| Jowei Chen |
Assistant Professor,
Department of Political Science,
University of Michigan, 2009-
Department of Political Science,
University of Michigan, 2009-
| Contact: |
Jowei Chen
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
5700 Haven Hall
505 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045
Telephone: (917) 861-7712
Email: jowei@umich.edu
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
5700 Haven Hall
505 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045
Telephone: (917) 861-7712
Email: jowei@umich.edu
Current Research Areas (Abstracts)
1. Vote Buying in United States Elections:
When Do Government Benefits Influence Voters' Behavior?
The Effect of FEMA Disaster Awards on US Presidential Votes. (Under Review)
Blog Reactions:
Andrew Gelman,
The Monkey Cage,
Matthew Iglesias,
Portfolio.com,
Lawyers, Guns and Money
FEMA hurricane disaster aid increases Bush votes among core Republicans, but not among Democrats or nonpartisans. FEMA also awards disproportionately more aid to Republican applicants, even conditioning on hurricane severity. Full Abstract.
FEMA hurricane disaster aid increases Bush votes among core Republicans, but not among Democrats or nonpartisans. FEMA also awards disproportionately more aid to Republican applicants, even conditioning on hurricane severity. Full Abstract.
Are Poor Voters Easier to Buy Off?
A Natural Experiment from the 2004 Florida Hurricane Season. (Under Review)
Government monetary awards converted poor voters into Bush supporters in November 2004. Full Abstract
2. The Geographic Targeting of Pork Barrel Projects:
The Law of k/n:
The Effect of Chamber Size on Government Spending in Bicameral Legislatures. (with Neil Malhotra)
American Political Science Review. Vol. 101, No. 4: p. 657-676. Abstract
Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 54, No. 2.
Abstract
Split Delegation Bias:
Working Paper. Abstract
3. The Electoral Geography of Legislative Districting:
Tobler's Law, Urbanization, and Electoral Bias:
Why Compact, Contiguous Districts are Bad for the Democrats. (with Jonathan Rodden)
We conduct legislative districting simulations using only the apolitical criteria of drawing compact and contiguous districts. We show that the Republican party naturally wins a disproportionately large share of legislative seats in Florida, even without gerrymandering. This result emerges because Democratic voters tend to live in highly concentrated, urban cores, thus "wasting" their electoral strength on a small number of landslide Democratic districts. Republican voters are geographically dispersed more evenly throughout the hinterlands, allowing the Republican party to win a disproportionate share of districts by a slight margin.