Other Research

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Coalition Portfolios and Policy Influence

Interest groups routinely participate in multiple coalitions with other groups.  We introduce the concept of a group’s coalition portfolio as the set of coalitions in which it participates.  We argue that groups with coalition portfolios that help them connect otherwise disparate groups will be considered more influential than others, and show this using a difference-in-differences design and data gathered from interviews with over one hundred lobbyists advocating on various aspects of the Medicare Modernization Act.

“Coalition portfolios and interest group influence over the policy process,” Interest Groups & Advocacy 2 (October 2013): 251-77, with Michael T. Heaney.

The Revolving Door and Congressional Networks on Healthcare Reform

Discussion of “revolving door” lobbyists -- those who are former policymakers or staff -- often centers on whether revolvers are more effective lobbyists because they possess policy expertise gleaned during government service (i.e. “what they know”) or because of their personal connections to people still in government (“who they know”). We find that revolvers’ connections to networks inside Congress give them procedural expertise as well as knowledge of where and how to acquire legislative information. In essence, “who you know” helps determine “what you know”.  Using data gleaned from legislative staffers and lobbyists working on the Affordable Care Act, we examine how this reconceptualization of revolvers’ comparative advantage influences their access to current legislators and their ability to gain information from other lobbyists.

“Revolving Door Access: Insider Ties, Legislative Allies, and Lobbying on the Affordable Care Act”, under review, with Richard L. Hall

“The Revolving Door, Presumed Access, and the Accrual of Political Intelligence in Healthcare Lobbying Networks”, with Richard L. Hall

Constrained Interest Group Venue Selection

Despite frequent critiques of the role of money in politics, research has produced mixed findings on the impact of disparities in groups’ lobbying resources on their lobbying influence. We argue that resources affect a group’s decision to lobby Congress, the bureaucracy, or both. We show that groups with higher levels of lobbying resources are more likely to lobby both venues across the issues they care about, while groups with lower resource levels target lobbying toward the venue that is currently more active in an issue area while being less likely to lobby the other. This suggests that resources allow wealthy groups to avoid having to pick their legislative battles.

“Interest Group Venue Selection Under Salience and Resource Constraints”, with LaGina Gause.