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AMPLE NEGATIVES,
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All kinds of phenomena about negatives have motivated interesting and valuable studies; there is something mystifying about the whole topic, particularly regarding the types of interaction it necessitates. One of the most interesting kinds of negative puzzles is that occasioned by the necessity of accounting for sentences which possess an abnormal number of negatives in surface structure. There are a number of types of sentences represented in this class, and for each several questions have to be answered:

(1) In what way(s) is this type of sentence abnormal (and therefore interesting)?
(2) Given that they are abnormal, why do such sentences occur?
(3) What methods of investigation are appropriate to answering (1) and (2)?

Obviously, there are many sub- and sub-sub-questions that these entail, and linguists of differing persuasions will differ as to just what "abnormal" means. For our purposes, however, some simple taxonomy will suffice; we define a negative sentence as one containing a negative and a normal negative sentence as one containing precisely one negative morpheme in surface structure, and precisely one negative in logical (or deep) structure, with the stipulation that the two be "corresponding nodes" in G. Lakoff's (1973) sense. This leaves us a wide field of "abnormal" negatives to play with.

A first division of the field can be made by separating those sentences which have more than one negative, but which have a 1-1 correspondence between negatives in SS and those in LS. This is the class upon which much ingenuity and effort have been lavished in an effort to establish logical (and occasionally sociological) principles for the interpretation and generation of the multiple negation. Some examples of this class (which I will call "logically interpretable") are:

(4) I don't want him not to come.
(5) I didn't realize nobody knew him.
(6) There isn't anybody who doesn't know him.
(7) You can't just not say anything.

These sentences are interesting in that they display a

wide variety of ways of combining the negatives, illustrating many important points relevant to the proper use of logical principles in natural language; they are abnormal only by definition, in that they are more complicated than the normal negative sentence. As to why they occur, this is a consequence of the possibilities of embedding, and the methods of generative syntax/semanitics, combined with logic, provide some tools that have been productive (if not always adequate). There is sufficient interest in and work on these sentences to justify our not considering them any further here.

We are left, then, with sentences that have either fewer negatives in SS than in LS, or more. Let us consider the former case first, since it defines a small class of sentences, idiomatic in nature, which seem to evidence a change in the perceived negativity of various elements. The only sentences I have encountered with fewer SS negs that LS are exemplified by:

(8) I could care less.
(9) I could give a damn.

Quite aside from the idiomatic nature of these constructions, the fact that a modal seems to be required makes them exceptional. Yet the fact remains that they are negative in force (in fact synonymous), thus having a negative in their semantics, while there appears to be none in their surface structure. This poses a problem for social and diachronic linguistics, in that what seems to be going on is that the idiomatized polarity item is associated with the negative sufficiently to give it what amounts to independent negative strength. A similar procedure seems to have occurred in French, with the effect that the usual negative morpheme in that language is pas, not ne (...pas), as the grammar texts claim. This is interesting and unusual, but not particularly productive.

Coming now to the abnormal negative sentences with more negatives in SS than in LS, we have several distinctions to make. First, there is a small class of sentences which have no negatives in logical structure, yet have one in surface structure. This phenomenon is present in several regional dialects, including my own native dialect, that of DeKalb County, Illinois, as well as (I have been informed) several New England dialects. This phenomenon (which I will call "spurious negation") is exemplified by (10). Since (10) is not only ungrammatical but also unintelligible for most speakers, I hasten to add a translation, (11), which is also grammatical in DeKalb County.
(10) **Bill can touch the ceiling, and so can't I.**

(11) Bill can touch the ceiling, and so can I.

Note that (10) is synonymous with (11), and not with (12):

(12) Bill can touch the ceiling, and I can't.

That is, the negative in the so-clause of (10) is completely spurious, and represents no logical negation at all. There are a lot of details one could add about this construction, for example the fact that it is restricted to so-clauses with subject-verb inversion, typically (but not always) takes VP-deletion in addition, and is ungrammatical if an overt negative is present in the first clause. Thus:

(13) **Bill is going/has gone/will go/goes to school, and/but so isn't/hasn't/won't/doesn't Harry.**

(14) He can't touch the ceiling, and neither can(*''t) I/I can't either/*so can't I.

(15) *Bill is going to school, and Harry isn't too.

