CHAPTER II
EMBEDDINGS

There are a number of interesting generalizations to be made regarding the behavior of verbs embedding\textsuperscript{1} generics. We begin with statives. In general, stative embedding predicates are free to embed either generic or non-generic sentences. Some examples are:

(1) Bill preferred to walk to school.
(2) Bill needed to walk to school.
(3) Bill hesitated to walk to school.
(4) Bill intended to walk to school.
(5) Bill expected John to walk to school.
(6) Bill wanted John to walk to school.
(7) Bill appreciated walking to school.
(8) Bill risked walking to school.
(9) Bill regretted walking to school.
(10) Bill happened to walk to school.

All of the above sentences are ambiguous, and may either refer to one act of walking, or to a series of such acts. It will be noted that all the above sentences are past tense; this is because there is some variation in the behavior of verbs (both active and stative) in their generic-embedding properties according to the tense of the verb.

On the whole, the generalization stated above holds, even
in the present tense, but as we can see, it does not hold for all cases:

(11) Bill happens to walk to school. (cf (10))
(12) Bill seems to walk to school.
(13) Bill appears to walk to school.
(14) Bill tends to walk to school.

The complements in (11)-(14) are all unambiguously generic, although happen in the past is ambiguous. seem, appear, and tend, on the other hand, normally are not ambiguous even in the past.

(15) Bill seemed to walk to school.
(16) Bill appeared to walk to school.
(17) Bill tended to walk to school.

There is one sense of seem and appear in which it is possible to read (15) and (16) as referring to one act of walking to school; that is the only seem reading. That is, the reading in which seem or appear is used to contrast with what we understand to be the real state of things, generally with contrastive stress, and generally dealing with visual sense data. The individual-act reading is possible here (in fact, the generic reading seems to be impossible on this reading) because it is difficult to imagine visual data referring to a series of acts characterized as "habitual" or characteristic; normally such misleading evidence refers to one occasion of an action. There is no such reading possible for tend, of course, which always has a generic complement; in fact, tend appears to be a generic itself, of some sort.
There are two other cases that I know of where a verb which is not a generic active has special requirements about the nature of its complement. These are the epistemic must and should. This was not discussed above with the other statives with the same property, since these are modals and pose special problems for analysis. In addition, the facts are rather weird.

Epistemic (but not root) must embeds either a generic or a stative; similarly, epistemic (but not root) should embeds either a non-generic or a stative. Other epistemic modals, as a rule, can embed only actives or volitional statives, and the actives may be either generic or not. (18) is predictably ambiguous between root and epistemic readings:

(18) Bill{should}{walk to school.
    {may
    {must

(Of the other primary modals, can does not give epistemic readings in the present tense except in negative-polarity environments and will does not give root readings--they will be discussed below.) In their root senses, the modals in (18) are also ambiguous between generic and non-generic readings of the complement, as shown by:

(19) Bill must (=obliged to) walk to school,
    a) because his father has the car today. (−gen)
    b) because his father won't let him drive until he's 23. (gen)

(20) Bill should walk to school, (=ought to)
    a) because it's such a nice day. (−gen)
b) because it's only a block away. (gen)

(21) Bill may walk to school, (=allowed to)

a) because it's such a nice day. (−gen)
b) because since his family moved next door to the school, they're not worried anymore about his being mugged. (gen)

Similarly, epistemic may (possible) is ambiguous:

(22) Bill may walk to school (=possible)

a) because it's such a nice day. (−gen)
b) because it's only a block away. (gen)

Note that in the (a) cases of (19)–(22), today may be appended to the sentence without changing the meaning, since they are non-generic, while in the (b) cases, every day can be added in the same way, since they tend to be generic.

Similarly, the root can is ambiguous in both its deontic and ability senses; can (=allowed) is substitutable in (21) without change of meaning, and is ambiguous between generic and non-generic in a way exactly parallel to root may, and (23) shows that the same is true of can (=able to):

(23) Bill can walk to school, (=able to)

a) tomorrow, since they've fitted him with prosthetics. (−gen)
b) and I'm going to see to it that he does so every day. (gen)

Admittedly, the qualifications necessary to get a single-occurrence reading for ability can are a bit bizarre, but this is because this modal predicates a property of the subject, and it is somewhat difficult to conceive of circumstances in which the property is temporary. Nevertheless, I think it is fairly clear that can in this sense need not refer to a series of actions, although it is
certainly capable of doing so.

Epistemic *can* occurs (normally) only in negative environments (loosely defined), and when it does, it is similarly ambiguous:

(24) Bill can't walk to school. (=not possible)
    a) because today he's going to give me a ride. (-gen)
    b) because he gives Fred a ride every day. (gen)

It is obvious that the epistemic future *will* of (25) can refer to either generic or non-generic readings:

(25) Bill will walk to school,
    a) today. (-gen)
    b) (every day) next year. (gen)

and the root reading which is present in negatives, as in (26), is likewise ambiguous:

(26) Bill won't walk to school, (=not willing to)
    a) because his feet are sore, and he's pissed off. (-gen)
    b) because he's protesting the President's physical-fitness policy. (gen)

However, the epistemic uses of *should* and *must* show a fascinating diversity in their requirements on the genericity of the complement. As noted, both can embed statives:

(27) Bill should be tall, because both his parents are over 7'6".

(28) Bill must be tall, because I heard his girlfriend has to use a ladder to kiss him.

However, due to the differences in the evidence used to reach the conclusions reported by *should* and *must* in their epistemic senses, and of the nature of the corroborating evidence they predict, there is a difference in the type of actives they
may embed. Both must and should in this sense refer to conclusions about present or future states or behavior, and both can be paraphrased (poorly) by probable or certain, but must reports a conclusion based on inductive evidence, while should reports one based on deductive reasoning. Thus the differences between the proper uses of (29) (due to R. Lakoff):

(29)a John must be easy to talk to.
   b John should be easy to talk to.

As Lakoff points out (1972), (29)a is usable in a situation in which the speaker hears noises emanating from John's office which seem to indicate that someone is communicating freely and easily with John, although he cannot be sure that this is necessarily the cause, having never spoken to John. (29)b is the wrong way to report this conclusion, but it is the proper way (and (29)b the wrong one) to report a conclusion on the part of the speaker based on knowledge that John's experience is of such a nature that it would predispose him to be easy to talk to in the situation he wants to assure the listener about. If, for example, he knew that John had suffered in school because his advisors had been distant, critical, and unhelpful, and that he had resolved that, as a professor, he would be the opposite, (29)b (but not (29)a) would be appropriate as a reassurance of someone about to talk to John about something academic for the first time.

