

Political Science 700.004

Political Economy of Development

Spring 2015

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Office: 324 Eggers, 443-4032
Office Hours: Mondays & Thursdays 12:30-2:00 pm

This seminar is intended to provide a grounding in the literature on political economy and political development. Several major approaches to the study of development will be covered, including modernization theory, dependency theory, the new institutional economics, and the role of cultural factors. Major themes include the causes and consequences of economic growth, the nature of the relationship between development and democracy, and the role of the state in the process of development.

Required Texts

The following books are available for purchase at the Syracuse University Bookstore:

- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*.
- Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*.
- Peter J. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*.
- Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.
- Terry Lynn Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*.
- Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History*.
- Adam Przeworski, et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*.

All other required readings will be placed on electronic reserves available through the Blackboard site for this course. Readings marked “additional” are listed as a guide to further reading for those interested.

Assignments and Grading

The most valuable part of this course is a lively discussion of the readings each week, and this is how we will spend nearly all of our class time. To get discussion started, every student will be asked to offer a brief comment or question about that week's readings. I will ask questions and moderate the discussion, and I may designate students to serve as defenders of a particular reading if the discussion becomes lopsided. Class participation will be 25% of the grade for the seminar.

The remaining 75% of the grade will come from three papers, 6–7 pages in length. The purpose of these papers will be to assess critically one or more of the readings for the week, and they are due at the beginning of the class in which these readings will be discussed. You have the flexibility of choosing which weeks you would like to submit a paper, and I encourage you to get started in the early weeks of the semester. I am not looking for a summary of the readings. Instead, I want you to make an argument that shows your own thinking on the issues raised therein. For example, if the readings reflect a debate in the literature, you could evaluate the different positions and explain which is the stronger one. Alternatively, you might focus on a particular reading and provide a thorough critique of its assumptions, methodology, etc. Or, you might step back and examine the broader issues raised in the literature and evaluate how well the scholarship addresses these issues. The purpose is to hone your critical thinking and writing skills.

I will consider, on a case-by-case basis, proposals to write a single 20–25 page term paper in lieu of the three shorter papers. Ideally, such papers would draw upon the course material and serve as the basis for a conference paper or dissertation-related work.

Academic Integrity

The Syracuse University Academic Integrity Policy holds students accountable for the integrity of the work they submit. Students should be familiar with the Policy and know that it is their responsibility to learn about instructor and general academic expectations with regard to proper citation of sources in written work. The policy also governs the integrity of work submitted in exams and assignments as well as the veracity of signatures on attendance sheets and other verifications of participation in class activities. Serious sanctions can result from academic dishonesty of any sort.

Academic Accommodations for Students with Disabilities

If you believe that you need accommodations for a disability, please contact the Office of Disability Services (ODS), <http://disabilityservices.syr.edu>, located at 804 University Avenue, room 309, or call 315-443-4498 for an appointment to discuss your needs and the process for requesting accommodations. ODS is responsible for coordinating disability-related accommodations and will issue students with documented disabilities "Accommodation Authorization Letters," as appropriate. Since accommodations may require early planning and generally are not provided retroactively, please contact ODS as soon as possible. You are also welcome to contact me privately to discuss your academic needs, although I cannot arrange for disability-related accommodations.

January 12: The Lay of the Land

- Clark, Gregory. 2007. *A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World*, Introduction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*, chapter 2. New York: Anchor Books.
- Easterly, William. 2001. *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*, chapter 1. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, chapter 2. New York: Crown Publishers.

Additional Readings

- Hagopian, Frances. 2000. "Political Development, Revisited." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(6/7): 880–911.
- Bates, Robert H. 1990. "Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development," in *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds.
- Pritchett, Lant. 1997. "Divergence, Big Time." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11(3): 3–17.
- Bates, Robert H. 2001. *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development*.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2007. *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth*, chapter 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

January 26: Modernization Theories Old and New

- Lerner, Daniel. 1958. "The Grocer and the Chief: A Parable," in *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, pp. 19–42.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1963. "Economic Development and Democracy." In *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, chapter 2. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, pp. 27–63.
- Deutsch, Karl W. 1961. "Social mobilization and political development." *The American Political Science Review* 55(3): 493–514.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the Third-World, 1950–1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Introduction and Chapters 1–2.
- Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. "Democratic Transitions." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 551–569.

