suggests that identity-marketing appeals can be positioned as identity consistent without ever mentioning the salient identity, but rather by simply leveraging an emotion profile-consistent frame.

Future Research Directions

The implications of social identity emotion profiles are varied, and suggest an assortment of different research directions. For one, are there specific situations where conforming to emotion profiles is particularly important? One could postulate that when an individual is in a situation where he or she is observed by others (public), emotion profile consistency would be of greater concern than when the individual is alone (private). Or, could emotion profile consistency be more important for some identities over others? Also, emotion profiles may interact with or be enhanced by social norms—within the organizational behavior literature, there have been some explorations of gender emotion rules, in that women are expected to express positive emotions but men are expected to express no emotion (Simpson and Stroh

2004). How might these culturally constructed emotion profiles interact or conflict with identity-specific emotion profiles?

Again, the current paper establishes a connection between social identities and emotions, postulating that just as actions, brands, and beliefs are incorporated into the identity concept, so too are specific emotions and emotion profiles. This relationship between identity and emotion has previously gone unnoticed, but may represent an essential motivation to engage in emotion regulation. The present focus is on attention deployment and situation selection as emotion regulation strategies that can promote emotion profile-consistency; however there are multiple research questions that can be answered beyond this. For one, the current framework describes the negative state of emotional dissonance as motivating emotion regulation. As of yet, the existing studies are unable to address this as a mediating factor—but experiments building upon the methods presented here could reasonably uncover this psychological process. Moreover, understanding how emotions are incorporated into social identities, their influence on and mediation of prototypical identity effects, and the motivational impetus provided by identity-specific emotions, all provide richer theory within the social identity literature itself.

For instance, study two demonstrated that performance was enhanced when an individual was experiencing identity-consistent emotions. Left unanswered are questions regarding whether identity-consistent emotions reinforce the identity, making it more salient and central. If an individual is experiencing anger, does it make him or her more likely to also feel like an athlete? Can emotions “prime the pump” of specific identities? Further, are specific identities better suited to specific emotion regulation strategies? Study three showed that individuals with active athlete identities were capable of avoiding sad emotions by using attention deployment, but perhaps other identities would be better suited to response modulation, situation modification, or

others. This paper is simply a first step in understanding how emotions are incorporated into social identities and the motivational consequences of these connections.

In addition to expanding our conceptualizations of social identity and the associations incorporated in these identity-networks, this paper also promotes the perspective that emotions can be used instrumentally, in the service of other goals. Emotion profiles may represent only one way in which emotions are seen as useful. Individuals have lay beliefs about the duration of emotions that influence their reliance on emotion regulation (Labroo and Mukhopadhyay 2009). It is likely, then, that individuals also have beliefs about when certain emotions can help achieve other goals. Indeed, some evidence exists that people believe happiness promotes creativity while sadness enhances analytic processing (Cohen and Andrade 2004), so other emotions and tasks may also be paired in consumers' minds. Thus, by activating different lay beliefs consumers' may be more or less motivated to engage in emotion regulation.

Conclusion. This research builds a connection between social identities and emotions, whereby emotion profiles are associated with identities, constraining the types of emotions which are valid for each identity. This represents a new area of research, bridging the gap between emotions and social identities, as well as suggesting a new way in which the emotion regulation process may be initiated. The implications of this relationship may be particularly relevant for marketing, with its prevalent use of identity-relevant persuasive appeals, as certain emotions may or may not reinforce the salient identity within the marketing communication.

