latter is already at work. Thus it is exemplary that Diderot and Vernant should have made themselves the storytellers of this “labyrinthe intelligence” (“intelligence en détails”), as Françoise Frontisi so well terms it. This discursive practice of the story (l’histoire) is both its art and its discourse.

At bottom, this is all a very old story. When he grew old, Aristotle, who is not generally considered exactly a tightrope dancer, liked to lose himself in the most labyrinthine and subtle of discourses. He had then arrived at the age of mimes: “The more solitary and isolated I become, the more I come to like stories.” He had explained the reason admirably: as in the older Freud, it was a connoisseur’s admiration for the tact that composed harmonies and for its art of doing it by surprise: “The lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for myth is composed of wonders.”

Part III
Spatial Practices

Chapter VII  Walking in the City

Seeing Manhattan from the 110th floor of the World Trade Center. Beneath the haze stirred up by the winds, the urban island, a sea in the midst of the sea, lifts up the skyscrapers over Wall Street, sinks down at Greenwich, then rises again to the crests of Midtown, quietly passes over Central Park and finally undulates off into the distance beyond Harlem. A wave of vertigo. Its agitation is momentarily arrested by vision. The gigantic mass is immobilized before the eyes. It is transformed into a texturology in which extremes coincide—extremes of ambition and degradation, brutal oppositions of races and styles, contrasts between yesterday’s buildings, already transformed into trash cans, and today’s urban irrigations that block out its space. Unlike Rome, New York has never learned the art of growing old by playing on all its past. Its present invents itself, from hour to hour, in the act of throwing away its previous accomplishments and challenging the future. A city composed of pomegranate places in monumental relief.

The spectator can read in it a universe that is constantly expanding. In it are inscribed the architectural figures of the coincidante oppositions, formerly drawn in miniatures and mystical textures. On this stage of concrete, steel, and glass, cut out between two oceans (the Atlantic and the American), by a frigid body of water, the tallest letters in the world compose a gigantic rhetoric of excess in both expenditure and production.
Voysers or walkers

To what erotics of knowledge does the centasy of reading such a cosmos belong? Having taken a voluptuous pleasure in it, I wonder what is the source of this pleasure of “seeing the whole,” of looking down on, totalizing the most immoderate of human texts.

To be lifted to the summits of the World Trade Center is to be lifted out of the city’s grasp. One’s body is no longer clasped by the streets that turn and return according to an anonymous law; one is possessed, whether as player or player, by the rumble of so many differences and by the overwhelming of New York traffic. When one goes up there, he leaves behind the mass that carries off and mixes up in itself any identity of authors or spectators. An Icarus flying above these waters, he can ignore the devices of Daedalus in mobile and endless labyrinths far below. His own special spreading and his own particular flight make him a voyser. He puts his body at a distance. It transforms the bewitching world by which one was “possessed” into a text that lies before one’s eyes. It allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, looking down like a god. The exaltation of a tonic and grotesque drive: the fiction of knowledge is related to this lust to be a viewpoint and nothing more.

One must finally fall back into the dark space where crowds move back and forth, crowds that, though visible from on high, are themselves unable to see down below? An Icarian fall. On the 110th floor, a poster, sphinx-like, addresses an enigmatic message to the pedestrian who is for an instant transformed into a visionary: it’s hard to be down when you’re up.

The desire to see the city preceded the means of satisfying it. Medieval or Renaissance painters represented the city as seen in a perspective that no eye had yet enjoyed. This fiction already made the medieval spectator into a celestial eye. It created gods. Have things changed since technical procedures have organized an “all-seeing power”? The totalitarian eye imagined by the painters of earlier times lives on in our achievements. The same spheric drive haunts users of architectural productions by materializing today the utopia that yesterday was only painted. The 1370 foot high tower that serves as a prow for Manhattan continues to construct the fiction that creates readers, makes the complexity of the city readable, and immobiles its opaque mobility in a transparent text.

Is the immense textology spread out before one’s eyes anything more than a representation, an optical artifact? It is the analogue of the facesmile produced, through a projection that is a way of keeping aloof, by the space planner urbanist, city planner or cartographer. The panorama-city is a “theoretical” (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture, whose condition of possibility is an oblivion and a misunderstanding of practices. The voyeur-god created by this fiction, who, like Schreber’s God, knows only cadavers, must disentangle himself from the murky intertwining daily behaviors and make himself alien to them.

The ordinary practitioners of the city live “down below,” below the thresholds at which visibility begins. They walk—an elementary form of this experience of the city; they are walkers, Wanderersleute, whose bodies follow the thick and thin of an urban “text” they write without being able to read it. These practitioners make use of spaces that cannot be seen; their knowledge of them is as blind as that of lovers in each other’s arms. The paths that correspond in this intertwining, unrecognized poems in which each body is an element signed by many others, elude legibility. It is as though the practices organizing a bustling city were characterized by their blindness. The networks of these moving, intersecting writings compose a manifold story that has neither author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of trajectories and alterations of spaces; in relation to representations, it remains daily and indefinitely other.