There are a number of points to be raised about this insightful observation. First, even though (29)a and b may
be used in the same conversational situation (to reassure someone about to talk to John), the grammatical phenomena are different. Note that the subject of talk to in (29)a is an indefinite; what is being conveyed is that John is easy for anyone (someone) to talk to, and therefore the listener may take advantage of the entailment that John will in fact be easy for him to talk to. This is not the case with (29)b, where you can be the understood subject without inference. That is, (30)a and b refer to quite different propositions:

(30)a  John must be easy for you to talk to.
       b  John should be easy for you to talk to.

(30)b is a paraphrase of (29)b, and is suitable for reassurance; (30)a is not the same at all as (29)a, and it will not do as a statement to reassure the listener. It reports a completely different conclusion on the part of the speaker, and has to be based on his knowledge that the listener has, in fact, talked to John already. In fact, the must refers to past activity, while the should in (30) refers to the future. Now although it is true that the easy to talk to construction is present in both the a and b sentences, it is not the case that they refer to identical times. In fact, it appears that the complement of should is non-generic, while the complement of must is generic. That is, (30)a describes something that is true in a timeless sense, while (30)b describes something that (we hope) will be true in the future, at least once. Since the active nature
of the easy to talk to construction is not above criticism, and since we are discussing here genericity as a property of active verbs, perhaps we need to investigate how these modals work with unambiguously active verbs. Lakoff again provides us with some examples:

(31) John should get tenure.

(32) *John must get tenure.

The astericity of (32) depends on its being read as an epistemic; in that reading, it is quite anomalous, since getting tenure is something that can happen only once to any given person, and therefore cannot be read as generic when the subject is a singular definite NP. Returning to Bill's familiar walks to school, we find that neither (33) nor (34) is ambiguous:

(33) Bill must walk to school. (gen)

(34) Bill should walk to school. (-gen)

(in the epistemic senses of the modals). Let us construct situations in which we would expect to find a generic use of the modals, and contrast them with situations which should evoke non-generic uses.

a)(should+non-generic) You and I are discussing Bill's weight; you are worried that he does not get enough exercise. I happen to know that Bill's mother has identical feelings, and that, in fact, she has stated her intention to get Bill to walk to school today, just for him to see how easy and pleasant it is. I say (34) to inform you that I think he will walk today.
b) (must+generic) You have the same worries as in (a). I know that Bill has no car, and nobody to pick him up, so although I do not know for a fact that Bill habitually walks to school, I say (33) to assure you that he does, in fact, get some exercise.

So far, so good. These are the uses that we have observed, and it is easy to construct situations in which they can occur. But what of the other cases, should+generic and must+non-generc? The following situational contexts should produce these uses, but we see that they do not work.

c) (should+generic)
You have the same worries as usual. I know that Bill's mother and father both want him to get a lot of exercise, and that they have in fact pronounced themselves satisfied with his progress. Since the school is within easy walking distance, I feel convinced that it is probable that he walks every day. I utter (34) to reassure you. (?)

d) (must+non-generic)
You have the usual worries. Since I tried to call Bill this morning at a time when he is usually home, and found that he had left for school, and since I know that he isn't here yet, and that he usually is when he drives, I say (33) to tell you that Bill is getting some exercise, anyway. (?)
I find that in the situations (c) and (d), even though there should be a possibility for epistemic use of the modals in the appropriate senses, (33) and (34) are not appropriate. Even with the appropriate time (in (d)) and frequency (in (c)) adverbs, these will not answer.

(35) *Bill must walk to school today.

(36) *Bill should walk to school every day.

(again, the asterisks are awarded only on the epistemic readings, which are predictably hard to get). It is interesting to note that the proper use of the epistemic modals in each case involves the progressive:

(37) Bill should be walking to school every day. (now)

(38) Bill must be walking to school today.

Why this should be is not obvious; we might expect a progressive in the non-generic case of (38) (responsive to (d), but not in the generic, since the progressive is notoriously the form par excellence for reporting action in progress, the "real" present tense, which is the diametric opposite of the usage of generics. What is happening here, I think, is that the stativity of the progressive be allows the complements of (37) and (38) to be embedded under the epistemic modals. We can see this by noting that both (37) and (38) are ambiguous between generic and non-generic complement readings. The (accidental) fact that the progressive is stative allows the normally forbidden readings to be made.

It might be objected that there are counterexamples to
to the claim that must embeds only generics, namely the (fairly common) construction in which a conclusion is stated with epistemic must, and then the reasons are explicated: such as (39):

(39) Jerry must arrive at 6:00, or you'd be scurrying around trying to clean up now.

Such a construction is possible with a sentence like (33), as in (40):

(40) Bill must walk to school *(today), or you wouldn't let his sister have the car.

Note that the sense of both (39) and (40) is that something is scheduled to happen, and it is known in advance; one of the familiar uses of the will-less future. Also, the time adverb is necessary in (40) in order to avoid the otherwise obligatory generic reading. In all such cases, paraphrases with must be going to V, must have to V, or must be V-ing, are possible; this is not the case in general with conclusions reported by epistemic must. I hypothesize that some future modal is present in these constructions, which further complicates the situation, as well as giving an overtly stative verb for immediate embedding under the epistemic must.

An interesting fact relating to all this data on the modals conconcerns the paraphrases of the modals should and must. While it has been noted before that the respective paraphrases ought to and have to are not exact, in a number of ways, I do not think the difference vis-à-vis genericity has been discussed. Briefly, although ought to and have to are more frequent paraphrases of the modals in their root
senses, as in (41) below,

(41)a Bill has to stay home and clean his room.
b John ought to go to church every Sunday; it's good for him.

they can, on occasion, paraphrase the epistemic uses of the modals, as in (42):

(42)a That has to be the longest home run ever hit in this park.\(^3\)
b That ought to be all for today.

Note that they can also paraphrase (29), and are usable under precisely the same circumstances as the modals should and must in these sentences:

(43)a John has to be easy to talk to.
b John ought to be easy to talk to.

(It appears that heavy stress on have in (42) and (43) is necessary to get an epistemic reading—we will assume it hereafter.)

The interesting fact is that the paraphrases do not share the restrictions that the modals have on the genericity of the complement; both ought to and have to may embed either generic or non-generic complements.

(44)a Bill has to walk to school.
b Bill ought to walk to school.

\(\#4\)a and b are ambiguous, as shown by the following dis-ambiguating additions:

(44)a 1 ...today--why else would he let you have the car? (\(-\text{gen}\))
2 ...--nobody in their right mind would drive 200 feet. (\text{gen})

(44)b 1 ...today--he does it every Wednesday. (\(-\text{gen}\))
2 ...--I know he's crazy about exercise. (\text{gen})

I do not have any idea why the paraphrases should (or must) work this way; as far as I can see, no property which the
paraphrases have that the modals don’t will account for the behavior of the paraphrases with generics.

