

PHIL 517: Graduate Proseminar: Syllabus for Ian's sessions

Topic: Philosophy of Language (with an emphasis on Sense and Reference)

The proseminar will earn distribution credit for philosophy of language and metaphysics.

Graduate students will be expected to write three short papers and give one presentation for each half of the proseminar. (So six short papers and two presentations in total.) Presentations will be expected to last 20-25 minutes. They are conceived as consisting of brief contextualizing remarks aimed to lead off the discussion.

The readings for the first five or six sessions will be placed on reserve in Tanner library. If I get time, some of the other readings *may* be made available on electronic resources. I'll keep you posted.

An asterisk indicates that a student will be expected to lead off the discussion that week.

Tentative syllabus.

1. The sense/reference distinction
G. Frege: *Begriffsschrift* section 8.
G. Frege: "On Sense and Reference"
Gareth Evans: *The Varieties of Reference*, ch. 1.
2. Intensional Contexts
Quine: "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes"
Kaplan: "Quantifying In".
3. Frege: Functions, concepts and objects: the concept *horse* problem
G. Frege. "On Function and Concept"
G. "On Concept and Object"
T. Parsons: "Why Frege should not have said the concept *horse* is not a concept"
4. The Analytic/synthetic distinction.
Kant, *Critique*, A6/B11-A10/B23
Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic* sections 1-4
W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism,"
H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson "In Defence of a Dogma"
5. Background to Russell's Theory of Descriptions
B. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, chs. 4 & 5.
W. V. Quine: "Russell's ontological development"
Excerpts from Proops on Soames, Soames's reply (on my web page)

6. The Theory of Descriptions

B. Russell “On Denoting” (omitting the “Grey’s Elegy” argument)
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 167-180.
Principia Mathematica, volume 1, 66-67
David Kaplan: “On Reading “On Denoting” on its Centenary”.
7. Strawson’s objections to the Theory of Descriptions*
P. F. Strawson “Identifying Reference and Descriptions”
Kai von Fintel “Would you believe it? The King of France is back”
8. Donnellan’s objection*

Keith Donnellan: “Reference and Definite Descriptions”
Saul Kripke: “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference”
Marga Reimer: “Donnellan’s distinction/Kripke’s test”
9. The Necessary and the Apriori*

Kripke *Naming and Necessity*, chapter 1
Then read the Preface
10. Kripke’s criticisms of the Description theory of names*

John Searle: “Proper Names”
Naming and Necessity, ch. 2.
11. Theoretical Identifications; Epistemic vs. Metaphysical modality

Naming and Necessity, ch. 3 and Addenda
12. Semantic Externalism and the Philosophy of Mind*

Hilary Putnam: “The Meaning of Meaning”
Tyler Burge: Excerpt from “Individualism and the Mental”