Ian S. R. Mladjov (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
Bulgaria’s
conversion to Christianity in 864 served as the catalyst for the so-called
“Photian Schism” between Rome and Constantinople. The Byzantine government was able to pressure the Bulgarian ruler
Boris I (853–889) into accepting the Greek rite. However, when the Byzantine church failed to grant Boris I an
autocephalous archbishop for Bulgaria, he turned to Rome in 866. Pope Nicholas I (858–867) and the East
Frankish King Ludwig II (840–876) both sent priests into Bulgaria, to introduce
the Latin rite. Alarmed, Patriarch
Photius (858–867) convoked a synod which condemned the western practices
introduced into Bulgaria and informed Boris that he was being led astray. This political maneuver backfired, causing a
major quarrel between the Papacy and the Byzantine church. Photius excommunicated Nicholas, who did not
live to react, and Pope Hadrian II (867–872) excommunicated the now deposed
Photius and his appointees in 869.
Emperor Basil I (867–886) and Patriarch Ignatius (867–877) reluctantly
agreed to accept the papal decision at the Council of Constantinople in
869–870. However, by now Rome too had
failed to satisfy the Bulgarians, and Boris sent a delegation to the council
inquiring whether Bulgaria belonged to Rome or to Constantinople. The eastern prelates who constituted the
majority of the participants voted in favor of Constantinople. Consequently Bulgaria returned to the Greek
rite and Boris expelled the Roman and Frankish missionaries from his
lands. Naturally, the Papacy vehemently
opposed the council’s decisions, and Pope John VIII (872–882) continually tried
to reverse the situation. When
Patriarch Photius was restored (877–886) he tried to conciliate Rome by
surrendering Bulgaria to the Roman church in 878. However, by this time Bulgaria was committed to the Byzantine
church and unlikely to revert to the Roman fold.
This
paper examines Bulgaria’s position between Rome and Constantinople during, and
especially after, the Photian Schism.
While it is clear that the Byzantine concession of 878 was correctly
calculated as purely symbolic, its on Bulgaria’s relations to the west has
remained virtually unexamined. I argue
that, although the Bulgarian church remained faithful to the practices of the
Greek rite—modified by Slavonic liturgy—some relations continued to exist
between Bulgaria and Rome during the late ninth and tenth century. The attempt of Patriarch Nicholas I
(912–925) to enlist papal support in his diplomatic dealings with Simeon I
(893–927) of Bulgaria in 923 suggests that the Papacy retained a certain amount
of influence, if not outright leverage, at the Bulgarian court. The papal intervention in the conflict
between Bulgaria and Croatia in 926 also implies this. Did the new relationship between Rome and
Bulgaria extend any further? In the mid
920s Simeon had come to terms with the Byzantines and agreed to a peace. However, he repeatedly undercut the proposed
peace by insisting that the Byzantines recognize not only his title of “Emperor
of the Bulgarians”—which they were begrudgingly willing to do—but also that of
“Emperor of the Romans.” Could this barrier
to peace have been inspired by something more than obstinacy? Perhaps Bulgaria was once again vacillating
between Constantinople and Rome in a quest for a new goal. Possibly a pope interested in extending his authority
into the Balkans, like John X (914–928), could have done what the later
correspondence between Kalojan (1197–1207) of Bulgaria and Pope Innocent III
(1197–1216) alleges—namely, that he confirmed the Bulgarian ruler as emperor
and the Bulgarian archbishop as patriarch.
The sources are limited, but this course of action is plausible. Moreover, the imperial throne in the west
was vacant from 924 to 962, and the Bulgarian ruler could have claimed—even if
he had not received—a Roman imperial title.
Regardless of the validity of Simeon’s claims as reconstructed in this
hypothesis, it seems reasonable to imagine in the early tenth-century a broad
southern Europe more integrated and aware of itself as such than before—and a
Bulgaria still suspended, in terms of diplomacy, between Constantinople and
Rome.