Truman's Motivations:
Using the Atomic Bomb in the Second World War
John W. Cooper
Saturday, December 9, 2000
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"A bright light filled the plane. The first
shock wave hit us. We were eleven and a half slant miles from the atomic
explosion, but the whole airplane cracked and crinkled from the blast…” said
Col. Paul Tibbets, the pilot who dropped the atomic bomb on Japan
(Seattletimes.com). Truman was a great champion of the atomic bomb. In addition to playing an essential role in
ending the Second World War, the atomic bomb served Truman in several other
ways. The use of the atomic bomb at the
end of the war helped the Truman administration avoid congressional
investigations into the clandestine development and the cost of the atomic bomb
which were hidden from congress, permitted the United States to retaliate
against Japan for Pearl Harbor, and allowed Truman to use the atomic bomb as a
bargaining tool with the Soviet Union.
Because of these benefits, some people have suggested that Truman did
not pursue all reasonable measures to secure Japan's surrender before the use of
the atomic bomb. If Truman’s goal was to
end the war as soon as possible, why did he attempt to delay the Soviet entry
into the war? Furthermore, why did he
fail to modify the demand for unconditional surrender if he knew his decision
not to guarantee the position of the Emperor was a barrier to Japan's
surrender? Upon critical examination,
however, one can determine that Truman hoped to end the war as soon as possible
without paying Stalin too high a price for the Soviet
Union's intervention.
Moreover, neither the clarification of the Emperor's post-war position
nor the Soviet entry into the war would have led to Japan's
surrender; and therefore the atomic bomb was necessary and responsible for
forcing Japan's
capitulation.
The Truman
Administration’s Benefits for Using the Atomic Bomb
The incredible cost of developing the
atomic bomb was itself an incentive to use it in the Second World War. The cost of creating the atomic bomb was
approximately $2-billion. (Sherwin,
138). If you convert that cost into
current monetary terms the cost of its development would near $20 billion
(Brooks.edu). To put this in
perspective, the total cost of all the bombs, mines, and grenades used
throughout the entire Second World War was only $31.5 billion and the total cost
of all the small arms materiel used in the entire war was only $24 billion
(Brooks.edu). Since the atomic bomb’s
development was hidden from congress and the American public throughout the war
for national security reasons, many people were concerned if the atomic bomb
did not prove to be effective there would be never-ending congressional
investigations. Byrnes, director of the
Office of War Mobilization said, “If the project proves a failure, it will then
be subjected to relentless investigations and criticism” (Sherwin, 200). Likewise Groves
revealed more concerns in his memorandum written about 2 weeks before Roosevelt’s death: “He was certain that the weapon would
bring the war to a rapid conclusion, thereby justifying the years of effort,
the vast expenditures, and the judgement of the officials responsible for the
project" (Sherwin, 145).
Furthermore, after the Germans were defeated, the Allied effort for
developing the atomic bomb increased. Opprenheimer recalled after the war: “I
don’t think there was any time where we worked harder at the speed-up than in
the period after the German surrender and the actual use of the
bomb…" (Sherwin, 145). The atomic bombs’ role in terminating the war
prevented endless investigations of the Truman administration. Although it is impossible to enter Truman’s
mind, one can speculate that its cost was an incentive to use the atomic bomb.
Furthermore, Truman may have used the
atomic bomb to retaliate against Japan
for their attack on Pearl Harbor and brutality toward America
throughout the war. Truman spoke biting
words about the atomic bomb's destruction.
Truman, after hearing of the results of the raid against Hiroshima, made the vile
remark: “This is the greatest thing in history” (Sherwin, 221). This does not prove that Truman's principle
motivation for using the atomic bomb was to retaliate, but Pearl
Harbor was in Truman's memory.
Truman said, “Nobody is more disturbed over the use of atomic bombs than
I am but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on
Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war" (Alperovitz,
563). In defending the use of the atomic
bomb he particularly mentioned Pearl Harbor,
and the brutality that the Japanese inflicted upon American prisoners of
war. By examining Truman's diction one can
determine that he may have harbored resentment towards Japan, because
he described the Japanese as a beast: "The only language they seem to
understand is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a beast you have
to treat him as a beast…” (Alperovitz, 563).