Escaping the imaginary totalizations produced by the eye, the everyday has a certain strangeness that does not surface, or whose surface is only its upper limit, outlining itself against the visible. Within this ensemble, I shall try to locate the practices that are foreign to the “geometrical” or “geographical” space of visual, panoptic, or theoretical constructions. These practices of space refer to a specific form of operations (ways of operating); to “another spatiality” (an “anthropological,” poetic and mystic experience of space), and to an opaque and blind mobility characteristic of the bustling city. A migrational, or metaphorical, city that slips into the clear text of the planned and readable city.

I. From the concept of the city to urban practices

The World Trade Center is only the most monumental figure of Western urban development. The atopia-utopia of optical knowledge has long had the ambition of surrounding and articulating the contradictions arising from urban agglomeration. It is a question of managing a growth of human agglomeration or accumulation. "The city is a huge monastery," said Erasmus. Perspective vision and prospective vision constitute the twofold projection of an opaque past and an uncertain future onto a
surface that can be dealt with. They inaugurate (in the sixteenth century) the transformation of the urban fate into the concept of a city. Long before the concept itself gives rise to a particular figure of history, it assumes that this fate can be dealt with as a unity determined by an urbanistic ratio. Linking the city to the concept never makes them identical, but it plays on their progressive syntheses to play a city to think the very plurality of the real and to make that way of thinking the plural effective: it is to know how to articulate it and be able to do it.

An operational concept?
The "city" founded by utopian and urbanistic discourse is defined by the possibility of a threefold operation:

1. The production of its own space (an empty space) rational organization must thus repress all the physical, mental and political pollutions that would compromise it;
2. The substitution of a new form, or of a systemic system, for the indeterminate and stubborn routines inherited by traditions: universal scientific strategies, made possible by the flattening out of all the data in a plane projection, must replace the tactics of users who take advantage of "opportunities" and who, through their trap-actions, these lapes in visibility, reproduce the capacities of history everywhere;
3. Finally, the creation of a universal and anonymous subject which is the city itself: it gradually becomes possible to attribute to it, as to its political model, Hobbes' State, all the functions and prediges that were previously scattered and assigned to many different real subjects—groups, associations, or individuals. The city, like a proper name, thus provides a way of conceiving and constructing space on the basis of a finite number of stable, isolatable, and interconnected properties.

Administration is combined with a process of elimination in this phase organized by "speculative" and classificatory operations. On the one hand, there is a differentiation and redistribution of the parts and functions of the city, as a result of inversions, displacements, accumulations, etc.; on the other there is a rejection of everything that is not capable of being dealt with in this way and so constitutes the "waste products" of a functionalist administration (abnormality, deviance, libretto, death, etc.). To be sure, progress allows an increasing number of these waste products to be reintroduced into administrative circuits and transforms even deficiencies (in health, security, etc.) into ways of making the networks of order denser. But in reality, it repeatedly produces effects contrary to those at which it aims: the profit system generates a loss which, in the multiple forms of wretchedness and poverty outside the system and of waste inside it, constantly turns production into expenditure. Moreover, the rationalization of the city leads to its mythification in strategic discourses, which are calculations based on the hypothesis or the necessity of its destruction in order to arrive at a final decision. Finally, the functionalist organization, by privileging progress (i.e., time), eases the condition of its own possibility—space itself—to be forgotten; space thus becomes the blind spot in a scientific and political technology. This is the way in which the Concept-city functions; a place of transformations and appropriations, the object of various kinds of interference but also a subject that is constantly reached by new attributes, it is simultaneously the machinery and the hero of modernity.

Today, whatever the avatars of this concept may have been, we have to acknowledge that if it is discourse the city serves as a totaling and almost mythical landmark for socioeconomic and political strategies, urban life increasingly permits the re-emergence of the element that the urbanistic project excluded. The language of power is in itself "urbanizing," but the city is left prey to contradictory movements that counterbalance and combine themselves outside the reach of panoptic power. The city becomes the dominant theme in political legends, but it is no longer a field of programmed and regulated operations. Beneath the discourses that ideologize the city, the rules and combinations of powers that have no readable identity proliferate, without points where one can take hold of them, without rational transparency, they are impossible to administer.

The return of practices

The Concept-city is decaying. Does that mean that the illness affecting both the rationality that founded it and its professionals afflicts the urban populations as well? Perhaps cities are deteriorating along with the procedures that organized them. But we must be careful here. The ministers of knowledge have always assumed that the whole universe
was threatened by the very changes that affected their ideologies and their positions. They transmit the misfortune of their theories into theories of misfortune. When they transform their bewilderment into "catastrophes," when they seek to enclose the people in the "panic" of their discourses, are they once more necessarily right?

