Networking the Parties:
A Comparative Study of Democratic and Republican National Convention Delegates in 2008

Seth E. Masket
University of Denver
smasket@du.edu

Michael T. Heaney
University of Michigan
mheaney@umich.edu

Joanne M. Miller
University of Minnesota
jomiller@umn.edu

Dara Z. Strolovitch
University of Minnesota
dzs@umn.edu

January 19, 2011

Abstract: Parties-as-networks is an emerging approach to understanding American political parties as decentralized, nonhierarchical, fluid systems with porous boundaries among a wide array of actors. The authors apply the parties-as-networks approach using data from surveys of delegates at the 2008 Democratic and Republican national conventions. Analysis of delegates’ memberships in a wide variety of organizations demonstrates that Democrats have larger organizational membership networks than do Republicans; Republican networks tend more toward hierarchy than do Democratic networks; and the content of Democratic networks is tilted toward labor and identity organizations, while Republican networks are more populated by civic, religious, and professional organizations.

Keywords: Parties-as-networks; national party conventions; Democratic Party; Republican Party; interest groups; social network analysis.

Acknowledgements: All authors contributed equally to this project. The authors’ names have been ordered based on a predetermined rotation scheme across multiple papers. The authors acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation, Small Grants for Exploratory Research # 0842474 and # 0842371 and from Center for Urban and Regional Affairs at the University of Minnesota. They thank Hans Noel, Barbara Norrander, Barbara Trish, and Daniel A. Smith for helpful suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 105th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, September 3-6, 2009, for which it received the Best Paper Award from the Section on Political Organizations and Parties, and at the Ray C. Bliss Conference on the State of the Parties: 2008 and Beyond, Cuyahoga Falls/Akron, Ohio, October 15-16, 2009.
President Bill Clinton’s remark that, in electoral politics, “Republicans like to fall in line and Democrats like to fall in love” (Will 2007, p. B7) is oft-quoted because it is highly evocative of the behavior of modern American political parties. While it purports to describe the attitudes of partisans, it captures something essential about the structures of the two major American political parties as well. For generations, the Democratic Party has been stereotyped as disorganized and undisciplined, with interest groups occasionally aligning – but often warring – over nominees, policy stances, and the direction of the party. The Republican Party, meanwhile, is typically lauded for its internal discipline and top-down command structure. Evocative as they are, however, these stereotypes often conceal as much as they illuminate about each of the two parties (Freeman 1986). For example, what appear to be bivalent “cultural” differences between the parties may sometimes be more accurately understood as differences in organization.

This article uses social network analysis to model the informal organizational structures of the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States. While we do not deny the existence or importance of party cultures, a social network approach helps to understand variations between the parties as differences in degree, rather than as differences between polar opposites. Our approach draws upon the emerging “parties as networks” perspective on American political parties (cf. Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller 2008; Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009; Grossman and Domínguez 2009; Herrnson 2009; Schwartz 1990). This perspective extends the traditional view of American political parties as serving tripartite roles – parties in government, parties in the electorate, and parties as organizations – to incorporate the roles of interest groups, social movements, consultants, 527s, and other organizations and activists that keep the parties’ machinery in motion (or grind it to a halt).

Our article elaborates upon the parties-as-networks perspective by arguing that substantive, political differences between the parties can be understood, in part, as the product of organizational differences in the size, structure, and content of their respective networks. Using original data from
in-person surveys conducted at the 2008 Democratic and Republican National Conventions, we demonstrate that analyzing delegates’ memberships in a variety of political organizations provides insights into each party’s structure, ideology, and culture, thus illuminating both crucial differences and important similarities between the parties.

We begin by situating the parties-as-networks perspective in the broader literature on party structure and organization. Next, we describe the methods used to measure networks among Democratic and Republican convention delegates in 2008. We then systemically compare the networks of the Democratic and Republican parties according to their size, structure, and content. We conclude by exploring the ways in which a parties-as-network perspective can help to illuminate the role of external actors within parties.

From the Tripartite Party to Parties-as-Networks

Generations of political scientists have learned about political parties through the lens that V.O. Key introduced in his book, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (1952: 329). In this classic text, Key partitioned parties into what he argued were their three central roles: “party in government,” “party in the electorate,” and “party as organization.” This tripartite definition has endured because it captures several fundamental truths about American political parties. First, Key’s formulation helps us to see that a political party is not a single organization. It is cobbled together and decentralized among its supporters in the electorate, officials elected under the party banner, and employees across 50 states. Second, this approach underscores the fact that no one actor runs a party. While the President may be the titular head of his/her party, even this powerful position does not come with the formal authority to direct all the activities of the party. The party not in control of the presidency has no clearly agreed upon leader, though high-ranking congressional or national committee officials may vie for that role. Third, the bulk of the work of the party is not accomplished through formal authority, but through informal interactions among myriad players.
who each struggle to control the direction of the party. Thus, viewed through Key’s framework, a party is far removed from an ideal-typical corporate body. Rather, it is a polycephalous creature with ambiguous boundaries.

