

POLITICAL SCIENCE 663
International Organization and Integration
University of Michigan, Winter 2008

COURSE LOCATION AND TIME:

5664 Haven Hall, 11:00-1:00, Wednesday. If you would like to meet with me but are unable to come during office hours, we can set up an appointment. Outside of class and office hours, the best way to contact me is by e-mail.

COURSE PRE-REQUISITES:

Students will find the course easier if they have taken Political Science 660 (Proseminar on World Politics). Much of the course material has statistics in it, so a good knowledge of statistics is recommended (at least two semesters' worth). Knowledge of game theory would be helpful but is not necessary. If you are unsure whether you should take the course because of the prerequisites, please contact me and we can discuss your situation.

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

This course is partially about international integration (insofar as it was probably the central issue of interest to the founding fathers of the subfield we call 'IO'); it is primarily about international cooperation and organizations more broadly. We briefly examine some of the foundational works of the subfield, as well as the basics of regime analysis and Realist/ Liberal Institutional debates. We move fairly quickly to more recent literatures, such as the 'legalization' of world politics; treaty compliance; questions of why international law and institutions exist and what they do; and the relationship between norms and international cooperation.¹ Finally, we examine empirical studies in various issue areas such as economic affairs, the environment, security, and human rights.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS:

The course requirements are three-fold:

- (1) **15%** of your grade will be based on your participation in weekly seminars. I will give top participation grades to students who contribute meaningfully to our discussions (this generally entails the ability summarize the content of the readings, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and relate them to other works and other areas of interest).
- (2) Each student is required to write two short papers (each about 5 pages, double-spaced) and do two short presentations (about 10 minutes) on two of the weekly readings (hence, you cover the same readings in your paper and your presentation). Each paper/presentation combination is worth 25% of your grade, for a total of **50%**. The paper (and related presentation) should do two things: summarize the readings, pointing out commonalities and/or disagreements between the authors; critique the readings and provide ideas on ways the research could be improved. The deadlines will vary depending on which readings you select; your summary paper is due by e-mail by 8pm the night before class.
- (3) Each student is required to write a research design paper (approximately 10 pages, double-spaced) in which you identify a puzzle pertaining to the subject matter of this course, propose a

¹ In any other department, I would dedicate a week to the very interesting debate on rationalism and institutional design (see the entire 2001 special edition of *IO*, 55 (4)). However, given that Barb Koremenos is a faculty member here, and covers this material in her course(s), I have decided not to assign that research.

potential explanation (or explanations), and discuss how one might go about testing those explanations empirically. (Note that I do not necessarily mean 'quantitatively' when I say 'empirically.' Case studies and experiments are also useful approaches!). I do not expect you to have the statistical analyses, case studies, or experiments done. However, if you have some data and feel it would be a better use of your time to write a research paper (rather than a research design paper), that is fine (I expect this may be the case for students who are further along in the program). Please discuss this with me. The paper is due by e-mail April 21, and is worth **35%** of your grade.

COURSE READINGS:

1. Two texts (listed below) are required. They are available for purchase at Ulrich's. You can also find them at www.half.com, www.addall.com, etc., probably at a lower price. I have also requested that a copy of them be put on reserve at the circulation desk of the first floor lobby of the Shapiro Library. If the items are not there (and have not been checked out by someone else), please let me know so I can ask the library to remedy this.
 - Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner. 2005. *The Limits of International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 - Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. 1997. *Theories of International Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
2. All other readings are articles, book chapters, or working papers. The benefit of this approach is that it keeps you up-to-date on the latest publications and on work that scholars have 'in the pipes.' The drawback is that it necessarily excludes most of the 'classics.' This course is in no way a substitute for *Classical Theories of World Politics* (Political Science 662). I have posted the (assigned) readings in an easy-to-use format on ctools, under 'resources.' Because the number of assigned readings is not *too* onerous, I expect you to come to class with a fairly strong grasp of the week's readings (ideally, the best way to do this is by reading each piece at least twice!) In addition to the assigned readings, I also provide a list of 'also recommended readings.' I do not expect you to read these during the semester, and we will not cover them extensively in class, but I do suggest that you also read them at some point during your graduate education.

COURSE WEBPAGE

You can access the course webpage at the UM coursetools site for your courses. Please check it regularly.