Rather than remaining within the field of a discourse that upholds its privilege by inverting its content (speaking of catastrophe and no longer of progress), one can try another path: one can try another path: one can recognize the microbe-like, singular and plural practices which an urbanistic system was supposed to subordinate or suppress, but which have outruled its decay, one can follow the swarming activity of this procedures that, far from being regulated or eliminated by panoptic administration, have reinforced themselves in a proliferating (legitimacy, developed and insinuated themselves into the networks of surveillance, and combined in accord with unrepeatable but stable tactics to the point of constituting everyday regulations and surreptitious creativity that are merely concealed by the frantic mechanisms and discourses of the observational organization.

This pathway could be described as a consequence, but also as the reciprocal, of Foucault’s analysis of the structures of power. He moved it in the direction of mechanisms and technical procedures, "minor instrumentalities" capable, merely by their organization of "details," of transforming a human multiplicity into a "disciplinary" society and of managing, differentiating, classifying, and hierarchizing all deviations concerning apprenticeship, health, justice, the army, or work. These often microbially rare discursive discipline, these "minor but flawless" mechanisms, draw their efficacy from a relationship between procedures and the space they redistribute in order to make an "operator" out of it. But what spatial practices correspond, in the area where discipline is manipulated, to these apparatuses that produce a disciplinary space? In the present conjuncture, which is marked by a contradiction between the collective mode of administration and an individual mode of reappropriation, this question is no less important, if one admits that spatial practices in fact secretly structure the determining conditions of social life. I would like to follow out a few of these multi form, resistance, tricky and stubborn procedures that elude discipline without being outside the field in which it is exercised, and which should lead us to a theory of everyday practices, of lived space, of the disquieting familiarities of the city.
appropriates and transcends the language: it is a spatial acting-out of the place (just as the speech act is an acoustically acting-out of language); and it implies relations among differentiatized positions, that is, among pragmatic "centrodes" in the form of movements (just as verbal enunciation is an "allocation." - posits another opposite: the speaker and puts centrodes between interlocutors into action). It thus seems possible to give a preliminary definition of walking as a space of enunciation.

We could moreover extend this problematic to the relations between the act of writing and the written text, and even transpose it to the relationships between the "hand" (the touch and the tale of the paintbrush [fe et la gace du peintre]) and the finished painting (forms, colors, etc.). At first isolated in the area of verbal communication, the speech act turns out to find only one of its applications there, and its linguistic modality is merely the first determination of a much more general distinction between the forms used in a system and the way of using this system (i.e., rules), that is, between two "different worlds," since "the same things" are considered from two opposite formal viewpoints.

Considered from this angle, the pedestrian speech act has three characteristics which distinguish it at the outset from the spatial system: the present, the discrete, the "phatic."

First, if it is true that a spatial order organizes an ensemble of possibilities (e.g., by a place in which one can move) and interdictions (e.g., by a wall that prevents one from going farther), then the walker actualizes some of these possibilities. In this way, he makes them exist as well as emerge. But he also moves about and he invents others, since the crossing, drifting away, or improvisation of walking privilege, transform or abandon spatial elements. Thus Charlie Chaplin multiplies the possibilities within the space he does with the same thing and he goes beyond the limits that the determinants of the object set on its utilization. In the same way, the walker transforms each spatial signifier into something else. And if on the one hand he actualizes only a few of the possibilities fixed by the constructed order (he goes only here and not there), on the other he increases the number of possibilities (for example, by creating shortcuts and detours) and prohibitions (for example, he forbids himself to take paths generally considered accessible or even obligatory). He thus makes a selection. "The user of a city picks out certain fragments of the statement in order to actualize them in secret."

He thus creates a discreteness, whether by making choices among the signifiers of the spatial "language" or by displacing them through the use he makes of them. He produces certain places to invent or disappear, and composes with others spatial "turns of phrase" that are "rare," "accidental" or illegitimate. But that already leads into a rhetoric of walking.

In the framework of enunciation, the walker constitutes, in relation to his position, both a near and a far, a here and a there. To the fact that the adverbs here and there are the indicators of the locutionary seat in verbal communication—a coincidence that reinforces the parallelism between linguistic and pedestrian enunciation—we must add that this location (here—there) necessarily implied by walking and indicative of a present appropriation of space by an "I" also has the function of introducing an other in relation to this "I" and of thus establishing a conjunctive and deductive articulation of places. I would stress particularly the "phatic" aspect, by which I mean the function, isolated by Malinowski and Jakobson, of terms that inaugurate, maintain, or interrupt contact, such as "hello," "well, well," etc. Walking, which alternately follows a path and has followers, creates a mobile organization in the environment, a sequence of phatic rapport. And it is true that the phatic function, which is an effort to ensure communication, is already characteristic of the language of walking birds, just as it constitutes the first verbal function acquired by children. It is not surprising that it also gymbals, goes on all fours, dances, and walks about, with a light or heavy step, like a series of "hollow" in an echoing labyrinth, anterior to or parallel to informative speech.