Despite the utility and intuitive appeal of the tripartite framework, over the years scholars have noted its inadequacies in explaining the ways in which parties actually work. For example, Aldrich (1995) stresses that the tripartite perspective fails to capture the evolution of the parties, especially as exemplified by the rise of self-identified independents in the electorate, candidate-centered campaigns, and parties-in-service to candidates. Similarly, scholars investigating trends in party polarization present a more complex portrait of the party than is offered by the tripartite framework. Rather than seeing cohesion among the parts of the party, they contend that party “elites” (including elected officials, convention delegates, campaign staffers, and opinion leaders) are becoming increasingly polarized.\(^1\)

The parties-as-networks perspective has emerged as an alternative to the tripartite view (cf. Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller 2008; Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009; Grossman and Dominguez 2009; Herrnson 2009; Schwartz 1990). Building on work by Schlesinger (1985) that incorporates office seekers and benefit seekers into the definition of a party, the parties-as-networks perspective conceives of a party to include its candidates and officeholders, formal party officers, loyal donors, campaign staffers, activists, allied interest groups, social movements, and friendly media outlets. Scholars employing the parties-as-networks perspective recognize that formal party organizations, including the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee (RNC), are prominent members of these networks (Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009), but treat these as only part

\(^1\) Scholars have also found increasing polarization among the most active voters (Abramowitz and Saunders 2005; Hetherington 2001; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Theriault 2008), but not among ordinary voters (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2004).
of broader networks. Power in these networks may be centralized or decentralized, featuring factions that simultaneously cooperate to beat the opposing party, compete to affect nominations, and struggle to shape the party’s future (Skinner 2005). Network analysis allows scholars to measure centralization, identify the members of factions, and detect changes in party organization.

Empirical studies have begun to address basic questions about the structure and functions of party networks. Schwartz’s (1990) investigation of Republican elites in the state of Illinois shows that the loose coupling of party networks promotes adaptation needed to achieve goals in an evolving environment. Bernstein (1999) and Doherty (2006) demonstrate that contrary to the views of scholars such as Sabato (1981), political consultants are more loyal to their party than they are to individual candidates, suggesting that they, too, are part of an expanded party network. Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller (2008) reveal that an alliance of donors and elite endorsers in each party have controlled presidential nominations since 1980. Masket (2009) uncovers evidence that this sort of coordination induces legislative polarization, even in an ostensibly weak-party system. Dominguez (2005), meanwhile, finds evidence of a network of donors and endorsers within each party who coordinate to promote some candidates in congressional primaries and prevent others from winning. Strolovitch (2007) and Frymer (1999) show how interest groups are connected to parties as representatives who push parties to incorporate interests that would otherwise be excluded. Other research adds lobbyists (Koger and Victor 2009), interest group coalitions (Grossman and Dominguez 2009), social movements (Heaney and Rojas 2007), and 527s (Skinner, Masket, and Dulio 2009) to the pantheon of actors in the party networks.

Expanding upon the parties-as-networks tradition, Grossman and Dominguez (2009) and Skinner, Masket, and Dulio (2009) use social network analysis to examine purported differences between the parties. Grossman and Dominguez exploit patterns of donations and endorsements by interest groups to primary candidates to tease out the role of interest groups in the parties. Their
findings show the Democratic Party to be no more factional than the Republican Party, with labor unions providing a great deal of organization within this party. In their study of the personnel links between 527 organizations and affiliated political groups, Skinner, Masket, and Dulio find the Republican Party to be the more hierarchical of the two. These research findings are generating a growing consensus that networks are at the heart of modern American parties (Bernstein 2005).

If American political parties are well characterized as networks, then it is important to understand better how these networks are constructed. Who are the leading actors? Who is connected to whom? How do the parties differ in the ways that they build their networks? In the next section, we test hypotheses about differences between the Democratic and Republican parties using the party-as-networks perspective.

2008 Convention Surveys

We measured networks among Democratic and Republican party delegates using surveys conducted on-site at the 2008 Democratic and Republican national conventions. National political conventions provide a unique setting within which to assess partisan behavior (Shafer 2010). Although parties are decentralized and divided into a multiplicity of loosely-coupled components, conventions bring the various elements of the party together in one place. Almost all leading party officials are in attendance and delegates are invited to participate on a largely representative basis, providing the opportunity to study a wide range of party activists and activities. ² For these reasons, political scientists have long turned to convention delegates to help understand the state of the

² Many biases exist in the selection of national convention delegates, with the nature of these biases differing between the parties. Yet there is no other gathering which convenes a less biased, more representative cadre of party activists. Thus, convention delegates provide a reasonable picture of the mobilized party. While delegates are more ideological extreme than party voters, these activists are particularly important in party decision making (Miller and Jennings 1986).
parties (e.g., Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Layman 2006; Dodson 1990; Herrera 1993; Jackson, Bigelow, and Green 2007; Munger and Blackhurst 1965; Soule and Clarke 1970; Wolbrecht 2002).

We surveyed party activists on-site at the conventions (rather than, for example, by phone afterwards) for several reasons. First, the surveys conducted in-person at political events tend to secure high response rates because they confront a relatively captive audience (Fisher, Stanley, Berman, and Neff 2005; Goss 2006; Heaney and Rojas 2007). Second, conducting surveys at an event ensures that respondents were actually in attendance and eliminates the need to obtain reliable lists of delegates from external sources, which may include nonparticipants and/or exclude actual participants. Third, surveying delegates at the conventions ensures that respondents are more focused on party concerns than might be the case either before or after the convention, when myriad other activities compete for respondents’ attention. Fourth, surveys conducted at the conventions are limited to a narrow window of time, reducing the risk that respondents are influenced by external events unfolding over a campaign cycle. Although there are many merits to the alternative methods of Internet, mail, or telephone surveys, the in-person survey compares favorably in obtaining high response rates of the actual participants at the convention while they are paying attention to the party, with minimal problems of time inconsistency.3

To conduct the surveys, we hired a team of 21 surveyors at the Democratic National Convention in Denver and 24 surveyors at the Republican National Convention in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Surveyors were systematically distributed in a representative manner throughout the events

---

3 It is impossible to eliminate completely problems such as time inconsistency. For example, it is possible for an event to take place during a convention that alters the way participants view politics, such as a breakthrough speech or a riot outside the hall. Such disruptions are less likely to occur during the narrow window of a convention survey than during the longer intervals often allowed for Internet, mail, and telephone surveys.
and meeting spaces of the conventions, including hotel lobbies, delegation breakfasts, caucus meetings, receptions, and the convention hall. Surveyors approached individuals wearing convention-credential name badges and invited them to participate in a 15-minute survey. The surveys were six pages in length with a total of 47 questions each.

