Spring 2007 (Yale University Version)

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Note: I am currently visiting Yale University. I am not teaching Kant at Michigan this term.

Required Texts

Critique of Pure Reason, edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood in the series: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Available now at Shaman Drum on State Street.

Coursepack of secondary literature. Available from Tyco Copy 262 Elm St.

Tentative Syllabus

Instructor: Ian Proops

Office: 409 Connecticut Hall
Office phone: 432-1673
Office hours: Tue 12.30-2.30.
email: iproops@umich.edu

General Introduction and Goals

In his mature or "critical" works (roughly 1781 and after) Immanuel Kant rejected the "rationalist" view that traditional metaphysical questions could be answered by reasoning deductively from a small number of (supposedly self-evident) first principles. Yet he also rejected the "empiricist" alternative, which held human knowledge to be confined to what comes to the mind through the senses, for he believed that we know the truth of certain principles that are too general to be known by observation and which seem to involve the idea of necessity. An example of such an 'a priori synthetic principle', as Kant called them, would be the causal principle: "every event has a cause". Kant maintained that principles of this kind were in a certain sense "mind-supplied," as were space and time themselves. He termed this view "Transcendental Idealism."

This course is primarily concerned with an examination of Kant's Transcendental idealism through a reading of Critique of Pure Reason (1781, 2nd edition 1787). The emphasis is on Kant's metaphysics and epistemology, and on close readings of primary texts, though care will be taken to locate Kant's problem in the context of his defense of eighteenth century Enlightenment thought. (Note: The exegetical literature even on the Critique is so vast that I have had to be extremely selective in assigning secondary readings.)

Course Requirements

For undergraduate students: one 4-5 page paper, due around mid-term (exact submission deadlines will be provided later), one 7-9 page paper due at the end of the term, and a final in-class writing exercise. The first paper will be worth 25% of the total grade, the second 40% , and the writing exercise 25%. There will be a participation component to the grade, based on attendance and contributions to discussion (quantity and quality thereof), worth 10%.

For graduate students: one 6-7 page paper, due at mid term, one 9-11 page paper, due at the end of the course, and an in-class writing exercise, which will be more demanding than the undergraduate writing exercise. The first paper will be worth 25% of the total grade, the second 40% and the final writing exercise 35%. There will be no participation component to the graduate students' grade.

Policy on Late Papers

Papers received late without prior arrangement or an excellent excuse (for example, serious illness, accompanied with a doctor's note) will be subject to a grade reduction. The schedule for grade reduction will be as follows.

<24 hrs late: reduced a third of a grade (e.g. B to B-)
>24 but <48 hrs late: reduced two thirds of a grade (e.g. B to C+)
>48 but < 72 hrs late: reducted a grade (e.g. B to C)
>72 hrs late: no credit given for the paper.

Policy on Plagiarism

Students found to have plagiarized will be referred to the Nurse, who, after a meeting with the student, will advise me on appropriate sanctions. Note that, depending on the circumstances, those sanctions may include receiving a failing grade for the course.

What constitutes plagiarism?

Students who have copied whole sentences from other students' papers (past or present), or from electronic sources will count as having plagiarized if no attribution is given. In my view, making a point that the Professor or section leader made in class without attribution does *not* count as plagiarism.
Sadly, plagiarism does occur from time to time. If you are thinking of risking it, ponder the fact that we have access to the materials you can access on the web, and that it is not so hard to catch plagiarists with the range of sophisticated anti-plagiarism software now available to Professors.

What's a good paper?

For undergraduates a good paper will show that the student has a firm grasp of the central concepts and arguments discussed in the course, and will include some attempt at originality; for example, a student might try to solve an interpretive puzzle, or devise a criticism of Kant or of an interpretation offered by one of the commentators we read. These attempts need not be wholly successful to earn full credit, but they should be sincere attempts to do philosophy, and not mere summaries of Kant's position. For graduate students the standards will be higher, but the general approach should be roughly the same (graduate students might place more emphasis on critical engagement and less on exegesis).

Tentative Schedule and Readings (subject to change)

Note: Readings under the heading 'Recommended but not required' should be read by students who wish to write an essay on the topic in question.
All students are encouraged to read as many of them as possible, but their knowledge of these articles will not be directly examined in the in-class writing exercise.

Lecture 1: Introduction No readings assigned, though students who would like to make a start over the break are advised to begin with the readings listed under Lectures 2 and 3 below.

Lectures 2: Intellectual background and Kant's Project in the "Critique"

Reading: Critique: Prefaces to both editions, Avii-Bxliv. "Kant's intellectual development 1746-1781", Frederick C. Beiser" in The Cambridge Companion to Kant pp. 26-61. Questions to think about: Kant's book is entitled the Critique of Pure Reason. In this title the word 'of' does double-duty. 'Pure Reason' is both the instrument and the object of critique. In other words, the 'critique' in question is Pure Reason's critique of itself. But what does that mean? What is Pure Reason and how does Kant envisage its critical task? (That is, which of its own excesses is Pure Reason charged with the task of curbing?)