Additional Readings

- Moore, Jr., Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens. 1993. "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7(3): 71–85.
- Burkhart, Ross E. and Michael S. Lewis–Beck. 1994. "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis." *American Political Science Review* 88(4): 903–910.
- Barro, Robert J. 1999. "Determinants of Democracy," *The Journal of Political Economy* 107(6): S158–S183.
- Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes. 2003. "Endogenous Democratization." *World Politics* 55(4): 517–549.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

February 2: "Statist" Rejoinder to Modernization Theory

- Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Chapters 1–5 and 7.
- Kesselman, Mark. 1973. "Order or Movement: The Literature of Political Development as Ideology," *World Politics*, 26(1): 139–154.

February 9: Dependency Theory

- Baran, Paul. 1952. "On the Political Economy of Backwardness," *Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies* 20 (January), 66–84.
- dos Santos, Theotonio. 1970. "The Structure of Dependence." *The American Economic Review*, 60(2): 231–236.
- Cardoso, Fernando Enrique and Enzo Faletto. 1979. *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. Marjory Mattingly Urguidi, preface. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wibbels, Erik. 2006. "Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World," *International Organization*, 60: 433–468.
- Kohli, Atul. 2009. "Nationalist Versus Dependent Capitalist Development: Alternate Pathways of Asia and Latin America in a Globalized World." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44(4): 386–410.
- Wibbels, Erik. 2009. "Cores, Peripheries, and Contemporary Political Economy." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44(4): 441–449.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 2009. "Response." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 44(4): 450–456.

Additional Readings

- Frank, Andre Gunder. 1966. "The Development of Underdevelopment," *Monthly Review*, 17(Sept.): 17–31.
- Kaufman, Robert R., Harry I. Chernotsky and Daniel S. Geller. 1975. "A Preliminary Test of the Theory of Dependency," *Comparative Politics*, 7(3): 303–330.
- Valenzuela, J. Samuel and Arturo Valenzuela. 1978. "Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Development." *Comparative Politics*, 10(4): 535–557.
- Evans, Peter. 1979. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Moon, Bruce. 1991. "Dependency Elements of Economic Structure." In *The Political Economy of Basic Human Needs*, chapter 8. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 179–213.
- Firebaugh, Glenn. 1992. "Growth Effects of Foreign Direct Investment," *American Journal of Sociology*, 98 (1): 105–130.
- Schwartz, Herman. 2007. "Dependency or Institutions? Economic Geography, Causal Mechanisms, and Logic in the Understanding of Development." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 42(1/2): 115–135.

February 16: Culture and Development

- Landes, David. 2000. "Culture Makes Almost All the Difference." In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress.*, Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. New York: Basic Books.
- Granato, Jim, Ronald Inglehart, and David Leblang. 1996. "The Effect of Cultural Values on Economic Development: Theory, Hypotheses, and Some Empirical Tests." *American Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 607–631.
- Chang, Ha-Joon. 2008. "Lazy Japanese and Thieving Germans." In *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism*, chapter 9. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
- Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2006. "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20(2): 23–48.
- Tabellini, Guido. 2010. "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(4): 677–716.

Additional Readings

- Grief, Avner. 1994. "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(5): 912–950.

- Harrison, Lawrence E. and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. 2000. *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. New York: Basic Books.
- Heydemann, Steven. 2008. "Institutions and Economic Performance: The Use and Abuse of Culture in New Institutional Economics." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43(1): 27–52.
- Hanson, Jonathan K. 2009. "Cultural Values and Economic Growth: A New Look at Past Findings." Article manuscript.

February 23: Geography and History

- Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. "History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14(3): 217–232.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4): 1231–1294.
- Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development." *Journal of Economic Growth* 9(2): 131–165.
- Young, Crawford. 2004. "The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics." *African Affairs* 103(410): 23–49.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, chapter 9. New York: Crown Publishers.

