What does it take to have knowledge? According to one view, known as the ‘JTB’ view (for Justified True Belief), it takes three things: truth, belief, and (sufficient) justification.

Dmitri knows that he’s not now forty years old iff
1. Dmitri isn’t now forty years old.
2. Dmitri believes that he’s not now forty years old.
3. Dmitri’s belief that he’s not now forty years old is sufficiently well justified.

How much justification is enough? According to the Skeptic, only beliefs which are epistemically certain are sufficiently justified in order to count as knowledge. In order for me to know that I’m not now forty years old, I have to be able to rule out every possibility in which I’m not now forty.

Because I’m not able to do so, the Skeptic claims that I don’t know that I’m not now forty years old. After all, I could have been kept in a state of suspended animation for 13 years as a baby. And if that were true, then I would now be forty years old. I can’t rule this possibility out, so I can’t be epistemically absolutely certain that I’m not now forty years old, so I can’t know that I’m not now forty years old.

Four arguments for Skepticism:

**Possibility of Error Argument**

- **P1** My belief that I’m not 40 could be mistaken.
- **P2** If a belief could be mistaken, then it’s not knowledge.
- **C** I don’t know that I’m not 40.

**Certainty Argument**

- **P1** I’m not absolutely certain that I’m not 40.
- **P2** In order to know that I’m not 40, I must be absolutely certain that I’m not 40.
- **C** I don’t know that I’m not 40.

**Indistinguishability Argument**

- **P1** The case in which I’m not 40 is indistinguishable from the case in which I was kept in suspended animation as a baby.
- **P2** Cases of knowledge cannot be indistinguishable from cases of nonknowledge.
- **C** I don’t know that I’m not 40.

**Transmissibility Argument**

- **P1** I don’t know that I wasn’t kept in suspended animation as a baby.
- **P2** If I don’t know that I wasn’t kept in suspended animation as a baby, then I don’t know that I don’t know that I’m not 40.
- **C** I don’t know that I’m not 40.
• G.E. Moore argued that we can

• One way to reject the Skeptic’s arguments is by rejecting the high standard they place on justification. Perhaps we can have knowledge even when we can’t rule out every possibility in which we’re wrong. This position is called ‘fallibilism.’

  **Fallibilism**
  A person can have knowledge even if they can’t rule out every possibility in which they’re wrong, and even if they can’t be absolutely certain.

• The Fallibilist rejects P2 of the first three arguments above.
  – I can know that I’m not 40 even if I could be wrong.
  – I can know that I’m not 40 even if I’m not absolutely certain that I’m not 40.
  – I can know that I’m not 40 even though my current state is indistinguishable from one in which I’m not 40.

• The Fallibilist could reject P1 of the *Transmissibility Argument*. They could insist that I *do* know that I wasn’t kept in suspended animation for 13 years.