Although it is impossible to determine what Truman thought or felt one
can speculate that Japan’s
brutality towards America
played a partial role in his decision to use the atomic bomb.
The United
States considered Russia a factor in the early
development of the atomic bomb. Groves said, “There was never from about two weeks from
the time I took charge of this Project any illusion on my part but that Russia was our
enemy…” (Sherwin, 62). Roosevelt, the
president of the United
States before Truman also, shared this view:
“… the President began to deal with atomic energy as an integral part of his
general diplomacy, linking and encompassing both the current wartime situation
and the shape of postwar affairs” (Sherwin, 84). Roosevelt was also cognizant of how,
Churchill, his major ally, viewed and hoped the atomic bomb could be used as a
bargaining counter with the Soviet Union
(Sherwin, 68). Likewise from the very
onset of the project Groves viewed Russia as America’s enemy. Roosevelt was made totally aware of the
possible political implications of for using the atomic bomb as Simpson
discussed with Roosevelt “the idea of using the [atomic bomb] as a bargaining
counter in postwar negotiations with the Soviet Union” (Sherwin, 166). Furthermore Chairman of the OSRD (Atomic
Energy Executive Committee) wrote, “The major consideration must be that of
national security and postwar strategic significance” (Sherwin, 80). From the earliest stages of the atomic bomb's
development politicians were considering its postwar significance.
Truman’s advisors heavily influenced
Truman’s feeling towards the Soviet Union.
Truman became president of the United States
following Roosevelt’s tragic death. For this reason Truman was relatively uninformed
about the atomic bomb development and Roosevelt's international policies
relating to the Soviet Union. Truman felt bound by Roosevelt’s former
policy to use the atomic bomb in the war, and not to open up negotiations with
the Soviet Union because he had not been elected president; Roosevelt
had won this position (Sherwin, 146).
His lack of information also allowed his advisors to easily mold his
opinion of the Soviet Union. Roosevelt had not
kept Truman informed of his foreign policy; therefore, when Truman became
president he lacked his own foreign policy, and consequently adopted the
foreign policy of his advisors. Kissinger described the manner in which
Truman's policy was shaped when he said "Soviet policies were explained to
Truman in inherent bad faith model. [It
is] clearly self-perpetuating for the model itself denies the existence of data
that could disconfirm it” (Sherwin, 153).
From the earliest outset Truman's advisors painted the Soviet
Union in the worst possible light.
Additionally, it was the belief of Stimson, Truman and Byrnes that only
after the power of the atomic bomb was shown would the Soviet Union become
accepting of America’s
point of view and territorial objectives (Sherwin, 194). Therefore, Truman’s advisors convinced him
that the Soviet Union was an enemy, which if
the atomic bomb was used, might be kept at bay.
Troubling
question about the decision to use the atomic bomb
There is some evidence that suggest that
the atomic bomb was not necessary to secure Japan's surrender. If the bomb was truly developed to end the
war as soon as possible, why wasn't the Emperor preserved? This appears contradictory, since his
position was maintained after the war.
Why wasn't the Soviet Union's intent
made clearer? Nevertheless, “On August 6
an American B-29 dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima without warning,
devastating the city and killing as many as 80,000 people” (Sigal, 2). From a humanitarian point of view if the use
of the atomic bomb could have been avoided Hiroshima was a great tragedy. There is some support for this
speculation. The United States’
Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that "in all probability prior to 1
November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not
been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion
had been planned or contemplated” (Alperovitz, 645). In spite of this statement, however, if one
carefully examines this survey, one realizes it did not accurately reflect Japan’s
readiness to surrender.
Additionally, General Curtis LeMay insulted
the use of the atomic bomb, calling the new weapon “the worst thing that every
happened… Even without the atomic bomb
and the Russian entry into the war, Japan would have surrendered in two
weeks” (Sigal, 178). At first glance
this statement in unsettling for those who believed the atomic bomb helped end
the war, however, the credibility and motivations of the pilot must be
considered. The airforce, ironically,
was not a champion of the atomic bomb.