Additional Readings

- Nunn, Nathan. 2009. "The Importance of History for Economic Development." *Annual Review of Economics* 1: 65–92.
- Gallup, John Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger. 1999. "Geography and Economic Development." *International Regional Science Review* 22(2): 179–232.
- Englebert, Pierre. 2000. "Pre-Colonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa." *Political Research Quarterly*, 53(1): 7–36.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *The American Economic Review*, 91(5): 1369–1401.
- Albouy, David Y. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment." *American Economic Review* 102(6): 3059–2076.
- Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 2003. "Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 50: 3–39.

- Gennaioli, Nicola and Ilya Rainer. 2007. "The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in Africa." *Journal of Economic Growth* 12(3): 185–234.
- Nunn, Nathan. 2008. "The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades." *The Quarterly Review of Economics* 123(1): 139-176.

March 2: The New Institutional Economics

- North, Douglass C. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(4): 803–832.
- Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(3): 271–303.

Additional Readings

- North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keefer, Philip and Stephen Knack. 1997. "Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation." *Economic Inquiry* 35(3): 590–602.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2000. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35(3): 3–31.
- Williamson, Oliver E. 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead." *Journal of Economic Literature* 38: 595–613.
- Bardhan, Pranab. 2005. "Institutions Matter, but Which Ones?" *Economics of Transition* 13(3): 499–532.
- Hanson, Jonathan K. 2014. "Forging Then Taming Leviathan: State Capacity, Constraints on Rulers, and Development." *International Studies Quarterly* 58(2): 380–392.

March 16: State-Led Development

- Kohli, Atul. 2004. "Introduction: States and Industrialization in the Global Periphery," in *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–24.
- Evans, Peter. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1–3 and 10.
- Bates, Robert H. 2005. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*, 2nd. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Krueger, Anne O. 1990. "Government Failures in Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 4(3): 9–23.

Additional Readings

- Leftwich, Adrian. 1995. "Bringing Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State," *Journal of Development Studies*, 31(3): 400–427.
- Waldner, David. 1999. *State Building and Late Development*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. 1999. *The Developmental State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

March 23: Regime Types, Growth, and Development

- Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review*, 87(3): 567–576.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the Third-World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 3–4.
- Lake, David A. and Matthew A. Baum. 2001. "The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services." *Comparative Political Studies* 34(6): 587–621.
- Haber, Stephen. 2006. "Authoritarian Government." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, eds., chapter 38. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 693–707.
- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*, chapter 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment," *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 322–343.

Additional Readings

- McGuire, Martin C. and Mancur Olson. 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: the Invisible Hand and the Use of Force." *Journal of Economic Literature* 34(1): 72–96.
- Almeida, Heitor and Daniel Ferreira. 2002. "Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance." *Economics and Politics* 14(3): 225–257.
- Gerring, John, Philip Bond, William T. Barndt, and Carola Moreno. 2005. "Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective." *World Politics*, 57(3): 323–64.

- Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2008. "Making Autocracy Work" In *Institutions and Economic Performance*, Elhanan Helpman, ed., chapter 11. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 452–510.
- Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Svobik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

March 30: Institutional Characteristics, Growth, and Development

- Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins. 2001. "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes." In *Presidents, Parliaments and Policy*, Stephan Haggard and Matthew D. McCubbins, eds., chapter 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 21–63.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*, chapter 2. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Nooruddin, Irfan. 2011. *Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments*, chapter 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*, chapters 3–6, 8, 11–13, 15. New York: Crown Publishers.

Additional Readings

- Hanson, Jonathan K. 2013. "Growth Paradigms and Congruent Institutions: Estimating Context-Varying Effects of Political Institutions on Economic Performance." *Political Science Research and Methods* 1(2): 239–262.
- Hanson, Jonathan K. 2014. "Democracy and State Capacity: Complements or Substitutes?" Forthcoming, *Studies in Comparative International Development*.