This construction (as one might expect, given its peculiarity) is much remarked-on locally, and is considered substandard. Nevertheless, it occurs, a fact which must give pause to those (like me) who think of negatives as meaningful elements governed by syntactic rules. This is a unique datum, and deserves to be investigated further. I do not however, believe that the usual methods of generative syntax or semantics are the proper vehicle for such a study, since the construction is totally opaque semantically (although it functions in all other regards—note the contractions—as a normal SS negative). Such a study would, I think, be far better conducted using the methods of sociolinguistics; the most semantics can offer to such an effort is moral support.

The remaining abnormal negative sentences share the property of having at least one negative in LS, but of having more negatives in SS. This would seem to be a homogeneous class, but I believe more divisions are in order.

Probably the most common type of sentence with this property, and the type that springs to mind most readily when "double negatives" are mentioned is the type exemplified by (16)-(19), the so-called "non-standard" cases:

(16) *It ain't no cat can't get in no coop.
(17) *I can't tell nobody.
(18) *She won't give me no cookies.
(19) Nobody never said that.

This phenomenon is widespread and well-known. What might appear to be happening, from an examination of the surface structure, is that spurious negative morphemes occur in apparently unlimited number. This is, of course, a massive over-simplification. The position, number, and meaning of the extra surface negatives are very highly constrained, and not only by syntactic considerations, as has been demonstrated amply. There are still, however, problems.

Labov’s (1972) study of this phenomenon contains many intriguing examples, and a number of useful insights, but it is flawed by a failure to recognize and make use of some concepts which have been developed in the literature in the last decade. A great deal of Labov’s ingenuity is wasted because he does not utilize the concept of polarity, which has obvious implications for a study centering on indefinites like any. The fact is that there are (at least) two any’s, one negative-polarity, and one ’possible-polarity,’ and only the former is subject to neg-attraction. Labov makes mention of the use of any in ”hypotheticals,” but does not seem to realize how many of the ”exceptions” he gives are actually examples of possible-polarity any which are naturally resistant to neg-attraction. Second, a negative-polarity any can only undergo neg-attraction with the negative which triggers its occurrence as a polarity item. This generalization also is missed by Labov and accounts for more of his ”exceptions.” Third, if the negative which triggers the any is incorporated, presupposed, or otherwise not free, neg-attraction is also blocked, regardless of how many other negatives might seem to be available for attraction; Labov misses this point as well, with the cumulative result that the analysis proposed for Standard English neg-attraction is cumbersome and (in some very important ways) wrong. Whether or not this vitiates his analysis of neg-concord is unclear, but since it is based on his account of neg-attraction, there is considerable doubt.

There is some evidence that the any’s involved here are in fact negatives of some sort in logical structure (as well as being related in some as-yet-unknown way to the modal ◊, as I have argued elsewhere (Lawler (1971)), although they do not ”cancel out” the way negative predicates do in e.g., (6). This would account for the fact that many languages have patterns similar to that in (16)-(19), and would analyze the Standard English any as a special case, requiring an additional lexical insertion rule to get any instead of the more natural no. Black English neg-concord
would then be an example of the unmarked case, and would represent a simpler and more natural solution.

What is important to notice about this analysis (or any other) is that the extra negative morphemes in surface structure all derive in some sense from a single negative predicate in logical structure, in that whether or not they represent any kind of negative logically, they are polarity items inside the scope of the primary negative trigger. The "natural" lexical insertion rule hypothesized above does not produce confusion\(^9\) for the reason that the controlling trigger must be specified, and it is understood to be the "real" negative.

After we have separated this class of abnormal negatives, however, a final class is left, and it is with this that the remainder of this discussion will concern itself. While there has been some discussion of sentences like (20)\(^{10}\)

(20) Bill hasn't written any good papers, I don't think.


no one (except Postal (1973)) has noted the peculiarities of sentences like (21):

(21) Not any good ones, he hasn't.

In both (20) and (21) there are two surface negatives, but only one logical negative. A likely source for (20) is (22), and for (21), (23):

(22) I don't think Bill has(*n't) written any good papers.

(23) Bill hasn't written (*not) any good ones.

Note the ungrammaticality of the extra negatives in (22)-(23). An interesting point to note in this regard is the fact (20) has a variant (24)a without the second negative, but (21) is poor unless both negatives present are, as note (25):

(24)a Bill hasn't written any good papers, I think.

b *Bill has written some/any good papers, I don't think.