The modalities of pedestrian enunciation which a plane representation on a map brings out could be analyzed. They include the kinds of relationship this enunciation entertains with particular paths (or "trace movements") by according them a truth value ("classical" modalities of the necessary, the impossible, the possible, or the contingent); an epistemological value ("episodic" modalities of the certain, the excluded, the plausible, or the questionable) or finally an ethical or legal value ("deontic" modalities of the obligatory, the forbidden, the permitted, or the optional). Walking affirms, suspends, tries out, transgresses, ruptures, etc., the trajectories it "speaks." All the modalities sing a part in this chorus, changing from step to step, stepping, through proportions, sequences, and intensities which vary according to the time, the path taken and the walker. These enunciatory operations are of an unlimited diversity. They therefore cannot be reduced to their graphic trail.
Walking rhotorics

The walking of passers-by offers a series of turns (tours) and detours that can be compared to "turns of phrase" or "stylistic figures." There is a rhetoric of walking. The art of "turning" phrases finds an equivalent in an art of composing a path (tourner un parcours). Like ordinary language, this art impletes and combines styles and uses. Style specifies a "linguistic structure that manifests on the symbolic level... an individual's fundamental way of being in the world." It composes a singular. Use defines the social phenomenon through which a system of communication manifests itself in actual fact; it refers to a norm. Style and use both have to do with a "way of operating" (of speaking, walking, etc.), but style involves a peculiar processing of the symbolic, while use refers to elements of a code. They intersect to form a style of use, a way of being and a way of operating.†

In introducing the notion of a "residing rhetoric" ("rhetorique habitante"), the fertile pathway opened up by A. Médard and systematized by S. Ostrovsky and J.-F. Auguyard, we assume that the "trophes" catalogued by rhetoric furnish the analogiae for the analysis of ways of appropriating places. Two postulates seem to me to underlie the validity of this application: 1) it is assumed that practices of space also correspond to manipulations of the basic elements of a constructed order; 2) it is assumed that they are, like the tropes in rhetoric, deviations relative to a sort of "literal meaning" defined by the urbanistic system. There would thus be a homology between verbal figures and the figures of walking (a stylized selection among the latter is already found in the figures of dancing) insofar as both consist in "treatments" or operations bearing on isolating units and analogiae for the analysis of ways of appropriating places. Two postulates seem to me to underlie the validity of this application: 1) it is assumed that practices of space also correspond to manipulations of the basic elements of a constructed order; 2) it is assumed that they are, like the tropes in rhetoric, deviations relative to a sort of "literal meaning" defined by the urbanistic system. There would thus be a homology between verbal figures and the figures of walking (a stylized selection among the latter is already found in the figures of dancing) insofar as both consist in "treatments" or operations bearing on isolating units and analogiae for the analysis of ways of appropriating places.

The long poem of walking manipulates spatial organizations, no matter how apocryphal they may be; it is neither foreign to them (it can take place only within them) nor in conformity with them (it does not receive its identity from them). It creates shadows and ambiguities within them. It inserts its own references and citations into them (social models, cultural mores, personal factors). Within them it is itself the effect of successive encounters and occasions that constantly alter it and make it the other's own: in other words, it is like a peddler, carrying something surprising, transversal or attractive compared with the usual choice. These diverse aspects provide the basis of a rhetoric. They can even be said to define it.

By analyzing this "modern art of everyday expression" as it appears in accounts of spatial practices, J.-F. Auguyard discerns in it two especially fundamental stylistic figures: synecdoche and assigning. The predominance of these two figures seems to me to indicate, in relation to two complementary poles, a formal structure of these practices. Synecdoche consists in "using a word in a sense which is part of another meaning of the same word." In essence, it makes a part instead of the whole which includes it. Thus "mail" is taken for "ship" in the expression "a fleet of fifty sail"; in the same way, a brick shelter or a hall is taken for the park in the narration of a trajectory. Assigning is the suppression of linking words such as conjunctions and adverbs, either within a sentence or between sentences. In the same way, in walking it adorns and fragments the space traversed; it slips over links and leaves out parts that it omits. From this point of view, every walk constantly leaps, or slips like a child, hopping on one foot. It precipices the elliptical of conjunctive facts.