They would rather show that the conventional bombing campaigns alone
were responsible for driving Japan
to its knees. The atomic bombs, unlike a
large bombing campaign, only require a few airplanes and would not necessitate
a large airforce. Nevertheless, the
troubling question has been raised. Was
the atomic bomb necessary, and was every reasonable measure taken to force Japan's
surrender before the use of the atomic bomb?
The Soviet Union’s Affects on Japan and the United States
Until the Soviet Union’s invasion of Japan, many Japanese hoped the Soviet
Union would intervene on their behalf. “Notwithstanding Sato’s warnings that the
Soviets would not alter the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the summary
characterized Togo as still blindly bent on “fly[ing] into the arms of Russia”
despite “the possibility that Russia might not be there to catch him” (Frank,
238). Near the end of the war, however, Togo
was convinced that the Soviet Union had no intention of helping Japan, because they had already made better
agreements with America to
divide up the spoils of war upon Japan's defeat.
Togo
lacked the one thing he needed to be convincing [in 1945]: he lacked concrete
evidence. He was thus caught between his
own desire to see the war terminated as soon as possible and the army’s
insistent demand that he undertake immediately to court the Soviet
Union (Butow, 79).
All
of Japan's officials did not
blindly hope that the Soviet Union would save
them. Unfortunately the officials who
harbored this belief did not have the evidence they needed to persuade a
majority of the governmental officials that this was true. Therefore Japan
continued to believe and hope that the Soviet Union
would intervene on their behalf.
The Japanese still hoped the Soviet
Union might intervene on their behalf when the atomic bomb was dropped and the
Russian army invaded Manchuria (Butow,
149). The fact that Japan was completely ignorant of Russian plans
to invade Manchuria is support for this
idea. The Japanese military official
estimate of Russian forces was 3 Infantry divisions stationed at the Manchurian
border when there were actually 15 divisions, and the estimate stated that
there were 2-3 Tank brigades when there were actually 8 brigades (Frank, 289). Obviously, the Soviet
Union's attack surprised the Japanese. When the invasion began on
August 9 General Headquarters stated that the “scale of these attacks is not
large” (Frank, 289). Even once the
invasions had begun the Japanese were in denial that their estimates were wrong
and that in fact this was the beginning of a full-scale invasion.
Russia harbored some aspirations of territorial
expansion in East Asia. This can be seen by looking at both Stalin
and the Soviet Union's behavior. Stalin expected that for Russia’s assistance in the defeat of Japan: “Russia
will share in the actual occupation of Japan” (Frank, 217). This at one time was a concession that the United States
was willing to make. However with the
advent of the atomic bomb the United
States no longer desired Soviet
assistance. Stalin still then tried to
gain territory and influence even when it was not needed. This can be seen because after the Soviet
Union was caught off guard by the United State's surprise use of the atomic
bomb: “[Stalin] decided to enter the war on 9 August, a week earlier than
previously scheduled, or a week earlier than President Truman had anticipated”
(Bix, 104). The Soviet Union desired to
share in the spoils of war by joining the war against Japan.
The United
States government officials hoped to keep the Soviet
Union out of East Asia. Walter Brown's diary records on July 24: “JFB
still hoping for time, believing after atomic bomb Japan will surrender and
Russia will not get in so much on the kill, thereby being in a position to press
for claims against China” (Alperovitz, 268).
Additionally, in Byrnes' book, Speaking Frankly, Byrnes wrote:
“As for myself, I must frankly admit that… I would have been satisfied had the
Russians determined not to enter the war” (Alperovitz, 274). Here is clear, first hand, evidence that
after obtaining the atomic bomb the United States did not desire Soviet
assistance. This view was also expressed
by Secretary of War Stimson who felt, “if the Russians seek joint occupation
after a creditable participation in the conquest of Japan, I do not see how we could
refuse them at least a token occupation” (Sigal, 135). Grew agreed with Stimson as he said, “Once, Russia is in the war against Japan, then Mongolia,
Manchuria, and Korea will
gradually slip into Russia’s
orbit” (Sigal, 97). Therefore it is
undeniable that many powerful people involved in the war effort strongly
desired that the Soviet Union not be involved in the Japan’s defeat.