(25)a *Some/*Any good ones, he hasn't.

b *Not any good ones, he has.

We will see that this is due to the fact that neg-raising, the rule involved in generating (20) and (22), is optional, while neg-insertion, the crucial rule in (21) and (23), is obligatory.

It is important to note the differences between abnormal negation like that in (20)-(21) and that evidenced in the "non-standard" cases discussed above,
in order to show that they are indeed different. Non-standard abnormal negation involves a variant of the lexical insertion rule inserting negative-polarity any, in that the output of that rule resembles the output of neg-attraction. (20)-(21), however, involve some very different phenomena. First of all, they are not non-standard, in that they are not determined by the same criteria that determines the distribution of the non-standard cases above; on the contrary, they exist (I would claim) in the standard English in the United States, at least, and seem to be extremely common. There are, to be sure, some variables involved; for example, many speakers accept (25)b (with some), but there is a peculiar strong, ironic emphasis on the last clause which sets off the apparent contradiction. On the whole, however, I have observed instances of these types of construction everywhere. A second fact to note is that in (21), and in (26), which is a variant of (20):

(26) Not any good ones, I don’t think.

a very special type of process has been applied, namely the fragment-creating rule discussed by Morgan (1972), which requires special contextual situations. In fact, Morgan fragments exist when possess only the first negative in (21):

(27) Not any good ones.

Obviously, all these facts need an explanation, and it would be nice if a single explanation could do the job for all of them.

Before we can progress to the explanation stage, however, there are a few details of observation and description that need to be cleared up. First, we need some terminology, and our choice of terms makes some implicit choices which we had best be aware of. We could, for example, intuitively decide that (20)-(21) derive from a movement rule, and call the rule “X-movement,” where “X” is some question-begging name identifying the phenomenon. This would commit us to several assumptions, some of them questionable: (a) that the sentences are derived, at least in the part we are interested in, by the same rule; (b) that the rule is a movement rule; and (c), since the same rule is involved, both sentences derive from movement to the same side of the sentence. I find these dubious, to say the least. To begin with, there is independent evidence for a rule of shifting, which performs the movement part of (20); second, while this will obviously not apply to (21), the nature of the rule involved is not very clear; and there is even the
possibility (which there is some evidence against)\textsuperscript{11} that (21) is in fact derived from juxtaposition of two sentences, each with its own negative, both of which have had material deleted by various rules. Finally, whatever the rule involved in (21), and whichever direction it moves (if it moves at all), the details of the rule of Slifting as regards left or right movement are equally unclear. Bearing these caveats in mind, I will maintain that a different rule is involved in (21) from that in (20); I call this rule negative-dislocation, and believe it is a movement rule, although I don't know in which direction it actually moves. The entire phenomenon of (20)-(21) and sentences like them I will call negative retention, for reasons which should become obvious below, and I claim that this is best statable in terms of a global constraint on surface structures containing negatives.

The next thing we need to do is determine if any more familiar rules can be invoked to account for the data so far. The first thing that comes to mind is that (21) represents an unusual variety of $Y$-movement, in that the object is typically what shows up at the beginning of the $S$, just as in $Y$-movement, and the addition of the extra negative may be a peculiarity of this rule in certain circumstances. There are several arguments against this.

First, note that while $Y$-movement is restricted to NP's in object position, and is in many sentences heavily dialect-dependent, this is not the case with negative-dislocation. Adverbs, NP's of all kinds, prepositional phrases, etc., can all occur fronted with a negative. It would require a collapsing of adverb-fronting and $Y$-movement to account for the data, and peculiarities arise even then:

\begin{align*}
(28) & \begin{array}{l}
\text{a} \quad \text{They don't do that} \\
\text{b} \quad \text{in France.} \\
\text{c} \quad \text{In France they don't. (Adv-fronting)} \\
\text{Not in France, they don't. (Neg-dislocation)}
\end{array} \\
(29) & \begin{array}{l}
\text{a} \quad \text{I can't open the door} \\
\text{b} \quad \text{with this key.} \\
\text{c} \quad \text{With this key I can't. (Adv-fronting)} \\
\text{Not with this key, I can't. (Neg-dislocation)} \\
\text{d} \quad \text{This key I can't. (Y-movement?)} \\
\text{e} \quad \text{Not this key, I can't. (Neg-dislocation)}
\end{array} \\
(30) & \begin{array}{l}
\text{a} \quad \text{Good ones he hasn't. (Y-movement)} \\
\text{b} \quad \text{Not good ones, he hasn't. (Neg-dislocation)}
\end{array}
\end{align*}
(31) a  I didn't ask Bill the question.
     b  *Bill I didn't.  (Y-movement)
     c  Not Bill, I didn't.  (Neg-dislocation)