Note also the paraphrases certain, likely, and supposed to, as well as thought to, said to, believed to, all of which raise to subject position (although not directly in all cases).

(45)a Bill is {certain} to walk to school.
   b Bill is supposed to walk to school.

(45)a is ambiguous; (45)b, in its epistemic sense, as a paraphrase of said to, is ambiguous as well. But (46), which means about the same thing as (45)b, is unambiguously generic:

(46) Bill is {thought} to walk to school.
   said

I have no explanation for these facts.

One (possible) generalization is that predicates which govern raising to subject position require, for the most part, generics in the complement. This does not allow for the behavior of most of the modals, or of their paraphrases, nor for the behavior of happen in the past, but does seem to be true in many cases.4

There are two exceptions which are polarity items: care and afford. care can only be used (with a complement, at least) in "negative" context, loosely defined, and afford requires a modal of possibility of some sort (cf. Horn 1972). Both of these are stative, although some of the usual tests are difficult to apply in these environments, and for the most part, they both are free to embed either
generics or non-generics. But in the present, with gerunds, they require generics.

(47) Does Bill care to walk to school? (g v -g)
(48) Did Bill care to walk to school? (g v -g)
(49) Did Bill care for walking to school? (g v -g)
(50) Does Bill care for walking to school? (g only)

(47)-(49) can refer either to a generic or a single act; (50) is generic.

(51) Bill can't afford to buy beer. (g v -g)
(52) Bill can't afford buying beer. (g only)
(53) ?Bill can't have afforded to buy beer. (g v -g)
(54) ??Bill can't have afforded buying beer. (g v -g)

Although (53) and (54) are anomalous syntactically, they clearly can refer to either a single act or a sequence, as can (51), although the present gerund must refer to a generic.5 It is interesting to note that with the past above the can, which is the normal way to express the meanings of (53)-(54), the restriction of (52) remains:

(55) Bill couldn't afford to buy beer. (g v -g)
(56) Bill couldn't afford buying beer. (g only)

which shows that the restriction is on the immediate tense of the verb.

I have no explanation for these facts either.

The other exceptions I have noted are all stative verbs of emotion, although it is not true by any means that all such verbs are aberrant. Here both type of complementizer and tense of verb are deciding factors:
(57) Bill likes to walk to school. (g only)
(58) Bill likes walking to school. (g only)\(^6\)
(59) Bill liked to walk to school. (g only)
(60) Bill liked walking to school. (g v -g)

Similarly, love and enjoy (with gerund only, of course) work like like:

(61) Bill loves to walk to school. (g only)
(62) Bill loved to walk to school. (g only)
(63) Bill loved/enjoyed walking to school. (g v -g)
(64) Bill loves/enjoys walking to school. (g only)\(^6\)

It is significant that the verbs prefer and appreciate, otherwise similar to like and its ilk (indeed, prefer is often analyzed as like better), are unexceptionable in their behavior, being free to embed either generics or non-generics in all their uses:

(65) Bill prefers to walk to school. (g v -g)
(66) Bill preferred to walk to school. (g v -g)
(67) Bill prefers/appreciates walking to school. (g v -g)
(68) Bill preferred/appreciated walking to school. (g v -g)

Finally, although love and like work similarly, the respective negative lexicalizations, hate and dislike, are unique in their behavior. Where love and like require generics, except in the past with gerunds, hate and dislike require generics only with an infinitive, regardless of tense. The use of an infinitive with dislike is possible in the (minority) dialect that I speak, but in many other dialects,
only gerunds are possible. It is important to note that don't like, presumably identical to dislike, even in my dialect, works like like, thus showing a difference from dislike.

(69) Bill hated to walk to school. (g v -g)
(70) Bill hated walking to school. (g v -g)
(71) Bill hates to walk to school. (g only)
(72) Bill hates walking to school. (g only)
(73) Bill dislikes walking to school. (g v -g)
(74) Bill disliked walking to school. (g v -g)
(75) %Bill dislikes to walk to school. (g only)
(76) %Bill disliked to walk to school. (g only)
(77) Bill doesn't like to walk to school. (g only)
(78) Bill didn't like to walk to school. (g only)
(79) Bill doesn't like walking to school. (g only)
(80) Bill didn't like walking to school. (g v -g)

It is possible that the readings of dislike which are different from those of like or don't like can be made to agree, in that it seems that the sense of the non-generic reading of (73) is that Bill disliked having to walk to school; that is, he was displeased with the fact that he was not allowed to do something different on that particular occasion. It is (almost) possible for me to get a similar non-generic reading of (80), which is the contrasting case with don't like; so this may not be a contrast at all, although why such a reading is possible in the first place, or why it should facilitate a non-generic reading
in the second place, are still mysteries, as is the behavior of hate.

The behavior of actives with embedded generics is also interesting, and illuminates many features of these verbs that have not been noticed before. The first case we will consider is the use of generics embedded under past-tense active verbs. In general, these verbs may embed either generics or non-generics. Examples:

(81) Bill prepared to walk to school.
(82) Bill requested to walk to school.
(83) Bill decided to walk to school.
(84) Bill managed to walk to school.
(85) Bill warned John to walk to school.
(86) Bill allowed John to walk to school.
(87) Bill forced John to walk to school.
(88) Bill instructed John to walk to school.
(89) Bill admitted walking to school.
(90) Bill suggested walking to school.
(91) Bill tried walking to school.
(92) Bill authorized John('s) walking to school.

(81)-(92) are all ambiguous, referring either to a habitual walking to school, or to one occasion. Note, however, that the nature of the relationship between the time of the performance of the higher verb and the time referred to in the complement varies in these sentences, as do the implications as to performance, possibility, and feelings of the actor regarding the walking to school. This is to be expected, given such a variety of verbs, but we shall see
that such differences play a crucial part in explaining even those few exceptions we can see reasons for. We will treat all exceptions at the end of the discussion; we proceed now to a consideration of present tense.