Truman shared the view of his
military officials, once he knew that the United States had developed an
atomic bomb that had proven effective in tests.
Truman, unfortunately, revealed very little about his own ideology so it
is difficult to put reasons behind his actions.
However, after looking at the August 15, 1960 issue of U.S. News and
World Report, one can gain valuable insight into Truman's psyche. Byrnes was interviewed and asked:
Was
there a feeling of urgency to end the war in the Pacific before the Russians
became too deeply involved?” and he responded: “There certainly was on my part,
and I’m sure that, whatever views President Truman may have had of it earlier
in the year, that in the days immediately preceding the dropping of the bomb
his views were the same as mine- we wanted to get through the Japanese phase of
the war before the Russians came in” (Alperovitz, 274).
This
did not come out for a number of years because of possible political
implications, but this is significant evidence that Truman desired to end the
war without Soviet intervention. At his time
Byrnes had no reason to be untruthful or mislead the American public. In 1960 Byrnes revealed this glimpse into
Truman's psyche: Truman desired to keep Russia out of the war.
Not only did Truman desire that the
Soviet Union not enter the war, his administration actually attempted to delay
the Soviet Union's entry into the war. China
was told by high-ranking officials in the States Department to stall their
negotiations with the Soviet Union so that
their entry into the war would be delayed.
Churchill reported:
Mr.
Byrnes told me this morning that he had cabled to T.V. Soong advising him not
to give way on any point to the Russians, but to return to Moscow and keep on
negotiating pending further developments it is quite clear that the United
States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war
against Japan (Alperovitz, 270-271).
This
is concrete evidence that the United States
intended to stall the Soviet Union's entry
into the war. Brown’s diary also reveals
Byrnes hoped to delay the Soviet Union's entry
into the war by having the Chinese delay their negotiations. “[Byrnes] hopes
Soong will stand firm and then Russians will not go in war… Then he feels Japan
will surrender before Russia
goes to war and this will save China. If Russia
goes in the war, he knows Stalin will take over and China will suffer” (Alperovitz,
267). This is further evidence which
supports the idea that the United States
tried to delay the Soviet Union's entry into
the war, because they hoped to limit Stalin's war gains. The United
States feared the price of Stalin’s help in forcing Japan to
surrender.
The United States attitude towards
Soviet involvement shifted throughout the war.
Before the proven effectiveness of the atomic bomb Soviet intervention
was viewed as absolutely essential for an invasion of Japan. After United
States military officials learned that the Navy would be
able to prevent Japanese troops stationed in Manchuria from traveling back to
reinforce Japan the officials
no longer viewed the Soviet Union’s
involvement as absolutely essential.
Lastly, "[Truman] and Byrnes had clearly decided that they
preferred not to utilize this method of attempting to end the war- and actively
sought to delay a Red Army attack” (Alperovitz, 270-271).
Even if the Soviet invasion had not
been delayed their invasion alone would not have been enough to force Japan's
surrender. “Soviet intervention did not
invalidate the Ketsu-go military and political strategy; the Imperial Army had
already written off Manchuria (Frank,
347). The Soviet invasion of Manchuria
was not readily apparent to the vast majority of the Japanese populace living
in Japan. Even after the invasion the “Masses thought Japan was
winning the war. There was, therefore,
no public opinion pressing for peace—until the savage bombing of the homeland”
(Brooks, 116). The atomic bomb did not
reach all the cities, but it was a strike at the homeland, the place where the
vast majority of Japanese lived. General
Umenzu, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff for Japan
while discussing Japan's
situation after the Russian invasion said, “Although Russian attack has made
the situation unfavorable, I do not think we need abandon the opportunity to
deliver one last blow to America
and England”
(Brooks, 79). He did not view the
Russian attack as a fatal blow to the Japanese military strategy.
