Nate Charlow

Nate Charlow Philosophy Ph.D. Student	University of Michigan Department of Philosophy 2215 Angell Hall 435 South State Street Ann Arbor, MI 48109

p e r s o n a l \| r e s e a r c h \| t e a c h i n g \| l i n k s

Personal I'm a fourth year student in the University of Michigan's doctoral program. I grew up in Omaha, Nebraska, and I did my undergraduate degree at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln (from which I graduated in 2005). My brother, Simon, is a second-year Ph.D. Student in NYU's Department of Linguistics. He appears to work exclusively on alternating quantifier scope. I'm fond of Morrissey / The Smiths, nineties rap, running, The Wire, Hitchcock movies, basketball, and my three year-old cat Rori. I blog occasionally at de crapulas edormiendo.

Research My work is largely in formal semantics, pragmatics, and epistemology. Lately I've focused on the logic, semantics, and pragmatics of imperatives and various kinds of root modals (deontic modals in particular). I generally work on topics lying at the intersection of linguistics, meta-ethics, action theory, epistemology, and decision theory.

Papers These are drafts. Please inquire before citing / quoting. Directives (Dissertation Prospectus, 2009) Abstract: A long position piece on (and overview of the linguistic and philosophical issues surrounding) the semantics, pragmatics, and logic of action-guiding linguistic devices. The focus is on imperative constructions, but I also discuss related modal constructions, and the relationships that obtain between them. What We Know and What To Do (2009) Abstract: I discuss a puzzle about indicatives and ought described by Kolodny and MacFarlane. Rejecting a modus ponens rule for the indicative conditional blocks one version, but is insufficient to block others. A total solution requires rethinking the relationship between relevant information (what we know) and how options are ranked in practical deliberation. I argue that relevant information makes a two-fold difference in thinking about what to do. It restricts the background of possibilities against which deliberation occurs. It also determines when considerations of value may count as reasons for actions that realize them and reasons against actions that don't. Imperative Statics and Dynamics (2009) Abstract: You could think of this as a much more formal version of Directives. Particular attention is paid to formalizing the semantics and pragmatics of an imperative language built on top of the language of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL). Good Books and Imprecise Probability (2008, down for revision) Abstract: This paper explores the related questions of (i) whether there is a pragmatic presumption against imprecise probabilities and (ii) how imprecise probabilities should be integrated into a normative theory of rational choice. Adam Elga argues that one rather natural way of effecting this integration allows an agent to reject each of a series of bets that promises a positive payout. A number of possible solutions to the case are argued to bear commitments in tension with basic assumptions of normative decision theory. Take Nothing for Granted (2008, down for revision)

Talks GN'R: Appetite for Disjunction (Comments on Jeroen Groenendijk and Floris Roelofsen "Inquisitive Semantics and Pragmatics") (Handout) Workshop in Philosophy and Linguistics (University of Michigan, Fall 2009) Proper Names, Presuppositions, and the A Priori (Handout) The Arché/CSMN Graduate Conference (2007) 11th Annual Oxford Philosophy Graduate Conference (2007)

Teaching As Primary Instructor Introduction to Philosophy (Fall 2009). Description: a topical introduction to contemporary analytic philosophy, focusing on issues in normative and meta ethics. As Assistant Instructor Advanced Symbolic Logic (Fall 2008) Problems of Philosophy (Winter 2008, Fall 2007)