An essay critically evaluating Cora Diamond's influential approach to reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. According to Diamond's approach, the Tractatus contains absolutely no substantive philosophical theses, but is purely an exercise in the debunking of nonsense. I argue that a convincing case for this claim has not yet been made--either by Diamond herself, or by the numerous defenders of this so-called "resolute" reading. Drawing both on published and unpublished sources, I assemble textual evidence that Wittgenstein held, and indeed took himself to have held, a host of substantive philosophical theses even in the (so-called) "body" of the Tractatus. I argue that resolute readers of the Tractatus have yet to offer a satisfactory explanation of these problematic texts; and I argue that the "frame/body" distinction alleged by some resolute readers does not survive close scrutiny.