Although militarily speaking Japan military officials may have realized that
they would most likely be unable to defeat America over the course of a long
protracted war, they hoped for one glorious military battle which would allow
them to gain better conditions than unconditional surrender. Koiso, near the end of the war, wanted to
throw Japan’s
military resources into one all-out effort to win a battle before seeking an
end to the war. He reasoned: “Let’s make
a peace overture only after such a victory [because the terms of settlement
would certainly be somewhat less onerous] if we ride on the wave of victory [when
suing for peace]” (Sigal, 33). One way
to view this is that: "Armies do not make the decision to end the wars the
states, the nation’s leaders calculate the likelihood that by continuing the
war it can improve the terms of settlement, compared with what it would
presently obtain” (Sigal, 14). Following
this logic it is possible and even logical to continue a war after it is lost
in the hope of obtaining better concessions.
Therefore the inevitability of Japan’s defeat, which at times was
obvious to both sides, is in itself not a good reason to delay the use of the
atomic bomb, since military defeat and war termination are two very different
things.
The Call for Unconditional Surrender
The Potsdam Declaration contained the
insistence on unconditional surrender, which consequently left the continued
existence of the Emperor ambiguous, was a concern for the Japanese officials
and American officials knew it.
Approximately five days before the Potsdam
conference was scheduled to begin, American leaders who had been able to
decipher the Japanese code during the war decoded Togo's
cable to Sato in Moscow. “… it is His Majesty’s heart’s desire to see
the swift termination of the war. In the
Greater East Asia War, however, as long as America and England insist on
unconditional surrender our country has no alternative but to [fight on]”
(Brooks, 156). It is apparent then, that prior to the Potsdam
conference the United States
did know that all issues pertaining to the Emperor were of the utmost
importance.
The Potsdam Declaration left the
position of the emperor up to interpretation and failed to clearly state his
fate. The declaration failed to state
whether the emperor was "one of 'those who deceived and misled the people
of Japan'
whose 'authority and influence' were to be 'eliminated for all time,' or a war
criminal destined to face 'stern justice,' or part of a 'peacefully inclined
and responsible government' ” (Sigal, 143).
The controversy was over a phrase suggested by Byrnes to describe the
government: "this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present
dynasty" (Bix, 91). There were some
concerns that this wording was unclear because this diction could have multiple
interpretations. It could be interpreted to mean that the United Nations:
intended to “depose or execute the present Emperor and install some other
member of the Imperial family” or that it was “a commitment to continue the
institution of the Emperor and Emperor worship" (Frank, 220).
After many debates the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally decided on new
language which they felt was less ambiguous.
“Subject to suitable guarantees against further acts of aggression, the
Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government” (Sigal,
132). This was ambiguous as well. The government officials believed that Japan had the
necessary military channels to clarify the conditions, but still in the end the
Potsdam Declaration said nothing about either the Soviet entry into the war or
the Emperor.
Truman was repeatedly urged to alter
the unconditional surrender conditions prior to the Potsdam Declaration. Truman was urged on 14 separate occasions to
consider altering the unconditional surrender conditions:
by
Acting Secretary of State Grew, former President Herbert, Counsel to the
President Samuel I. Rosenman, Assistant Secretary of War, Admiral Leahy, State
Department in a formal recommendation of June 30, 1945; Under Secretary of the
Navy Ralph, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (Alperovitz, 300).
This
is undeniable proof that Truman was completely aware of the possible
ramifications for failing to alter the terms of unconditional surrender.
Truman was unable to alter the terms
of unconditional surrender because the cry for unconditional surrender was too
strong and had gained too much momentum.
“Unconditional surrender… had become a political shibboleth by the time
Truman took office… [Truman was not] ready to retreat publicly from this path
that Roosevelt had blazed" (Sherwin,
225). Truman became president in a very
tragic way, with the death of Roosevelt. Truman's support for unconditional surrender
was reinforced as soon as he took office.