Since the generic is by and large a phenomenon of the present tense of active verbs (with uses in other constructions that can, hopefully, be explained by reference to the present)\(^8\), we would expect the phenomena regarding the embedding of sentences under generics to be of extreme interest--and they are. But there is a puzzling plethora of cases in which the present tense of embedding verbs is not generic, in the sense we have been discussing here; it does not refer to a series of actions, but rather to a state of some sort, and in fact we will see that such constructions behave exactly like statives. This phenomenon is most noticeable with performative verbs, but shows up also with other verbs, some of which can refer also to acts, and so have a true generic reading in the present. Some examples are:

\[(93)\] Bill advises John to walk to school. (=has advised)

\[(94)\] Bill authorizes John to walk to school. (=has authorized)

\[(95)\] Bill plans to walk to school. (=has plans)

\[(96)\] Bill chooses to walk to school. (=has chosen)

\[(97)\] Bill promises to walk to school. (=has promised)

\[(98)\] Bill suggests walking to school. (=has suggested)

\[(99)\] Bill denies walking to school. (=has denied)
(100) Bill admits walking to school. (=has admitted)

(101) Bill confesses to walking to school. (=has confessed)

The first thing to notice is that all of the above sentences are quite similar to a perfect; the possibility of expressing this meaning in the present is somewhat surprising. Second, all of them are ambiguous with respect to the genericity of the complement—it may refer either to a series or to a single act in each case. This coincides with our results about the behavior of statives, and in fact, I think that these sentences are stative, being similar to the stative perfect. Note that the use of many of the constructions in (93)-(101) in the progressive or the imperative, the usual tests for the stative/active distinction, do not carry the same meaning as the use in the present tense shown above. In the progressive and imperative, not surprisingly, these verbs refer to the acts of advising, authorizing, planning etc, rather than to the state of having advised, authorized, planned, etc, which is their force in (93)-(101). If we can keep this reading of act in mind when we reread these sentences, we find that true generics emerge, and the possibilities of embedding change rather drastically.

(93') Bill advises John to walk to school. (=gives advice)

(94') Bill authorizes John to walk to school. (=gives authorization)

(95') ...(=makes plans)

(96') ...(=makes choices)

(97') ...(=makes promises)
(98') ...(makes suggestions)
(99') ...(makes denials)
(100') ...(makes admissions)
(101') ...(makes confessions)

In the paraphrases of the active sense of (93)-(101), note first that the verb make is present in a disproportionately large number of cases; I find it difficult to believe that this is an accident, although I can offer no explanation for it. Second, except for (93'), where the appropriate nominalization is a mass noun, generic plurals appear in the paraphrases. This is done on purpose, so as to carry the sense of repeated action which the habitual generic shows; it is at present a mystery, however, why (and how) the generic plural corresponds to the habitual verbal generic--we discuss this below (Chapter VI). Third, and most important from our present point of view, the genericity of the complements varies somewhat from the pure ambiguity shown in the stative uses of these verbs.

A number of characteristics of the verbs must be taken into account in order to understand their generic behavior. First, there is the matter of whether a given action can be repeated at will, and under what circumstances--this is clearly relevant when we are considering cases of repetitions, as we must when faced with the habitual generic active uses of the verbs in (93')-(101'). This shows up in consideration of the first two verbs, advise and authorize. Clearly, one can give the same advice repeatedly, although if this
is done, it invites the inference that the advisee has not followed the previous advice. This is the case with the reading of (93') on which Bill (frequently) advises John to walk to school every day, i.e., the embedded generic case. There is also a reading which corresponds to the non-generic reading of the past (102):

(102) Bill advised John to walk to school.

on which the advice was for John to walk to school on a particular occasion. However, this reading, when put into the present generic active use of advises, forces a genericity onto the complement sentence, by virtue of the frequency of performance of the act of advising. That is, the reading means something like: Bill (frequently) advises John to walk to school (the next day)\textsuperscript{10}, and the generic quantifier binding advise carries over, binding walk. This is clearly not the same sense of "generic" as the one we have been using to test for embeddings; for one thing, there is an existential binding advise, which produces on this reading an existential binding walk, quite different from the universal we have come to expect from this sentence, and which is present in the embedded generic reading discussed above. I call this phenomenon "secondary genericity", and we will see that it is quite common in the complements of generic actives. It corresponds to the non-generic use present in the complements of past-tense actives. Note that nothing of the sort occurs with statives--I believe that this is because of the lack of quantifiers in statives, and
indeed, of the lack of occasions or states which they would have to quantify over; states do not "occur", they exist. Thus we see that the present tense of advise can embed a true (universal) generic, or a derived (secondary) generic, which takes an existential from the quantifier commanding advise, but may not embed a non-generic, unlike the past tense of this verb.

The verb authorize, on the other hand, seems to be able to embed only a secondary generic in the present tense. This is accountable for in terms of our knowledge of the mechanism of authorization. Normally, one can be authorized either to do something once, or to do it whenever he wants. If the former, than authorization must be repeated in order to do it again felicitously; if the latter, no further authorizations are needed--in fact, further authorizations are infelicitous, since the need is not present, and therefore the attempted performance of authorization fails. Since the truth of a reported performative depends on its felicitous performance, repetition of authorization, as given in the generic (94'), depends on the felicitous performance of the act in each repetition, thus forcing us to interpret authorize in its (non-generic) sense of "authorize to do once", and also giving a secondary generic reading to the complement walk to school, corresponding (again) to the non-generic embedded under the past authorize. There are marginal situations in which one can get generic readings on the complement--if, for example, authorization is needed from week to week for John to walk to school that
week; but such situations require a great deal more contextual knowledge than is usually present, and therefore do not spring to mind as easily. This shows once again, however, something that by now surely needs no more proof, that context and knowledge of the world play a terrifically important part in grammatical processes.

The general case, then, is exemplified by (93')—generic actives in the present may either embed a generic (with, therefore, a separate quantifier), or a non-generic, which derives secondary genericity from the quantifier commanding the higher verb. They may not embed a non-generic without secondary genericity. Exceptions, as might be expected, are many, although most can be explained with reference to such conditions as were appealed to in the case of authorize. We can now proceed to consider first, the rest of the verbs in (93')-(101'), and second, the exceptions to the general rule which are not on this list.

plan seems to work like authorize in that, as a generic, it is hard to read the sentence as embedding a true generic; rather, it seems to give secondary genericity to the complement. (95') is normally to be interpreted as meaning that Bill (frequently) plans to walk to school (the next day), or some such. This is because plan, like authorize, is not really repeatable at will without the invited inference that the previous plans have not been carried out, unless the complement is non-generic, which would be the case in the secondary genericity reading. If we know additionally that
Bill never follows through on his plans, or at least that he will not follow through on his plans in this case, we can use (95') to report a tendency of his to make plans at intervals which are never fulfilled—the implication is that he would like to walk to school, but never quite finds it convenient, although he gets enthusiastic enough from time to time to intend to start; somehow, this seems to be a form of activity typical enough of many people to be acceptable as a characterization, and thus as a possible meaning.