We obtained surveys of 546 delegates (504 with valid network data) at the Democratic National Convention and 407 delegates (369 with valid network data) at the Republican National Convention. These totals yielded samples that of 12% of the population of Democratic convention delegates and 17% of the population of Republican convention delegates. Of the delegates approached by our survey team, 72% of those at the Democratic National Convention, and 70% of those at the Republican National Convention, agreed to participate in the survey. Since social network analysis is especially sensitive to differences in the size of networks analyzed (Anderson, Butts, and Carley 1999), we randomly resampled delegates (from our original sample) at the Democratic National Convention to ensure that both networks contained exactly 369 valid network observations. This approach produces equivalent samples of Democratic and Republican delegates.

---

4 To determine if network data were valid, we assessed whether respondents not listing organizational memberships intended to answer “no” or if they failed to answer the question. If the respondent answered that, “yes”, she or he was a member of a political organization, but did not list the name of the organization, then we coded the organization as missing. If the respondent left the space blank while also failing to indicate yes or no, then we looked at other questions on the page to distinguish between missing data and “no” answers. If the respondent skipped only the membership question, then we coded the answer to indicate a “no”. However, if she or he skipped other questions on the page, then we coded the answer as missing.
allowing for a direct comparison between the two networks.5

The networks analyzed here are based on responses to the following open-ended question: “Are you a member of any political organizations, social movement organizations, interest groups, or political advocacy groups?; If yes, which ones?”6 This question reveals which organizations are the most numerous in the network and which organizations tend to share members.7 The overlapping memberships among organizations are the links in the network. Co-membership in organizations demonstrates which ones are closely tied to one another and which organizations are not so closely tied to one another. First, sharing members among organizations may facilitate their

5 If we had not resampled from the data, the result would have been to inflate the size of the Democratic network and to overweight Democratic observations in the statistical analysis.

6 While some people might think of social movements as a product largely of the liberal side of the political spectrum (e.g., civil rights, women’s, anti-war), social movements have been increasingly salient to conservatives in recent years. Movements for homeschooling and Christian values, as well as against abortion and health care reform, have been especially important. Further, these communities have not shied away from using the term “movement.” For example, the National Right to Life Committee (the nation’s preeminent anti-abortion group) refers to itself as part of the “pro-life movement” (National Right to Life 2009).

7 We recorded all organizations that the respondent wrote in answering this question. If the respondent wrote “Democratic Party” or “Republican Party”, then we discarded these responses, since such membership is self-evident from the individual’s selection as a delegate and is not specific enough to indicate networks within the parties. If the individual answered with the name of a specific party club (e.g., Long Beach California Republican Club), then we entered that information in the network analysis. If we could not read a respondent’s handwriting, we coded that survey as a “missing” case. We used Internet searches to help identify organizations in ambiguous cases.
collaboration in coalitions and influence their choice of causes, as common members act as brokers and foster trust between the organizations (Heaney and Rojas 2008). Second, these network ties facilitate the flow of information – useful news as well as destructive gossip between the organizations (Burt 2005). Third, as Truman (1951, pp. 156-187) explains, overlapping memberships deeply affect cohesion within political organizations. Overlapping memberships may provide a source of stability for the party if, for example, closely aligned subgroups within the network support the party leadership’s agenda. Alternatively, cohesive groupings may serve to excite factionalism if they seek to drive conflicting agendas. These considerations suggest that overlapping organizational memberships within a party are relevant to understanding its informal political structure.

In the next three sections, we test whether there are differences in the size, structure, and content of Democratic and Republican Party networks. Comparisons of size reveal differences in the extent to which party activists turn to political organizations, social movement organizations, interest groups, or political advocacy groups. Comparisons of structure illuminate variations in how the parties organize their networks into a broader political system. Comparisons of content yield insight into which political interests utilize party networks and shed light on the raw materials used to assemble coalitions within the parties.

Network Size

We hypothesize that the size of the Democratic Party’s organizational network will be larger than the Republican Party’s network. The basis of this hypothesis is twofold. First, differences in state-level delegate-selection rules matter (Carsey, Green, Herrera, and Layman 2006). While organized interests play a key role in delegate selection in both parties, they play a relatively more extensive role within the Democratic Party than within the Republican Party (Shafer 1988, pp. 108-147). We expect that more interest-group recruitment of delegates at the DNC is likely to yield
more interest-linked delegates in the Democratic Party. Second, we expect that opportunities for
membership matter. While conservative citizens’ advocacy organizations have been on the rise in
recent years, liberal advocacy organizations still greatly outnumber them (Berry 1999). Given that
Democrats have more chances to join organizations that support their causes and that organized
interests play a larger role in Democratic than Republican delegate selection, we hypothesize that
Democratic delegates will, on average, be members of more organizations than Republicans, and
thus that the Democratic organizational network will be larger than the Republican network. We
begin by considering whether differences exist at the individual level between the personal networks
of activists in the two parties. These personal networks are referred to as “ego networks.” In the
organizational networks we examine here, an ego network consists of the list of organizations of
which an individual is a member. Thus, if individuals in one party have a greater propensity to join
organizations than do individuals in the other party, then the ego networks in one party will be larger
than those in the other.

