Prioritized Interests: Diverse Interest Group Coalitions and Congressional Committee Agenda-Setting

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Abstract

Many bills, addressing many public problems, demand the attention of Congress; only a few get it. Given limited time and resources, congressional agenda-setters must determine which bills to grant scarce agenda space, and which to neglect. How do they make this determination? I examine interest group influence on decisions to grant bills committee consideration, often both the critical legislative winnowing point and the focus of lobbying efforts. Little existing scholarship on interest group lobbying examines the effect of lobbying on legislative advancement, and what does emphasizes the role of organizational numbers and resources (particularly, campaign contributions) as sources of interest group influence. By contrast, I argue that committee agenda-setters have incentives to grant consideration to bills supported by organizations representing a diverse set of industries, social causes and other interests. Analyzing new data from interest group positions on over 4700 bills introduced in the U.S. Congress between 2005 and 2014, I find that bills supported by such interest diverse coalitions are more likely to attain committee markup, especially for majority-party sponsored bills and those introduced during divided government. This suggests that lobbying influences legislative advancement by helping committee agenda-setters predict bill viability in later legislative stages. In doing so, it "biases" legislative advancement in favor of bills supported by diverse interests.

Observers of the U.S. Congress often lament that lawmakers are drawn away from pursuing the common good by lobbyists representing wealthy special interests and their parochial concerns. This lament is not unfounded; starting in the 1970s, lobbyists have proliferated in Washington. For example, in 2015 there were over ten thousand registered lobbyists, and lobbying expenditures totaled over $3 billion; during the preceding election cycle, organizations contributed nearly half a billion dollars to federal candidates' campaigns, often through affiliated political action committees (PACs). The sustained ubiquity of lobbying suggests that interest groups and advocacy organizations believe that their political investment accrues policy influence.

Systematic evidence of such influence is mixed. There are conflicting findings about whether groups' campaign contributions and direct lobbying expenditures "buy" influence, either on legislators' behavior or policy outcomes (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech 2009; Gilens and Page 2014; Wawro 2001; Hall and Wayman 1990; Kalla and Broockman 2016; Esterling 2007; McKay 2012a). Moreover, such conflicting findings extend to whether, how, and under what conditions interest groups have policy influence at all (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Grossmann 2012a; Grossmann and Pyle 2013; Hojnacki, Kimball, Baumgartner, Berry and Leech 2012; Burstein and Linton 2002). Thus, interest groups may influence legislators, presumably in order to influence legislation, but it is not clear what impact lobbying has on congressional lawmaking.

While research on lobbying provides mixed results about how interest groups influence lawmaking, research on congressional lawmaking has largely ignored interest group influence. Instead, theories of lawmaking have examined how institutional prerogatives grant some legislators power over Congress's legislative agenda. Schattschneider (1960), Bachrach and Baratz (1962), as well as Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1964) have famously argued that the ability to define alternatives and control the legislative agenda is a potent form of political power. Subsequent accounts have discussed who wields this power, and for what purpose. Most recently, Cox and McCubbins (2005) argue that, in the current post-reform Congress, this ability rests with majority party leadership. In this account, party leaders ensure that the legislative agenda consists only of bills on which majority party members have achieved consensus. However, their account, and the related accounts of Aldrich and Rohde (2001) and Den Hartog and Monroe (2011), focus almost

exclusively on the floor agenda. However, the floor agenda is only the final step in defining what members of Congress are asked to vote upon.

By contrast to the empirical scrutiny applied to agenda-setting on each chamber's floor, the agenda-setting role of congressional committees has been the subject of relatively few empirical studies. However, even in the supposedly less committee-centered post-reform Congress, committee consideration remains the first and most drastic winnowing point in the legislative process; fully 82% of bills introduced since 1974 have died due to lack of committee consideration. What work has been done suggests that committee chairs select bills for the agenda that both accord with the preferences of their co-partisans (Krutz 2005) and are viable in subsequent stages of the legislative process (Evans 2001). In these accounts, it is assumed that chairs assess either desirability and viability through observation of the behavior of other legislators. Interest groups are not a focus of prior accounts of committee agenda-setting.

In this article, I argue that interest groups influence committees' legislative agendas by altering committee chairs' assessments of which bills are viable. To the extent that committees assess legislative viability with uncertainty, they improve these assessments by relying on heuristics present in their political environment. Such heuristics may include interest groups, who direct most lobbying toward bills at the committee stage (Drutman 2010; Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira and Semanko 2005; Baumgartner, Larsen-Price, Leech and Rutledge 2011). If interest groups can serve as a signal for legislative viability, chairs will be in a position to receive that signal before granting a bill committee consideration.

Central to this account is that a lobbying coalition's signals will be more informative about legislative viability if that coalition is diverse. Irrespective of a coalition's size (i.e., the number of organizations in the coalition), a coalition is diverse to the extent that its member organizations vary in their policy preferences, their organizational styles, or the industries and social causes for which they advocate. In her study of the policies included in Clinton-era welfare reform, Phinney (2017) finds that diverse coalitions more credibly signal to legislators about the quality of policy proposals. As a result, when diverse coalitions form, the proposals they prefer are more likely to be included in enacted policy reforms.

Here, I examine whether coalitions with a particular type of diversity also influence which reforms

get considered in the first place. I theorize that committee chairs observe each side's interest diversity, the presence of organizations representing a wide variety of industries, social causes, and other interests among that side's members. Knowing that such coalitions will be better able to recruit rank-and-file legislators to their side, committee chairs will favor granting consideration to bills gaining the support of a relatively interest-diverse set of organizations. To test this expectation, I analyze new data on over 13,000 organizations' positions on over 4700 bills introduced in Congress between 2005 and 2014 (the 109th through 113th Congresses). I find that bills supported by coalitions with higher levels of interest diversity are more likely to receive committee consideration. Moreover, these associations are stronger in situations where the chair is more likely to value information about bills' legislative viability: for bills sponsored by majority party members or introduced during periods of divided government. At the same time, I find no association, nor the predicted non-linearities in an association, between interests' PAC contributions or organizational numbers and committee consideration. These findings are consistent with my argument that interest group coalitions influence committees' legislative agendas when they are diverse, and that that diversity helps committee agenda-setters assess "downstream" legislative viability.

This article makes several contributions. First, this study examines interest group influence across many groups, bills, and issue areas, and across a time period that featured several shifts of party control in both the legislative and executive branches. Thus, it offers new insights about both lobbying in general and the interactions between interest group influence and legislative institutions. Indeed, it considers either more bills, more years, or more organizations (and most often, all three) than any previous examination of interest group influence on lawmaking. Second, this study expands our understanding of what, precisely, lobbying may influence. If lobbying's influence is confined to individual legislators, it has limited and conditional implications for lawmaking generally; if it can influence what proposals Congress attends to at all, those implications are that much more sweeping and systemic. Such systemic influence is the focus of this article. Third, where previous studies of interest group influence have focused on individual group attributes, resources, and decisions, as well as aggregates thereof among groups working in coalition, this study shows that coalitions of interest groups have collective attributes that can influence legislative advancement. In this sense, interest groups can have influence beyond the

content of their advocacy activity or the particular legislators to which they gain access. Lobbying can be informative apart from the particular contributions, information, or subsidies given to lawmakers. One consequence of this is that even though individual groups pursue narrow, parochial concerns, the total impact of lobbying includes a "bias" of legislative agendas toward consensus legislation favored by broad elements of the American society and economy. In addition, it shows that access to any individual legislator is unnecessary, in addition to being insufficient, to influence that legislator's decisions. Finally, it adds interest group lobbying to our understanding of lawmaking, allowing the latter to better account for one of the most ubiquitous features of contemporary congressional politics.

A Prospective Viability Theory of Committee Agenda-Setting

Building from several assumptions about committee agendas and lobbying, I theorize how interest group lobbying on a bill informs committee agenda-setters' beliefs about the legislative viability of that bill. This theory posits a scenario in which policy-motivated committee chairs must predict the intensity of both the support and the opposition that different legislative proposals will garner among other legislators. Lobbying helps chairs make these predictions, by showing chairs the breadth of interests with a stake in a bill as well as their support for or opposition to it. Anticipating how lobbying will mobilize rank-and-file legislators around different bills, chairs adjust their agenda-setting decisions.

This theory of interest groups as indicators of legislative viability rests on several assumptions about committees, committee leaders, and interest groups, grounded in scholarly understanding of these actors.[1] First, legislators, including committee chairs, are motivated by the desire to advance legislation (Kingdon 1989; Hall 1996; Wawro 2000). Doing so not only serves any policy goals a legislator might have, but also allows them to more credibly claim credit with their constituents and to develop a reputation for legislative effectiveness that can be a source of influence within their chamber (Fenno 1973; Volden and Wiseman 2014; Hall 1996; Sulkin 2005). Second, committee chairs have some discretion in selecting bills for hearing. Indeed, chairs possess institutional prerogatives that allow them to select the topics, including

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[1]Additionally, I assume that: (i) committee chairs exercise bounded rationality; (ii) that lobbying on a bill is costly to interest groups; (iii) and that chairs can observe which groups are lobbying on a bill prior to making a decision about whether to grant that bill consideration.

bills, of hearings held by their committees (Oleszek 2011). Functionally, this allows them, for many[2] bills referred to their committee, to advance their own personal priorities in deciding whether to grant bills consideration (Berry and Fowler 2015; Volden and Wiseman 2014; Walker 1977; Maltzman 1997) .