*choose*, in the active generic reading of (96'), means something like *come to intend* (thereby resembling *decide*, which works similarly), with the added inference that the act intended was one of a short list of possible choices (similar to the distinction between the question words *which* and *what*). A choice, however, like an authorization, is not repeatable unless it was made on the basis of one performance only; and this is precisely the reading we get for (96'): secondary genericity in the complement. Repeated choices to perform a series of actions (when it is understood that making the choices is contemporaneous with the supposed performance of the actions in the series) are infelicitous unless it is true either that the actions are not, in fact, being carried out, in which case a new (and in this case, renewed) choice may be necessary, or that the choice must be renewed from time to time, since the original choice was for a limited amount of time. We have encountered
both of these situation above—the non-performance case with plan, and the periodic-renewal case with authorize; as before, however, neither of these is primary, and both require additional contextual information. The secondary generic reading of the complement of choose is the one that we would normally get.

(97') with promise is an example of the "normal case"; it behaves like advise, embedding either a true generic or a secondary generic. This is because a promise need not be carried out, and if it is not, a repeated promise is felicitous (if perhaps dubious). We can get a normal reading of non-performance here because promise, unlike choose and authorize, is specifically vague about performance. It explicitly states that only the verbal commitment is made; keeping the promise is another story—this is not the case with choose and authorize, which each invite the inference that performance follows; if it were known at the time choosing or authorizing that it would not, the performatives would be infelicitous, and the act would misfire; but an insincere promise is still a promise. Suggestions are similar to advice and promises in this property, so that (98') with suggest is also normal, and can embed either generic or secondary generic.

The last three verbs in (93')-(101'), deny, admit, and confess to, are different from the others in that they refer to past actions, rather than future ones. They are also different in that even in their active generic uses they
behave like statives, embedding either generics or true non-generics, with secondary genericity possible, but not necessary. I think that these two differences are related. Note that the explanation we have given for the occurrence of secondary genericity above rests to a large extent on the (understood) fact that performance of advising, authorizing, planning, etc. must precede the performance of (in this case) walking to school. When considering whether such performative acts can be repeated at will, we need to know something about the performance of the act specified in the complement, which in a sense completes the performative. This is not true of verbs which refer to past activities. Thus, if John admits walking to school, there are no constraints on the number of times the act of walking has been performed, since no completion is needed; a single act or a series can be referred to. If we have special information to the effect that an individual admission, denial, or confession is required for each act, secondary genericity is possible, but, in contrast to the usual case with the other verbs, this is unusual, and requires quite specialized situations in order to be understood.

We see then, that, all other things being equal, the generalization made above stands—generic active embedding verbs can always have generic complements, or secondary generics, but not non-generics. When other things are not equal, the deciding factors include repeatability, conditioned by the relationship between the embedding verb and the embedded sentence, and reference to future vs. past time.
As we will see, there are also others.

Among the verbs which are normal, according to our criterion, are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>agree</th>
<th>threaten</th>
<th>refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>promise</td>
<td>request</td>
<td>manage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>try</td>
<td>avoid</td>
<td>suggest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>order</td>
<td>encourage</td>
<td>advise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instruct</td>
<td>remind</td>
<td>warn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>challenge</td>
<td>urge</td>
<td>ask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>help</td>
<td>tell</td>
<td>beg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+force</td>
<td>+require</td>
<td>+permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+prepare</td>
<td>+arrange</td>
<td>+allow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+fail</td>
<td>+succeed</td>
<td>+persuade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+decide</td>
<td>+convince</td>
<td>+get (NP to V)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those verbs which are marked with "+" are irregular in that they share the restrictions on authorize and choose, and thus have only secondary generic complements in the present active. It should be understood that these verbs are being considered here only in their uses which embed untensed (infinitive or gerund) clauses—the behavior of tensed clauses is a quite different matter.

Verbs which appear to be exceptions to this generalization are numerous:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>stop</th>
<th>finish</th>
<th>start</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>begin</td>
<td>continue</td>
<td>cease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remember</td>
<td>forget</td>
<td>invite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guarantee</td>
<td>practice</td>
<td>learn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teach</td>
<td>train</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The top six verbs in this list share a number of properties: they all refer to the nature of the continuation of an action or series of actions; all except stop and finish may take either gerund or infinitive; and in the past, they are ambiguous, embedding either a generic referring to a series of acts or a non-generic referring to the performance
of a single (durative) action. If the act referred to in
the complement is punctual, instead of durative, only a
generic reading is possible, which leads us to suspect that
these verbs may themselves have some aspect of genericity
about them. Examples of their behavior in the past:

(103) Bill stopped walking to school.
(104) Bill started walking to school.
(105) Bill began walking to school.
(106) Bill finished walking to school.
(107) Bill continued walking to school.
(108) Bill ceased walking to school.

(103)–(108) are all ambiguous, and may either refer to one
act or a series. Similar results are obtained with infinitives
instead of gerunds with start, begin, continue, and cease.
However, when we substitute a punctual verb such as arrive
for the durative walk, we find only generics possible:

(109) Bill stopped arriving on time.
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{\underline{started}} \\
\text{\underline{began}} \\
\text{\underline{continued}} \\
?\text{\underline{finished}} \\
\text{\underline{ceased}}
\end{align*}
\]
(and similarly with infinitives in those cases allowing
them). The supposition that these verbs have some relation
to generics is based on the fact that, unlike verbs like
agree and promise, which are also ambiguous in the past,
the stop-class verbs, when they refer to a single act,
have specific reference to its extension in time—this is
suspiciously like the property of generics of referring to
the extension of a series of acts in time. Thus, a punctual
verb in the complement of a normal verb in the first list
does not alter the possibility of a non-generic complement;
(110) is still ambiguous, as (109) was not:
(110) Bill promised to arrive on time.
In the present, the situation is complicated; all of
the stop-class verbs except continue (which probably belongs
to a different semantic class, anyway) can only be performed
once in the course of a given durative action. Thus, the
generic active use of stop, start, begin, finish, and cease
necessarily refers to a series of actions, and a secondary
generic interpretation is possible, and in fact, preferred.
Since the past generic use of these verbs referred to the
beginning or end of a series, instead of a single act, the
consequent true generic reading is hard to get, since we
must have a situation requiring a series of series, so to
speak, in order to refer to multiple beginnings or ends
of series. Such a reading can be supplied for start in the
following situation: Bill makes a resolution each month
that he will walk to school that month, and actually succeeds
in keeping it for a while, but eventually gives up and rides
to school the rest of the month; we can report this situation
by (111):
(111) Bill starts walking to school at the beginning
of the month, but by the end, he's riding again.
As usual, when additional context is supplied, a further
interpretation becomes easy. Note that in the same situation,
further descriptions are possible, although some are aberrant:
(112) Bill stops walking to school about the middle of the month, and from then on, he rides.