In reality, these two pedestrian figures are related. Synecdoche expands a spatial element in order to make it play the role of a "more" (in and displace meaning in the direction of equivalences) in the way a tremulous image conflues and multiplies the photographed object. In these two modes, the analogy can be accepted. I would add that the geometrical space of urbanists and architects seems to have the status of the "proper meaning" constructed by grammarians and linguists in order to have a normal and normative level to which they can compare the drifting of "figurative" language. In reality, this faceless "proper" meaning (as "proper" same figures) cannot be found in current use, whether verbal or pedestrian; thereby the fiction produced by a use that is also particular, the metalloglossic use of science that distinguishes itself by that very distinction.††
WALKING IN THE CITY

fragmentations, that is, through these rhetorical operations a spatial phrasing of an analogical (composed of juxtaposed citations) and elliptical (made of gaps, lapses, and allusion-like type) text is created. For the technological system of a coherent totality space that is “linked” and simultaneous, the figures of pedestrian rhythmic substituential trajectories that have a mythical structure, at least if one understands by “myth” a discourse relative to the place/nower/or origin) of concrete existence, a story jerry-built of elements taken from common sayings, an in- and-fragmentary way whose gap mesh with the social practices it symbolizes; figures are the acts of this stylistic metamorphosis of space. Or rather, as Rikls puts it, they are moving “trees of gestures.” They move over the rigid and conceived territories of the medico-pedagogical in which registered children find a place to play and dance their “spatial stories.” These “trees of gestures” are in movement everywhere. Their forests walk through the streets. They transform the scene, but they cannot be fixed in a certain place by images. If in spite of all this an illustration were required, we could mention the fleeting images, yellow, green and metallic blue calligraphies that sound without raising their voices and emblazon themselves on the subterranean passages of the city, “embroideries” composed of letters and numbers, perfect gestures of violence painted with a pistol, Shiwas made of written characters, dancing graphics whose fleeting apparitions are accompanied by the rumble of subway trains: New York graffiti.

If it is true that forest of gestures are manifest in the streets, their movement cannot be captured in a picture, nor can the meaning of their movements be circumscribed in a text. Their rhetorical transplantations carry away and displaces the analytical, extreme proper meanings of urbanism: it constitutes a “wandering of the semantic” produced by names that make some parts of the city disappear and exaggerate others, distorting it, fragmenting it, and diverting it from its immobile under.


The figures of their movements (synechdoche, ellipse, etc.) characterizes both a “symbolic order of the unconscious” and “certain typical processes of subjectivity manifested in discourse.”

The similarity between “discourse” and dreams has to do with their use of the same “stylistic procedures”; it therefore includes pedestrian practices as well. The ancient catalog of tropes that from Freud to Bataille has furnished an appropriate inventory for the rhetoric of the first two registers of expression is equally valid for the third. If there is a parallelism, it is not only because correlation is dominant in these three areas, but also because of its discourse (personalized, dreamed, or walked) development is organized as a relation between the place from which it proceeds (an origin) and the nowhere it produces (a way of “going by”).

From this point of view, after having compared pedestrian processes to linguistic formations, we can bring them back down in the direction of one singular, or at least discover on that other side what, in a spatial practice, is inaccessible from the dreamed place. To walk is to lack a place. It is the indefinite process of being absent and in search of a proper. The moving about that the city multiplies and concentrates makes the city itself an immense social experience of lacking a place—an experience that is, to be sure, broken up into countless tiny deportations (displacements and walks), compounded for by the relationships and intersections of these exoduses that intervene and create an urban fabric, and placed under the sign of what ought to be, ultimately, the place but is only a mark the City. The identityfulness by this place is all the more symbolic (names) because, in spite of the inequality of its citizens’ positions and profits, there is only a pulsation of passer-by, a network of residences temporarily appropriated by pedestrian traffic, a shuffling among pretenses of the proper, a universe of rented spaces, haunted by a nowhere or by dreamed-of places.

Names and symbols

An indication of the relationship that spatial practices entertain with that absence is furnished precisely by their manipulations of and with “proper names.” The relationships between the direction of a walk (le sens de la marche) and the meaning of words (le sens des mots) situate two sorts of apparently contrary movements: one extraneous (to walk is to go outside), the other introverted (mobility under the stability of the signifiers). Walking is in fact determined by semantic tropes; it is attracted and repelled by nominations whose meaning is not clear, whereas the city, for its part, is transformed for many people into a “desert” in which the meaningless, indeed the irritating, no longer takes the form of shadows but becomes, as in Genet’s play, an impalpable light that produces this urban text without obstructions, which is created by a technocratic power everywhere and which puts the city-dweller under control (under the control of what? No one knows): The city

WALKING IN THE CITY

103
keeps us under its gaze, which one cannot bear without feeling dizzy," says a resident of Rouen, France. In the spaces brutally cut by an alien reason, proper names carve out pockets of hidden and familiar meaning. They "make sense"; in other words, they are the impetus of movements, like vocations and calls that turn or divert an itinerary by giving it a meaning (or a direction) (sense) that was previously underdetermined. These names create a nowhere in places; they change them into passages.