Third, committee chairs estimate the political effects of bills, and thus the positions and priorities of other legislators on those bills, with uncertainty (Krehbiel 1991; Arnold 1990). This uncertainty arises because most legislators take positions on most bills only *after* such bills have been put on the legislative agenda, either by the committee chair or by some other actor. Indeed, the reduction of this uncertainty has been argued (e.g., by Krehbiel 1991) to be the function of committee consideration of legislation. Thus, chairs' assessments of legislative viability are acts of prediction. This prediction is complicated by the uncertain connections between a bill's explicit provisions and its material and electoral effects. Moreover, because Congress is inundated with potential "solutions" and a seemingly infinite array of policy "problems", (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) there are many bills capable of passing that simply never capture Congress's collective attention. For these reasons, chairs face uncertainty in attempting to determine which bills are capable of legislative progress.

Finally, I assume that interest group lobbying encourages legislators to invest costly effort on issues on which the legislator and interest group agree. This mobilization can result from many mechanisms: making stronger or more technical arguments to other legislators (Esterling 2007; Schnakenberg 2017); connecting legislators to important district subconstituencies (Hansen 1991; Kollman 1998); or subsidizing legislators' lawmaking efforts (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Lorenz 2015). Crucially, this implies that lobbying mobilizes allied legislators to more actively support or oppose a bill.

These assumptions in place, committee chairs' decision-making can be characterized as the allocation of scarce agenda space among bills referred to her committee.[3] In doing so, she will, to the extent possible,

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[2]Exceptions include bills demanded by majority party leaders and bills reauthorizing existing programs. Chairs may incur prohibitive costs if they decide to neglect such bills. However, the dominance of party-demanded bills on a committee's agenda is conditional, (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Maltzman 1997) while the predominance of reauthorization issues varies by committee and over time (Adler and Wilkerson 2012). To the extent that either predominate, the empirical relationships predicted here should be weaker or absent. Thus, to the extent that empirical tests reported below fail to account for bills in which chairs have little discretion, it will weaken related statistical associations and thus raise the likelihood of false null findings.

[3]For clarity in the prose, I refer to committee chairs with feminine pronouns, lobbyists with masculine pronouns, and other legislators with the singular or plural "they" and related pronouns.

grant consideration to bills in such a way as to advance legislation she most favors among all possible sets of policy outcomes resulting from her agenda-setting decisions. In evaluating bills, a chair may face a trade-off between a bill's value to her and its probability of advancing. Because she has discretion over her committee's agenda, she will prefer to allocate committee consideration to bills she prefers to the status quo while neglecting bills that she does not. However, because she derives utility from legislative advancement as well, her evaluation of a bill will be conditioned by her predictions of whether that bill would advance further, should she grant it consideration. As a result, chairs should prefer granting consideration to bills that she prefers to the status quo *and* that are more likely to pass subsequent stages of the legislative process, all else equal. And, thus, a bill will be more likely to be granted consideration if the chair of its committee of referral has reason to believe that it will be viable in later legislative stages. Given this, forces that change a chair's assessment of a bill's viability in later legislative stages should also change the probability that the bill is granted committee consideration in the first place.

Interest Groups and Prospective Legislative Viability

Optimal committee agenda-setting would be a straightforward exercise if the chair were able to observe a bill's legislative viability directly. However, chairs observe viability with substantial uncertainty. To overcome this uncertainty, chairs look for cues in their political environment (Krutz 2005; Simon 1985). Such cues can be observed in interest groups' decisions to lobby on a bill. To the extent that a group incurs costs to lobby on a bill, that group will be more likely to lobby on bills where they have more compelling interests at stake. Thus, by observing which groups lobby on a bill, chairs can learn about the interests at stake in its advancement.

   Lobbying can affect the chair's perception of a bill's legislative viability by modifying the intensity of rank-and-file legislators' policy preferences. To continue advancing, a bill needs many individual legislators' sustained efforts and support. Each new stage of legislative advancement requires satisfying at least as broad a range of actors as were required to get to and pass previous stages.[4] In addition to

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[4]This is because at each legislative stage, the additional agenda-setter or pivotal voter is either more extreme in their policy preferences than those from previous stages or not. If they are more extreme, it broadens the range of legislators who must be simultaneously satisfied in order to advance beyond that stage. If the pivotal voter at the latest stage is as or less extreme than

satisfying many legislators, the bill must remain a priority for them, lest other demands on legislators' time – from the crush of other policy problems to campaigning and fundraising obligations – sweep the bill aside. Because of this, advancing a bill requires a potentially wide range of legislators' intense support. Lobbying can intensify a legislator's support for a bill, particularly when a lobbyist and target legislator share policy preferences or issue priorities. Thus, lobbying's ability to mobilize many legislators toward one position on a bill affects whether that bill has the sustained, broad appeal necessary to pass. Because a chair is incentivized to grant consideration to legislatively viable bills, the influence of lobbyists on the breadth of a bill's appeal may affect the chair's calculus in granting that bill consideration.

At the same time, interest group influence rarely happens in isolation. In most cases, more than one group is lobbying on a bill at any given time. Groups often compete over legislative issues, (Baumgartner et al. 2009; McKay 2012b; Holyoke 2009, 2011) thus forming what Baumgartner et al. (2009) refer to as two lobbying "sides", supporters of a policy proposal ("status quo challengers") and opponents of that proposal ("status quo defenders"). Within a side, interest groups routinely coordinate lobbying efforts by forming coalitions with one another (Hula 1999; Hojnacki 1997). The construction of coalitions, and by extension sides themselves, serves as an important way for interest groups to gain large numbers of allies in Congress and, through them, policy influence (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015). Thus, the factors that allow the groups on one side of a bill to intensify many legislators' support make those groups more influential over committee chairs' agenda-setting decisions.

The Electoral Connection, Interest Diversity, and Legislative Viability

Interest groups help legislators connect their lawmaking activities to their reelection. Legislators seek reelection, (Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1989) but cannot do so by simply appealing to the median voter in their districts. Instead, they rely on the support of a collection of local industries, ethnic- or other identity-based communities, social causes, and other "subconstituencies" salient to the voters of their district (Bishin 2009; Fenno 1978). These subconstituencies have distinct issue priorities and policy preferences, which legislators benefit from appearing to address in their legislative work (Sulkin 2005; Hall

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others, advancing beyond that stage requires the same breadth of legislative appeal as did getting through the previous stages.

1996). However, subconstituencies do not necessarily communicate to their representatives which specific policy proposals they prefer. Instead, legislators must identify such proposals, either by investing their own scarce time and effort or by relying on a proxy for their district subconstituencies that is motivated to monitor legislation and suggest policy proposals that the legislator's critical subconstituencies will support.

This proxy role is served by interest groups. By definition, an organized interest group represents an industry, demographic group, social cause or other shared interest; they also monitor legislation and suggest policy proposals their members will prioritize. Thus, legislators appear to use groups as proxies for the broader interests they represent, (Grossmann 2012*b*) and grant access to groups that represent key district interests (Hansen 1991; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). However, each group is only able to appeal to a subset of legislators this way: those whose reelection prospects rely on the subconstituencies that the group represents. Thus, most individual interest groups are unlikely to influence committee chairs' legislative agenda-setting decisions through the subconstituencies they represent.

A lobbying *side* can collectively overcome this limitation if it has a wide range of subconstituencies represented among its member organizations. I define a lobbying side's *interest diversity* as the degree of observable variety in distinct subconstituencies represented among its member organizations. For example, consider two interest group sides of a hypothetical healthcare bill: one side consists of three pharmaceutical companies; the other consists of one doctors' association, one health insurance carrier, and one health consumer advocacy group. While the two sides are of equal size – three organizations each – the second side is more diverse because the interests represented by its member groups are more distinct from one another. Phinney (2017), in the most comprehensive treatment of coalition diversity[5] to date, argues that diverse coalitions are more likely to arise around a policy proposal that gains elite-level salience, faces strong opposition, or has uncertain policy consequences. However, diversity is also a product of deliberate coalition recruitment efforts. Indeed, in preliminary work, Crosson and Heaney (2016) find that issue-level factors similar to those identified by Phinney induce coalition leaders to actively recruit coalition members from organizations representing diverse interests. Moreover, Tattersall (2013) and

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[5]The concept of interest diversity discussed here is something of a combination of what Phinney calls "professional" diversity and "domain" diversity.

Phinney both argue that fostering coalition diversity can remit organizational benefits to a group, by introducing it to new ideas, innovative advocacy strategies, and a broader set of potential future group leaders. Thus, coalitions have both intrinsic and external motivations, independent of any legislative influence gained, to foster interest diversity in the coalitions in which they participate.

When a coalition is diverse, lobbyists actively promote that diversity to legislators.[6] Drawing from a signaling model, Phinney argues that legislators find diverse coalitions' signals about policy proposals more credible, for at least three reasons. First, diverse coalitions synergize their members' advocacy tactics and organizational networks. Second, they send a more heterogeneous signal to legislators about the quality of a legislative proposal. Third, diverse coalitions are harder to maintain, making their legislative signals costlier. Thus, legislators have reason to believe that bills favored by interest-diverse coalitions are "better" than those favored by homogeneous coalitions, all else equal. Moreover, diverse coalitions are more likely to include members representing important reelection subconstituencies or shared policy preferences (see e.g. Bonica 2014) with a given legislator. As these are both important antecedents of access-granting and partnership-formation between legislators and interest groups, (Hansen 1991; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1964) diverse coalitions can access, and mobilize, more legislators. Thus, through both collective and individual-level mechanisms, interest diversity on a side allows that side to appeal to legislators.