Comment: In preparing for this class you are strongly encouraged to make notes answering these study questions, but there is no requirement that you write anything to show me yet. In your note-taking be sure always to write down the page number of the text that supports what you want to say. You may use either the traditional citations e.g. 'B6'. (Kant wrote the Critique in two editions. 'A' refers to the first edition (1781), 'B' to the second (1787)), or the Guyer and Wood edition page nos. You'll find that the secondary literature uses the A/B system, but the Guyer-Wood lay out occasionally makes this system confusing.

Lecture 3: A priori synthetic judgements, part 1: Kant's notion of the a priori

Reading: Critique 'Introduction' A1/B1-A16/B30, A151/B 190. Ralph Walker, Kant, ch.1. James van Cleve "Necessity, Analyticity, and the A Priori", ch 2. of his book Problems from Kant.

Questions to think about: a) What is it for a judgement to be analytic or synthetic? b) What is an a priori judgement? How does it differ from an a posteriori judgement? c) How can you tell when a judgement is a priori? d) Can you give any examples of a priori judgments that are not claims of arithmetic or geometry? e) What kinds of claim does Kant take for granted as a priori synthetic knowledge? f) What kinds of claims does he think he must argue we know a priori ? g) Are analytic judgements capable of extending our knowledge?

Lecture 4: A priori synthetic judgments, part II: Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction

Reading: As for lecture 4, but with the addition of my article "Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgments", Nous, 2005, a pre-publication version of which is available on my website.

Questions to think about: a) Which of the four (alleged) characterizations of the analytic/synthetic distinction do you think most central? Why? Is the distinction supposed to apply to all judgments of whatever form, or only to those of subject-predicate form? How illuminating/tenable do you find the distinction to be?

Lecture 5: Metaphysical Exposition of the Concepts of Space and Time: Kant's two arguments for the apriority of space (Note: we pay special attention to space, but you should also read the sections on time.)

Reading: Critique of Pure Reason Guyer and Wood, pp. 155-192 (Note the editors present the first and second edition versions in their entirety. You should read both to get a feel for the differences between them. Because of this repetition, in writing about these sections it would be better to refer to them by the Guyer and Wood page numbers).Charles Parsons' "Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic", sections I-II, in the Cambridge Companion to Kant. Henry Allison Kant's Transcendental Idealism pp.10-13 & pp.81-89. Daniel Warren "Kant and the Apriority of Space".

Terminological note: By 'appearances', in the context of the above readings Kant will usually mean ordinary things in space and time, but by 'intuitions', he will mean perceptions.

Lecture 6 & 7: Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space II: Kant's two arguments for space as a 'pure intuition'

Reading: Critique A19/B34-B73, for general orientation, but focus on: A 25/B40. C. Parsons "The Transcendental Aesthetic" III-IV, pp. 62-66 & pp. 69-74. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, pp. 90-98. Joshua Brown, "Spatial infinity and the intuition of space".

Questions to think about: 1) How should one characterize Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions? 2) How does Kant argue that our representation of space is an intuition? (Kant offers two arguments. You should be prepared to discuss them both). 3) How is such a conclusion compatible with our possessing the concept of different spaces?

Lecture 8: Kant on Mathematical Knowledge: the case of Geometry

Reading: Critique: Focus on the "Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space": B40-41. Re-read Introduction section V. i.e. B14-18, A713-24/B 741-51 Charles Parsons: "The Transcendental Aesthetic", section III i.e. pp.74-80. Michael Potter. Reason's Nearest Kin, ch. 1.sections: 1.1-1.10 (section 1.11 recommended, not required). Michael Friedman: Kant and the Exact Sciences ch.1. sections: 1-2, pp.55-71.

Recommended, not required:

Lisa Shabel: "Kant on the 'Symbolic Construction' of Mathematical Concepts" (gets to the bottom of Kant's discussion of algebra).

[Note: the recommended readings for this section is heavier than usual both because this literature sheds much light on lectures 6-11 and because Kant's philosophy of mathematics lends itself to a paper. Graduate students, in particular, are advised to consider writing on Kant's views on arthmetic.]

Questions to think about: a). Why did Kant think that we needed to rely on our intuition of space in conducting geometrical proofs? b) Where, and how, might this reliance have manifested itself?

Lecture 9: Kant's arguments for the Ideality of Space in the Aesthetic

Reading Critique A26/B42-A32/B48. Allison Kant's Transcendental Idealism, ch.2.

Questions to think about. a) How does Kant argue that space and time are not 'properties of things in themselves'? What are things in themselves? b) What does it mean to say space and time are 'subjective conditions of sensibility'? How does Kant argue for this view? c) What does Kant mean by saying (at A28/B44) that he asserts the 'empirical reality' of space but also its 'transcendental ideality'?

Lecture 10: Unknowable Reality: Phenomena, Noumena and the Thing in itself

Reading Critique: A236/B295-A260/B315 Henry Allison Kant's Transcendental Idealism, ch. 11. James van Cleve, ch. 10, "Noumena and Things in Themselves."