Second, note that Y-movement and adverb-fronting moves the element from a full matrix sentence which does not have to be fragmented; neg-dislocation requires that a discourse-deletion of Morgan's type take place. This is not evident from (28)-(31), since discourse-deletion is optional and to avoid confusing the issue, the examples of adverb-fronting and Y-movement above have been fragmented. If we try similar cases with full sentences, a different pattern emerges:

(32) a  In January I don't go skinny-dipping in Lake Michigan too often.
     b  Not in January, I don't (*go skinny-dipping in Lake Michigan too often).

(33) a  Bill I don't see around here very much any more.
     b  Not Bill, I don't (*see around here very much any more).

Third, (as noted by Postal) neg-dislocation is strictly a highest-island phenomenon. It cannot be embedded or conjoined, unlike adverb-fronting and Y-movement, which are not penthouse rules:

(34)  I thought they did that everywhere, but she told me that (*not) in France they don't.
(35)  In England, they do, but (*not) in France they don't.
(36)  I thought he liked all kinds of fruit, but he informed me in no uncertain terms that (*not) raspberries he didn't.
(37)  Cherries I really like, but (*not) raspberries I don't.

Fourth, there is a great difference in the pragmatic contexts required here. Y-movement and adverb-fronting both topicalize, and can introduce new information; neg-dislocation cannot introduce new information, at least in the same sense. It typically requires that the lexical item isolated with the initial negative be present in the context of the discourse, either verbally or in some situational way. Consider the following contexts:

A: You are a guest at breakfast and your host sets a bowl of raspberries in front of you.
You hate raspberries and evidence disgust. Your host inquires about your reaction by uttering (30).
You can reply by using (39)a, but not (39)b.
(38) I thought you liked raspberries.
(39)a Not raspberries, I don't.

b #Raspberries I don't.13

B: You are a guest as before. The host inquires your tastes before preparing breakfast by asking (40). You can reply by using (41)a, but not (41)a.
(40) Is there anything you particularly don't like?
(41)a #Not raspberries, I don't.

b Raspberries I don't.

C: You are a guest as before and are served raspberries. You evidence disgust, and the host utters (42). You may reply using either (43) a or b.
(42) I thought you liked all kinds of fruit.
(43)a Not raspberries, I don't.

b Raspberries I don't.

In situation A, the physical presence of raspberries and the prior use of the lexical item raspberries make it old information, and Y-movement is inappropriate, although neg-dislocation is OK. In B, the lack of prior mention of the lexical item, and the absence of any raspberries in the situational context makes neg-dislocation inappropriate, although Y-movement is fine. In C, the physical presence of raspberries counts as context for neg-dislocation while the lack of prior mention of the lexical item makes Y-movement appropriate as well. It seems clear that the two rules must be separated.

Granted, then, that this represents a new rule, where does the negative come from? And does it come from the same place in cases where Sliftings occurs? There are two ways to answer this question, and both converge on the same solution. Let us consider the syntactic solution first.

The fact that is striking in both (44) and (45) is that the negative has been moved by at least one rule prior to the operation of Slifting or neg-dislocation; in (44) the rule is neg-raising---in (45) it is neg-insertion, which also applies (twice) in (44):

(44) He didn't really do that, I don't think.
(45) Not that, he didn't.
A solution which is at least somewhat satisfying is possible in terms of retaining the original negative after the movement rule has applied, and causing it to be present in the surface structure because of some constraint. This is equivalent to treating neg-raising (a cyclic, governed, optional, minor raising rule) and neg-insertion (a post-cyclic, ungoverned, obligatory, major lowering rule) as both being rules which copy the negative into the appropriate slot, and then delete the original (either immediately or post-cyclically by means of a global constraint like [+DOOM]). Detailed solutions are possible using any combination of these features, but some of them raise questions which are not easily answerable, at least within the context of this paper. If, for example, these (very different) rules are decomposable into copy+delete, how far can we push the analysis? Are all rules which move negatives copy+delete? Are all movement rules to be treated this way? Are, then, all deleted negatives (or elements, in the wider hypothesis) available for appearance in SS under some conditions? If so, does this involve a constraint on the deletion part of the rule, and if so, at what stage does this part apply (and therefore at what stage must the constraint be stated)? Or should the whole thing be stated in terms of a global rule? If so, how do we constrain that?