Truman reflected, "I was applauded frequently, and when I
reaffirmed the policy of unconditional surrender, the chamber rose to its feet”
(Sigal, 94). This support for Roosevelt's legacy made it difficult for Truman to alter
the terms of unconditional surrender.
This policy had come to symbolize the sacrifices that America had incurred during the war and it
represented a goal which America
had been fighting to obtain. There was
an "aura surrounding the Roosevelt legacy
of unconditional surrender…" that Truman found almost impossible to go
against without firm, powerful, evidence and not mere speculation (Frank, 216).
Truman felt it difficult to
guarantee the position of the Emperor because of political concerns at home and
in Japan. “As wars draw to a close, officials do battle
on two fronts at once: on one, to bring the enemy state to terms, and on the
other, to end the war in a way that best serves their organizational interests”
(Sigal, 23). Near the end of the war
Truman did consider changing the terms.
However, the consensus among many officials was that modifying the terms
was not a prudent course of action.
MacLeish, serving as assistant secretary of state for public and
cultural affairs, suggested: “ ‘a very unfavorable public reaction’ to any
reinterpretation of unconditional surrender” (Sigal, 112). This idea is supported by a poll that found
most Americans hated the Emperor. This
poll asked people to pass on the Emperor’s fate. “33 percent of a national
sample favored executing him; 17 percent wanted him put on trial; 11 percent
preferred imprisonment; and 9 percent favored exile” (Sigal, 95; Frank, 215).
It is not a prudent course of action to absolve the Emperor of all wartime
responsibility when over 70% of the American public felt that he should be
exiled or even executed especially since popular support for the war effort was
essential for continuing the war against Japan.
Once Truman knew the atomic bomb had
been proven effective he felt the possible benefits did not outweigh the risks
inherent in clarifying the position of the Emperor. Hull
warned:
[Should]
it fail the Japs would be encouraged while terrible political repercussions
would follow in the US. Would it be well first to await the climax of
allied bombing and Russia’s
entry into the war?” Bynes agreed that
“terrible political repercussions” were too great a risk (Sigal, 128).
Truman
agreed with both Hull
and Bynes, because he thought there was the risk of possible civil unrest at
home and that if this tactic failed the Japanese would be encouraged to
continue their fight to the bitter end.
Some critics of the use of the atomic bomb point to the fact that after
the war the Emperor was untouched. Once
the war was over, there was no longer the risk that his preservation would
encourage the Japanese to fight on. This
risk was nullified and even if there were a political backlash at home, it would
not interfere with the war effort as at this point in time, the war would have
been won. The preceding points are
essential to understanding why the Emperor's position could not be clarified
during the war.
After the Potsdam Declaration—the Necessity of the
Atomic Bomb
Japan's response to the Potsdam
Declaration was ambiguous. The Japanese
military officials had an almost impossible task. If they were to release anything they needed
to satisfy many different groups within Japan. They needed to find a way to:
strike
a balance between the cabinet’s decision not to say anything that would destroy
the possibility of negotiating for better terms through Moscow and a certain necessity for it to say
something that would appease the military’s demand for a strongly worded
rebuttal and would also satisfy the expectations of the misguided masses
(Butow, 144).
There
was no immediate official response; instead it was from the Japanese newspaper
the United States
found their response. In response to the
Potsdam Declaration Japanese official Suzuki used the word mokusatsu. "[Suzuki's] phrase, mokusatsu, passed
out of the conference room Friday afternoon and found its way onto the front
pages of Japan’s Saturday morning papers” (Butow, 146). The word, mokusatsu, does not have one
translation into English. “For a person
who was privy to the cabinet’s decision mokusatsu may have conveyed the meaning
of “withholding comment” (Butow, 144). However,
it can also be interpreted to mean: "to reject." Therefore their response was unclear and did
not transmit to the United States
a willingness to accept the Potsdam
declaration.