Coalition diversity may inform committee chairs' agenda-setting decisions. If a diverse coalition has formed on a side, legislators will become aware of that diversity and view it as a sign that the bill is both "better" in general and more relevant to them in specific. To the extent this holds, interest diverse coalitions will mobilize legislators' support for or opposition to a bill more effectively than less-diverse coalitions, even if the less diverse coalition includes more organizations or has higher aggregate organizational resources. Moreover, through coalitions' lobbying efforts, interest diversity is likely to be observed by committee chairs prior to their making agenda-setting decisions. These qualities of

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[6]Although they do not discuss diversity specifically, Baumgartner et al. (2009) do find that lobbyists mention the support or opposition a proposal has among other groups and constituents in arguments to legislators, roughly eleven percent of the time. In the interest group bill positions data used below, a similar percentage of bill sides have interest diversity at least one standard deviation above the mean. If one assumes that a lobbyist's argument about other groups' positions is more credible when the mentioned "other groups" represent obviously different interests than the lobbyist, this suggests that when group sides have diverse members, they promote that diversity in their lobbying interactions with legislators.

effectiveness and observability make interest diversity a useful heuristic for chairs in predicting the legislative viability of bills. If a bill's supporters are more diverse than its opponents, chairs have reason to believe that the bill will garner more support than opposition. Likewise, if a bill's opponents are more diverse than their supporters, the bills' opposition may make the bill less viable. Hence, the balance of interest diversity across the two sides of a bill is expected to influence chairs' agenda-setting decisions.

Hypothesis 1: To the extent that the set of interest groups supporting a bill is higher in interest diversity than that opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to be granted committee consideration.

Alternative Sources of Interest Group Influence

Though this article focuses on interest diversity as a source of interest group influence, prior research has identified two other sources of interest group influence that may confound the relationship between interest diversity and committee consideration. These are campaign contributions and organizational numbers (i.e., the size of a side rather than its diversity). These serve as alternatives to Hypothesis 1, but there is reason to doubt that either should be associated with agenda-selection decisions on specific bills.

Campaign Contributions. One of the most common concerns about the role of organized interests in policymaking is their ability to direct tremendous amounts of money to legislators' campaigns. Campaign contributions can incentivize individual legislators to get involved in issues, (Esterling 2007; Hall and Wayman 1990) to grant access, (Kalla and Broockman 2016) to introduce legislation, (Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999) and to vote in accordance with a donor's preferences (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier and Munger 1993; Stratmann 1998). Unsurprisingly, they are also coordinated with groups' lobbying activities (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001; Ansolabehere, Jr and Tripathi 2002). While the relationship between resources and policy success has appeared inconsistent, (Hojnacki et al. 2012) recent evidence suggests that that is because its effects occur at the side-level rather than at the individual level (McKay 2012*a*; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015). That is, rather than examining the resources of individual groups lobbying on a bill, legislators are believed to compare the campaign resources (among other types of lobbying resources) amassed by interests across both sides of the bill and act according to the balance of these resources. Thus, a bill's legislative viability may be buttressed if

supporters' contributions outweigh opponents', or imperiled if its opposing interests are more generous campaign donors than its supporters.

Hypothesis 2: To the extent the set of interest groups supporting a bill has higher levels of campaign contributions than that opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to be granted committee consideration.

Campaign contributions are prevalent in congressional politics, but it is unclear that this affords influence over bills' committee consideration. Like other means of interest group influence, contributions operate at the individual, PAC-to-legislator, level. This may indeed affect legislators' individual behavior, both in to whom they grant access and in their participation in committee activities (Hall and Wayman 1990; Kalla and Broockman 2016; Esterling 2007; Powell and Grimmer 2016). However, the impact of this individual-level influence on committee agendas is not automatic. Instead, PAC contributions appear motivated by other goals; specifically, to buy access to key incumbents, to reward voting behavior, and to support the reelection of ideologically like-minded legislators (Powell and Grimmer 2016; Stratmann 1998; Fouirnaies 2017). For these reasons, we should not expect PAC contributions to impact committee agenda-setting decisions on individual bills.

Side Size. Alignment of interest groups across lobbying sides may have a substantial impact on whether a policy change is adopted. Gilens and Page (2014) find that the balance of interest group alignments between those supporting and those opposing a policy change is an important predictor of policy adoption, even when controlling for the preferences of middle-income citizens and economic elites. This might be because legislators often know which individual organizations tend to agree with them on matters of policy, and may follow signals from these groups (Kingdon 1989). Having a large number of organizations on one side might indicate that side's collective clout or ability to persuade legislators to their cause. Thus, larger sides may be more likely to prevail.

Hypothesis 3: To the extent that the set of interest groups supporting a bill is larger (i.e. has more groups) than that opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to be granted committee consideration

However, there are at least two reasons to doubt that it is sheer numbers that makes a lobbying side effective. First, individual groups vary substantially in their access to a given legislator; in particular, legislators prefer to grant access to interests that are aligned either in their policy preferences or, as

described above, their important district interests (Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1964; Hansen 1991). A side can be large, but if its members can only reliably access a few legislators then their influence on lawmaking may be mitigated. Second, coalition work has been shown to be quite costly for individual coalition members (Hojnacki 1997). It would be counterproductive to coordinate a coalition among groups on a side unless that coordination provided benefits beyond what the members could accomplish on their own. Thus, large sides may be influential, but that benefit should accrue from factors other than their size itself.

New Data on Committee Consideration and Interest Groups' Bill Positions, 2005-2014

To assess how committee consideration is shaped by interest groups, I collect new data on each. To capture committee consideration of bills, I use data from the Congressional Bills Project (CBP) and the legislative tracking website Govtrack. I also use Govtrack, the CBP, as well as data from the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), for various control variables in the model estimates reported below.

I also require data on interest groups' bill positions. Neither common source of lobbying data has such information for large numbers of bills. Many lobbying studies (e.g., Grossmann and Pyle 2013; Baumgartner et al. 2011; LaPira, Thomas and Baumgartner 2014; Leech et al. 2005) rely on data gleaned from reports filed by lobbying organizations under the Lobby Disclosure Act (LDA). LDA reports contain information about issues, and to some extent specify bills, on which an organization lobbied. However, LDA reports do not normally contain information about registrants' positions on a particular bill; thus, they cannot test this article's empirical expectations. The other common data source is to interview or survey lobbyists (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009; Victor 2007; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson and Salisbury 1993). Doing so can glean rich detail about groups' positions on legislation, but they are limited in two key ways. First, the cost of conducting interviews often means that interview-based studies cover a small number of issue areas (c.f., Baumgartner and Leech 1998, for a discussion). Second, lobbyists' perceptions color their explanations for any phenomena, such as committee consideration, outside of their direct control. Thus, I cannot rely on these data for present purposes.

Instead, I collected new data on the positions taken by organizations on congressional legislation. The

non-profit, non-partisan organization Maplight documents public positions taken by interest groups, advocacy groups, institutions, and firms on specific bills, beginning in the 109th Congress (2005-2006) and continuing through the present.[7] Maplight researchers examine news stories, blogs, websites as well as letters sent by organizations to members of Congress. As of February 2016, Maplight had documented 67,827 positions taken by approximately 13,000 organizations on over 5,390 bills introduced during the 109th to 113th Congresses. Each position in the dataset includes the bill number, the organization's name, the organization's position on that bill (supporting, opposing, or "NA"[8]), a citation documenting the source from which Maplight inferred that position, and a code[9] for the organization's industry or cause. I collected these data using Maplight's application programming interface (API).

Beyond the bill positions themselves, I require information on the industries and other interests lobbying on each bill, including their campaign contributions. For both, I rely on a taxonomy developed by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). The taxonomy includes 430 interest group categories, allowing for nuanced distinctions between interests of different types.[10] Maplight applies these interest group categories to each organization taking a position on a particular bill, according to the particular organization's reasons for lobbying the bill.[11] For these interests' campaign contribution levels, I collected Federal Election Commission (FEC) data compiled by the CRP itself; CRP uses its taxonomy for categorizing[12] campaign contributions. Merging across these datasets results in a combined dataset of 4757 regular[13] House (H.R.) and Senate (S.) bills from the 109th to 113th Congresses for which Maplight

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[7] Political scientists have used Maplight data on individual bills in prior research (Broz 2014; Galantucci 2015; Laposata, Kennedy and Glantz 2014; Moore, Powell and Reeves 2013). This article is among the first to use Maplight's entire dataset.

[8] In the analyses reported below, I treat positions of "NA" as an indication of interest in the bill, and so groups with "NA" positions are included in interest group salience measure. They are not factored into the other interest group variables.

[9] These come from an "interest group category" taxonomy (detailed below) from the Center for Responsive Politics.

[10] The taxonomy organizes interests at three levels: Sectors (e.g. Healthcare vs. Defense); Industries (e.g. Public Sector Unions vs. Transportation Unions, within the Labor sector); and "interest group categories" (e.g. Foreign Policy Hawks vs. Foreign Policy Doves, within the "Foreign & Defense Policy" industry, within the "Ideology/Single Issue" sector). For more information about these codes, I refer the reader to CRP's website (`https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/slist.php`, accessed August 27, 2017).

[11] More information can be found on its bill positions API page (`http://maplight.org/data/passthrough/#legacyurl=http://classic.maplight.org/us-congress/guide/data/support-opposition`, accessed August 27th, 2017).

[12] For more information on the CRP methodology for categorizing contributions, see `https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/methodology.php` (accessed August 27th).