SCHEDULE AND READINGS:

WEEK 1 (JANUARY 9)

Introduction to the Course. Brief History of the Subfield.

- J. Martin Rochester. 1986. "The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study." *IO*, 40 (4): 777-813.

Also recommended:

- Alexander Thompson and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "International Organization." In Bouckaert and DeGeest, eds. *Encyclopedia of Law and Economics*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000. (Available at: <http://encyclo.findlaw.com/9800book.pdf>).

WEEK 2 (JANUARY 16)

(Some) Foundational Works

- Ernst Haas. 1976. "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration." *IO*, 30 (2): 173-212.
- Hedley Bull. 1977. Chapters 1 (pp. 3-22), 3 (pp. 53-76) of *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Chapter 4 of Harold Jacobson. 1984. *Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System*. New York: Knopf.
- Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics*, 1 (October): 226-54.

Also recommended:

- The rest of H. Bull.
- E. H. Carr. 1946. *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Ernst Haas. 1968. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic, and Social Forces*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- ----- . 1975. *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*. Berkeley: UC Press.
- Robert Keohane. 1984. *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- David Mitrany. 1976. *The Functional Theory of Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

WEEK 3 (JANUARY 23)

Regimes and "Isms"

- Hasenclever et al, chapters 2-5.
- Arthur Stein. 1990. Chapter 2 (pp. 25-54) of *Why Nations Cooperate*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Also recommended:

- Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons. 1987. "Theories of International Regimes," *IO*, 41 (3): 491-517.
- Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security*, 20 (1): 39-51.
- Robert Keohane. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- John Mearsheimer. 1994/1995. "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19 (3): 5-49.
- John Mearsheimer. 1995. "A Realist Reply." *International Security* 20 (1): 82-93.
- Andrew Moravcsik. 1997. "A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *IO*, 51 (4): 513-53.
- Susan Strange. 1982. "Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis," *IO*, 36 (2): 303-34.

WEEK 4 (JANUARY 30)

"Legalization" and World Politics

- Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal. 2000. "The Concept of Legalization." *IO*, 54 (3): 401-19.
- Karen Alter. 2000. "The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?" *IO*, 54 (3): 489-518.
- Christian Reus-smit. 2003. "Politics and International Legal Obligation." *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (4): 591-625.
- Kal Raustiala. 2006. "Form and Substance in International Agreements." *American Journal of International Law* 100 (3): 581-614.

Also recommended:

- The rest of the 'Legalization' special issue of *IO*, 54 (3). Also available as a book: Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2001. *Legalization and World Politics*. Boston: MIT Press.
- Karen Alter. 2000. "The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?" *IO*, 54 (3): 489-518.
- Martha Finnemore and Stephen Toope. 2001. "Alternatives to 'Legalization': Richer Views of Law and Politics." *IO*, 55 (3): 743-58.

- Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2001. "Response to Finnemore and Toope." *IO*, 55 (3): 759-60.

WEEK 5 (FEBRUARY 6)

What Do the Lawyers Think?

- Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2004. Introduction (pp. 1-35) and Conclusion (pp. 261-71) of *A New World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Goldsmith and Posner, Introduction; chapters 1, 3, 6; Conclusion.
- Robert Keohane (a Political Scientist, not a Lawyer, but this is a good comparison of the two fields' views). 1997. "International Relations and International Law: Two Optics." *Harvard International Law Journal*, 38 (2): 487-502.

Also recommended:

- Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1998. *The New Sovereignty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Goldsmith and Posner, chapters 2, 5, 7, 8 (chapter 6 assigned later in syllabus).
- Andrew Guzman. 2002. "International Law: A Compliance Based Theory." *California Law Review*, 90: 1823.
- Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2002. "International Law, International Relations, and Compliance." In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, *The Handbook of International Relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA, London: Sage Publications.

WEEK 6 (FEBRUARY 13)

Why Organizations?

- Ernst Haas. 1990. Chapters 1 (pp. 1-15) and 3 (pp. 51-96) of *When Knowledge is Power*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kenneth Abbott, and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42 (1): 3-32.
- Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. 2004. Chapter 2 (pp. 16-44) of *Rules for the World: International Organizations and Global Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Alexander Thompson. 2006. "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission." *IO*, 60 (1): 1-34.