A friend who lives in the city of Strasbourg, when he is in Paris, toward the rue des Saints-Pères and the rue de Sevres, even though he is going to see his mother: these names articulate this sentence that his steps compose without his knowing it. Numbered streets and street numbers (112th St., 9 rue Saint-Charles) orient the magnetic field of trajectories just as they can haunt dreams. Another friend unconsciously apprehends the streets which have names and, by the fact, transmits her orders or identities in the same way as demonstrates and classifications; she goes instead along paths that have no name or signature. But her walking is thus still controlled negatively by proper names.

What is it then that they spell out? Disposed in constellations that hierarchize and semantically order the surface of the city, operating chronological arrangements and historical justifications, these words (Borrego, Bostocks, Boulaville...) slowly lose, like worn coins, the value engraved on them, but their ability to signify cut their first definition. Saints-Pères, Corinthe Colton, Red Square... these names make themselves available in the diverse meanings given them by passers-by; they detach themselves from the places they were supposed to define and serve as imagistic meeting-points on itineraries which, as metaphors, they determine for reasons that are foreign to their original value just may be recognized or not by passers-by. A strange toponymy that is detached from actual places and flies high over the city like a foggy geography of "meanings" held in suspension, directing the physical dismantlements below: Place de l'Étoile, Censore, Poissonniers.

These constellations of names provide traffic patterns: they are stars directing itineraries. "The Place de la Concorde does not exist," Malaparte said, "it is an idea." It is much more than an "idea." A whole series of comparisons would be necessary to account for the magical powers proper names enjoy. They seem to be carried as emblems by the travellers they direct and simultaneously decorate.

Linking acts and footsteps, opening meanings and directions, these words operate in the name of an empyrean-out and wearing-away of their primary role. They become liberated spaces that can be occupied. A rich indeterminacy gives them, by means of a semantic tactualization, the function of articulating a secret, poetic geography on top of the geography of the literal, forbidden or permitted meaning. They disseminate other routes into the functionalist and historical order of movement. Walking follows them: "I fill this great empty space with a beautiful name." People are put in motion by the remaining relics of meaning, and sometimes by their waste products, the inscribed remainders of great ambitions. Things that amount to nothing, or almost nothing, symbolize and orient walkers' steps: names that have ceased precisely to be "proper.

In these symbolizing kernels three distinct (but connected) functions of the relations between spatial and signifying practices act (indicated and perhaps founded): the believable, the memorable, and the primitive. They designate what "authorizes" (or makes possible or credible) spatial appropriations, what is repeated in them (or is recalled in them) from a silent and withdrawn memory, and what is structured in them and continues to be signed by an in-fantile (in-fans) origin. These three symbolic mechanisms organize the topic of a discourse on the city (legend, memory, and dream) in a way that also elides urbanistic systematization. They could already be recognized in the functions of proper names: they make habitable or believable the place that they clothe with a word (by emptying themselves of their classifying power, they acquire that of "permitting" something else); they recall or suggest phantoms (the dead who are supposed to have disappeared) that still move about, concealed in gestures and in bodies in motion; and, by naming, that is, by imposing an injunction proceeding from the other (a story) and by altering functionalist identity by detaching themselves from it, they create in the place itself that creation, or nowhere that the law of the other carves out within it.

Credible things and memorable things: habitability

By a paradox that is only apparent, the discourse that makes people believe is the one that takes away what it urges them to believe in, or never delivers what it promises. Far from expressing a void or describing
used to open up space to something different. What does travel ultimately produce if it is not, by a sort of reversal, “an exploration of the deserted places of my memory,” the return to nearby exoticism by way of a detour through distant places, and the “discovery” of relics and legends: “fleeting visions of the French countryside,” “fragments of music and poetry,” in short, something like an “uprooting in one’s origins” (Hedegger)? What this walking exile produces is precisely the body of legends that is currently lacking in one’s own vicinity; it is a fiction, which moreover has the double characteristic, like dreams or pedestrian rhetoric, of being the effect of displacements and condensations. As a corollary, one can measure the importance of these signifying practices (to tell oneself legends) as practices that invent space.

From this point of view, their contents remain revelatory, and still more so is the principle that organizes them. Stories about places are make-believe things. They are composed with the world’s debts. Even if the literary form and the stematic schema of “superstitions” correspond to stable models whose structures and combinations have often been analyzed over the past thirty years, the materials (all the rhetorical details of their “manifestations”) are furnished by the leftovers from nominations, taxonomies, heroic or comic predicates, etc., that is, by fragments of scattered semantic places. These heterogeneous and even contrary elements fill the homogeneous form of the story. Things extra and alter (details and excesses coming from elsewhere) insert themselves into the accepted framework, the imposed order. One thus has the very relationship between spatial practices and the constructed order. The surface of this order is everywhere punched and torn open by ellipses, ellipses, and steps of omission; it is a slip-order.