April 6: Redistribution, Clientelism, and Corruption

- Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. "Corruption." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108(3): 599–617.
- van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999*, chapter 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. "Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin," *World Politics* 55(3): 399–422.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2008. "Beyond Clientelism: Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4/5): 638–673.

- Hicken, Allen and Joel W. Simmons. 2008. "The Personal Vote and the Efficacy of Education Spending." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1): 109–124.

Additional Readings

- Alesina, Alberto and Dani Rodrik. 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 109(2): 465–490.
- Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle. 1994. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa." *World Politics* 46(4): 453–489.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study." *Journal of Public Economics* 76(3): 399–457.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2001. "Inefficient Redistribution." *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 649–661.
- Arriola, Leonardo R. 2009. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa," *Comparative Political Studies* 42(10): 1339–1362.

April 13: Ethnic Diversity and Development

- Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 1997. "Africas Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1203–1250.
- Miguel, Edward. 2004. "Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics* 56(April): 327–362.
- Posner, Daniel A. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi," *American Political Science Review*, 98(4): 529–545.
- Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 709–725.
- Franck, Raphaël and Ilia Rainer. 2012. "Does the Leader's Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa." *American Political Science Review*, 106(2): 294–325.

Additional Readings

- Collier, Paul. 2000. "Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance." *Economics & Politics* 12(3): 225–245.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2004. "Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 849–863.
- Montalvo, Jose G. and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2005. "Ethnic diversity and economic development." *Journal of Development Economics* 76(2): 293–323.

- Easterly, William, Jozef Ritzen, and Michael Woolcock. 2006. "Social Cohesion, Institutions, and Growth." *Economics & Politics* 18(2): 103–120.
- Kimenyi, Mwangi S. 2006. "Ethnicity, Governance and the Provision of Public goods." *Journal of African Economies* 15: 62–99.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Rohini Somanathan. 2007. "The Political Economy of Public Goods: Some Evidence from India." *Journal of Development Economics*, 82: 287–314.
- Lieberman, Evan S. and Prerna Singh. 2012. "The Institutional Origins of Ethnic Violence." *Comparative Politics* 45(1): 1–24.
- Hanson, Jonathan K. 2010. "Stitching a Patchwork Quilt: Democracy, Social Heterogeneity, and Development Outcomes." Article manuscript.
- Hanson, Jonathan K. 2012. "Diversity and Development: The Interaction of Political Institutions with Social Context." Article manuscript.

April 20: The Resource Curse

- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty*. Chapters 1–3, 5, and 9–10.
- Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. 2001. "The Curse of Natural Resources." *European Economic Review* 45(4): 827–838.
- Ross, Michael L. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53(3): 325–61.
- Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 508–537.

Additional Readings

- Ross, Michael L. 2004. "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3): 337–356.
- Collier, Paul and Anne Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4): 563–595.
- Synder, Richard and Ravi Bhavnani. 2005. "Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(4): 563–597.
- Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik. 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse." *The Economic Journal* 116(508): 1–20.

April 27: Inequality and Development

- Boix, Carles. 2010. "Origins and Persistence of Economic Inequality," *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 489–516.

- Ross, Michael L. 2006. "Is Democracy Good for the Poor?" *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4): 860–874.
- Abrami, Regina, Edmund Malesky, and Yu Zheng. 2011. "Accountability and Inequality in Single-Party Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China." *Comparative Politics*, 43(4): 401–419.
- Houle, Christian. 2009. "Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization." *World Politics* 61(4): 589–622.
- van de Walle, Nicolas. 2009. "The Institutional Origins of Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 307–327.

Additional Readings

- Landa, Dimitri and Ethan B. Kapstein. 2001. "Review: Inequality, Growth, and Democracy." *World Politics* 53(2): 264–296.
- Ansell, Ben and David Samuels. 2010. "Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach," *Comparative Political Studies* 43(12): 1543–1574.
- Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman. 2012. "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule," *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 495–516.
- Hanson, Jonathan K. 2013. "Loyalty and Acquiescence: Authoritarian Regimes and Inequality Outcomes." Article manuscript.