[13] I exclude from this analysis both reauthorization and appropriations bills. For both bill types, lobbying is focused not on a bill's passage or failure, but on securing amendments to it; for example, changes to funding levels or tweaks to an existing program. Appropriations bills were, per the process detailed by Grossmann and Pyle (2013), identified as including in their bill

has documented at least one interest group position and the CRP has collected relevant campaign finance information. Summary statistics for all variables used in this analysis are presented in the Appendix.

The bills included in this analysis comprise a large set of "newsworthy" bills, but not a random sample of bills. Particularly, one criterion for "newsworthiness" is legislative advancement.[14] As a result, Maplight data exhibit some selection on the dependent variable, committee consideration. Indeed, the CBP reports that although only 7 percent of bills in the 109th to 113th Congresses received consideration in committee in their chamber of origin, about 21 percent of Maplight bills from the same time period were reported from committee. Sample selection procedures that, like Maplight's, are correlated with a dependent variable tend to attenuate causal effect estimates (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). This attenuation suggests that the true effects of interest group lobbying side composition on committee agenda-setting may be larger than reported here.

The Dependent Variable: Committee Consideration. My theory concerns the allocation of consideration to bills in committee. By default,[15] committee consideration has three stages: First, a hearing, in which testimony from witnesses (often, federal bureaucrats and representatives of firms or industries likely to be affected by the proposal in question) selected by the committee chair as well as the minority party's ranking member on the committee; Second, a markup, in which committee members develop a specific bill, through amendments to some initial proposal; Third, a vote on whether to report the bill from the committee so that it might proceed to debate in the full chamber (Oleszek 2011). I focus here on markups and reports. Granting a markup implies that a chair has settled on specific bill, and any members (including, the chair) who wish to amend the bill must put effort into developing those amendments (Evans 2001; Hall 1996). Hearings, by contrast, are often only loosely tied to specific bills,

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titles any of the following strings: "making appropriations", "making supplemental appropriations", "emergency supplemental appropriations", "making miscellaneous appropriations", and "supplemental appropriations". Similarly, reauthorization bills were identified as those including the string "reauthoriz" in their extended titles. This study's findings are robust to including both types of bills in the model.

[14] Maplight describes its process for selecting bills for research as follows (`http://maplight.org/us-congress/guide/data/support-opposition`, retrieved March 28, 2016.): "We gather this data for newsworthy bills: bills that move forward in Congress or that are mentioned in the news or blogs. We do not research support/opposition for ceremonial bills (such as naming post offices)."

[15] In practice, committee consideration can deviate from the default process. For example, a committee chair can hold a markup on a bill but not allow amendments to be considered. Or a committee may forego a hearing on a bill that it has taken testimony on in the recent past. Or, when a bill is a priority item for the majority party, the chair may forego both a hearing and a markup and move straight to a vote to report.

but even when they are tightly connected, the viability of the bill being "heard" is not as important as drawing committee members' attention to it (see Kingdon 1995). Thus, a markup and report are the earliest definitive indication that a bill is on Congress's legislative agenda. Gaining both is an important precondition for proposals to be eligible for agenda space in the full chamber, for passing the chamber, and, ultimately, for becoming law.

To collect which bills have received consideration, I used web scraping to gather records of bills' legislative progress compiled by Govtrack. For each bill, if any full committee in the bill's chamber of origin marked-up the bill, I recorded the bill as having received a *Markup*. Similarly, if any full committee in the bill's chamber of origin reported the bill, I recorded the bill as having received *Reporting* from committee. To capture whether a bill received either form of consideration, I constructed a combined *Markup or Reporting* indicator. Also, the CBP dataset contains information about committee bill reporting, which I use to develop an alternative measure of whether a committee in the bill's chamber of origin *Reported* the bill. The four variables that measure committee consideration – *Markup (Govtrack)*, *Reporting (Govtrack)*, *Markup or Reporting (Govtrack)*, and *Reported (CBP)* – are highly but not perfectly correlated (the minimum correlation between them is $r = 0.72$). The main results reported below use the Markup or Reporting measure, while I estimate the same models with the other measures of committee consideration in the appendix as an additional robustness check.

Independent Variables: Lobbying Side Attributes. To test the hypotheses outlined above, I measure three attributes of the interest group sides on the sample bills. These attributes are a side's interest diversity, campaign contributions, and size.

H1: Net Interest Diversity. mean 3.153, sd 8.948. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the balance of interest diversity across bill sides should be associated with committee consideration. To measure interest diversity, I use the CRP interest group categories assigned to each organization lobbying on a bill. I measure a side's interest diversity as the number of unique such categories among organizations on that side. To return to the earlier example, a side composed of three pharmaceutical companies would have an interest diversity score of 1, while a side comprised of one health insurer, one doctor's association, and one healthcare consumer advocacy group would have an interest diversity score of 3. To measure the balance

of interest diversity between a bill's supporting organizations and its opposing organizations, I subtract the latter from the former; this produces a net interest diversity score.

H2: Net Campaign Contributions - $2,675,000 increments. mean 3.344, sd 14.320. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the balance of campaign contributions across bill sides is associated with committee consideration. Using CRP interest group category codes, I tally, for each organization on a side, the total campaign contributions during the election cycle during which the bill was introduced from PACs in that interest category, and sum these amounts to get the total contributions from that side's interests.[16] Then, to measure the relative advantage of the bill's supporters over their opponents, I net the opponents' total contributions out of supporters' total contributions. Thus, negative values of this variable indicate that the opposing interests gave more contributions than supporting interests. For ease of presentation, I scale the variable in increments of $2,675,000. This is the number of voting members of Congress (535) multiplied by the maximum an individual PAC may legally give to an individual candidate in an election cycle ($5000).[17] Thus, a one-unit increase in this variable is equivalent to one additional interest (i.e. industry or cause) supporting a bill giving the maximum contribution allowable (from a single PAC) to every member of Congress. Using this measure, any relationship between campaign contributions and committee consideration should be large in magnitude.

H3: Net Side Size. mean 6.234 sd 21.722. Hypothesis 3 holds that when one side is comprised of more organizations than another, the side with more organizations lobbying is expected to win.[18] This variable is the number of organizations supporting the bill minus the number opposing it.

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[16]This potential double-counting (or triple-, etc.) of interests' campaign contributions accounts for instances in which organizations in the same category lobby on opposite bill sides. The net effect of that code's contributions is effectively weighted by the balance of organizations with that code on each side.

[17]The CRP reports that in the 2013-2014 cycle only four PACs gave $2,675,000 or more to federal candidates, even including affiliate PACs (e.g. the state affiliates of national organizations) and individual contributions from employees of the PAC, which are not counted against the PAC's limit. The four PACs in question were those affiliated with the National Association of Realtors, the National Beer Wholesalers Association, Honeywell International, and the National Auto Dealers Association. Across interest group categories, the average total PAC contribution in the 2014 election cycle was a little less than $900,000, with a standard deviation of nearly $1.7 million. Another interpretation of the Net PAC contribution variable is thus one interest category going from zero contributions to one standard deviation above the mean level of campaign contributions.

[18]Including this variable also allows me to disentangle the number of groups lobbying on a bill from the number of *interests* lobbying on a bill. A side's size is also its maximum interest diversity: thus, to an extent an interest group side is diverse, it is also large, but many large coalitions are not diverse. By including Net Side Size, I can distinguish between these.

Controls

Coalition diversity does not arise randomly across proposals. Phinney (2017) finds that coalition diversity is more likely to arise in certain political contexts. Two of these[19] are, (1) when a bill is highly salient to policy elites (i.e., lawmakers and interest groups), and (2) when a side has a strong opponent but the sides are still close enough that a new member on either side might tip the balance. If these factors are also associated with committee consideration, they are potential confounds to any estimated relationship between diversity and consideration. Thus, they are possible sources of omitted variable bias.

Using the Maplight data, I control for these bill-level factors. I compare the sides' sizes to measure the bill's *Interest Group Competitiveness* (-|# of Supporters - # of Opponents|). (mean -9.424, sd 20.54.) Specifically, I subtract the number of opponents from the number of supporters, take the absolute value of that difference, and then multiply that absolute value by -1. The resulting quantity is a non-positive number that captures how closely sized the two sides are. To the extent one side greatly outnumbers the other, this number will be large and negative; as the numbers of supporters and opponents converge, this quantity gets closer to zero. Bills with evenly matched (and thus maximally competitive) lobbying sides have a value of zero for this variable. To measure *Interest Group Salience* (mean 12.538, sd 25.815), I total the number of supporters, the number of opponents, and the number of groups with interest but no documented position (see above) that Maplight registered as lobbying on a bill. Including this variable also controls for the finding of Grossmann and Pyle (2013) that the total number of groups lobbying on a bill is associated with that bill's legislative advancement. Finally, I measure a bill's ability to garner *Legislative Salience* (mean 30.646, sd 50.318), as its total number of cosponsors. Though cosponsorships do not often predict legislative advancement, they do signal awareness of and at least passive support for a bill (Wilson and Young 1997; Koger 2003).