finish is rather different from stop and cease in this respect; it seems to mean that the act or series of acts came to an end as scheduled, and as expected, and cannot be used to refer to a situation in which the expectation of the actor is at variance with the actual performance; one can stop or cease doing something in the middle, but cannot finish it there.

continue is also rather unusual, in that it seems to partake of both stative and active nature; it is durative, where stop, etc. are punctual. It is difficult, if not impossible, to point to any part of the time extension of a durative act like walking as a specific example of the person's continuing to walk, and thus a secondary generic reading, where there must be a one-to-one correspondance between the occurrence of the higher verb and that of the lower, is very difficult to get; we normally interpret (113) as having a generic complement:

(113) Bill continues to walk to school.

with the continue referring to the performance of a series of acts of walking. Thus the reference of continue to the extension of the series in time predominates over that to the extension of the act in time. Again, we can get a secondary generic reading if we try, but the context must specify a particular point in the time-extension of the act, so that it can be identified as the occurrence of the
act of continuing associated particular act of walking referred to in the complement. Suppose Bill is a misogynist, and is being annoyed by Betty, who stops whenever she sees him walking to school and offers him a lift, which he always refuses. We can report his behavior by (113), when asked what Bill does at that point, and the reading is one of secondary genericity, since a particular point has been identified in the act of walking, and it is possible to refer to Bill's action at that point as one of continuing.

*remember* and *forget* are parallel in a number of ways, including their behavior with embedded generics. We must first distinguish the different meanings of these verbs with gerunds and infinitives: with a gerund, *remember* and *forget* refer to past activity, and thus are similar to *deny*, *admit* and *confess*—they are ambiguous in both past and present, since one can remember or forget doing one thing or a series of things as many times as needed, although these verbs are different from the performatives discussed above in that they are not usually volitional, and thus a generic active use in somewhat more difficult. They are similar to the performatives, however, in that a stative present tense use is possible, equivalent to (or at least paraphrasable by) a perfect—"I forget" means "I have forgotten", and "I remember" does not normally mean the active "call to mind"; it usually can be paraphrased by "have remembered" or "still know". The use of these verbs with gerunds, then, is predictable, given the generalizations
applicable to deny, admit and confess.

With infinitives, forget and remember are very different, referring to present or future actions, rather than past; they seem to be semi-implicatives of some sort, although there is disagreement as to whether they belong in the same class in this respect. For our purposes, however, such distinctions are not important; what is is the behavior with generics. It seems that the choice of examples is crucial here, since (for some reason) (114) is unambiguously non-generic in the past, and (115) is only secondarily generic in the present:

\begin{align*}
(114) \quad & \text{Bill } \{ \text{remembered} \} \text{ to walk to school} \\
& \{ \text{forgot} \} \\
(115) \quad & \text{Bill } \{ \text{remembers} \} \text{ to walk to school.} \\
& \{ \text{forgets} \}
\end{align*}

However, there are instances in which a single act of remembering or forgetting can refer to a series of acts, as in (116)-(117):

\begin{align*}
(116) \quad & \text{Bill } \{ \text{remembered} \} \text{ to walk my dog while I was on vacation.} \\
& \{ \text{forgot} \} \\
(117) \quad & \text{Bill } \{ \text{remembers} \} \text{ to walk my dog while I'm on vacation.} \\
& \{ \text{forgets} \}
\end{align*}

While secondary generic readings are possible here, referring to multiple acts of forgetting or remembering, it is also possible to mean that one act of memory was performed, which led to the performance (or non-performance, in the case of forget) of a series of actions. The added context must specify a continuous length of time during which a series of acts is to be performed, and the verb must be read as "call to mind and keep in mind for that period" or "expunge from memory and
do not recall for that period" in order to get the generic complements in (116)-(117). This is normally only possible for short periods, since we cannot be paying continuous attention to everything all the time.

The choice of example is also crucial to the analysis of invite and guarantee. Normally one can invite a person to do something only when the speaker is somehow involved in the action invited. Thus I can invite you to my home, but not to Mary's, if I am not going to attend with you— even if I am authorized, I am merely passing along Mary's invitation. Thus, while the assumption that I will be accompanying Bill can be understood on the non-generic reading of (118), it is difficult to get on a generic; and (118) is normally understood to refer to one act of walking:

(118) I invited Bill to walk to school.

However, if the participation of the speaker is specified, invite can embed either a generic or a non-generic:

(119) I invited Bill to walk to school with me.

Similarly, the present of invite can invite the assumption of participation only when referring to specific acts, and thus (120) is secondarily generic only:

(120) Max invites Bill to walk to school.

But when the participation is specified, a true generic is also possible:

(121) Max invites Bill to walk to school with him., although this invites the inference that Bill continues to refuse Max's invitations, since an invitation to perform a
series of acts is repeatable contemporaneously with the acts only if it has not previously been accepted. *invite* is thus regular, like *promise*, with the added proviso that speaker participation be explicitly referred to. I have no idea why such participation cannot be inferred from the generic, as it can from the non-generic.

*guarantee*, similarly, has overtones of genericity which make a non-generic (in the past) or secondary generic (in the present) hard to get for the complement, primarily because of the strong and durative-result implications of the verb. *guarantee* can be used statively in the present, meaning *have guaranteed*, and it can be ambiguous in that sense. The past active *guarantee* tends toward a generic reading on the complement:

(122) Bill guaranteed to fix my car.

(122) would normally be read as a strong promise (with penalties applicable in case of non-performance) on the part of Bill to fix my car whenever it needed it. When a specific instance is given by context, a non-generic is possible:

(123) Bill guaranteed to have the car ready by 5 today.

but the thing that makes (122) generic is the presumption that guarantees are given upon purchase of an item. If I bought my car from Bill, the generic would normally be understood; if, on the other hand, Bill is merely someone who is sure that he can fix my car, and says so, a non-generic is quite possible, and *fix* is read as "succeed
in fixing", rather than the pure active of the generic reading of (122). In the present, when it is read as a true habitual generic, rather than a stative, guarantee works like promise, with some differences. A generic complement is possible, with the invited inference that the guarantee, since it is repeated, has either not been taken advantage of or has been found to be false. In a situation specifying a repetitive set of circumstances in which it is appropriate for a guarantee to be made regarding a particular act, a secondary generic reading is also possible:

(124) Every time we have the walkathon to benefit crippled children, Bill guarantees to walk twenty miles.