A sketch of the relevant derivational steps in analysis of (44) and (45) follows:

(Circled nodes are corresponding in (46)-(53))
Note that the assumption that neg-insertion is post-cyclic leads to the possibility of the retained original negative in (48) inserting after Slifting occurs, and its status as an occurring element has been determined. If neg-insertion is cyclic, we need a constraint to block it if neg-raising is going to apply on the following cycle, something that this analysis obviates. Note also that the constraint which allows retention of the original negative is operational in the cyclic part of the derivation in (48), but in the post-cyclic part in (45), probably following subject-formation and do-support.

Some support for this analysis (or for one akin to it) is provided by the behavior of retained negatives devolving both from neg-raising and from neg-dislocation in regard to neg-attraction. If the retained negative derives through neg-raising and Slifting, it can neg-attract; if it derives through neg-insertion and neg-dislocation, it cannot. Thus,

(54) (I think) he hasn't written any good papers.
(55)a Not any good ones, I don't think.
   (fragmented)
   b No good ones, I don't think.
(56)a Not any good ones, he hasn't.
   b *No good ones, he hasn't.

I believe that this is a result of the fact that, on this analysis, the next node under the retained negative in (55) is a $S$, and (as we saw in (44)), the negative can insert, a step which I believe is necessary for neg-attraction to occur. In (56), on the other hand, there is only one simplex sentence, which is broken up by removal of the inserted negative by neg-dislocation. The inserted negative is then unavailable for neg-attraction, and the rule of neg-insertion is not applicable again (even when the isolated element is itself a $S$):

(57)a Not that I could see, he didn't.
   b * (That) I couldn't see, he didn't.)

thus blocking application of neg-attraction.

What, then, is the mysterious constraint that allows negatives to be retained in SS when they would ordinarily be deleted (or moved, if we take a completely global view of the phenomenon)? It seems obvious that the strange rules, both of which have the effect of removing the isolated element from the scope of the SS negative, are involved. I believe the appropriate constraint, which must be globally stated, is something like (58):

(58) If an element (call it $E$) which is commanded in Logical Structure by a negative $N_L$ is isolated outside the scope of the Surface Structure negative $N_S$ which corresponds to $N_L$, $E$ must appear in Surface Structure inside the scope of another surface negative $N_L$, which also corresponds to $N_L$.

That is, if you move out the negative that ordinarily would command the element you are obliged to provide another in the proper relationship.

If (58) is correct, we should ask why it does not apply to Y-movement and adverb-fronting (as well as to dislocation). The answer is, I believe, that the structural difference between these rules of topicalization and the rules of Slifting and Neg-dislocation precludes application of the constraint in the former, but requires it in the latter. In (48) and (53) the rules are given as Chomsky-adjoining the two $S$'s,
thus removing the command relationship between the surface negative in the second clause and the isolated element in the first. In Y-movement and adverb-fronting, however, the rules do not Chomsky-adjoin, but rather sister-adjoin, thus retaining the command relationship, and keeping the isolated element within the scope of the surface negative. (58) will not apply.