There are common institution- and sponsor- level factors that make a bill more likely to receive

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[19] Though a proposal's policy uncertainty is a factor Phinney identifies as encouraging interest diversity, I do not control for it in the models reported below. There is to the best of my knowledge no common or feasible way to measure this across many different bills. One potential proxy for policy uncertainty is the timing of a bill's introduction. Bills introduced early in a congress (e.g., the first month or two) are more likely to be carried over from previous congresses than bills introduced later in a Congress. If one assumes that bills that have been introduced in multiple Congress are better comprehended than new bills, then it is possible to take a bill's introduction timing as a proxy for the relative certainty around that bill. The results reported below are robust to the inclusion of bill introduction timing.

committee consideration. As strategic actors and close observers of the legislative process, lobbyists are likely to understand these factors and direct lobbying toward bills that are more likely to make legislative progress. Controlling for these is thus necessary for minimizing omitted variable bias. I include an indicator of whether the sponsor was a *Majority Party Member* of their chamber, indicators of whether they were a *Committee Member*, a *Majority Party Committee Member* (i.e., an interaction effect of Majority Party and Committee Member) or the *Committee Chair* for the bill's committee of referral. These are all factors that are commonly found to be associated with a bill's advancement, particularly through committee (Krutz 2005; Evans 2001; Grossmann and Pyle 2013). I measure *Unified Government* with a dichotomous indicator for whether the Congress in question featured control of the House, the Senate, and the White House by the same party. A bill's *Issue Area* is indicated using the bills's CAP major topic code, and its *Congress* is a factor variable indicating the Congress in which the bill was introduced.

Empirical Strategy

How does interest diversity influence committee agenda-setting? To address this question, I model whether each bill received committee consideration in its chamber of origin during the Congress in which it was introduced, as a function of the Net Interest Diversity of the organizations lobbying on the bill, as well as the those organizations' Net Side Size, and the Net PAC Contributions of the interests they represent.

When analyzing observational data with non-randomized treatment variables, political scientists may adopt one of several identification strategies. However, these strategies are not feasible here. Difference-in-differences (DiD) designs require within-subject variation (e.g., from a panel or time-series - cross section) to achieve causal identification, through the assumption that treated and non-treated subjects would have followed parallel trends absent the treatment. For this dataset, there is no within-bill variation to exploit, so DiD cannot be used. Another common identification strategy, Instrumental Variable (IV) regression, relies on an exogenous source of variation in the independent variable. IV regression is invalid if the exogenous source, or instrument, causes changes in the dependent variable in

any way other than through its effect on the independent variable (a violation of the exclusion restriction, c.f., Sovey and Green 2011). This is the case for potential instruments for interest groups' legislative influence; exogenous shocks that can systematically change lobbying strategies almost always change legislator behaviors as well (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Thus, common causal identification strategies are unavailable here.

Given these constraints, I embed my hypotheses within a simple regression framework. The four committee consideration measures described above – *Markup (Govtrack), Reporting (Govtrack), Markup or Reporting (Govtrack)*, and *Reported (CBP)* – are each binary indicators. Also, there are likely both time-invariant characteristics of legislative issue areas as well as common shocks affecting all bills in a given Congress. Given these considerations, I employ mixed effects logistic regressions, with congress fixed effects and issue random effects.[20] These account for period- and issue-specific effects on committee consideration that are not captured in the model's other variables.

This approach encounters problems common to observational studies using cross-sectional data. For these models to provide valid causal inferences, one must assume that interest group side attributes (particularly, Net Interest Diversity) are independent of committee consideration, conditional on controlled variables. This assumption is both stronger than those required in other research designs and also impossible to validate in any empirical context. To the extent it does not hold, endogeneity is introduced into the model, in this case most likely through either uncontrolled confounding variables or reverse causation. I have minimized the former by controlling for known causes of interest diversity and committee consideration, though unobserved confounds may still introduce bias.

Reverse causation remains possible. In this case, a bias from reverse causation would require that (a) committee consideration causes more groups to lobby on a bill, (b) those groups belong to interest group categories not already lobbying on the bill, and (c) newly lobbying interest categories are more likely to support the bill than those already lobbying on it. There is evidence that legislative advancement

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[20]Though guidelines from Clark and Linzer (2015) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012), as applied to this dataset, support this modelling strategy, I have estimated the models accounting for different assumptions about error structure. These include: single-level logit models with and without clustered standard errors; probit and mixed probit models; mixed logit models with legislator-level random effects; as well as multilevel logits with bills nested within legislators (i.e. their sponsors), with bills nested in both legislators and issue areas, with issue fixed effects and bills nested within chambers and then congresses, and finally with bills nested within legislators, issue areas, and congresses. All models produced substantively similar results.

encourages lobbying activity, (Grossmann and Pyle 2013, though see also Drutman 2010) so I control for the number of groups lobbying on the bill.[21] However, for newly lobbying organizations to represent new interests implies either that every organization in that interest category was unaware of a relevant bill before it gained committee consideration, or that the bill was not only amended in committee but that those amendments sufficiently expanded the bill's scope to become relevant to additional interests. The former of these is implausible and the latter is rare.[22] Finally, if new interests were to join a legislative battle, there is little evidence that they would be more likely to join the supporting side. In fact, the movement of legislation would incentivize previously non-lobbying opponents to actively oppose the bill and previously lobbying opponents to recruit new allies to do so.

Without exogenous variation in Net Interest Diversity, I cannot eliminate endogeneity bias in my model estimates. Thus, the evidence reported here should be taken as suggestive. However, I can examine whether committee consideration patterns are more consistent with my argument that interest diversity serves as a heuristic for legislative viability than with other explanations of interest group influence. To do so, I proceed in two steps. First, in my primary model, I examine whether committee consideration is more strongly associated with Net Interest Diversity than with Net Side Size and Net PAC Contributions. If so, it suggests that interest diversity influences committee consideration more than organizations' lobbying or campaign contributions. Second, I demonstrate that the relationships between these legislative side attributes and committee consideration are non-linear in ways that my theory explains but alternative theories cannot. Specifically, I examine how coefficient estimates change for bills with less certain, if not necessarily lower, legislative viability – those introduced by majority party sponsors or during periods of non-unified government. If the coefficients on these variables change substantively when divided across majority and minority-party bills, or across unified and non-unified government, it suggests that committee chairs are more responsive to interest group side attributes for

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[21]Though doing so risks trading upward bias from reverse causation for upward bias from a post-treatment variable, in this case the latter bias is smaller; the coefficient of Net Interest Diversity reported below increases when not controlling for the number of groups lobbying on the bill.

[22]Between the 109th and 113th Congresses, less than half of bills reported from a committee had been amended at all, and, among bills in the dataset, the average difference in legislative subject terms (a rough proxy for the scope of its provisions) between bills reported from committee and those that were not is less than one half of one percentage point (i.e., less than one quarter of one standard deviation).

bills with less certain legislative viability. This, in turn, would support the theory that interest groups influence committee agenda-setting by conditioning agenda-setters' perceptions of bills' likelihood of further legislative advancement.

Results: Committee Agendas Favor Bills with the Support of Diverse Interests

The main results are reported in Figure 1. The figure presents the estimated coefficients of four mixed effects logistic regression models in which committee consideration (either Markup or Reporting) is regressed on interest group side attributes (Net Interest Diversity, Net PAC Contributions, and Net Side Size), with Congress (period) fixed effects and Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) Major Topic Code random effects. The models vary by which controls they include. Model 1 (coefficients with point estimates marked as circles in Figure 1) includes only a control for majority party sponsor. In effect, it assumes that committee consideration is the product only of interest group side attributes, majority party status, and unmeasured congress- or issue-invariant factors. Model 2 (diamond markers) also includes controls for bill-level factors likely to result in diverse lobbying coalitions, as described above. Model 3 (square markers) contains interest group side attributes, majority party status, Congress fixed effects, major topic code random effects, and additional controls for lobbyist-observable factors likely to result in increased probability of committee consideration, as described above. Model 4 (triangle markers) is the full model specification, including all controls. Results with respect to Net Interest Diversity and Net Side Size are quite consistent across all four models; Net PAC Contributions coefficient point estimates are positive across all models, but not statistically significant in the full specification. Thus, for Diversity and Side Size at least, inferences are unlikely to depend on model specification. While subsequent discussion would accurately characterize all models (since the results across them are by and large very similar), the graphical representations presented here will be based on the results of Model 4, in which the dependent variable is committee markup or reporting. Table 4, containing the full results of each model, is in the appendix.

Figure 1: Net Interest Diversity, Net PAC Contributions, and Net Side Size: Coefficient Plot from Four Model Specifications

Point estimates (with 95% confidence intervals represented by solid lines) from the four mixed effects logit models of committee consideration, for the three coefficients of interest. Coefficients from a given model have the same color and point estimate marker shape. Model 1 (Circle) contains the interest group side attributes as well as a control for majority party sponsor, as well as congress fixed effects and CAP major topic code random effects. Model 2 (Diamond) contains these, as well as controls for factors likely to encourage interest group diversity: interest group salience, total number of cosponsors, and interest group competitiveness. Model 3 (Square) contains interest group side attributes, congress fixed effects, major topic code random effects, and controls for factors likely to encourage committee consideration: majority status, committee member sponsor, majority-party committee sponsor, committee chair, and unified government. Model 4 (Triangle) contains all of the full model specification, including all controls, Congress fixed effects, and CAP major topic code random effects. Full results table in the Appendix.

Interest diversity is precisely estimated and positively associated with committee agenda-setting across all models. Thus, over a wide range of bills, relatively high diversity among a bill's supporters (compared to its opponents) is associated with that bill's committee consideration. Figure 2 displays the predicted probability of committee consideration (markup or reporting), in Model 4 of Figure 1, over the range of values of Net Side Size. Model 4 estimates that, with other variables at their means, a shift from one standard deviation below mean Net Interest Diversity to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with at 9.3 percent increase in the probability that the bill will be granted some

form of committee consideration. Given that, all else equal, a given bill only has a 21 to 30 percent chance (depending on the dependent variable measure) of gaining committee consideration, this is a substantively significant improvement in a bill's probability of committee consideration. This suggests that committee agenda-setters prefer to grant consideration to bills when those bills have the support of a relatively diverse range of industries, social causes, and other interests.