In our survey, 44.31% of delegates did not have any memberships in political organizations,
27.37% had a membership in one organization, and 28.32% had memberships in more than one
organization. On average, each respondent was a member of 1.06 organizations. At the maximum,
one respondent indicated that she had memberships in eight political organizations. Breaking these
results out by party reveals that Democratic and Republican delegates join political organizations at

---

8 This statement pertains only to citizens’ advocacy organizations. If business, trade, and
professional organizations are included in the count, then the proportion of conservative
organizations increases substantially.

9 This rate of participation in political organizations (55.69%) is roughly of the same order of
magnitude as reported in other studies of activist participation. For example, Heaney and Rojas
(2007, p. 447) find that 63% of antiwar protesters held some kind of organizational membership.
different rates. On average, Democratic delegates were members of 1.22 political organizations per person, while Republican delegates were members of 0.90 political organizations. Thus, Democrats join 35.55% more political organizations per person than do Republicans, making their ego networks larger, on average. This difference of means is statistically significant ($t=3.3957, p\leq 0.001$).

To test whether this difference between Democratic and Republican delegates’ organizational affiliations is statistically significant once we take other explanations for joining organizations into account, we regressed the number of organizations joined by a person on party membership, sex/gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, and income. The results, reported in Table 1, reveal that Democratic delegates remain significantly more likely than Republican delegates to join political organizations. The analysis reveals that female delegates are more likely to be members of organizations as well, but shows that no other variables are statistically significant.$^{10}$

The results in Table 1 demonstrate that Democratic delegates have larger ego networks of political organizations than do Republican delegates. This finding – that Democratic delegates are more likely to be members of political organizations – is consistent with the view of the Democratic Party as the party of interest groups (Freeman 1986). This difference may partly be explained by differences in national-level delegate-selection rules. Democratic delegate-selection rules ensure that

---

$^{10}$ We estimated the regression with a Negative Binomial Model because this is an appropriate model when the dependent variable takes the form of a “count” (Cameron and Trivedi 1998: 70-72). We imputed missing data using complete case imputation (constrained to the possible intervals of the data) to avoid the selection biases caused by “dropped” observations (Wood, White, Hillsdon, and Carpenter 2005). More sophisticated imputation routines, such as Bayesian multiple imputation, are not required in this case because missing cases are a relatively small percentage of the sample (King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve 2001).
male and female delegates are equivalent in number, while the Republicans have no such rule. As a result, our sample at the DNC is comprised of 53.49% women and 46.51% men, while our sample at the RNC is 67.99% men and 32.01% women. Since women are significantly more likely than men to report memberships in political organizations in our sample (t=2.4721, p≤0.014), the difference in the gender composition of the parties helps to tip network size to the Democrats.\textsuperscript{11} At the same time, the multivariate model reported in Table 1 shows that although both gender and party are significant predictors of membership, being a Democratic delegate remains significant, so gender does not explain the difference entirely.

Our findings highlight the circularity of the party-group joining process. Democrats join more political organizations than do Republicans. At the same time, the Democratic Party seems to do more to encourage people who are members of non-party organizations to become delegates. Because liberal organizations are more numerous than conservative ones, there are more opportunities of this type for liberals.

While Democrats report a greater number of memberships in political organizations, we do not claim that Democrats are, in general, “more networked” than are Republicans. Rather, our result shows that Democrats are more likely to participate in a particular network – the network of formal political organizations – than are Republicans. Indeed, Republicans may participate more than their Democratic counterparts in other kinds of politically relevant networks. For example, our survey showed that Republicans attend religious services more frequently than do Democrats, with 46.88% of Republicans attending services every week, and only 21.95% of Democrats attending services that often (t=7.3770, p≤0.001). Clearly, some (if not many) individuals attending worship services on a regular basis are likely to build networks that are politically relevant through these

\textsuperscript{11} This finding departs from some previous studies which show that men are more active participants than women in political organizations (e.g., Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995, p. 225).
events (Wilcox 2005). In this light, churches might be viewed as political organizations that consequently should have been included in the list of response options in our question. In fact, less than one half of one percent of our respondents listed a church in response to our open-ended question, suggesting that few delegates understand churches as explicitly political organizations. Churches were listed in response to our question three times by Republicans (a Presbyterian church, a Southern Baptist church, and one unspecified local church), while no Democratic respondent listed any church as a political organization. Thus, to understand religious networks more completely, we would have had to ask an additional question focused on identifying specific houses of worship and/or denominational affiliations. Given the data that we collected, we interpret our analysis as pertaining to one very important kind of network but, still, only one kind of network.12

Regardless of why Democrats are more closely connected with political organizations than are Republicans, the differences between Democrats and Republicans at the ego-network level matter at the whole-network level. Since each Democrat joins more organizations, on average, than does each Republican, consistent with our hypothesis, the overall Democratic network is larger than the Republican network. The main component (plus one organization) of the combined Democratic-Republican network is depicted graphically in Figure 1.13 Circles represent

12 Network analysts stress that networks are “multiplex”, which means that actors have several kinds of overlapping network ties (Gould 1991). Actors may have networks pertaining to friendship, resource exchange, kinship, co-membership, and so on. Network studies always focus on some subset of these ties which the researchers judge to be most relevant to the case in question.