Questions to think about: a) Consider Kant's uses the terms 'noumenon', 'transcendental object' and 'thing in itself'. Do you think these are supposed to be equivalent notions? If so, why does Kant choose to use three different terms for the same thing? If not, then how do these terms differ in meaning? b) What is the difference between the positive and the negative senses of 'noumenon'?

Lecture 11: Kant on Substance: The First Analogy

Reading: Critique: A176/B218-A189/B232 Begin at the section heading: 'Analogies of Experience'

James van Cleve "Substance and the First Analogy", ch.8 of Problems from Kant.

Questions to think about: a) What claim is Kant arguing for in the 1st Analogy (try to explain what it means)? b) What is his premise? (Subsidiary question: what does he mean by 'experience' in the context of this argument?). c) How is the argument supposed to go? and where would you find fault with it?

Lecture 12: Kant on empirical Causation: The Second Analogy

Reading: Hume: Treatise "Of the idea of necessary connexion" Treatise I.iii.xiv. Reading: The Second Analogy, A189/B232-A211-B256.

Paul Guyer: "Kant's Second Analogy: Objects, Events and Causal Laws." And (recommended, not required): Michael Friedman, "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science" in the Cambridge Companion to Kant.

Questions to think about: a) For what thesis exactly is Kant arguing in the second analogy? b)Which are the central stands of his argument, which less central? c) What would you object to in Kant's argument, which parts of it do you find compelling? Why?

Lecture 13: The Metaphysical Deduction & Introduction to the Transcendental Deduction

[Note: these sections of the Critique are discussed out of sequence--I'll explain why in class]

"The Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding" A66/B91-B116, "The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" A84/B117-B129 Kant's Letter to Marcus Hertz, 1772. Dieter Henrich "Kant's notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique" J. Michael Young "Functions of Thought and the Synthesis of Intuitions" in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, pp. 101-122.

Questions to think about: a) What is the purpose of the Metaphysical Deduction? If it is an argument, what is it an argument for? If it isn't an argument, what is it? b) What clues does Kant's legal analogy give us to the structure of the Transcendental Deduction? c) What would the analogue of a legal "question of fact" be in Kant's deduction? d) How does a transcendental deduction differ from an 'empirical deduction', on the one hand, and a 'physiological derivation' on the other? e) What did Kant view as having been Locke's mistake with respect to the categories?

Lecture 14: The Deduction of the Categories in A

Critique A95-A130
Paul Guyer "The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories," sections 1-3.

Questions to think about: a) What does Kant mean by the "transcendental unity of apperception" (A108)? What role does it play in the argument of the A-Deduction? b) How do the various kinds of synthesis described by Kant proceed? c) How much is the Deduction supposed to show? That the categories have actual instances in space and time, or merely that it is intelligible that they should do so?

Lectures 15: The Deduction of the Categories in B

Critique B129-169 Paul Guyer "The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories", in the Cambridge Companion to Kant, sections 4 &5. Dieter Henrich "The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction" in Walker ed., Kant on Pure Reason (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, OUP).

Questions: a) Is Henrich right in thinking that the B-Deduction divides into two steps in the way he claims? b) If the apperception principle is "identical and analytic," how can it afford us any philosophical knowledge? c) How much is the B-Deduction supposed to achieve? d) How is the argument supposed to work?

Lecture 16: The Schematism and Remaining Principles

Critique: A137-147/B176-187 & A148-176/B187-218 & A218-226/B265-275

Questions: a) What is the Schematism for? b) What is a schema? Ralph Walker, Kant, ch. 7

Lectures 17: Introduction to the Dialectic: Transcendental Illusion and Ideas & The First Paralogism

Critique: Guyer-Wood pp. 411-417, and 445-446 Michelle Gilmore Grier, "Illusion and Fallacy in Kant's First Paralogism"
Questions: a) What is transcendental illusion? b) How does the first Paralogism illustrate transcendental this illusion?

Lectures 18-19: The Antinomies

A405/B432-A490/B419 Allison ch. 3 "The Antinomy of Pure Reason".James van Cleve ch. 6, "The Ideality of Matter" (to end of section B)

Recommended, not required, Charles Parsons: "Infinity and Kant's Conception of the 'Possibility of Experience'.

Lecture 20: Solutions to the Antinomies

A491/B519-A567/B595. van Cleve ch. 6., "The Ideality of Matter" section C.

Lecture 21-22: Critique of Traditional Theology

A567/B595-A642/B670 Allen Wood "Rational theology, moral faith, and religion" ch. 13. in The Cambridge Companion to Kant.
Allen Wood, "Kant's Critique of the Three Theistic Proofs", excerpt from Kant's Rational Theology in P. Kitcher ed., Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

Lecture 23: The Regulative Principles & The Deduction of the Ideas

A643/B671-A704/B732 Further readings to be announced.

Lecture 24: Kant's Doctrine of "Practical Faith": God, Free will, Immortality

A795/B823-A819/B847 Further readings to be announced. Critique of Practical Reason: Akademy pages 120 (sect III)-142

Lecture 25: In-class writing exercise (Firmly scheduled for the final meeting of the class)

(Note: I expect some lectures to run over, so this schedule is only provisional and I've only outlined class-plans for 25 out of our 26 meetings.)