Contrary to the expectations of much public and elite discourse on money in politics, the direct impact of campaign contributions on committee agendas appears to be potentially positive, but both inconsistent and substantively negligible. The coefficient on Net PAC Contributions is statistically significant in all the models depicted in Figure 1 except in the full model specification (Model 4). This suggests that an apparent association between PAC contributions and committee consideration is a product of omitted variable bias. Figure 2 displays the predicted probability of committee consideration (markup or reporting), in Model 4 of Figure 1, over the range of values of Net PAC Contributions. It shows that However, even if the impact of campaign contributions on committee agenda-setting were more consistent, the results here suggest any effect they have is very small. The coefficient on PAC contributions is by far the smallest lobbying-related coefficient across all models, despite the side attributes being measured on comparable scales. This result is particularly surprising given the scale of the *Net PAC Contributions* variable: each one-unit increase in this variable represents giving the *maximum* annual single-PAC contribution to *every* member of Congress. These results are consistent with the literature's mixed evidence of a relationship between contributions and legislative outcomes.

Also contrary to expectations, the number of a bill's supporting organizations relative to its opposing organizations (*Net Side Size*) is *negatively* associated with committee consideration. Across all models, the coefficient of Net Side Size is negative and statistically significant. Figure 2 displays the marginal predicted probability over the range of Net Side Size (all other variables at their means), for Model 4 of Figure 1. In the model, a shift in Net Side Size from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a 10.8% decrease in the probability that a bill received committee consideration (when all other variables are at their means). If taken at face value, these results complicate existing theories that the size of a lobbying coalition helps it attain its policy preferences, and

Figure 2: Effect of Net Lobbying Side Attributes on Predicted Probability of Consideration

This graph presents the marginal predicted probability of committee consideration across the range of values of Net Side Size, Net PAC Contributions, and Net Interest Diversity, using the model of Committee Markup or Reporting presented in Model 4 of Figure 1 with all other variables at their means. The line represents the average marginal predicted probability at a given level of each independent variable, and the shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval around that estimate.

demonstrate that the costs to individual groups of coalition participation (Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999) may be counterproductive. Also, this result complicates the interpretation of the marginal effect of increasing Net Interest Diversity. However, given that a one-standard deviation shift in Net Interest Diversity is 8.9 interest group categories, while a standard deviation shift in Net Side Size is 21.9 organizations, this suggests that the ability to add diversity to an interest group side without significantly increasing the number of organizations on that side is a net benefit for the side in question, at least in terms of its ability to gain a bill committee consideration.

Though I leave reporting their estimates to the Appendix (see Table 3), the coefficients on the various controls are consistent with prior work on committee agenda-setting. Consistent with Grossmann and Pyle (2013), the models' coefficients on the Number of Groups Lobbying on a bill is positively and statistically significantly associated with committee consideration. Also, for most of the models, the coefficient on Interest Group Competitiveness is positive and statistically significant. Together, these results complicate the negative coefficients on Net Side Size, since they are all manipulations of the numbers of supporters and opponents.[23] Taking these results into account, the addition of one group supporting a bill will either increase or decrease the probability of committee consideration, depending on whether the comparison value of Net Side Size is negative or positive.[24] Finally, the coefficient on

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[23]Though it is true that Competitiveness and Number of Groups Lobbying are highly correlated with Net Side Size, the coefficient on Net Side Size remains negative, statistically significant, and approximately the same size when these variables are removed.

[24]If it is negative, one additional group lobbying for the bill will also increase Competitiveness; in this case, the sum of the

Number of Cosponsors is small and imprecisely estimated. Taken together, these results suggest that factors that generate interest diversity have separate impacts on committee consideration apart from their ability to incentivize interest diversity; if so, interest diversity would be a partial mediator of the relationship(s) between salience (and competitiveness) and committee consideration. In addition, the results for sponsor- and institution covariates track with the extant literature on committee consideration (Krutz 2005; Grossmann and Pyle 2013). Majority party status, committee membership, the interaction thereof, committee chairmanship, and unified government are all positively associated with committee consideration and precisely estimated. This gives us some confidence that the bills in the maplight data are representative of congressional legislation in general.

Taken together, the results suggest that interest groups play a role in committee agenda-setting. An interest-diverse coalition supporting a bill will not overcome majority party legislators' and committee members' institutional advantages in getting their bills on the committee's agenda. Instead, it is more likely that interest diversity plays a role in deciding which majority or committee member bills are likely to be considered. Though these results are novel, they do not yet evince this study's theory: that the chair's need to assess legislative viability generates conditions under which interest groups can be influential on committee agenda-setting. To investigate this, I turn next to the role of institutional alignments and majority party prerogatives in conditioning interest group influence.

Interest Diversity is More Influential When Chairs Place Higher Value on Legislative Viability

Here, I test whether the influence of interest diversity changes with the chair's prior beliefs about the viability of a bill. I assume that when a chair believes that a bill's viability is ambiguous – i.e., neither certain nor impossible – she will give greater weight to external sources of information about that viability in her consideration-granting decisions with respect to that bill. If lobbying coalition interest diversity constitutes such externally-sourced viability information, it should therefore be more influential on a

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coefficients on Net Side Size (-0.016), Interest Group Salience (0.022), and Competitiveness (0.018) will be positive (0.024). If Net Side Size is currently positive (or 0), adding one group will decrease Competitiveness, and the sum of the coefficients will be negative (-0.012).

chair's consideration-granting decisions with respect to bills of ambiguous viability than bills for which viability is relatively assured or unlikely. This, in turn, suggests a non-linearity in the association between interest diversity and committee consideration; it should be stronger for bills where viability is, a priori, more ambiguous. If this expectation holds, it is consistent with my theory's contention that the chair's need to anticipate legislative viability creates conditions for interest group influence.

I focus on two factors that introduce ambiguity into bills' legislative viability. These are: First, the party status of the bill's sponsor; and Second, the partisan alignment between the chambers of Congress and the White House. In the contemporary Congress, the majority party has very strong agenda-setting powers in both chambers (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Den Hartog and Monroe 2011). My initial results confirm that majority-party legislators' bills are much more likely to be considered in committee than minority-party legislators'. However, majority-party status alone is not a sufficient predictor of committee consideration: committee agendas include only a fraction of bills referred to the committee, even among those bills sponsored by majority party members. In fact, only about a third of majority-sponsored bills (1455 out of 3930) in my data received committee consideration. Because chairs prefer to grant consideration to viable bills, they will examine majority-party members' bills for indications that a bill is legislatively viable relative to other majority party bills. The theory presented above argues that lobbying side attributes can inform the chair of a bill's legislative viability. Thus, the association between lobbying side attributes and committee consideration is likely to be stronger for majority-sponsored bills than minority-sponsored bills.

I also consider the role of institutional alignments among the chambers of Congress and the White House as a moderator for interest group influence on committee agendas. Divided government generally makes it harder - though crucially, not impossible - to pass new legislation (e.g Mayhew 1991; Kelly 1993; Howell, Adler, Cameron and Riemann 2000; Maltzman and Shipan 2008; Binder 1999). This is because under divided government and ideological sorting between the parties, the ideological distance between pivotal voters across the stages of the legislative process tends to increase. In such situations, indications, including lobbying side attributes, that a bill can appeal to a wide range of legislators ought to matter more because making legislative progress is more difficult. However, because the majority party in each

Figure 3: Effect of Net Lobbying Side Attributes on Predicted Probability of Consideration , by Party Status

This graph presents the marginal predicted probability of committee consideration for majority party (dark lines) and minority party (lighter lines) bills, across the range of values of Net Side Size, Net PAC Contributions, and Net Interest Diversity, using the model of Committee Markup or Reporting presented in Model 4 of Figure 1 with all other variables at their means. The solid lines represents the average marginal predicted probability at a given level of each independent variable, and dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval around that estimate.

chamber will still prefer their chamber's majority-party members' bills, I expect that the effects of unified and divided government are primarily constrained to majority party members within each chamber.

I test these hypotheses in two ways. First, I plot the marginal predicted probability of consideration[25] over the range of values of each independent variable, by whether the sponsor is a member of the majority or minority party. These plots appear in Figure 3. They show a distinction between majority and minority party members, not just in their predicted probability of consideration, but in the slope of two side attributes' associations with predicted probability of consideration. For both Net Side Size and Net Interest Diversity, majority party-sponsored bills have larger associated marginal differences in the predicted probability of consideration than minority-sponsored bills. Thus, for majority party members' bills, increasing interest diversity while minimizing increases in side size is especially useful. For minority-sponsored bills under general conditions, the associations keep the same sign but loses statistical significance. PAC contributions do not have a stronger association with committee consideration for either majority- or minority party members.

Second, I reestimate the model[26] on various subsamples of the data. Each subsample varies by sponsor party status (Majority, Minority, or Both) and institutional alignment (Unified Government, Divided

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[25]Here, I use the results from Model 4 of Figure 1, where the dependent variable is Committee Consideration (Markup or Reporting).

[26]again, Model 4 of Figure 1.