13 The main component of a network is the largest, fully connected part of a network (J. Scott 2000). Consider that a single network may be made up of several components, some of which contain many nodes, others of which contain few nodes. The advantage of examining only the main component in a graph is that it allows the viewer to see the “main action” of the network without
organizations mentioned by Democratic delegates, squares represent organizations mentioned by Republican delegates, and triangles represent organizations mentioned at both conventions. The size of the shapes is scaled according to the number of mentions that they received in each network, with the thickness of the links between the organizations determined by the number of delegates with co-memberships in these organizations. While any one link in this network may be a random occurrence, we present this diagram because we believe that the overall pattern of connections is revealing of the nature of linkages among organizations within and between the parties.

 INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

Immediately apparent from the graph in Figure 1 is that organizations connected with the Democratic Party outnumber those connected with the Republican Party, with 238 organizations affiliating only with the Democratic Party, 184 organizations affiliating only with the Republican Party, and 12 organizations mentioned by delegates at both conventions. The Democrats’ numerical advantage exists because each individual is a member of more organizations, on average, including minor actors. While the mathematical analysis of the network should include all nodes, it may be illustrative to only visualize the main component in a diagram. In this case, we have visualized the main component of the network plus the Campaign for Liberty, since this is a relevant organization, even though it is not in the main component of the network.

14 The spring-embedding algorithm in Netdraw 2.046 was used to position organizations close to one another in the network if they have a similar pattern of memberships among delegates (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2009).

15 Not all of these organizations are visible in the graph because we have reported only the “main component” of the graph. A complete representation of the graph – minor components and isolates included – is available from the authors upon request.
and because their memberships are dispersed more widely among different organizations rather than being concentrated on a few peak organizations, as is the case in the Republican network.

**Network Structure**

To understand the differences between Democratic and Republican networks in more depth, we investigate whether there are differences in their structures. We hypothesize that Republican networks exhibit a more hierarchical pattern, while Democratic networks exhibit a more egalitarian pattern. These expectations derive from historical analyses of party behavior. For example, Freeman (1986) notes that Democratic conventions have experienced fights over credentials and legitimacy, while the Republicans usually rally around their nominee. Similarly, Shafer (1986) observes that Democratic delegates are more given to flamboyant displays of individualism, with Republicans preferring deference to authority and reliance on formal channels of communication.

The very concept of “network” rejects strict hierarchies and focuses instead on relationships (Powell 1990). Nonetheless, we can talk about a network having an organizational structure that is “more hierarchical” or “less hierarchical.” Consistent with W. Scott (1998, p. 91) and others who study organizations as “open systems,” our concept of hierarchy is one based on “clustering and levels.” Specifically, we measure the tendency for overlapping memberships to be organized into levels such that many people are members of one peak organization (or a series of peak organizations), but not co-members of the same secondary organizations (Siegel 2009).

Returning to Figure 1, a visual inspection of the graph suggests a difference between the organizational logics in the Democratic and Republican regions of the graph. In the Democratic region of the graph, egalitarian ties appear to be more prevalent. No one actor dominates the network too much, with peers connecting with each other widely across the graph. Organizations appear to connect with one another without needing to channel those contacts through a broker.

The Republican region of the network, in contrast, displays a stronger hierarchical tendency.
The National Federation of Republican Women (NFRW), the National Rifle Association (NRA), the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), and the RNC are relatively dominant actors in the network. They garner a disproportionate share of mentions from the delegates, with numerous actors connected to the network only through these leading organizations. This hierarchical pattern is replicated among smaller, less dominant actors, such as the Heritage Foundation and Concerned Women for America, which bridge a variety of less-commonly-mentioned organizations.

Differences in the degree of hierarchy between the Democratic and Republican networks can be understood, in part, by considering the leading organizations in both networks. Table 2 reports the top 11 organizations in the Democratic network and the top 10 organizations in the Republican network, in terms of the number of times the organizations were cited by delegates. As is evident in Table 2, no single organization dominates the Democratic list, as the leading five organizations are roughly at parity with one another. In contrast, the NFRW not only dominates the Republican network, but bests any Democratic organization in absolute terms. Similarly, the Republicans’ second-ranked NRA draws more support than any single organization in the Democratic network. We depict this difference in Figure 2, which shows the sharp falloff in citations in the Republican network relative to the Democratic one. These findings are especially notable given that Republicans have an overall lower propensity for organizational membership than do the Democrats. Republicans may be less likely to join organizations but, when they do so, they are drawn to a small number of leading ones.

Variations in the tendencies toward hierarchy may affect which organizations are close to the center of the network. The Democrats’ comparatively nonhierarchical structure makes the center of its network more open to newcomers than is the case in the Republican network. For example, two of the four organizations at the center of the Democratic network – MoveOn and the Stonewall...
Democrats – are relative newcomers, having been founded in 1998 and 1999 respectively. In contrast, all four of the leading organizations in the Republican network were at least 35 years old at the time of the survey in 2008. The fifth- and sixth-ranked organizations in the Republican network – the Young Republicans of America and the Campaign for Liberty – were founded more recently (2006 and 2008 respectively). However, the Campaign for Liberty – an organization founded by Republican member of Congress Ron Paul to advance his agenda – is not connected to the main component of the Republican network.16 This finding illustrates the extent to which Republican Party challengers are treated as outsiders.17

To formalize our analysis of hierarchy, we conducted a statistical test of the hierarchical tendencies of the Democratic and Republican networks. To do so, we use a statistical test that examines the “degree-degree correlation” of the network. An organization’s network “degree” is the number of ties that it has to other organizations. The degree-degree correlation approach assumes that a network has a “hierarchical tendency” when organizations with “high degree” (many network ties) are likely to connect with organizations of “low degree” (few network ties), but not with other organizations of equivalent degree. In contrast, a network is less hierarchical when organizations connect with organizations of equivalent degree. This measure reflects our notion of hierarchical networks as more divided into levels than focused on ties among peers. A degree-degree correlation of 1.00 would indicate a network among perfect equals (every actor has an equal degree), while a correlation of -1.0 would indicate a network of extreme inequality (the highest degree actor is tied

16 In general, we have not included organizations outside the main component of the network in Figure 1. However, we have done so in the case of the Campaign for Liberty because it was cited by eight delegates, despite its isolated status.