The verbal relics of which the story is composed, being tied to lost stories and opaque acts, are juxtaposed in a collage where their relations are not thought, and for this reason they form a symbolic whole. They are articulated by lacunes. Within the structured space of the text, they thus produce anti-texis, effects of dissolution and escape, possibilities of moving into other landscapes, like cellar and bushes; “at once, at once,” because of the process of dissemination that they open up. Stories differ from rumors in that the latter are always injustices, initiators and results of a leveling of space, creators of common movements that reinforce an order by adding an activity of making people believe things to that of making people do things. Stories diversely rumors totalize. If there is still a certain oscillation between them, it
seems that today there is rather a stratification: stories are becoming private and sink into the secluded places in neighborhoods, families, or individuals, while the rumors propagated by the media cover everything and, gathered under the figure of the City, the masterwork of an anonymous law, the substitue for all proper names, they wipe out or construct any suppositions guilty of still relating the figure.

The dispersion of stories points to the dispersion of the memorable as well. And in fact memory is a sort of anti-museum: it is not localizable. Fragments of it come out in legends. Objects and words also have hollow places in which the past sleeps, as in the everyday acts of walking, eating, going to bed, in which ancient revolutions stumler. A memory is only a Prince Charming who stays just long enough to awaken the Sleeping Beauties of our wordless stories. "Here, there used to be a bakery." "That's where old lady Dupuis used to live." It is striking here that the places people live in are like the presences of diverse absences. What can be seen designates what is no longer there: "you see, here there used to be..." but it can no longer be seen. Demonstrates indicate the invisible identities of the visible: it is the very definition of a place, in fact, that it is composed by these series of displacements and effects among the fragmented strata that form it and that plays on these moving layers.

"Memories tie us to that place... It's personal, not interesting to anyone else, but after all that's what gives a neighborhood its character." There is no place that is not haunted by many different spirits hidden there in silence, spirits one can "invoke" or not. Haunted places are the only ones people can live in—and this is the secret of the "fleeting." But like the gothic sculptures of kings and queens that once adorned Notre-Dame and have been buried for two centuries in the basement of a building in the rue de la Chaussee-d'Antin, these "spirits," themselves broken into pieces in like manner, do not speak any more than they see. This is a sort of knowledge that remains silent. Only hints of what is known but unexpected are passed on "just between you and me.

Places are fragmentary and inward-turning histories, pasts that others are not allowed to read, accumulated times that can be unfolded but like stories held in reserve, remaining in an enigmatic state, symbolizations encrypted in the pain or pleasure of the body. "I feel good here!" the well-being under-expressed in the language it appears in like a fleeting glimmer is a spatial practice.

Childhood and metaphors of places

Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else.

Aristotle, Poetics 1457b

The memorable is that which can be dreamed about a place. In this place that is a palimpsest, subjectivity is already linked to the absence that structures it as existence and makes it "be there." Duchins. But as we have seen, this being-there acts only in spatial practices, that is, in ways of moving into something different (maniere de passer à l'autre). It must ultimately be seen as the repetition, in diverse metaphors, of a decisive and original experience, that of the child's differentiation from the mother's body. It is through that experience that the possibility of space and of a localization ("not everything") of the subject is inaugurated. We need not return to the famous analysis Freud made of this matrix-experience by following the game played by his eighteen-month-old grandson, who threw a reel away from himself, crying "oh-oh in pleasure, for (i.e. "over there," "gone," or "no more") and then pulled it back with the piece of string attached to it with a delighted look (i.e. "here," "back again")." It suffices here to remember this (perilous and satisfied) process of detachment from indifinition in the mother's body, whose substitute is the stop: this departure of the mother (sometimes she disappears by herself, sometimes the child makes her disappear) constitutes localization and exteriority against the background of an absence. There is a joyful manipulation that can make the maternal object "go away" and make oneself disappear (insofar as one considers oneself identical with that object, making it possible to be there (because) without the other but in a necessary relation to what has disappeared; this manipulation is an "original spatial structure.

No doubt one could trace this differentiation further back, as far as the naming that separates the foetus identified as masculine from his mother—but how about the female foetus, who is from this very moment introduced into another relationship to place? In the initiatory game, just as in the "joyful activity" of the child who, standing before a mirror, sees itself as one (it is she or he, seen as a whole) but another as (that), an image with which the child identifies itself, what counts is the process of this "spatial caption" that inscribes the passage toward the other as
the law of being and the law of place. To practice space is thus to repeat
the joyful and silent experience of childhood; it is, in a place, to be other
and to move toward the other.

Then begins the walk that Freud compares to the trampling underfoot
of the motherland. This relationship of oneself to oneself governs the
internal alterations of the place (the relations among its streets) or the
pedestrian unfolding of the open territories accumulated in a place (moving about
the city and travelling). The childhood experience that determines spatial
practices later develops its effects, proliferates, floods private and public
spaces, undoes their readable surfaces, and creates within the planned
city a "metaphorical" or mobile city, like the one Kandinsky dreamed of;
"a great city built according to all the rules of architecture and then
suddenly shaken by a force that defies all calculation."