Government, or Both). Table 1 presents, for each of these subsample tests, the coefficient estimates for the interest group side attributes (full results table in the appendix). For the most part, these results track with my expectations. The association between Net Interest Diversity and committee consideration increases for majority party bills, bills introduced during divided government, and majority-party bills introduced during divided government. With the exception of minority-sponsored bills under unified government, the coefficients on Net PAC Contributions largely maintain their full-sample direction and precision. The association between Net Side Size is negative and statistically significant for majority-party bills and bills under divided government, and majority party bills under divided government; for minority-party bills, and majority party bills under unified government, the association changes in sign and is, regardless, not statistically significant.

The striking and puzzling divergence from previous results occurs for minority party bills introduced under unified government (Model 6 of Table 1). Here, the coefficients for both PAC Contributions and Interest Diversity change signs, get much larger, and are statistically significant. There are at least three possible explanations for this divergence. The first is that the small subsample (140 out of an original sample of over 4700) that represent minority-party bills introduced in unified government (i.e. where that party is totally out of power) are unrepresentative of the full sample for reasons other than their being solely minority party bills introduced under unified government. The second explanation is related to the first: because the subsample is so small relative to the number of issue areas, a mixed effects logit model is inappropriate. Instead, Model 6 uses a logit model with standard errors clustered on major topic code, though this should produce similar results (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012).

Third, this result suggests that while majority-sponsored bills benefit from the signal of broad appeal that interest diversity provides, minority-sponsored bills may benefit from the concentrated support of homogenous wealthy interests. This possibility has some basis in the literature. Policy-motivated minority-party legislators, particularly in periods of unified government, may recognize that they are unlikely to pass ideological and salient bills (see Howell et al. 2000) and instead introduce bills that are non-ideological or concern non-salient issues. On such bills, legislators' votes appear more responsive to PAC contributions (Witko 2006). More generally, this possibility suggests that which lobbying side

Subsample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
- Party Status	Maj	Min	Both	Both	Min	Min	Maj	Maj
- Unified Government?	Both	Both	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
Net Interest Diversity	0.0395***	-0.00186	-0.0232	0.0352***	-0.000388	-0.257*	0.0435***	-0.0208
	(0.00953)	(0.0270)	(0.0306)	(0.00954)	(0.0287)	(0.120)	(0.0106)	(0.0313)
Net PAC contribs.	0.00566	0.00986	0.00263	0.00630	0.00698	0.285**	0.00521	-0.00304
	(0.00410)	(0.0130)	(0.0175)	(0.00405)	(0.0149)	(0.103)	(0.00429)	(0.0182)
Net Side Size	-0.0188***	0.000463	0.0172	-0.0166***	0.000314	0.0821	-0.0200***	0.0171
	(0.00452)	(0.0119)	(0.0203)	(0.00427)	(0.0122)	(0.0617)	(0.00479)	(0.0208)
Random Effects:								
Major Topic Code	0.393**	1.160*	0.0966	0.480**	1.248*		0.447**	0.0494
	(0.143)	(0.583)	(0.0933)	(0.170)	(0.622)		(0.161)	(0.0784)
Institution and Sponsor Controls?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Congress Fixed Effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	3460	1295	789	3968	1157	140	2811	649

Table 1: Lobbying and Committee Consideration of Legislation, Institutional Variation

Full results table in Appendix. Standard errors in parentheses. All models are mixed effects logit models, except Model 6 which is a logit model with standard errors clustered on major topic code. "Institution and Sponsor Controls" include indicators, as relevant to the subsample, of the following: majority party sponsor, committee member sponsor, majority-party committee member sponsor, committee chair sponsor, and unified government.* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

attributes – including PAC contributions, interest diversity, or others – make lobbying influential varies with both sponsor- and congress-level conditions.

These analyses generally support the theory that lobbying is influential due to chairs' uncertainty surrounding bills' legislative viability. Majority party bills are not only more likely to be considered in general, but the association between interest diversity and committee consideration is substantively larger for majority party bills than minority party bills. This suggests that chairs use their observation of lobbying on bills to help them determine which majority party bills are more likely to garner broad, sustained support. Similarly, the association between lobbying side attributes and committee consideration is stronger in periods of divided government. Because the policy preferences that must be simultaneously satisfied in order for a bill to pass are broader in such periods, all bills in divided government are (weakly) less viable than they would be if introduced during unified government. Under divided government, chairs thus have greater incentives to value legislative viability in bills they grant consideration. Because lobbying side attributes are more strongly related to committee consideration during divided government, this suggests that lobbying is informing chairs about which bills are still viable. Together, these analyses not only show that lobbying, and particularly Net Interest Diversity, is associated with committee agenda-setting, but it is more strongly associated with committee

agenda-setting on bills where legislative viability is particularly uncertain.

Conclusion

Analyzing a large new dataset of interest groups' positions on congressional legislation, I show an association between aggregate and collective attributes of interest group coalitions lobbying on both sides of a bill and committee agenda-setters' decisions to grant the bill consideration, and how this association varies under different institutional alignments and with different kinds of bill sponsors.

Where previous accounts of interest group influence on Congress emphasize groups' resources and ability to access individual legislators, this article provides evidence consistent with an alternative theory of how interest groups influence legislative agendas. I find evidence that committee agenda-setters prefer to grant consideration to bills supported by organizations representing diverse interests. To the extent that interest groups supporting a bill represent a more diverse set industries, social causes, identity groups, and other interests than those opposing the bill, the bill is more likely to receive consideration. By contrast, I do not find evidence that committee agenda-setters strongly or consistently favor bills supported by organizations representing wealthier interests, insofar as those groups give higher levels of PAC contributions. Chairs also appear more likely to ignore bills favored by coalitions that are large but not very diverse, suggesting that coalition participation may be counterproductive if the coalition is not more than the sum of its parts. In addition, I document non-linearities in the association between interest diversity and committee consideration; the association is stronger for majority party bills than minority party bills, and stronger during divided government than during unified government. The cross-sectional nature of the data impedes causal inference from any one of these results, but collectively they are more consistent with the theory that lobbying helps chairs assess legislative viability, and is more influential when chairs have more reason to value information about legislative viability, than with resource-based accounts of interest group influence.

This article contrasts with and expands upon previous accounts of interest group influence on lawmaking. While interest group influence has been mostly concerned with how interest groups make

tactical decisions and influence legislator behavior (for a review, see Hojnacki et al. 2012), and to a much lesser extent how they influence policy outcomes (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Grossmann 2012*a*), this study joins only a few others (e.g., Grossmann and Pyle 2013) in directly examining how interest groups influence legislative advancement. In doing so, it moves beyond other studies, which examine the interest groups' legislative influence as a function of their numbers (Grossmann and Pyle 2013; Gilens and Page 2014) or their resources (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Kalla and Broockman 2016) to identify an alternative source of interest group influence on legislative advancement: diversity within lobbying coalitions. While not the first to identify diversity as an attribute of advocacy coalitions (Phinney 2017), this article is the first study to show that diversity among organizations lobbying on a bill is associated with that bill's likelihood of gaining agenda space. In doing so, it suggests that what makes a group's lobbying efforts influential is how much their position-taking changes key agenda-setters' beliefs about a bill's viability later in the legislative process. In this sense, though lobbyists may or may not employ "informational" strategies (c.f. Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Schnakenberg 2017) per se, lobbying itself is informative because, in the aggregate, it clarifies the economic and societal interests at stake in a given bill. Finally, this article provides one of the first analyses of how lobbyist influence interacts with majority party power and institutional alignments. Future research may look more closely at how these and other institutional and systemic factors condition how lobbying influences lawmaking. In doing so, it should encourage models of lawmaking and legislative agenda-setting to take interest group lobbying into account.

More broadly, this study shows that the systemic effect of lobbying on lawmaking may be distinct from the effect of individual interest groups on individual legislators' behavior. It may be the case that individual organizations pursue narrow, parochial interests, which in turn compel their legislator allies to more strongly commit themselves to those organizations' priorities. Even if this is true, and legislators find compromise more costly, it actually incentivizes consensus-driven legislative agendas by allowing legislative agenda-setters to more precisely promote bills that will be broadly supported and block bills that will be broadly opposed. If so, interest groups may contribute more to problem-solving in Congress than is often believed.

Appendix: Summary Statistics & Full Results Tables

Table 2 presents the summary statistics and data sources for all variables appearing in analyses presented in this study.

Variable	Obs	Mean (or Prop.)	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Dependent Variable: Committee Consideration						
Referred or Marked Up	5221	.289				GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)						
Marked Up in Committee	5221	.266				GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)						
Reported from Committee	5221	.268				GT
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)						
Reported from Committee (CBP)	5221	.219				CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)						
Independent Variables: Interest Group Side Attributes						
Net Interest Diversity	5221	3.153	8.948	-54	97	ML & CRP
(# of Unique Interests)						
Net Contribution Levels	4917	3.344	14.320	-119.630	324.618	ML & CRP
(Same Year PAC contributions, $2.675mil increments)						
Net Side Size	5221	6.234	21.722	-122	262	ML
(# Supporters - # Opponents)						
Control Variables: Bill Context and Sponsor						
Competitiveness	5221	-9.424	20.54	-262	0	ML
(-|#Supporters - #Opponents|)						
Interest Group Salience	5221	12.538	25.815	1	524	ML
(Total # of Groups Lobbying)						
Legislator Salience	5221	30.646	50.318	0	380	GT
(# of Cosponsors)						
Sponsor is Majority Party Member	5221	.726				CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)						
Sponsor is Committee Member	5214	.553				CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)						
Sponsor is Committee Chair	5214	.049				CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)						
Unified Government	.171					CBP
(1 = Yes, 0 = No)						
Congress Fixed Effects						CBP
(Congress in which bill was introduced)						
Bill's Issue Area						CAP
(CAP Major Topic Code)						

Table 2: Summary Statistics

This table presents summary statistics for each of the continuous and count variables included in this paper's empirical models. Data sources (and abbreviations) are Maplight.org ("ML"), Govtrack.us ("GT"), Center for Responsive Politics (OpenSecrets.org, "CRP"), the Congressional Bills Project ("CBP"), and the Comparative Agendas Project ("CAP").