Japan's response to the Potsdam Declaration
gave Truman and the nation further evidence that Japan needed to be compelled to
surrender. The allied newspapers
interpreted the word mokusatsu to mean: “reject" (Brooks, 164). Truman concurred with this definition,
because he said, “[Japan's]
leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum” (Brooks, 164). Since the American newspapers reported the
interpretation of the controversial word to mean "reject" Japan was able to see America's interpretation of their
response. However, “there is no record
of an effort by the Japanese government to overtly or covertly transmit to the
Allies any hint that mokusatsu did not precisely reflect its attitude” (Frank,
234). Additionally if Hirohito, who read
the newspapers daily, had been concerned about the ambiguity of Japan's
response and possible misinterpretation of its meaning, to this very day
"we have no record of it" (Bix, 91).
Japan's
secret cables intercepted and decoded by the United
States failed to suggest Japan had any desire to
surrender. James F Byrnes memoirs
revealed that there was no reason to delay the use of the atomic bomb. A decoded cable from Japanese militarists to
Japan’s Ambassador in Moscow:
“We
cannot consent to unconditional surrender under any circumstances. Even if the war drags on, so long as the
enemy demands unconditional surrender we will fight as one man against the
enemy in accordance with the Emperor’s command.” Byrnes said, “That cable, which we
intercepted, depressed me terribly. It
meant using the atomic bomb; it probably meant Russia’s entry into the war”
(Sigal, 7).
The
United States
intercepted this cable. Byrnes was "depressed" by this cable because
he knew that it was infeasible to alter America's
call for unconditional surrender and this would most likely mean that the
atomic bomb would have to be used against Japan.
Even if the preservation of the Emperor
were guaranteed there is substantial evidence this clarification would not have
led to Japan’s
surrender. American readers intercepted
a cable dialogue between Sato and Foreign Minister Togo, which supports this
claim. In this dialogue, which was made
available to American officials, Sato informed Foreign Minister Togo that the best terms Japan could
obtain were unconditional surrender with the stipulation that the Imperial
institution could remain. When Sato suggested the best Japan could
hope for was to keep the Emperor, but otherwise accept the unconditional
surrender. “Togo in unambiguous language and in
the name of the cabinet absolutely rejected such terms: ‘We are unable to
consent to it under any circumstances whatever’ ” (Frank, 230). This dialogue led American officials to
believe the demand for unconditional surrender need not be modified.
Additionally, information not available
to American officials during the war shows the necessity for the atomic bomb,
as the Japanese were not on the verge of surrendering after receiving the Potsdam declaration. There was some debate in Japan as to whether or not Japan should
surrender. Japan's
leading businessman urged Suzuki to accept the Potsdam terms. This evidence has been used by those who
support the idea that Japan
was on the verge of surrendering, but upon examining Suzuki's reply it becomes
quite clear that this is not the case.
Suzuki replied:
[For]
the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have arisen that force
them also to end the war. That is why
they are talking about unconditional surrender.
Precisely at a time like this if we hold firm they will yield before we
do. Just because they have broadcast
their Declaration, it is not necessary to stop fighting. You advisers may ask me to reconsider but I
don’t think there is any need to stop [the war]
(Frank, 235).
This
statement reveals many important things about the Japanese military plan. This is evidence which suggests that not
modifying the terms of the Potsdam Declaration to guarantee the position of the
Emperor was actually the right course of action. Suzuki used the Potsdam Declaration that made
no such guarantee to create the idea that "circumstances have arisen that
force them to end the war." This is
exactly the view that the Truman administration wisely wanted to avoid. Furthermore, his statement that "at a
time like this if we hold firm they will yield before we do" shows that,
to Suzuki, it was not important whether
or not Japan was winning
militarily, but was rather the battle of wills that Japan must win. Before the use of the atomic bomb Suzuki felt
that the Japanese would be able to win the battle of “will” and consequently
outlast the Americans, because America
was looking for a way out of the war.
Suzuki had no intention of surrendering, and clarifying the position of
the Emperor would have only helped him continue his cry for war.
Even after the use of the atomic
bomb the Japanese were divided as to whether or not to surrender. “Only on August 9, after withstanding months
of blockade and bombardment, obvious preparations for invasion, two atomic
bombs, and Soviet intervention, did the Big Six formulate terms for ending the
war” (Frank, 344). Unfortunately the big
six were unable to come to a conclusion.