I mentioned above that there were two ways to approach the problem, and that both of them gave the same results. The second way to go about investigating the phenomenon is to ask the second of the three questions I gave at the beginning—why do such sentences occur at all? A pragmatic, communicationally-based inquiry like that soon establishes that negation is, in fact, a very important thing to communicate, and that phenomena like polarity items and "non-standard" multiple negation exist, among other reasons, to increase redundancy and ensure that the negative message is communicated. One further way is to impose a constraint on surface structures like (58), which has the effect of forbidding sentences (or utterances) which require the addressee to re-interpret the meaning after hearing most of the utterance, because the negative is not in the proper place and does not bear the appropriate relationship to the rest of the utterance. This way of looking at the constraint shows why it exists, and why it also covers the cases noted by Zimmer (1971) in which compound NP's cannot be formed from nouns which are joined in a predicative relationship containing a negative. A variant of (58) would cover this situation, and would do so for precisely the reason (58) covers the neg-dislocation and Shifting cases—negatives are highly important pragmatic items, and must be expressed, and if any syntactic process intervenes which would have the effect of vitiating the negative force of the utterance, something happens to the derivation—either it blocks, or another negative must be inserted in some syntactically determined place. This explanation is 'functional' in the sense used in Morgan (1973), in that it gives a pragmatic reason for an otherwise inexplicable and seemingly ad-hoc phenomenon which is nevertheless felt as natural in some sense. The explanation is in fact so simple and sensible that it feels out of place in a linguistic paper, but to my knowledge it has never been proposed in so many words as an output constraint. The situation resembles that currently brewing in phonology, where conspiracies are being discovered left and right. This is, in fact, a conspiracy of
the type discussed in Pyle (1974), and his discussion of the role of output constraints and teleological rules goes rather far in the direction of giving an elegant and productive theoretical basis for it. We see, then, that examining the problem from both sides is of value.

In closing, I would like to leave you with some observations of a phenomenon that is particularly mystifying to me, and which impelled me in the first place to begin to investigate this topic. There is a class of sentences involving negative-dislocation which appear to violate Ross constraints with impunity; in particular, the Coordinate Structure Constraint seems to be fractured beyond repair in (59)b:

\[(59)\]

a Can linguists study negation?
b Not and stay sane, they can't.

Note that the same initial clause is possible in the corresponding dislocated sentence, as well as in the Morgan fragment:

\[(60)\]

Not and stay sane, I don't think.
\[(61)\]

Not and stay sane.

This type of construction is severely limited in distribution. In my speech, it is ungrammatical unless:

(a) the sentence it is derived from is negative---Y-movement, adverb-fronting, or any other rule that would effect such a shift is ungrammatical without the not:

\[(62)\]

*And stay sane they can.

(b) the conjoined element is the second member of the conjunction:

\[(63)\]

*Not stay sane and, they can't.

(c) the conjoined element must be a VP; any other element that can be conjoined will not work:

\[(64)\]

a Can Frank eat peas?
b *Not and carrots, he can't.
\[(65)\]

a Can we go over the river?
b *Not and through the woods, we can't.
\[(66)\]

a Can we say that Mary came to the party?
b *Not and that she enjoyed it, you can't.

Those cases in which some of the above S's (or similar ones) can be accepted are, I believe, examples of the relevant generalization here: the and is acceptable only if it is derived (in whatever mysterious way) from an underlying conditional. Thus (59)b means not if they want (intend, try, etc.) to stay sane. Similarly,
some get (65)b if it means not if we want to go through the woods. The restriction to VP's is imposed because they represent underlying complements (with EQUI) of the conditional want. For some reason, and's representing conditionals are not at home in environments containing certain auxiliaries: can in its able sense is fine, as are its paraphrases, but not in its allowed sense; similarly, while have of the perfect is not too bad, the past variant is awful:

(67)a Can Frank leave at nine?
   b Not and get there on time, he can't.

(68)a Can Frank come out to play?
   b *Not and get all dirty, he can't.

(69)a Did Frank leave at nine?
   b *Not and get there on time, he didn't.

(70)a Has Frank ever left at nine?
   b ?Not and gotten there on time, he hasn't.

(71)a Should Frank wash the dishes?
   b ??Not and dry them, he shouldn't.

(72)a Is it possible for Frank to wash the dishes?
   b Not and dry them, it isn't.

(73)a Is it necessary for Frank to wash the dishes?
   b *Not and dry them, it isn't.

Something is obviously going on there that is too deep for me to see. I have never had the pleasure of writing a paper on any topic without modals and their mysteries intruding somewhere along the line, and I had hoped that this one might be an exception. Despite the best of intentions, however, I must conclude by saying that much remains to be discovered about modals, as well as other things.