17 See Koger, Masket, and Noel (2009) for a similar finding regarding Howard Dean vis-à-vis the Democratic Party in 2004.
only to the smallest actors). Thus, if a correlation is relatively closer to 1.0, we can say that a network is comparatively more egalitarian, while a correlation closer to -1.0 indicates that a network is comparatively more hierarchical (see Han, Qian, and Liu 2009 for further details and justification).

Analysis of the Democratic network yielded a degree-degree correlation of 0.353, while the Republican network yielded a 0.101 correlation. Thus, consistent with our hypothesis, the Democratic network displays a significantly greater tendency toward connections among equals, while the Republican network displays a significantly more hierarchical tendency ($t=3.4229$, $p \leq 0.001$). To consider the possibility that the whole network and the main component of the network might differ in their tendencies toward hierarchy, we also examined the structure of the main component separately (i.e., the part of the network depicted in Figure 1). The degree-degree correlation in the main component only is 0.170 for the Democrats and -0.055 for the Republicans. This analysis also supports the expectation that the Republican network is significantly more hierarchical ($t=2.4648$, $p \leq 0.014$). While hierarchy is only one characteristic of network structure, it is an important one in this context. A more hierarchical structure may be superior for achieving coordination, unity, and dissemination of information. A more egalitarian structure, in contrast, is more prone to factionalism and the incorporation of diverse points of view.

Examining the differences between the two networks yields some insights into the comparatively disciplined behavior within the Republican Party and the comparatively factional behavior within the Democratic Party. Within the Democratic Party there is no clear center of power but, rather, a few close clusters of actors. The Young Democrats and the College Democrats lead a cadre of young delegates on the far left part of the network.\footnote{The graphical location of organizations in the network is determined on the basis of organizational co-membership, not ideology. However, the locations of organizations in this network correspond loosely with their ideological position on the left-to-right ideological spectrum.} NARAL Pro-Choice America
and the Human Rights Campaign are closely connected toward the center of the Democratic network. MoveOn and the Progressive Democrats of America are located near to important advocacy groups such as Amnesty International, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Sierra Club. Somewhat surprisingly, organized labor operates on the periphery of the network, with "Big Labor" organizations such as the AFL-CIO and Change to Win in the north central region, and organizations such as the National Education Association occupying the south left. The marginality of labor indicates that labor-affiliated delegates tend to work with their unions but are less inclined to join other major advocacy organizations than are other delegates. This multi-cephalous pattern suggests that Democrats are less likely than Republicans to marshal interest groups successfully on behalf of party-driven causes, in part, because informal organizational structures undermine coordination and rapid diffusion of information.

Within the Republican Party, power is centralized in a few key organizations. The NFRW is particularly critical to guiding women’s participation within the Republican Party. The NRA and the NRLC are unambiguously the leading interest groups. Formal party organizations, such as NFRW, the RNC, and the Young Republicans have a comparatively stronger position within the Republican network than comparable organizations have within the Democratic network. These patterns suggest that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to use their allied organizations for a clear political advantage because they have identifiable, leading organizations that can coordinate action and disseminate information.

Network Content

Networks are not mechanistic structures that dictate political outcomes, but are instead frameworks within which strategic political actors pursue their objectives. Understanding the role of
networks thus requires knowing who those actors are. Below, we examine whether Democratic and Republican networks differ substantially in their content, as reflected in organizational origins, forms, and goals. The most obvious difference in content between the two parties’ networks is that they do not share many actors in common. The two networks contain 436 organizations in total, yet share membership in only 12 organizations – a mere 2.75% in common. Five of these organizations were referenced by respondents only as generic organizational types (e.g., arts, education), leaving only seven specific organizations in common, which are reported in Table 3.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

The seven overlapping organizations listed in Table 3 reveal a great deal about the parties’ coalitions. In particular, each of the overlapping organizations is at least 47 years old, with a mean age of 102 years at the time of the survey in 2008. That is, these organizations arose well before the emergence of the political conflicts that currently separate the two parties. Perhaps more importantly, though, is that the degree of overlap is slight in each case. The NRA drew citations from delegates at both conventions, but 22 of its 23 citations came from Republicans. Similarly, 7 of the 9 citations of the NAACP came from Democrats. Thus, even among these “cross-party” organizations there is relatively little bipartisanship.

The organizational polarization reported in this study is further evidence of partisan polarization. At the same time, part of the explanation for why the parties have become increasingly polarized in recent years may be the lack of cross-cutting political organizations that have the potential to force the parties to converge on key issues (cf. Mutz 2002). If there were organizations with strong ties to both parties, then these groups might act as brokers on difficult policy issues (Heaney 2006). Such brokerage might occur informally as well. For example, if more Democrats and Republicans were members of the same organizations, there might be a greater basis for shared values and common understanding. Given the stark division in the network between the parties,
promises of cooperation appear quite bleak, suggesting a corollary of Truman’s (1951) argument discussed above: where there are few overlapping memberships, there is little basis for cohesion.