There were two opposing plans. A
plan with four conditions and the foreign minister's plan which was to
surrendering with only the first condition.
1.
A guarantee that the imperial family will continue to reign.
2.
Disarmament of the armed forces by Japan herself.
3.
Trial of war criminals by Japan
herself.
4. Occupation of Japan to be limited to the minimum
time and places.
It was suggested that these conditions be preliminary to
our acceptance of the Potsdam
terms (Brooks, 77).
The atomic bomb allowed Japan to surrender. The atomic bomb convinced the Emperor to
intervene and break the deadlock in favor of accepting the Potsdam declaration. Why did the Emperor finally intervene? When he originally urged his officials to
accept the terms and surrender for Japan's better good he gave three
reasons: "a collapse of domestic morale” and two military concerns:
“inadequate preparation to resist the invasion and the vast destructiveness of
the atomic bomb and the air attacks”
(Frank, 345). There was no
mention of the Soviet intervention, and two of his three reasons related to the
atomic bomb: "collapse of domestic moral [as a result of] the vast
destructiveness of the atomic bomb…" It is true, however, that later on
August 14 when he restated his position he did cite both the Soviet Union's
intervention and "scientific power" (Frank, 345). This time he did mention the Soviet Union, but the Emperor mentioned the atomic bomb
as well. Therefore, there is no logical
way one could conclude that the atomic bomb was not a major factor in his
decision to intervene because he presented it each time he gave the reasons for
Japan’s
surrender.
Neither
the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war convinced Japan to
surrender. However the shock of both,
especially the use of the atomic bomb gave the people the opportunity and the
Emperor a sense of urgency to become involved which allowed people to involve
him which may have ended the war. (Sigal, 279).
The atomic bomb allowed the military
establishment an honorable way out of the war. Suzuki’s analysis: “If military
leaders could convince themselves that they were defeated by the power of
science but not by lack of spiritual power or strategic errors, they could save
face to some extent” (Frank, 347). Japanese officials were able to believe that
they were not ruined because of a lack of will and honor to the Emperor to
fight to the bitter the end, but rather they could justify the defeat as due to
science alone.
Truman’s main motivation for using the
atomic bomb was to force Japan
to surrender. Some revisionist
historians have suggested that Truman unnecessarily prolonged the war in order
to use the atomic bomb. Truman may have
delayed the Soviet Union’s entrance into the
war, but he had commendable reasons. If
the Soviet Union participated in Japan’s defeat Stalin would expect
post-war concessions. Once Truman knew
that the United States
possessed the atomic bomb he hoped to use this technology to defeat Japan without
the high cost of Stalin’s assistance.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's entrance into the war in itself would
not have been enough to force Japan
's surrender, because it did not interfere with Japan’s
plan for one glorious military battle to break America’s will to continue the
war. Truman could not modify the demand
for unconditional surrender because it had gained too much momentum. The Emperor was extremely unpopular in America and Truman was concerned about a
political backlash if he went against Roosevelt’s
call for unconditional surrender.
Likewise, in Japan,
Truman feared that this clarification could actually inspire the Japanese to
fight on and give them the false hope that the United
States would allow Japan to end the war on terms
better than unconditional surrender.
This danger was real as Suzuki used the Potsdam
declaration, which did not modify the terms of unconditional surrender, to
support the idea that the United
State’s resolve was
weakening. Additionally, Japan’s “rejection” of the Potsdam Declaration
and intercepted cables further led the Truman to believe that Japan was not
on the verge of surrendering. In the end
it was the atomic bomb, perhaps coupled with the Soviet
Union’s invasion, which led to the end of the war. When Emperor Hirohito finally surrendered he
cited the atomic bomb in both surrender speeches and the Soviet invasion in
one. This leads one to conclude that the
atomic bomb played a key role in convincing the Emperor to surrender. Therefore the use of the atomic bomb was
both justified and necessary to draw the war to a rapid and definite
conclusion.
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