NOTES

0. I am indebted to a number of people for assistance in this undertaking; most importantly, Paul Postal, who kindly granted me permission to mine his insightful but now (alas) abandoned squib (Postal 1973) for generalizations and data—he should not be blamed for what I have done with the topic; Jerry Morgan, discoverer of Morgan fragments (for which terminology I hope he will forgive me), to whom we all owe a debt of gratitude for taking the skeletons out of the generative semantics closet and rattling them loudly, thus demonstrating the need for pragmatic, functional analyses of the sort advocated here; finally, my colleagues and students at the University of Michigan, especially Fred Lupke, upon whom I visited this mess
in several versions. None of the above are responsible for the errors of o- and commission contained herein, although Postal and Morgan can hardly escape blame for being stimulating enough to motivate me to attempt this study.


2. These are the ones I thought of, that is. I have since been bombarded with further examples, of which perhaps the hairiest is (74), which means (75):

(74) That'll teach you to trust him.
(75) That'll teach you not to trust him.

While this cannot be accounted for in terms of idiosyncratic polarity items like (8) and (9), there is obviously some idiomaticity involved. Note, for instance, that the negative in (75) can trigger polarity items, while the one we intuit in (74) cannot:

(76) That'll teach you *(not) to say anything.

In addition, the construction requires use of the modal will:

(77) That taught me to trust him.

(77) is literal only. I remain at a lost to account for all these facts.

3. I will use '*' in this paper to mark sentences which are acceptable in the dialect under discussion (in this case, DeKalb County English), but possibly not others. Stars in this context refer to unacceptability in the particular dialect.

4. This is of course Labov's (1972) famous example (1).

5. As discovered and named by Horn. There is, unfortunately, no single source in the literature which explicates the phenomenon as such, although the concept is present in spirit in almost every serious discussion of negatives. See also Klima (1964) for the feature affect, an ad-hoc precursor of polarity.

6. For further discussion of the 'possible-polarity' any, see Horn (1972), as well as Lawler (1973).

7. For instance, Labov notes that embeddings of various types make any acceptable. What he does not note is that some of the embedding predicates he uses are in fact modals, conditioning possible-polarity any, and the others have internal negatives, conditioning negative-polarity any. Neg-attraction is blocked in both cases; in the first case because the any is of the
wrong type, and in the second, because the negative is already internal to the predicate and is thus unavailable for attraction. An example is his (24)a:

\[(78)\] For anyone not to go was a shame. (=24)a

in which shame is already implicitly negative; the spurious presence of the negative in the complement only clouds the matter. Another example, of possible-polarity any, in his (26)b, where the embedding predicate O.K. is a deontic modal:

\[(79)\] For anybody not to eat in my mother's restaurant is O.K. (=26)b

Again, the presence of the negative in the complement is irrelevant. An example of an embedding predicate which is neither modal nor negative is normal, and the following sentences show how the embeddings fail, regardless of the complementizer (to which Labov attributes the goodness of the any's):

\[(80)\] *For anyone to eat at my mother's restaurant is normal.
\[(81)\] *For anyone not to eat at my mother's restaurant is normal.
\[(82)\] *Anyone('s) eating at my mother's restaurant is normal.
\[(83)\] *Anyone('s) not eating at my mother's restaurant is normal.

And extraposition does not help any, as opposed to the cases Labov cites, where the well-known tendency to extrapose heavy subjects makes some of his sentences better, for reasons having nothing to do with negation. 8. A further example is found in Labov's (22)d, in which there is no preceding free negative. The any is triggered by the if.

\[(84)\] If John says that anyone shouldn't go, he's exceeding his authority. (=22)d

Labov states that the 'obligatory character of neg-attraction is effectively cancelled'. In fact, it is not. What is going on is that the any in (84) cannot attract to a negative that does not trigger it. If the negative in (84) did trigger the any, neg-attraction would be obligatory, yielding (85):

\[(85)\] If John says that no one should go, he's...

which, of course, is not synonymous to any reading of (84). Apparently, the cases where Labov thinks neg-
attraction is not obligatory are either cases where it is blocked altogether, or ones where he confuses two any's, of which one cannot undergo neg-attraction at all and the other must undergo it.

9. That is, most of the time they don't. As Labov notes, his (1) (my (16)) does produce confusion to speakers of other dialects. What has apparently happened here is that the rules for the scope of neg-concord deviate from those for neg-attraction in standard English, allowing the Neg to reach down into a relative (although the subject relative has been deleted, note---this may be a conditioning environment). It is still apparent, however, that the appearances of the negative in this sentence all derive somehow from the first commanding negative, although the details have been changed.