Beyond the identities of specific organizations in these networks, an analysis of the types of organizations in the networks is revealing of the parties’ similarities and differences. We coded organizations into 13 different organizational types – reported in Table 4 – while allowing individual organizations to be coded under multiple types. The most apparent similarity between the two networks is that both contain substantial heterogeneity in the types of actors that compose them, as postulated by the parties-as-networks view. Both networks contain a wide variety of organizational types, such as party auxiliary organizations (e.g., College Democrats, National Federation of Republican Women), traditional interest groups (e.g., NRA, NARAL Pro-Choice America), professional associations (e.g., National Association of Realtors, American Medical Association), civic associations (e.g., Rotary International, the Boy Scouts of America), and a variety of other organizational types. At least some (if not all) of these organizations are likely to be important to party decision making because they command the loyalties of key activists within the parties. The tripartite view of parties largely ignores these party participants, while the parties-as-networks view embraces them as central to the parties’ informal organizational structures.

Considering the differences, we found that the Democratic network is significantly more likely than the Republican network to contain organizations promoting organized labor or representing groups based on social identities or ascriptive inequalities (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, age). Further, the results show that the Republican network is more likely than is the Democratic network to include civic, religious, and professional associations. Neither network has a statistically significant advantage in drawing support from organizations designed to support parties, campaigns, ideological points of view, the environment, single-issues, veterans, students or youth, or governmental bodies (e.g., city parks commissions).
Conclusion

The parties-as-networks framework differs most starkly from the tripartite perspective in the greater role it ascribes to external actors, such as interest groups, social movements, media, political consultants, and advocacy organizations. If these actors are truly important to the governance of and positions taken by parties, then it is important to understand how they interact within the party system. We have attempted to deepen our understanding of parties by highlighting the relevance of external actors and by modeling how it is they relate to the party vis-à-vis party organizations. Although the Democratic Party is commonly thought of as the party of interest groups, such organizations clearly play a role in both parties. Our network analysis yields important insights about how these organizational roles are constituted.

First, network analysis exposes the informal centers of power of the party. Our analysis reveals that any investigation of the organization-party ties within the Republican Party ought to begin with the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the National Federation of Republican Women (NFRW). The NRA is solidly connected to other major Republican organizations, including NFRW, the NRLC, the RNC, and smaller organizations active in Republican politics. At the same time, it has connections with non-partisan and liberal organizations, such as Rotary International, the AARP, the Sierra Club, and the American Medical Association. The NRA’s political power appears, then, to come not only from its important position among Republicans, but also from its cross linkages with other organizations at a time when such overlapping memberships are uncommon. In contrast, the NFRW is more deeply embedded within the Republican network than the NRA, and is primarily connected with other Republican interests. These observations suggest that these two conservative organizations are likely to garner different patterns of support within the party, potentially affecting the ways in which they influence the party agenda.
Second, systematic analysis of external actors within the party generates an additional
dimension for analyzing party differences. Political scientists have long observed differences in the
“culture” of the parties. For example, they have noted that Republicans tend be more comfortable
than Democrats in leaving important party decisions up to party leaders, while Democrats seem to
prefer aspects of internal democracy (Freeman 1986). More recently, scholars have suggested that
differences between the parties are related to genetic variations among their members (Alford, Funk,
and Hibbing 2005; Settle, Dawes, and Fowler 2009). The parties-as-networks approach offers a
framework for interpreting variations in culture as the result of the interactions of party members
with organizations, rather than as essential individual differences (cf. Wedeen 2002).

Third, network analysis provides a window into the evolution of each of the two major
parties. Although we do not have access to information about party networks from earlier
conventions, organizational age yields partial insights on evolution. This kind of change is most
clearly evident within the Democratic network. The movement of MoveOn.org and Stonewall
Democrats to the center of the network, a mere decade after their founding, reflects important
evolution. MoveOn’s rise is especially notable, as its Internet origins and informal organizational
structure suggests the increasing centrality of the relatively young “netroots” as constituency within
the Democratic Party (Chadwick 2007). A slightly different interpretation might be given to the rise
of Stonewall Democrats, founded in 1998 by a high-ranking party-insider, Congressman Barney
Frank. It suggests that lesbian and gay interests are moving toward a position of parity with many
other Democratic interests, at least in terms of voice, if not yet influence.

Insights about the evolution of each party may also be gained from which organizations are
*not* central to the network. We were stunned that the National Organization for Women (NOW)
was mentioned only once by Democratic delegates. NOW’s peripheral status would have been
inconceivable in the 1970s and 1980s when it was a major mover of the Democratic agenda.
This result may reflect a "mainstreaming," or even “capture,” of feminist issues within the Democratic Party or, alternatively, attempts on the part of female party activists to find new vehicles for representing women within the party (Frymer 1999; Goss and Heaney 2010; Strolovitch 2007). Thinking about the strategic place of interest groups within parties – groups’ goals and how those relate to the parties or not – is essential to understanding party evolution over time (Clemens 1997).

More research is needed to understand party network evolution more thoroughly. Including network-oriented questions in quadrennial surveys of delegates would be a first step in this direction. It is important to distinguish between those elements of party network structures that are fairly stable and those that might vary depending on the candidates in a particular election. For example, how might the Republican network change if the party nominated Sarah Palin as its candidate in 2012? Would “tea party” organizations become more central to the Republican network? How much more central? Alternatively, could the rise of the tea party movement make Sarah Palin a more prominent leader among delegates? Replication of our analysis at future conventions could yield insight into these kinds of questions.