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Net Interest Diversity	0.0469***	0.0367***	0.0407***	0.0316***
	(0.00829)	(0.00844)	(0.00868)	(0.00890)
Net PAC Contributions	0.0108**	0.00861*	0.00907*	0.00657
	(0.00376)	(0.00378)	(0.00402)	(0.00405)
Net Side Size	-0.0205***	-0.0197***	-0.0183***	-0.0157***
	(0.00383)	(0.00399)	(0.00395)	(0.00414)
# Groups Lobbying on Bill		0.0250***		0.0169***
		(0.00394)		(0.00395)
Competitiveness: (- |Net # of Supporters|)		0.0173***		0.0137**
		(0.00514)		(0.00513)
Total # of Cosponsors		-0.000851		-0.000149
		(0.000707)		(0.000748)
Minority-Party Committee Member			1.325***	1.317***
			(0.217)	(0.218)
Majority-Party Committee Non-Member			1.313***	1.280***
			(0.199)	(0.200)
Majority-Party Committee Member			2.558***	2.529***
			(0.192)	(0.193)
Committee Chair			1.003***	0.939***
			(0.106)	(0.107)
Unified Government			1.492***	1.557***
			(0.339)	(0.340)
Major Topic Code Random Effects				
	0.380**	0.383**	0.427**	0.436**
	(0.136)	(0.139)	(0.152)	(0.157)
Congress Fixed Effects?	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	4757	4757	4757	4757
AIC	5018.0	5223.7	4579.8	4558.8
BIC	5082.7	5301.3	4663.9	4662.3
Log Likelihood	-2499.0	-2599.9	-2276.9	-2263.4
Wald χ^2 (d.f.)	360.6 (8)	219.4 (10)	672.9 (11)	682.2 (14)

Table 3: Net Interest Diversity, Net PAC Contributions, and Net Side Size: Full Results from Four Model Specifications

Estimates of mixed effects logit models of committee consideration (Markup or Reporting). Standard errors in parentheses. Each column (other than the first, which contains variable names) presents the results of a mixed effects logit model with major-topic code random effects and Congress fixed effects. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3 presents the full model results for the models depicted in Figure 1.

Table 4 contains the results of the full model (Model 4, Figure 1) estimated on each measure of the dependent variable.

Committee Consideration	(1) Markup or Report	(2) Markup	(3) Reporting	(4) Reported
Data Source	Govtrack	Govtrack	Govtrack	CBP
Net Interest Diversity	0.0331***	0.0303***	0.0358***	0.0266*
	(0.00868)	(0.00852)	(0.00872)	(0.0111)
Net PAC Contributions	0.00686	0.00368	0.00506	0.0106
($2.675mil increments)	(0.00390)	(0.00384)	(0.00391)	(0.00632)
Net Side Size	-0.0163***	-0.0129**	-0.0164***	-0.0136*
	(0.00408)	(0.00397)	(0.00409)	(0.00552)
# Groups Lobbying on Bill	0.0219***	0.0192***	0.0169***	0.0127**
	(0.00398)	(0.00373)	(0.00371)	(0.00391)
Competitiveness: (- |Net # of Supporters|)	0.0181***	0.0153**	0.0122*	0.0110
	(0.00521)	(0.00495)	(0.00492)	(0.00572)
# of Cosponsors	-0.000845	0.000166	-0.000877	-0.00203*
	(0.000738)	(0.000729)	(0.000748)	(0.000879)
Minority Party Committee Member	1.177***	1.172***	1.188***	1.113***
	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.203)	(0.234)
Majority Party Non-Committee Member	1.236***	1.199***	1.267***	0.844***
	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.178)	(0.209)
Majority Party Committee Member	2.516***	2.327***	2.461***	2.282***
	(0.164)	(0.165)	(0.171)	(0.196)
Sponsor is Committee Chair	0.112	0.154	0.185	-0.392
	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.225)
Unified Government	1.327***	1.037**	1.371***	5.214***
	(0.333)	(0.325)	(0.327)	(0.453)
Constant(bill-level)	-3.061***	-3.085***	-3.269***	-6.784***
	(0.225)	(0.226)	(0.228)	(0.403)
Random Effect: Major Topic Code				
	0.431**	0.429**	0.404**	0.468**
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.145)	(0.173)
Congress Fixed Effects?	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	4757	4757	4757	4757

Table 4: Lobbying and Committee Consideration of Legislation, Full Table

Standard errors in parentheses. Each column (other than the first, which contains variable names) presents the results of a mixed effects logit model with major-topic code random effects. The columns differ by their dependent variable and its source. The dependent variables for Columns 1-3 were scraped from the legislative tracking site `govtrack.us`; the dependent variable for Column 4 is taken from the Congressional Bills Project (CBP). Column 1 is a model of the bill being granted a markup or being reported. Column 2 is a model of the bill receiving a markup. Column 3 and Column 4 are models of the bill being reported from a committee in its chamber of origin. The models presented here indicate that: the net number of unique interests supporting a bill (i.e. their "interest diversity" relative to the bill's opponents) is consistently and positively associated with committee consideration of a bill; the relative advantage of PAC contributions (here in $2.675mil increments, since that is the maximum contribution -$5000- that can be given by a PAC to a member of Congress per cycle, multiplied by the number of members of Congress - 535) among interests supporting a bill is not strongly associated with committee consideration; and that the relative size of the side supporting a bill is negatively associated with committee consideration of that bill. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5 presents full results from the models presented in Table 1.

SUBSAMPLE	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
-Party Status	Maj	Min	Both	Both	Min	Min	Maj	Maj
-Govt Unified?	Both	Both	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
Net Interest Diversity	0.0395***	-0.00186	-0.0232	0.0352***	-0.000388	-0.257*	0.0435***	-0.0208
	(0.00953)	(0.0270)	(0.0306)	(0.00954)	(0.0287)	(0.120)	(0.0106)	(0.0313)
Net PAC contribs.	0.00566	0.00986	0.00263	0.00630	0.00698	0.285**	0.00521	-0.00304
	(0.00410)	(0.0130)	(0.0175)	(0.00405)	(0.0149)	(0.103)	(0.00429)	(0.0182)
Net Side Size	-0.0188***	0.000463	0.0172	-0.0166***	0.000314	0.0821	-0.0200***	0.0171
	(0.00452)	(0.0119)	(0.0203)	(0.00427)	(0.0122)	(0.0617)	(0.00479)	(0.0208)
# Groups Lobbying	0.0249***	0.000351	-0.00649	0.0269***	-0.0000288	-0.0247	0.0319***	-0.00712
	(0.00449)	(0.0127)	(0.0116)	(0.00461)	(0.0131)	(0.0531)	(0.00540)	(0.0118)
Competitiveness	0.0208***	-0.00102	0.00572	0.0229***	-0.00165	-0.0322	0.0276***	0.00421
	(0.00581)	(0.0165)	(0.0181)	(0.00589)	(0.0170)	(0.0733)	(0.00677)	(0.0188)
# of Cosponsors	-0.000859	0.00113	-0.00124	-0.000820	0.00201	-0.0108	-0.000971	-0.000797
	(0.000789)	(0.00208)	(0.00170)	(0.000824)	(0.00226)	(0.00733)	(0.000882)	(0.00181)
On Committee						2.220***		
						(0.631)		
Min. On Comm.		1.220***	1.970***	1.056***	1.083***			
		(0.209)	(0.590)	(0.211)	(0.228)			
Maj. Not on Comm.			1.213*	1.253***				
			(0.551)	(0.183)				
Maj. on Comm.	1.296***		2.585***	2.551***			1.316***	1.379***
	(0.0895)		(0.526)	(0.175)			(0.0999)	(0.214)
Chair-Sponsored	0.0828	-0.205	-0.519	0.198	0.173		0.156	-0.407
	(0.168)	(0.693)	(0.527)	(0.172)	(0.716)		(0.180)	(0.539)
Unified Govt	1.301***	1.011**						
	(0.344)	(0.331)						
Constant (Bill)	-1.756***	-3.694***	-1.640**	-2.484***	-2.150***	-2.840***	-1.330***	-0.322
	(0.178)	(0.379)	(0.621)	(0.236)	(0.355)	(0.443)	(0.186)	(0.368)
Random Effects:								
Major Topic Code	0.393**	1.160*	0.0966	0.480**	1.248*		0.447**	0.0494
	(0.143)	(0.583)	(0.0933)	(0.170)	(0.622)		(0.161)	(0.0784)
N	3460	1295	789	3968	1157	140	2811	649
AIC	3933.2	768.3	902.5	3819.3	659.7	113.7	3143.4	793.3
BIC	4019.3	835.4	963.3	3907.3	720.4	137.2	3214.7	842.5

Table 5: Lobbying and Committee Consideration of Legislation, Institutional Variation

Standard errors in parentheses. All models are mixed effects logit models, except Model 6 which is a logit model with standard errors clustered on major topic code. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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