Also recommended:

- Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations." *IO*, 53 (4): 699-732.
- Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons. 2002. "International Organizations and Institutions." In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage: 192-211.
- Douglass North. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5 (1): 97-112.
- Mancur Olson. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bruce Russett and John Sullivan. 1971. "Collective Goods and International Organization." *IO*, 25 (4): 845-65.
- Cheryl Shanks, Harold Jacobson, and Jeffrey Kaplan. 1996. "Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992," *IO*, 50 (4): 593-627.

WEEK 7 (FEBRUARY 20)

Treaty Compliance

- George Downs, David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *IO*, 50 (3): 379-406.
- Beth Simmons. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs." *APSR*, 94 (4): 819-35.

- Jana von Stein. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? 2005. Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *APSR*, 99 (4): pages TBA.
- Daniel Hopkins and Beth Simmons. 2005. "The Constraining Power of International Treaties: A Response to Von Stein." *APSR*, 99 (4): pages TBA.

Also recommended:

- Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *IO*, 47 (2): 175-205.
- Beth Simmons. 1998. "Compliance with International Agreements." *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 1: 75-93.
- Michael Tomz. 2002. "Democratic Default: Domestic Audiences and Compliance with International Agreements." *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Boston, August 29—September 1. <http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz>.
- ----- . 2005. "The Influence of International Agreements: An Experimental Approach." *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 2-5*.

WEEK 8 (FEBRUARY 27): STUDY BREAK – NO CLASS

WEEK 9 (MARCH 5)

Norms, Culture, and International Cooperation

- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *IO*, 52 (4): 887-917."
- Jeffrey Legro. 1996. "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," *APSR* 90 (1): 118-137.
- Jeffrey Checkel. 2001. "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," *IO*, 55 (3): 553-88.
- James Fearon and Alexander Wendt. 2002. "Rationalism vs. Constructivism: a Skeptical View." In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*. London: Sage.

Also recommended:

- Emmanuel Adler. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *European Journal Of International Relations*, 3 (3): 319-63.
- Jeffrey Checkel. 1999. "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *ISQ*, 43, (1): 83-114.
- Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Craig Parsons. 2002. "Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union," *IO* 56 (1): 47-84.
- John Gerard Ruggie. 1998. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *IO*, 855-85.
- Alexander Wendt. 2003. "Why a World State is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations*, 9 (4): 491-542.

WEEK 10 (MARCH 12)

The Impact of Domestic Politics on International Cooperation

- Robert Putnam. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *IO*, 42 (3): 427-60.
- Chapter 2 of Lisa Martin. 2000. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Commitments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Edward Mansfield, Helen Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *APSR*, 94 (2): 305-21.

- Jon Pevehouse. 2003. "Democratization, Credible Commitments, and Joining International Organizations. In *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of International and Domestic Institutions*. Ann Arbor: UM Press: 25-48.

Also recommended:

- The rest of Drezner, ed., *Locating the Proper Authorities*.
- The rest of Martin, *Democratic Commitments*.
- ----- and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1997. "Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization." *JCR*, 41 (1): 117-46.
- Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. 2005. "The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation." *JCR*, 49 (5): 639-60.
- Helen Milner and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries," *IO*, 59 (1): 107-43.
- Kenneth Schultz. 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *IO*, 59 (1): 1-38.
- Beth Simmons. 1994. "Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years, 1923-1939." Princeton: Princeton University Press.

* Note: In addition, see the vast literature on the link between domestic politics and international conflict.

WEEK 11 (MARCH 19)

International Law/Institutions and International Economic Affairs

- Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement," *Journal of World Trade*, 37 (4): 719-35.
- Andrew Guzman. 2004. "Global Governance and the WTO." *Harvard International Law Journal*, 45: 303-51.
- Judith Goldstein, Doug Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade," *IO* 61 (1): 37-67.
- Todd Allee. 2005. "The 'Hidden' Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Reduction of Trade Conflict." *Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association*, Chicago, IL, April 7-10.