10. Primarily in Ross (1973). Note particularly that Ross's analysis posits Chomsky-adjunction as the operation performed; this will become important presently. We will be restricted here to discussing predicates which undergo Slifting when negated. As Ross observes, they all govern Neg-raising, thus opening the possibility of a copy-delete analysis, which he proposes. Whether such an analysis is correct or not is irrelevant to our discussion (although the trees below use it for simplicity in tracing corresponding nodes), as are the details of the rule of Slifting. What is relevant is the fact that a negative which is ordinarily deleted shows up on the surface in just the right place.

11. Aside from the details of neg-attraction below, which argue for a single sentential source for sentences like (21), there is also some evidence that they differ in crucial ways from a construction which might be considered a likely source, namely, whatever process is at work in generating (86):

(86) He hasn't written any---not any good ones.

I claim (contrary to Postal's (1973) hypothesis) that this is unrelated to (21), but is rather the result of conjoining two sentences, each with its own negative. Evidence comes, first of all, from intonation. The dash in (86) represents a contour associated with a sentence boundary; the impression is one of a qualifying afterthought, which is substantiated by the fact that parentheticals like anyway, at any rate, at least, etc., can appear in (86) but not in (21). Second, the construction in (86) must retain an anaphor of the object when it operates on an object; only with adverbs does it fully resemble (21):
They don't do that---not in France.

(In both cases, the first S can be Morgan-fragmented, producing superficial resemblances to (21):

(88)a They don't---not in France.
   b He hasn't---not any good ones.}

There is a dialect (not mine) which accepts (89):

(89) *Not raspberries, he doesn't like.

which differs from the more normal (90) in retaining the main verb:

(90) Not raspberries, he doesn't.

Even in this dialect, however, an object anaphor may not be retained:

(91) *Not raspberries, he doesn't like them.

(We ignore the intonation of (91) which has a semicolon or period intonation after raspberries, and which clearly comes from two sentences). But with the postposed Neg in (86), the object is essential in all dialects:

(92)a *He doesn't like---not raspberries.
   b *He hasn't written---not any good ones.

There is a reading of (92)b which is grammatical, but it refers to letters, which is the understood object or write when the highly idiomatic rule of object-deletion is applicable. This rule is also applicable in post-posed negative constructions, and the anaphor in the post-posed phrase must be coreferential with the deleted object, and not with any other noun. The point is that the post-posing in (86) requires an object, unless it is deleted under a minor rule which also is applicable in full sentences, while the preposing in (21) requires its deletion in all cases. This can be easily and naturally accounted for by treating (21) as being derived by a chopping rule, and (86) as a reduced conjunction of two S's, with no chopping rule, only deletions.

12. I think the facts here have to do not with the rules per se, but rather with the intonation contours they carry. The b sentences in each case would require a sentence-final low intonation to carry on for the majority of the sentence, thus producing an odd effect. The a sentences have no such restriction, since Y-movement and adverb-fronting do not produce a lowering after the auxiliary.

13. I use ']' here to indicate sentences which are not ungrammatical, but rather inappropriate in
context. Note that there is a reading (a phonetic reading, that is—I have been unable to distinguish any semantic differences) of (39)b which is more acceptable in this context, but it requires that the intonation contour on raspberries be identical to that in (38)a. The other pronunciation of (39)b is inappropriate as marked here. Note, however, that the good contour in situation A is inappropriate in situation B, even though the other contour is appropriate here. I am at a loss to account for these facts, but the data read as stands for the single intonation of neg-dislocation, and for one intonation of Y-movement.

14. This analysis is proposed (for neg- raising only) in Ross (1973). It can be restated as a global constraint on outputs, which is what I advocate here. I doubt whether such a formal mechanism as Ross proposes is justified, particularly in view of the functional explanation for this constraint, which also explains a number of other phenomena, such as NP compounds, where the question of copy+delete does not arise. The `copy only` directions in the trees below should be taken as indicating corresponding nodes, rather than as a substantive claim.

15. An example is leg man, which cannot mean a man who dislikes women's legs, although there are plenty of other things it can mean.

16. For a non-phonological conspiracy on the left, see Thrasher (1973, 1974).

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