This seminar explores classical questions in the philosophy of social science. General themes include the nature and models of explanation; conceptions of rationality, objectivity and justification. We shall consider how these themes help illustrate (and possibly obscure) contemporary controversies such as the debates about the nature of political science and about role of rational choice and evolutionary psychology in political science.

The seminar presupposes a basic understanding of social-scientific methodologies. Seminar participants are welcome to explore their own research interests from a meta-level perspective, whether their interests are theoretical or empirical.

The only dogma in the seminar is the prima facie value of methodological pluralism: we’ll proceed with the assumption that all standard social scientific approaches are legitimate and have much to contribute. Partisans of particular approaches are welcome to argue for their position but must respect others’ perspectives.

Seminar mechanics will depend on the number of participants, but count on presentations, short response papers and a term paper.

The following books have been ordered through Shaman Drum:

Little, Varieties of Social Explanation (Westview)
Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (Princeton UP)
Martin & Macintyre, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science (MIT Press)

Course Schedule

The following schedule is open to changes, partly contingent on participant interests. Readings marked with an R will be available for photocopying at the political science department, those marked with JSTOR on www.jstor.org. Articles without additional markings or bibliographic info are in Martin & Macintyre.

Week 1: Introduction—no reading

Week 2: Causal Analysis

J.S. Mill, System of Logic, Bk. VI, chs. ii-iii (R)

Carl Hempel, “The Function of General Laws in History”

Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, chs. 1-2

Weeks 3-4: Rational Choice Explanations and Models Rationality

Week 3

Little, ch. 3

Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics”

Dagfinn Follesdal, “The Status of Rationality Assumptions in Interpretation and in the Explanation of Action”

Jon Elster, “The Nature and Scope of Rational-Choice Explanation”

Week 4

Little, ch. 7

Donald Davidson, “Hempel on Explaining Action” in Essays on Actions and Events. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 261-275. (R)

Amartya Sen, “Behavior and the Concept of Preference,” Economica 40 (1973), pp. 241–259. (JSTOR)

Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6:4 (1977), pp. 317–344. (JSTOR)

Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211:4481 (1981), pp. 453–458. (JSTOR)

Week 5: Interpretation Theory

Little, ch. 4

Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”

Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”

Martin Hollis, “Reason and Ritual” in Reason in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.) (R)

Week 6: Functionalism and Structuralism

Little, ch. 5

G.A. Cohen, “Functional Explalanation: In Marxism”

Jon Elster, “Functional Explanation: In Social Science”

Harold Kincaid, “Assessing Functional Explanations in the Social Sciences”

Weeks 7–8: Individualism, Holism, Reductionism

Little, ch. 9

F. A. von Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), selections. (R)

Richard Miller, “Methodological Individualism and Social Explanation”

Alan J. Nelson, “Social Science and the Mental”

Kenneth J. Arrow, “Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge,” American Economic Review 84:2 (1994), pp. 1–9. (JSTOR)

Harold Kincaid, “Reduction, Explanation, and Individualism”

Emile Durkheim “Social Facts”

Margaret Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation. (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996.), chs. 1–3. (R)

Week 9: Neutrality, Objectivity and Value-freedom

Max Weber, “’Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy”

Charles Taylor, “Neutrality in Political Science”

Ernest Nagel, “The Value-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry”

Week 10: Critiques of Objectivity: Feminist Epistemologies

Naomi Weisstein, “Psychology Constructs the Female”

Alison Wylie, “Reasoning about Ourselves: Feminist Methodology in the Social Sciences”

Nancy Hartsock, “The Feminist Standpoint” in Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka, eds. Discovering Reality (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), pp. 283–310. (R)

Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 183–201. (R)

Week 11: Reconstructing Objectivity

Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge

Week 12: Thanksgiving--no seminar.

Weeks 13-15: Current Controversies

Week 13: Evolutionary Psychology

Allan Gibbard, "Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice." Midwest Studies in the Philosophy VII (1982): pp. 31-46. (R)

Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. "From Evolution to Behavior: Evolutionary Psychology as the Missing Link." In The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality, edited by John Dupré (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1987), pp. 277-306. (R)

Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms." American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1095-111.

Cosmides and Tooby. "Better Than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand." American Economic Review 84, no. 2 (1994): 327-32. (JSTOR)

John Arhcer, "Human Sociobiology: Basic Concepts and Limitations." Journal of Social Issues 47, no. 3 (1991): 11-26. (R)

Week 14: Evolutionary Psychology continued

Jerry Fodor, In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998), chs. 14, 15, 17. (R)

Justin D’Arms, Robert Batterman and Krzyzstof Górny, “Game Theoretic Explanations and the Evolution of Justice,” Philosophy of Science 65 (1998), 76–102. (R)

Week 15: Convergences?

Robert Bates et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). Different selections for different people. (R)

Jon Elster, “Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition” APSR 94:3 (2000), pp. 685––695.

Bates et al., Reply to Elster APSR 94:3 (2000), pp. 696–702.

Elizabeth Anderson, “Beyond Homo Economicus,” Philosophy & Public Affairs29:2 (2000)170–200.

Updated Wednesday, September 26, 2001