

Problem Set # 2: The Symmetry Theorem
Economics 609, Winter 2003

Due: Thursday, January 30, 2:30 P.M.

1. Consider the firm problem

$$V^t(K_t) = \max_{U, \mathcal{E}, H, N, M, I} E_t \sum_{\substack{\tau=t+jh \\ j \in \{0, 1, \dots\}}} \frac{D_\tau}{D_t} [P_{Y,\tau} F(U_\tau K_\tau, \mathcal{E}_\tau H_\tau N_\tau, M_\tau; Z_\tau) - W_\tau G^\tau(H_\tau, \mathcal{E}_\tau, U) N_\tau - P_{M,\tau} M_\tau - P_{I,\tau} K_\tau \Phi(I_\tau / K_\tau)]$$

s.t.,

$$K_{t+h} = K_t \Gamma(I_\tau / K_\tau, U; Z_\tau).$$

The intertemporal pricing kernel D , the output price P_Y , the factor prices W , P_M and P_I and the technology vector Z are stochastic, but exogenous to the firm. U is the workweek of capital. \mathcal{E} is worker effort per hour. H is weekly hours for each worker. N is the number of workers. M is the quantity of materials used. I is investment. The superscripts on V and G indicate that these functions are time-varying.

- a. Write down the Bellman equation (the recursive equation) for the value function.
- b. Show that if the function F has constant returns to scale in the three arguments other than technology—namely UK , $\mathcal{E}HN$, and M —that the value function has constant returns to scale in K . Show that this guarantees that average Q ($= V(K)/K$) is equal to marginal q ($= V'(K)$). Besides a constant-returns to scale production function, what other assumptions above are critical to this result? Note that the surface complexity of the problem above is meant to indicate a wide variety of things the result of constant returns to scale for $V(K)$ does *not* depend on. If you have trouble with this problem, follow Polya's advice: do a simpler, related problem first, then gradually add back in the extra complexity of the original problem.

2. *Rate of Time Symmetry.* Let preferences in a maximization problem be given by

$$v_t = hU(X_t) + e^{-\rho h} E_t v_{t+h},$$

$v_T \equiv 0$. The contemporaneous constraint does not depend on K_t :

$$X_t \in \mathcal{X}$$

The transition equation for K (=intertemporal budget constraint) is given by

$$K_{t+h} = K_t + h[rK_t + f(X_t)] + K_t \sigma g(X_t) \sqrt{h} \epsilon_{t+h}$$

where ϵ_{t+h} is an i.i.d. binomial random variable equal to +1 with probability .5 and equal to -1 with probability .5.

Since we will be considering a transformation that alters the rate at which time passes, label everything by the number of periods from the terminal date rather than by a date. Time t corresponds to the $[n+1]$ st period from end and time $t+h$ corresponds to the $[n]$ th period from the end. After doing this relabeling, consider the following transformation of the constraints and preferences:

$$\begin{aligned} h &\rightarrow \frac{h}{\theta} \\ \rho &\rightarrow \theta \rho \\ r &\rightarrow \theta r \\ \sigma &\rightarrow \sqrt{\theta} \sigma \\ v &\rightarrow \frac{v}{\theta} \\ K &\rightarrow \frac{K}{\theta} \\ X &\rightarrow X. \end{aligned}$$

- a. Show that this transformation is a symmetry of the constraints and the preferences.
- b. Consider the limit of the original maximization problem as the time interval $h \rightarrow 0$ and the end-date $T \rightarrow \infty$:

$$V^t(K_t; \rho, r, \sigma) = \max E_t \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho(\tau-t)} U(X_\tau) d\tau$$

s.t.,

$$X \in \mathcal{X}$$

and

$$dK_t = [rK_t + f(X_t)]dt + K_t \sigma g(X_t) dz.$$

Argue that with U , r , f and g not having time as an argument, V is not in fact a direct function of time. Then use the symmetry theorem and find what implications there are for the form of V as a result of the symmetry of the value function with respect to the *rate of time* transformation above. This turns out to be a very useful result. It hinges on recognizing the difference between stocks, flows and pure rates.