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TABLE 1
PRETEST 1: EMOTION PROFILES

	Athlete	Businessperson	Artist	Volunteer
anger	5.25 _a	2.75 _b	3.75 _b	2.42 _b
disgust	4.00 _a	3.73 _a	4.82 _a	3.82 _a
fear	4.75 _a	3.92 _a	3.50 _{a,b}	2.08 _b
guilt	2.25 _a	3.13 _a	3.50 _{a,b}	4.94 _b
happiness	5.46 _a	4.15 _b	5.00 _a	6.77 _c
pride	6.08 _a	5.17 _a	4.50 _a	5.67 _a
sadness	1.45 _a	1.91 _a	5.09 _b	3.82 _b
boredom	2.38 _a	2.94 _{a,b}	4.31 _b	3.63 _b
challenge	6.17 _a	6.00 _a	4.50 _b	3.58 _b
disappointment	3.46 _{a,b}	4.38 _a	3.77 _{a,b}	3.23 _b
fascination	4.36 _a	4.55 _a	6.64 _b	5.55 _a
hope	5.75 _{a,b}	4.92 _a	5.17 _a	6.50 _b
relaxation	3.67 _a	4.00 _{a,b}	5.75 _b	4.92 _{a,b}
worry	3.64 _{a,b}	4.00 _{a,b}	2.73 _b	4.73 _a

Note: scale values ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely helpful. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at the $p < .05$ level.

TABLE 2
PRETEST 2: EMOTION PROFILES AND PERSON JUDGMENTS

		Appropriate	Authentic	Perform Better	Likeable	N
Athlete	Angry	56.72	5.67	6.66	5.27	32
	<i>SD</i>	25.24	1.23	2.12	1.35	
	Sad	39.33	3.96	2.54	4.03	24
	<i>SD</i>	30.39	1.39	1.82	1.25	
Volunteer	Angry	30.76	3.28	3.14	2.83	29
	<i>SD</i>	31.10	1.32	1.89	1.49	
	Sad	50.96	4.71	5.30	4.71	23
	<i>SD</i>	23.78	1.30	2.18	1.21	

Note: the appropriateness scale ranged from 0=extremely inappropriate to 100=extremely appropriate; the authentic scale (5 items) ranged from 1= disagree completely to 9= agree completely; the single-item performance scale ranged from 1=not at all to 9= extremely; and the likeability scale (3 items) ranged from 1= bad/unfavorable/dislike to 9= good/favorable/like.

TABLE 3
STUDY 1: EMOTION PROFILES AND PERSUASION

		Attitude toward Advertisement	Relevance	Intentions to Change Behavior	N
Athlete	Angry	51.89	3.79	4.21	14
	<i>SD</i>	14.45	1.64	2.67	
	Sad	37.94	2.68	2.93	14
	<i>SD</i>	10.63	1.40	1.77	
Volunteer	Angry	23.71	1.86	1.86	14
	<i>SD</i>	9.96	1.17	1.51	
	Sad	40.17	3.14	3.91	11
	<i>SD</i>	12.49	1.52	2.55	
Control	Angry	41.29	3.53	3.40	15
	<i>SD</i>	15.61	1.87	1.88	
	Sad	40.03	3.07	3.33	15
	<i>SD</i>	13.94	1.66	2.35	

Note: the attitude toward the advertisement scale ranged from 0 to 100 (10 items); the relevance scale (2 items) ranged from 1= not at all to 9= extremely relevant/meaningful; the single-item intention to change behavior scale ranged from 1=not at all to 9= extremely likely.

FIGURE 1
MODEL OF PROPOSED THEORY





FIGURE 2
STUDY 1: EMOTIONAL ADVERTISEMENTS

Angry Advertisement

How could you do this to me!



Doctors estimate that up to 80% of people who have herpes don't know it and aren't getting treated.

Protect yourself. Don't hurt the ones you love.

Get tested.



Sad Advertisement

How could you do this to me?



Doctors estimate that up to 80% of people who have herpes don't know it and aren't getting treated.

Protect yourself. Don't hurt the ones you love.

Get tested.



FIGURE 3

STUDY 2: EMOTION PROFILES AND INSTRUMENTAL PERFORMANCE




FIGURE 4
STUDY 3: PROCEDURE




FIGURE 5

STUDY 3: EMOTION REGULATION AND EMOTION PROFILE-INCONSISTENCY





FIGURE 6

STUDY 4: EMOTION REGULATION AND PRODUCT EVALUATIONS

