I am an experimental economist at the Research Center for Group Dynamics of
the Institute for Social Research at the
University of Michigan. I received my
Ph.D. in Economics and Mechanism Design from The University of Arizona in 2001;
Vernon Smith was my advisor.
My
research has focused on applied microeconomic topics in
experimental economics, including behavioral game theory
and mechanism design. But it is centered on a broad theme:
principal-agent problems are ubiquitous, but enforceable
complete contracts between them are not. Given this
mismatch, it is natural to ask how the strategic
environment in which the principal and agent interact can
be structured so that they reach efficient outcomes even in
the absence of a complete contract. This theme cross-cuts
areas within economics and management, and also areas
within psychology and the cognitive/decision
sciences.
My work has been supported by the International Foundation
for Research in Experimental Economics, the Rasmussen
Foundation, the Interdisciplinary Committee for
Organizational Studies at UM, and the National Science
Foundation.
An overview of my research is available: Research Statement
An overview of my teaching philosophy (including student
reviews) is available: Teaching Statement