It seems to me that the normal invited inference of (124) is that Bill then fails to go the full distance, although this can, of course, be cancelled. If we choose the right examples, then, guarantee is "normal".

practice is a strange verb, having two not-unrelated meanings: it can mean either doing something similar to the act described, in order to get ready for doing the act itself, or doing the act specified, but not "for the record". (125), for example, can mean either that Bill walked, in

(125) Bill practiced walking to school.

order to prepare for his travel to school, but he did not do so over the route which led to the school—he may have even stayed home and walked on a treadmill; it can also mean that Bill walked to school on an occasion on which school was not in session—this meaning is only possible if we read
"walking to school" as meaning walking to a session of school, i.e., going to classes, which is surely our normal interpretation. This last is necessary in order to give the context for the "on the record/off the record" distinction necessary in the second meaning. It is interesting to speculate as to which actions can be understood as having this distinction. (126), for example, seems to me to mean only that the astronaut trained in a simulator, not that he made practice flights to the moon itself:

(126) Astronaut Smedley practiced going to the moon. This seems to follow from the fact that trips to the moon are sufficiently rare to allow of no performances which are "off the record", thus barring the second possible meaning of practice. On the other hand, it is hard to see how one could say (127) without implying that (127') was also true:

(127) Bill practiced walking.

(127') Bill walked.

Even in the case where it is necessary to practice walking, there is no meaning I can see of (127) which does not entail action on the part of the subject that could be described as walking. If Bill had been in an accident which left him without the use of his legs, for instance, and he was slowly recovering his abilities, he might lie in bed and make walking motions with his legs--but I do not think that this could be reported by either (127) or (127'); in order to practice walking one must walk. This should, in turn, follow from the common nature of the action of walking; so common, in fact, that it is a prime--nothing resembles it to the
degree necessary for the first meaning of **practice** to be a possible meaning; and so common that it is certainly conceivable that one can do it "off the record".

In the first meaning, **practice** is ambiguous—it can refer to either one performance or a series of performances of the act in the complement, since the performance of this act is not involved—it is merely assumed that the subject intends to perform this act at a later time, and is now doing something to prepare for this. This is true both in the present and past.

(128) The astronaut practiced going to the moon.
(129) The astronaut practices going to the moon.

He may have practiced or be practicing for one trip or many; the repetitive aspect of **practice** does not enter the picture. In the second meaning, however, questions of repetition are important. It is possible to practice doing something by doing it only once, or by repeating it. Thus the past of the second meaning has four possible interpretations:

(130) Bill practiced running the hundred-meter dash.

a) Bill ran it once for practice, and will run it once for the record.

b) Bill ran it many times for practice, and will run it once for the record.

c) Bill ran it once for practice, and will run it many times for records.

d) Bill ran it many times for practice, and will run it many times for records.

I do not think the distinction between the a-b examples, on the one hand, and the c-d sentences, on the other, is significant, dealing as it does with the
intentions of the subject—what should count as a generic complement is the reading found in b and d. Thus practice can embed either generic or non-generic complements in the past, although the distinction is not the one we have become accustomed to making. In the present, in the second meaning of practice seemingly only a secondary generic is possible:

(131) Bill practices running the hundred-meter dash.

If (13) means either that he practiced once or several times, note that each act of running the hundred-meter dash counts as an act of practicing; thus there is a one-to-one correspondence even in the past, and the generic (131) carries the same meaning, since it clearly refers to separate acts of practicing, and each one is one act of running the hundred-meter dash. I cannot make sense of any putative true generic reading—it seems to me that such a concept is a contradiction, although I cannot see why, except that practice requires a one-to-one correspondence in the second reading.

Teach, learn, and train, the last of the exceptions in the list on page 59 are clearly related, and the question of determining their generic-embedding capacities seems at first a difficult one. To begin with, it seems strange, in fact the wrong type of question to ask, to try to find out whether the complement of these verbs is generic or non-generic. Consider (132):

(132) Bill taught Mike to drive a VW.

(teaching someone to walk to school is strange for obvious semantic reasons). This sentence can mean several things:
it can mean that Bill instilled in Mike the belief that he (Mike) should drive a VW—this meaning shows up with other complements, e.g., (133)a–d:

(133)a I taught the children to be respectful.
   b The sergeant taught the recruits to be respectful to officers.
   c She taught her children to be fair and honest.
   d Nixon taught the country to expect duplicity.

Note the non-epistemic should which seems to be involved here; the reason why it is so difficult (in fact, pointless) to determine the genericity of the complement of teach in this meaning is because it is, in some sense, stative, as indicated by the stativity of the more frequent uses in (133), and by the use of should in paraphrases. should, in its non-epistemic sense, can embed either generics or non-generics, as we showed before. There is a similar meaning of learn, in which it functions as the inchoative corresponding to the causative teach, and sentences similar to (132)–(133) can be constructed with learn.

However, the most common meaning of teach and learn with infinitive complements is not the should meaning, but a different one, involving a means adverbial of some kind, often specifically mentioned as the how in teach/learn how. In order to get this reading, one must assume that the learner did not know how some action was to be performed, and the teacher caused him to come to know how. know how is semantically equivalent in many ways to the ability reading of can, and a useful paraphrase of teach in this meaning is cause to come to be able; but this also embeds
a modal, and the same problems arise as with the should-reading of teach. In interpreting (132) with the able-reading, it is hard to get any feeling of whether the complement refers to one or a series of acts of driving a VW. We are allowed to assume conversationally that a skill may, and in fact probably will be applied repeatedly, and hence a generic seems proper, somehow; but the distinction is not by any means clear-cut. This situation seems similar to that with practice, where there is a conflict between what one does as practice, and what one intends to do after practicing—either can be a single action or a series. Similarly, learning to drive a VW probably involves driving one repeatedly, and is most likely intended to make one able to drive one any number of times one wants; but neither fact seems relevant, since what is embedded is a modal, unlike the complement of practice, and is therefore stative. learn, in this case, is again the corresponding inchoative, and behaves similarly.

train, the final example, is clearly related to teach, but has different implications. It seems usable only when the teaching or training takes a significant amount of time, and when it involves a significant amount of (presumably repetitive) practice. For this reason, it can be used to describe preparation for a one-time activity, where learn cannot, unless how is specified. Thus, if it is assumed that delivering the valedictory address is something a person can do only once, (134) is good, while (135) is bad unless how is used:
(134) Bill trained Mike to deliver the valedictory address.

(135) Bill taught Mike *(how) to deliver the valedictory address.

The implication in (134) is that the actual delivery was on the record, and thus did not figure in the practice that went on in the training; no such presumption is possible with teach, unless it is specifically mentioned that the teaching consisted only of imparting the means to do the particular action.

In the present, the additional presumptions of train make it possible in generic form, but it is strange to find teach as a generic with definite subject and definite acts specified in the complement. Note the strangeness of (136):

(136) ??Mike teaches Bill to drive a VW.