More generally, the results that we have presented suggest that, in the wake of the interest group "explosion" of the 1960s and 1970s (Berry 1999), the tripartite view of parties offered by V. O. Key is – or at least has become – incomplete. By neglecting the informal roles of actors external to parties, the tripartite perspective neglects an important aspect of representation in American politics. Parties, interest groups, social movements, and other political organizations interact within

---

19 The failure to identify many NOW activists was not the fault of the research design. Female delegates made up over half of the sample. Moreover, we conducted surveys at meetings of the women’s caucus. Other women-dominated organizations, such NARAL Pro-Choice America (11 delegates) and Planned Parenthood (6 delegates), were well represented.
the spaces created by parties to attempt to advance issues, interests, and personalities. The parties-as-networks framework helps to generate a more coherent view of interaction as these actors co-evolve with one another, adapting to changing demands for representation across varied dimensions (e.g., interest, issue, ideology, race, class, gender, geography, industry). Knowledge of the differences between the size, structure, and content of each party's networks provides a step toward fuller understanding of the evolving representative functions of American political parties.

References


Koger, Gregory, Seth E. Masket, and Hans Noel. 2009. Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and


Shafer, Byron. 1986. Republicans and Democrats as Social Types; or Notes toward an Ethnography of the Political Parties. *Journal of American Studies* 20: 341-54.


Table 1. Determinants of Delegates’ Memberships in Political Organizations  
Negative Binomial Estimation with Complete Case Imputation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Regression Results</th>
<th>Descriptive Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Memberships in Political Organizations</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Std. Err.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party = Democratic</td>
<td>0.2686</td>
<td>0.0982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex/Gender = Woman</td>
<td>0.2291</td>
<td>0.0956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age in Years</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American/Indian</td>
<td>0.1379</td>
<td>0.2225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White/Caucasian</td>
<td>0.2546</td>
<td>0.1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African American</td>
<td>-0.0916</td>
<td>0.2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/Hispanic</td>
<td>0.0344</td>
<td>0.2192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0.2919</td>
<td>0.2819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>-0.0070</td>
<td>0.0366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Income in thousands of dollars</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.3926</td>
<td>0.2922</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent variable ($\mu, \sigma$)  
N 738  
\(\alpha\) 0.4869 0.0877  
Likelihood Ratio \(\chi^2\) (df=10) 61.08*** 30.09***  
Log Likelihood -1031.6422

Note:  
*** denotes p <0.001  
** denotes p <0.010  
* denotes p <0.050
Figure 1. Organizational Co-memberships of Democratic and Republican Delegates, 2008

Legend

- Organization Mentioned by Democratic Delegate(s)
- Organization Mentioned by Republican Delegate(s)
- Organization Mentioned by Both Democratic and Republican Delegates
- The Organizations Connected by Lines Share a Member or Members
Table 2. Organizations Most Frequently Cited by Delegates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizations Cited by Democratic Delegates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Stonewall Democrats</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>StoneDems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>College Democrats of America</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>CollegeDems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Organized Labor (AFL-CIO, Change to Win)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Young Democrats of America</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>YoungDems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>MoveOn</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>MoveOn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>National Education Association</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>NEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Human Rights Campaign</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>HRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>NARAL Pro-Choice America</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>NARAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>NAACP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sierra Club</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>Sierra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Progressive Democrats of America</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>PDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizations Cited by Republican Delegates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National Federation of Republican Women</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>NFRW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Rifle Association</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>NRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>National Right to Life Committee</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>NatRtLf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Republican National Committee</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>RNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Young Republicans of America</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>YoungReps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Campaign for Liberty</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Camp4Lib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Heritage Foundation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Boy Scouts of America</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>BoyScouts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>McCain Victory Team</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>McCainVicTm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Multiple Organizations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2. Number of Citations for Most Highly Ranked Organizations

![Bar chart showing the number of citations for most highly ranked organizations by Democrats and Republicans. The x-axis represents the rank, and the y-axis represents the number of citations by delegates. The chart compares the number of citations for Democrats and Republicans across different ranks.](image-url)
Table 3. Organizations Cited Both by Democratic and Republican Delegates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Democratic Citations</th>
<th>Republican Citations</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
<th>Abbreviation In Figure 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>National Rifle Association</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td>NRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>National Association for Advancement of Colored People</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>NAACP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sierra Club</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>Sierra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AARP (formerly American Association for Retired Persons)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>AARP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>American Medical Association</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1847</td>
<td>NRA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rotary International</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Rotary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Amnesty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Differences in Network Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Type</th>
<th>Democratic Network</th>
<th>Republican Network</th>
<th>Difference of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Auxiliary Organization</td>
<td>39.92%</td>
<td>42.93%</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Organization</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Organization</td>
<td>10.08%</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
<td>-3.56***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Organization</td>
<td>28.99%</td>
<td>20.11%</td>
<td>-2.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Organization</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
<td>3.26%</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Association</td>
<td>1.26%</td>
<td>7.07%</td>
<td>3.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Organization</td>
<td>0.84%</td>
<td>7.07%</td>
<td>3.47***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Organization</td>
<td>4.62%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Organization</td>
<td>18.07%</td>
<td>15.22%</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Association</td>
<td>5.88%</td>
<td>13.04%</td>
<td>2.56*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Organization</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>-1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student or Youth Organization</td>
<td>6.72%</td>
<td>4.34%</td>
<td>-1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Body</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=422

Note: Includes only organizations that do not appear in both networks.

*** denotes p <0.001
**  denotes p<0.010
*   denotes p<0.050