Chapter VIII Railway Navigation
and Incarceration

A TRAVELLING INCARCERATION. Immobile inside the train; seeing
immobile things slip by. What is happening? Nothing is moving
inside or outside the train.

The unchanging traveller is pigeonholed, numbered, and regulated in the
grid of the railway car, which is a perfect actualization of the rational
utopia. Control and food move from pigeonhole to pigeonhole: "Tickets,
please..." "Sandwiches? Beer? Coffee?..." Only the restrooms offer
an escape from the closed system. They are a "safety" panopticon, a way
out for the ill, an escape for children ("Wen-wen") - a little space of
irrationality, like love affairs and sewers in the utopias of earlier times.
Except for this last given over to excesses, everything has its place in a
gridwork. Only a rationalized cell travels. A bubble of panoptic and
classifying power, a module of imprisonment that makes possible the
production of an order, a closed and autonomous insularity - that is
what can traverse space and make itself independent of local roots.

Inside, there is the immobility of an order. Here rest and dreams reign
supreme. There is nothing to do, one is in the state of rest. Everything
is in its place, as in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Every being is placed
there like a piece of printer's type on a page arranged in military order.
This order, an organizational system, the result of a certain reason, is
the condition of both a railway car's and a text's movement from one
place to another.

Outside, there is another immobility, that of things, towering moun-
tains, stretches of green field and forest, deserted villages, colonnades of
buildings, black urban silhouettes against the pink evening sky, the
twinkling of occasional lights on a sea that proceeds or succumbs our
histories. The train generalizes Diderot's Merveilleux, a speculative ex-
erience of the world: being outside of these things that stay there,
detached and absolute, that leave us without having anything to do with

114
7. “Memory,” in the ancient sense of the term, which designates a passive presence to the plurality of times and is thus not limited to the past.


12. See below, Part IV, Uses of Language.

13. See below, and also above in Chapter II, p. 22.


7. “Walking in the City.”


5. Descartes, in his *Regulae*, had already made the blind man the guarantor of the knowledge of things and places against the illusions and deceptions of vision.


7. See F. Chour, *Figures d’un discours inconnu* (Cerise, April 1972), 293–317.

8. Urbanistic techniques, which classify things spatially, can be related to the tradition of the "art of memory"; see Francis A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956). The ability to produce a spatial organization of knowledge (with "places" assigned to each type of "figure" or "situation") develops its procedures on the basis of this "art." It determines stops and can be recognized even in Bentham’s *Panopticon*.

Such a form remains stable in spite of the diversity of its concerns (past, future, present) and its projects (preserving or retouching relative to changes in the status of knowledge).
8. Auguyard, Par à par.
11. On this point that gardens organize into "labyrinths," see P. Bourdieu, L'Invention d'une théorie de la pratique (Genève: Droz, 1973), 215, etc.; Le Sens pratique, 5-52.
12. See Anne Baldassari and Michel Jucquet, Pratiques relationnelles des enfants à l'école et institution (Paris: CRECELE-CORDIES, 1976), and by the same author, Ce qui se transmet (Paris: Puf, 1976).
15. For Benveniste, "discourse is language considered as assured by the person who is speaking and in the conditions of its inexistence." (ibid., 266).
17. See also, for example, the epigraph in Patrick Modiano, Place de l'Étoile (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).
19. For example, see Parcels, the name of a great urbanistic ambition near Paris, has taken on a symbolic value for the inhabitants of the town by becoming in the eyes of France as a whole the example of a "blessed" future. This significa avant gives its citizens with the "prestige" of an exceptional identity.
20. Superstitions, "to be in," as something in addition or superfluous.
22. Ibid., 74, 206.
24. One can say the same about the photos brought back from trips, substituted for and turned into legends about the starting place.
25. Terms whose relationships are not thought but postulated as necessary can be said to form a symbol of a cognitive mechanism characterized by a "deficit" of thinking, see Dan Sperber, Le Système de l'Europe (Paris: Hermann, 1974); Restitutions Symboliques, trans. A. L. Minton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
30. See note 49.
31. See the two analyses provided by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams and Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. J. Strachey (New York: Livingston, 1960); and obo Samu, L'Esprit magique (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), 42-54.
34. V. Kostansky, Du sentiment dans l'art (Paris: Denoël, 1966), 57.
9. "Spatial Stories:"
3. See below, p. 118.
9. See, for example, Catherine Bidon and Francis Ho Thanh Kieu, Le Fils des fantômes dans un arbre enfouis (Paris: CEREEE, 1974), Alain Michaud and Jean-François Auguyard, Situations d'habitation en Alsace (Paris: ESA, 1976), etc.
10. See George H. T. Koushe, Geography in the Middle Ages (London: Methuen, 1938), etc.
12. The map is reproduced and annotated by Pierre Héa, L'Evolution de la mémoire et la notion du temps (Paris: Chatto, 1962), 284-287. The original is