This follows from the meaning of can (or should, in the other meaning); if one is able to do something, one continues to be able to do it, and repetitions of teaching are not needed. With a generic or plural subject in the complement, the strangeness disappears, and we are then referring to repeated actions of teaching, each with a different student:

(137) Mike teaches his students to drive a VW.

If, of course, we imagine a situation wherein Bill regularly forgets how to drive a VW, we can say that Mike is the person who re-teaches him each time by using (136), but such a situation is strange, to say the least.

train seems not to be so completive as teach, and by using it, we are able more easily to imagine a situation of
incomplete learning, which could necessitate retraining, than a situation describable with teach. Note the difference between (138) and (139):

(138) Bill teaches his dog to piss outside.

(139) Bill trains his dog to piss outside.

(138) is only interpretable if we read his dog generically as meaning "the dog he has at the time". Such a reading is also possible with (139), but here it seems possible to mean that the process of training is not successful in some cases, and therefore it can be repeated with the same dog, thereby giving a true generic reading of train. While such a reading may not be terribly good, it is at least much better than the corresponding one with teach, and shows that the practice and durative aspects of train are what is being concentrated on.

To summarize, the investigation of the possibilities of embeddings with generics has led us to a number of interesting conclusions. Of these, the most important is probably the strong evidence that these generics contain quantifiers of some kind. It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that this is a conclusion which an investigator finds forced upon him when serious investigation goes far enough, but so far there have been no arguments other than strictly semantic ones for the existence of these quantifiers. The facts about secondary genericity, however, allow of no other explanation within the framework of a generative model; there can be no way that the variable determining the frequency of the
activity described in the lower sentence can agree exactly with that of the higher verb, unless there is a quantifier binding the higher verb when it is generic, and which then binds the lower verb as well, when it derives from a non-generic source sentence—when it is itself generic, of course, there can be no question of the scope carrying over. To my knowledge, no one has discussed the phenomena of secondary genericity before, or the hypothesis of underlying quantifiers would no doubt be more widespread. As it is, I find any other type of analysis lacking in too many basic elements (although I must admit that the specifics of the analysis I am assuming here are as open to criticism as any I am condemning).

The second point worth recapitulating is that there is a distinction between statives and actives; this is surely no surprise to anyone, but it needs an explanation in this context, nevertheless. One of the things I had hoped to uncover when I undertook this study was why statives and generics are similar in so many ways; I regret to say that, although I am now in possession of many more facts about this relationship, its nature and significance still remain a large mystery to me. In particular, I cannot explain to my own satisfaction why statives and actives behave differently in the ways they embed generics; to say, as I did above, that this is due to a lack of quantifiers in the statives, which would disallow the possibility of a secondary generic reading in the present, is correct as far as it goes, but there is still no explanation which gives
the reason why statives can't have quantifiers, while actives can---we still cannot adequately describe the nature of the stative concept, as distinct from that of the active, and until we do, there seems to be no hope of explaining the similarity of generics and statives.

Finally, the classes of verbs within the gross groupings of active and stative that have been discussed here, and the semantic criteria which determine them, seem to be useful in other ways than to characterize generic embedding possibilities. While very little of the material I refer to is original, some of the observations seem to be generalizable to explain other phenomena, and they certainly appear to be useful in the central task of isolating and decomposing the aspects of meaning which do so much to make verbs (and nouns as well) so individually distinct. To my mind, there are few things so important to the future of a viable semantics as the use of semantics to get at the basic variation which makes "synonym" a joke; until we are in a position to isolate such primes, we must slog away at the surface, without a hope of getting the illuminating insights which (we hope) are awaiting us.
FOOTNOTES

1 In this chapter I am using the word "embed" to refer to complement embedding; although there are a number of things one could say with regard to subordinate clauses and relatives, for example, I think the facts with regard to complementization of gerunds and infinitives are sufficiently interesting and coherent to deserve discussion by themselves.

2 As was mentioned in Chapter I, there is a strong correlation between statives and generics; with few exceptions, wherever a stative is acceptable, so is a generic, even though an active non-generic may be unacceptable. As the reader will note, I have been unable to account for this fact, and am reduced to noting it in passing.

3 I am grateful to Robin Lakoff for noting the interesting nature of this sentence, and for leading me step-by-step through the wilderness of modals and their paraphrases.

4 I am informed by John Kimball that similar generalizations have been advanced by Joe Emonds; presumably, they will have the same lack of generality as noted here.

5 This ambiguity (for those who get the sentences) is most likely due to the fact that have is, in fact, an infinitive, and one would expect that afford would behave the same way in any infinitive clause, if that is what effects the distinction.

6 It was pointed out to me by George Lakoff that (58) and (64) can take a non-generic complement reading, under somewhat special circumstances: if either of them is uttered at a time when it is understood that Bill is still engaged in the activity of walking to school, particularly if the speaker and listener are in a position to note Bill's enjoyment, then they can have reference to the particular act of walking to school involved and in progress. I hypothesize that this puzzling fact (which is not, apparently, true for infinitives) may be related to the behavior of hate and dislike, which act as though the act were still in progress, by this definition. Needless to say, I have no explanations to offer.

7 That is, the one which is possible when the act is not in progress, which can produce a reading similar to that
discussed in footnote 6.

8 We will not discuss here the generic use of the present progressive exemplified by the following dialogue:

A: What are you doing these days?
B: I'm studying generics.

9 Note, for example, that (140) is grammatical, even though seem requires a stative or generic, and it is still good when we hypothesize a situation in which only one act of advising took place (in the past). This can only mean that the complement of seem is not generic, although it appears active and is in the present tense; it must be stative:

(140) Bill seems to advise us to take this lying down.

10 The precise time when it is advised that he walk to school is actually irrelevant, and it need not be the same relative time each time the advice is given. That is, Bill may have advised John to walk to school the next day once, and may also have advised him to walk to school on the next Wednesday a few times, etc. The important thing to notice is that there is always a one-to-one correspondence (on this reading) between the time of the act of advising and some future-to-that-act time when the walking is being urged to happen. The fact that such a correspondence appears here is proof that the quantifier binding the higher verb binds the lower one also, and that, in fact, there is a quantifier present.

11 For example, certain modals condition the occurrence of any, as well as negatives

(141) Anybody can do that.

(142) *Anybody did(n't do) that.

and these any's with modals can appear in different places; in particular, they can be the subject of the modal, although they cannot be the subject of the negative verb which would, if they did not precede it, condition their appearance. But any is grammatical as the subject of (143), showing that a modal is present in the logical structure:

(143) Anybody knows how to do that.

It is significant that in German, the normal way to express (143) uses können, an overt modal, and the closest translation of English can (=be able). These topics are discussed in (Horn, (1972)).