Also recommended:

- Judith Goldstein. 1996. "International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American 'Unfair' Trade Laws," *IO* 50 (4): 541-64.
- Nathan Jensen. 2004. "Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of International Monetary Fund Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48 (2): 194-210.
- Andrew Rose. 2004. "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review*, 94 (1): 98-114.
- Beth Simmons and Andrew Guzman. 2002. "To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO." *Journal of Legal Studies*, 31 (1): S205-S235.
- James Vreeland. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Robert Wolfe. 2005. "See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System." *European Journal of International Relations* 11 (3): 339-65.

WEEK 12 (MARCH 26)

International Law/Institutions and International Cooperation on the Environment

- *The Economist*. April 17, 2003. "How to Make Treaties Stick."
- Ronald Mitchell. 1994. "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance." *IO*, 48 (3): 425-58.

- Raustiala, Kal. 1997. "States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions." *International Studies Quarterly* 41: 719-40.
- George Downs. 2000. "Constructing Effective Environmental Regimes." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3: 25-42.
- Randall Stone and Elena McLean. 2005. "Two-Level Bargaining and the Kyoto Protocol." *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Washington, DC, September 1-4.

Also recommended:

- Scott Barrett. 2003. *Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Edith Brown Weiss and Harold Jacobson (Eds). 2000. *Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords*. Boston: MIT Press.
- Xinyuan Dai. 2005. "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism." *IO* 59 (2): 363-98.
- Ronald Mitchell. 1994. *Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance*. MIT Press.
- ----- and Patricia Keilbach. 2001. "Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange." *IO*, 55 (4): 891-917.
- Kal Raustiala and David Victor. 2004. "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources." *IO*, 58 (2): 277-309.
- Evan Ringquist and Tatiana Kostadinova. 2005. "Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol." *AJPS*, 49 (1): 86-102.
- Thomas Schelling. 2002. "What Makes Greenhouse Sense?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June.
- Alexander Thompson. 2005. The Rational *Choice* of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Climate Regime. *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Washington, DC, September 1-4.

WEEK 13 (APRIL 2)

International Law/Institutions and International Security

- Virginia Page Fortna. 2003. "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace." *IO*, 57 (2): 337-72.
- Brett Ashley Leeds. 2003. "Do Military Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *AJPS*, 47 (3): 427-39.
- Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen. 2005. "Making and Keeping Peace." *IO*, 59 (2): 261-92.
- Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein. 2002. "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism." *IO*, 56 (3): 575-607.

Also recommended:

- Robert Axelrod. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- ----- and Robert Keohane. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics*, 38: 226-54.
- Brett Ashley Leeds. 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties." *IO*, 57 (4): 801-27.
- James Morrow. 2001. "The Institutional Features of Prisoners of War Treaties." *IO*, 55 (4): 971-91.
- Christopher Rudolph. 2001. "Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals." *IO*, 55 (3): 655-91.

WEEK 14 (APRIL 9)

International Law/Institutions and Human Rights

- Andrew Moravcsik. 2000. "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe." *IO*, 54 (2): 217-52.

- Daniel Thomas. 2001. Introduction (pp. 3-23) of *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Goldsmith and Posner, chapter 4.
- Emilie Hafner-Burton. 2005. "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression." *IO*, 59 (3): 593-629.

Also recommended:

- Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises." *The American Journal of Sociology* 110 (5): 1373-1411.
- Oona Hathaway. 2002. "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *The Yale Law Journal*, 111: 1935-2042.
- ----- . 2003. "The Cost of Commitment," *Stanford Law Review*, 55: 1821-62.
- Eric Neumayer. 2005. "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" *JCR* 49 (6): 925-53.
- Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Katherine Sikkink. 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Beth Simmons. 2004. "International Law and Compliance and Human Rights." *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17-21.*

WEEK 15 (APRIL 16)

International Law/Institutions and Development

- William Easterly. 2002. Chapters 6 (pp. 100-20) and 7 (pp. 123-37), and 14 (pp. 285-91) of *The Elusive Quest for Growth*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Jeffrey Sachs. 2005. Chapters 3 (pp. 51-73) and chapters 12-14 (pp. 225-88) of *The End of Poverty*. (Yes, I am assigning a book in which Bono wrote the foreword. Suspend your disbelief! This book nicely [albeit somewhat simplistically] summarizes Sachs's views on development, and is likely to be influential in policy circles. A proper treatment of the development literature would require at least a semester, so I want to just give you a taste of some of the ideas in this literature).